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Defined by stridently redistributionist economic policies that challenge mainstream economic 
norms in many Western democracies, radically left-wing political actors have risen to prominence 
in many such countries. Despite their newfound prominence, the radical left remains 
understudied relative to their radical right counterparts. In my voter-level analysis, I test two 
common explanations of radical left support. First, the ‘policy-proximity’ account, which suggests 
radical left support is the result of proximity between voters and these actors on policy dimensions. 
I examine this with three plausibly relevant policy dimensions: economics, cultural policy, and 
migration policy. Second, the ‘populism-based’ account, which suggests the radical left draws 
support from populist voters attracted by their challenge to established political parties.  
I test both these accounts in three case studies: Germany, the US, and the UK. I draw upon survey 
data which includes voters’ support for the radical left, their policy preferences on the policy 
dimensions, and their populist attitudes. Additionally, I use research designs which enable me to 
more confidently rule out ‘persuasion effects’ arising from pre-existing electoral support of voters. 
Furthermore, simultaneous examination of both the policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts controls for possible confounding between them.  
I find little evidence supporting the populism-based account in all three case studies. Policy-
proximity results are more nuanced. German case findings generally conform with the policy-
proximity account; however, I am least able to deal with persuasion effects here. I deal with 
persuasion effects more in the US case; however, US case findings commonly challenge the policy-
proximity account.  Finally, in the UK case I use panel data to rigorously deal with persuasion 
effects when examining changes in Labour Party support as this party shifts to the radical left 
under Jeremy Corbyn. I find that policy-proximity explains relative magnitude of shifts in Labour 
support but cannot explain pronounced positive shifts in this support across ideological groups. 
Overall, across the three cases, I find some support for the policy-proximity account; however, 
there are aspects of radical left support which policy-proximity does not explain. Consequently, 
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Although opinion is divided on whether left-wing challenges to established politics are a 
positive development (Forrester, 2019), or a threat to liberal democracy (Holmes, 2017; Kagan, 
2019), there can be little doubt that in recent years these challenges have occurred. In 
Germany, Die Linke continues to be a prominent electoral force despite ties to the discredited 
government of East Germany (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Campbell, 2018). In the United 
States, the 2016 presidential candidacy of Senator Bernie Sanders triggered an ongoing debate 
about the future of the Democratic Party (Edsall, 2019). In the United Kingdom, the 
established Labour Party veered away from convergence, and outwardly challenged 
economic norms while under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn (Maigaushca & Dean, 2019; 
Watts & Bale, 2018). Further examples also exist, including the rise of SYRIZA in Greece at the 
expense of the more moderate PASOK (Mudde, 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), the 
rise of Podemos in Spain to come third in national elections (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016; 
Kioupkiolis, 2016), and the fall of the more moderate Parti Socialiste in France with support 
moving to the more radical La France Insoumise (Hanley, 2017).  
What unites these challenges from the left is strident economic policies including opposition 
towards fiscal austerity, deregulation, and lower taxes. Those policies are ones accepted, to 
varying extents, by both centre right and centre left political actors. In contrast, these left-wing 
challengers promote higher taxes – particularly on wealthy individuals and on businesses – 
public ownership, stronger economic regulation, and higher government spending (March, 
2008; 2012; Roca, et al., 2017). In contrast to the established centre-left’s acceptance of economic 
norms including low taxes and austerity, this ‘radical left’ challenges economic policy 
convergence. My thesis focuses on this radical left, and asks what explains support for radical left 
political actors in contemporary Western democracies?  
This research question is important, because a large number of countries have seen their long-
established parties challenged by the radical left. It is therefore important to investigate why 
these radical left challengers have received such high – sometimes surprisingly high – levels 
of electoral support. Perhaps this radical left support is explained by voters being more radical 
than previously assumed, or maybe this support arises from a backlash against established 
14 
 
politics. Thus, not only does investigating radical left support tell us about these increasingly 
prominent political actors, it potentially also offers wider insights into the state of electoral 
politics in Western democracies. In response to the greater prominence of these radical left 
actors, I investigate where their support has come from.  
However, despite the radical left’s recent breakthroughs and new prominence, there has not 
been a great deal of research into the support they have received. In comparison with the 
radical right, where there is a large field of research stretching back well into the twentieth 
century, research on the radical left is relatively new, and most existing research here has 
focused on their ideology and policies. This existing research is important, especially as it has 
identified the radical left’s economic policy challenge to their converged counterparts, and 
defined these political actors based on this (March, 2008; 2012, Roca, et al., 2017). Most of this 
existing radical left literature is ‘party-level’ research, where radical left parties themselves are 
the unit of analysis. Further examples of this include research which has categorised these 
political actors (Gomez, et al., 2016), shown how they have evolved historically (March & 
Mudde, 2005), identified other ideological features of the radical left (Charalambous, 2011; 
McGowan & Keith, 2016), and separated them from their more extreme counterparts (March, 
2008). Although important and useful, these party-level contributions do not explore reasons 
why the radical left receives voters’ support. To examine the motivations behind radical left 
support, my thesis differs from these party-level accounts by taking a ‘voter-level’ direction.  
Voter-level research on the radical left is so far relatively uncommon, but there have been 
recent efforts by political scientists to study which voters support radical left political actors 
and why. For example, through consideration of populism (Akkerman, et al., 2014), of the 
impacts of both policy preferences and populism (Akkerman, et al., 2017), and the roles of 
nativist and redistributionist policy preferences (Rooduijn, et al., 2017), on support for both 
the radical right and the radical left. My thesis builds on and complements this recent research, 
examining a new range of empirical cases and using diverse research designs to investigate 
mechanisms which potentially underpin radical left support.  
Early commentary on the emerging radical left suggested they were too ideologically extreme 
to be electorally competitive (Cowley, 2017; Jones, 2016; Jones, 2017; Freedland, 2017; Cohen, 
2017); however, contrary to these initial assessments they have received substantial electoral 
15 
 
support. This unexpected success raises an interesting question: are voters more left-wing, or 
become more left-wing, than originally thought? If this is the case, voters may be more 
receptive, or have become more receptive, to the radical left’s policies. This would then 
suggest voters support the radical left based on their own policy preferences. This leads me 
to one of the theories which I test in this thesis – the policy-proximity account.  
This account is built on the highly established spatial theory of voting, which suggests that 
levels of proximity between voters and political actors in policy spaces explains electoral 
support (Downs, 1957). Under this account, voter policy-proximity with the radical left 
determines their support for these political actors. However, existing literature drawing upon 
that theory has not generally considered how voter policy preferences are potentially the 
result of ‘persuasion’. For example, in relation to the radical left, voters’ pre-existing support 
for a radical left actor may cause them to alter their policy preferences. In this scenario, radical 
left support from these voters would be the cause of, rather than the consequence of policy-
proximity, and thus not conform with the spatial theory of voting (Brody & Page, 1972). An 
important contribution I make in this thesis is consideration for and isolation of these 
‘persuasion effects’ when testing how far policy-proximity explains support for the radical 
left.  
I analyse the impacts of policy-proximity on three policy dimensions. Economic policy defines 
the radical left and separates them from their competitors. Consequently, it is plausible that 
spatial proximity with voters on an economic policy dimension may explain support for the 
radical left. Under the policy-proximity theory, this would mean observing support for the 
radical left from voters in close proximity with these political actors on an economic policy 
dimension. This would also mean voters who are not in proximity with the radical left here 
would be less supportive of them. Aside from economics alone, it may also be on other policy 
dimensions that levels of proximity with voters explains radical left support. Voters may be 
more concerned with non-economic policy instead, which leads me to consider the potential 
impacts of proximity on cultural and migration policy, and whether this explains support for 
the radical left. Previous research connecting migration policy with radical left actors 
(McGowan & Keith, 2016), and the post-materialism thesis of Inglehart (1971) drawing out 
‘cultural policy’ relating to individual rights, motivate my consideration of these two non-
16 
 
economic dimensions. Additionally, research into radical right support has found these two 
non-economic dimensions to be important to voters, and to explain support for radical right 
actors (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). A further contribution my thesis 
makes is through testing whether levels of proximity with voters on these two non-economic 
policy dimensions also explains radical left support. In brief, what I mean by ‘migration 
policy’ is voter preferences regarding the place of migrants within a country. By ‘cultural 
policy’, I am referring to preferences around broad social and personal rights – such as drugs 
policies, law and order beliefs, and attitudes towards LGBT rights and abortion.  
The second theoretical explanation I examine in this thesis is whether voter populism explains 
support for radical left actors. Populism itself is defined by its appeal to the ‘ordinary/’pure 
people’ versus a ‘corrupt elite’ group (Mudde, 2007). For example, the Dutch radical left’s call 
to voters with ‘Vote Against!’ as their election slogan, while attacking political elites as ‘neo-
liberal Ayatollahs’ (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35). Similar populism has been observed from 
numerous other instances of the radical left (March & Mudde, 2005, pp. 35-36), leaving this a 
common (although not necessarily ubiquitous) feature of these political actors.  
Populism has featured as a theory of electoral support in numerous accounts of the radical 
right in the past, and has been found in previous research to explain support for both the 
radical right and the radical left in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014; 2017). There is the 
possibility that voters who adhere to this ‘people’ versus ‘elite’ dichotomy – and who therefore 
hold more populist attitudes – would be supportive of the radical left as a result of the anti-
elite rhetoric of those political actors. This possibility leads me to also test the populism-based 
account, and how far this explains radical left support.  
This briefly explains the two potential explanations of radical left support that I examine in 
this thesis. My simultaneous consideration of both these theories is itself important as a 
contribution to existing literature which has generally not tested the two alongside each other. 
Both of these accounts potentially confound one another, meaning my consideration of both 
accounts allows me to examine the distinct roles of each on radical left support.  
I test these theoretical accounts via three quantitative case studies, looking at support for Die 
Linke in Germany, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign in the US, and the UK Labour Party 
under Jeremy Corbyn. In contrast to existing research in this field (Mudde, 2017; Doerschler 
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& Banaszak, 2007; Akkerman, et al., 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), I do not focus 
purely on radical left political parties. The German case involves examining support for a 
‘classic’ radical left party, but the US and UK case studies focus on actors rather than long-
established radical left political parties. The US case study focuses on a radical left candidate 
in an intra-party primary election. The UK case study looks at an established political party 
which shifted to the radical left specifically upon the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party 
leader.  
These three case studies represent an original and valuable contribution to existing research. 
Fundamentally, these cases greatly expand the scope and consequently the relevance of my 
thesis by testing the theories across three case studies. The breadth and depth provided by my 
thesis thus contrasts with previous voter-level radical left research that has often focused on 
a more limited range of cases (for example, Akkerman et al. 2014; 2017). Furthermore, this is 
a new combination of case studies, meaning my thesis brings voter-level analysis of radical 
left support to new contexts.  
There are also specific features within these cases which allow me to better deal with 
alternative explanations of radical left support, including the persuasion effects issue I 
highlighted earlier. In particular, it is important that the US and UK case studies are not long-
established radical left parties, which are more likely to occur in a multiparty context (for 
example, Die Linke in Germany). The US and UK radical left not being long-established actors, 
like Die Linke, allows me to better isolate policy-proximity and populism effects in both of 
those cases. This is because, without that established radical left party, it is less likely that 
US/UK voters have prior support for or attachments to the radical left in these cases. This then 
mitigates persuasion of voters’ policy preferences and populist attitudes based on pre-existing 
radical left support/attachments. Fundamentally, the diversity between these three case 
studies, including examining support for a longstanding radical left actor in the multiparty 
German context versus looking at support for the emerging radical left in the US and UK 
cases, is a strength of my analysis. It is a strength because in my research I take analysis of 
radical left support to new and under-studied contexts, thus broadening previous 
examination of support for these actors.  
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In each of my three case studies, I examine the extent to which individual voters’ support for 
a radical left actor can be explained by variation in respondent-actor ideological proximity on 
economic left-right, cultural liberal-conservative, and migration inclusive-exclusive 
dimensions, and by variation in respondent populist attitudes. I do this in all three cases 
thanks to survey data which includes measures of radical left support, of policy preferences 
on three dimensions, and of populist attitudes.  
Across all three case studies, I do not consistently find highly populist voters to be more 
supportive of the radical left. Thus, results in my thesis do not support the populism-based 
account. Turning attention to policy-proximity results, in the Germany case study results 
generally conform with the policy-proximity account. In particular, on the economic policy 
dimension, where I find both increased radical left support from proximal voters and 
decreased support from spatially-distant voters. However, the nature of Die Linke as a long-
established and prominent political party meant I could not thoroughly separate its possible 
persuasion effects from voters’ policy preferences and populism. This brought me to the US 
case study, where the intra-party nature of the radical left actor controlled for one likely 
persuasion effect: partisan attachments. Although I find greater radical left support based on 
economic policy-proximity, US case results generally did not conform with the policy-
proximity account. I find a curvilinear pattern of radical left support, with spatially-distant 
voters on all three policy dimensions more supportive of the radical left – contrary to 
expectations. Finally, in the UK case I exploited panel data to rigorously deal with persuasion 
effects. Relative to the policy-proximity account’s expectations, I find mixed results. 
Challenging this account, I find a general increase in radical left support including from 
spatially-distant voters. However, looking at magnitudes of these increases in radical left 
support, I find these to be higher from the more proximal voters, which suggests there is some 
policy-proximity effect on radical left support here. That leads me to conclude limited 
observation of this account in the UK case study.  
In sum, I take two established theories of support, which previously featured in radical right 
research, operationalise these in the context of three cases, and test their ability to explain 
electoral support for the radical left in each case. Results in these three cases do not entirely 
conform with either account. However, I find limited evidence of policy-proximity explaining 
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radical left support. Furthermore, I find this after greater consideration for persuasion effects, 
and in a new combination of case studies. Lack of evidence in favour of the populism-based 
account suggests the rise of the radical left’s support is not the product of a populist backlash 
against established political parties. Meanwhile, radical left support does seem to reflect 
policy appeals of these political actors, with this seen not based on just economic policy alone 
but also on cultural and migration policy. However, policy-proximity on the three dimensions 
does not comprehensively explain support for the radical left – as demonstrated with some 
unexpected observations of radical left support from spatially-distant voters. I have found 
policy-proximity only partially explains radical left support. Further research is needed to 
continue to explain this phenomenon, and that research needs to look beyond traditional 
spatial accounts. I discuss a few potential alternative explanations for future exploration in 
the conclusion of this thesis.  
Thesis Structure 
To address the question of explaining support for the radical left, my thesis proceeds as 
follows.  
Chapter 1 includes discussion of existing literature. I argue in this chapter that support for 
radical political actors has been associated with proximity on economic, cultural, and 
migration policy and based on populist attitudes in previous research. The radical right and 
radical left do not share all characteristics. For example, differing in their policy emphasis: the 
radical right focusing on opposition towards immigration, and the radical left on economics. 
Furthermore, they differ in terms of their cultural policies: the radical left being more liberal, 
and the radical right more authoritarian and conservative. But the radical right and radical 
left are similar in the way they challenge their more moderate counterparts: centre right and 
centre left political actors, respectively. Their similar position as political challengers suggests 
that insights from radical right studies, including the roles of policy-proximity and populism, 
may also explain support for the radical left. I also review existing research on radical left 
actors, showing how this has primarily focused on the policy positions taken by these actors. 
I also discuss the limited previous voter-level research into radical left support here. I draw 
attention to gaps in this existing literature, including the lack of consideration for both policy-
proximity and populism.  
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In Chapter 2, I present the two main theoretical accounts I examine in this thesis. I discuss the 
theory behind the policy-proximity account first, including the idea of a voters’ ‘ideal point’ 
in a policy space, and levels of utility voters associate with different policy positions taken by 
political actors. From this, I draw out the three policy dimensions considered under the policy-
proximity account in my thesis, and state the broad expectation that voters in proximity with 
the radical left on these dimensions will be more supportive of these political actors. I then set 
out the populism-based theory, linking back to the definition of populism in the literature 
review, and highlighting the anti-elite policies of the radical left. I then examine whether 
support for the radical left is greater among individuals who exhibit higher levels of populist 
sentiment.  
In Chapter 3 I explain the research methods practised in the final three chapters of the thesis. 
The overall purpose of the first half of Chapter 3 is to explain and justify the overall 
methodological approach in my thesis. I explain the regression models which feature in this 
thesis, with indication of how I include spatial and populism variables in these regressions. 
In the second half of this chapter, I focus on the case studies, including their respective roles. 
I discuss the ‘classic’ German case study in the context of its established nature, which makes 
it difficult to disentangle the potential persuasion effects of Die Linke on voters’ policy 
preferences and populism. The US and UK cases arise in response to this, making important 
strides to deal with potential persuasion effects. In the final part of Chapter 3, I justify why 
other radical left case studies do not feature in my thesis, drawing particular attention to 
inadequate data in these cases.  
I then proceed to the empirical case studies. This includes the German case study in Chapter 
4, the US case study in Chapter 5, and finally the UK case study in Chapter 6. Focus in these 
cases is on Die Linke, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign, and the Labour Party under 
Jeremy Corbyn, respectively. These three chapters all follow broadly the same format, with 
focus first on contextualising the radical left political actor, before a shift to case-specific 
methodology, theoretical expectations, then results.  
Following the empirical chapters, I conclude this thesis. In that conclusion, I summarise my 
findings and discuss their implications. Those implications reflect on each of the three case 
studies, and on both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. Results lead me to 
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conclude partial explanation of radical left support based on voter-actor policy-proximity on 
the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. Finally, I offer some potential 
avenues for future research, which may build off my thesis to find further factors which 
explain support for the radical left in contemporary Western democracies.  
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
1.0: Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss literature relating to the spatial theory of voting, and populism as an 
explanatory factor of electoral support. Part of this discussion includes literature on support 
for and the appeal of radical right political actors, and crucially how this radical right research 
could inform study of radical left support. The first three sections of this chapter are focused 
on the underlying spatial and populism-based theories: the first looking at previous research 
linking economic policy-proximity with electoral support, the second focusing on literature 
showing roles of cultural and migration policy-proximity, and the third directed at existing 
literature on populism and its role in electoral support. In the fourth and final part of this 
chapter I discuss some further contributions to existing radical left research, including my 
simultaneous consideration of both policy-proximity and populism, and examining radical 
left support via evaluation questions.  
1.1: Economics and Radical Left Support 
To draw out economic policy-proximity as a potential explanatory factor of radical left 
support, I focus first on existing literature which has indicated economic policy as the defining 
characteristic of the radical left. In this first sub-section, I show what the economic policies 
emanating from the radical left are, which also leads into delineation of the radical left from 
their ‘Centre Left’ and ‘Extreme Left’ rivals. I then turn attention to the second part of this 
section, where previous research has demonstrated economic policy preferences to be 





1.1.1: Economics – Defining the Radical Left 
It is vital to understand what is meant by the radical left in my thesis. For this purpose, I adopt 
a minimal definition, capturing the key general point of differentiation between radical left 
actors and other political actors. This definition defines the radical left as challengers towards 
contemporary capitalist economic norms within their respective context. Note the consideration of 
the contexts of radical left political actors. Thus, two radical left actors in two different 
countries may offer different policies, but both offer policies that challenge contemporary 
capitalist economic norms in their respective countries. I draw this minimal definition from 
existing literature – in particular ‘party-level’ research. The term ‘party-level’ refers to the 
focus on the policies proposed by political actors, but also their leadership and levels of 
organisation. Opposing the party-level is the ‘voter-level’, which instead focuses on the factors 
which cause individual voters to support the actor.  
The language of ‘contemporary capitalist economic norms’ alludes to economic policies which 
are often branded as ‘neo-liberal’ (March, 2008; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). In party-
level research, Luke March identifies the radical left’s opposition towards ‘neo-liberal 
marketization and trade liberalisation promoted by the Euro-Atlantic financial institutions’ – 
the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ being its other moniker (March, 2012, p. 6). Economics-
based accounts define neo-liberalism as espousing the deregulation of business and finance 
in favour of the ‘free market’, privatisation of public services, reductions in state social 
spending, opposition towards trade unions, and reduced taxes on the rich and corporations, 
among other policies (Kotz, 2009, p. 307).1  
The radical left are opposed to these contemporary capitalist economic norms, and are instead 
found to promote ‘collective economic and social rights’ in response to economic inequality 
(March, 2012, p. 9). Furthermore, the radical left’s opposition towards austerity and support 
for redistributive tax-and-spend policies are other economic policies from radical left political 
actors, according to March (March, 2012, p. 8; March & Mudde, 2005), and further demonstrate 
their opposition towards contemporary economic norms. Specific examples of the radical 
left’s economic policies include anti-corporate attitudes from the Dutch radical left (March, 
 
1 Some features of radical left’s economic policies also shared by radical right. In particular, 
protectionism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 125-128). 
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2012, p. 130), and the promotion of redistributive taxation, a higher mandatory minimum 
wage, and a shorter working week from the German radical left (March, 2012, p. 124).  
It is also important to consider the context of these radical left economic policies. An example 
to illustrate this is the US radical left. Part of the appeal of Bernie Sanders in his 2016 
presidential campaign was his proposal for single-payer healthcare (Gordon, 2016). This 
policy is mainstream in Europe, accepted by the right and the left, but in the US it represents 
a radical proposal which even the Democratic Party has been reluctant to accept (Brownstein, 
2019).  
In Europe too, context plays a role when identifying the radical left. The context of Eastern 
Europe is one of Soviet Communism, which still has a legacy that permeates into the modern 
radical left in this region. For example, the radical left in Eastern Europe has been slow to 
embrace pro-European and environmentalist policies. Furthermore, East European radical left 
political actors remain more conservative in terms of cultural policy, and Leninist in terms of 
their internal culture and organisation (March, 2012, pp. 92-93).  
Context is important to identifying the radical left political actor in the US. It is also important 
when explaining variance in the radical left across Europe. The minimal definition of the 
radical left is therefore explicit that what exactly constitutes a radical left stance depends on a 
country’s political context. Something which is relevant to this point about context is the time 
period under investigation in my research. I examine radical left support in the 2015-2017 
period. During this period there were many prominent radical left actors offering stridently 
anti-austerity and pro-redistribution economic policies. I discuss this time period more in the 
research design chapter of my thesis.  
To further illustrate what is meant by the radical left, I contrast these political actors with their 
centre left counterparts. The radical right’s policies have been indicated to be radicalisations 
of mainstream right-wing beliefs, such as authoritarianism and nativism (Mudde, 2010). 
Similarly, the radical left have been said to radicalise mainstream left-wing beliefs like 
egalitarianism and internationalism, with more strident policies in these areas from radical 
left political actors compared to those offered by their centre left counterparts (March, 2012, 
p. 9).  
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By looking at their relationships with egalitarianism, I also separate the radical left from their 
centre left counterparts. This is a principle shared across left-wing politics, but egalitarianism 
is promoted to varying extents between the manifestos of centre left and radical left political 
actors. To demonstrate this variance, I look to the manifestos of the German radical left Die 
Linke versus that of their centre left opponents – the SPD. Die Linke’s manifesto is committed 
towards ‘equality of all persons’ – a statement combined with tax increases intended at 
‘reducing the extreme inequality and concentration of private wealth’ (Die Linke, 2011, p. 34; 
p. 41). This commitment is further galvanised by section 5 of the party’s 2017 election 
manifesto, declaring ‘Inequality is Unsocial’ before offering vociferously redistributionist 
policies: including financial transaction tax, higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, and 
higher taxes on large inheritances (Die Linke, 2017, pp. 37-39). In contrast, the SPD’s manifesto 
makes commitments not to economic equality of outcomes, but rather offers ‘equal 
opportunities for women and men’ (SPD, 2009, p. 5), combined with fewer material 
commitments around taxation and equivocation on opposition towards austerity (SPD, 2009, 
p. 26). Furthermore, the SPD’s 2017 manifesto’s overtures towards equality primarily focus 
on social inequality, including gender and racial equality, rather than economic inequality 
and the wealth redistribution offered by Die Linke (SPD, 2017).  
The radical left is also separated from the centre left by their different attitudes towards the 
contemporary capitalist economic norms of their particular contexts. Remember I discussed 
these norms earlier, with these including policies like lower taxation, reduced government 
spending, privatisations, and promotion of the free market. In brief, the centre left accepts 
these contemporary capitalist economic norms, but the radical left reject them and instead 
propose ‘root and branch systemic change of capitalism’ (March, 2008, p. 3).  
More specifically, on the issue of these contemporary capitalist economic norms the position 
of the centre left is one of convergence in the 2015-2017 period of my investigation. Centre left 
political actors converged with right-wing political actors, becoming more ideologically alike, 
and aligning themselves with these same economic norms. For example, in Germany the SPD 
shifted to the right in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the UK the Labour Party also became more 
right-wing over roughly the same period. They both converged to accept these ‘neo-liberal’ 
economic policies (Turner & Green, 2007). The radical left, on the other hand, rejected 
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convergence, and tried to fill the vacuum left by the increasingly moderate centre left (Abedi, 
2002). Therefore, I distinguish the radical left from the centre left by their different attitudes 
towards these contemporary capitalist economic norms.  
Overall, the radical left differs from the centre left by the former’s rejection of ‘neo-liberal’ 
economic policies, with the latter embracing them. The radical left’s economic policies lean 
pro-state, advocating a limited role of private enterprise (March, 2012, p. 16). They are 
vehemently anti-austerity, instead supporting increased taxation on the wealthy and 
businesses, and favouring increases in public spending and workers’ rights (March, 2012, p. 
124). All of this presents a challenge to this ‘neo-liberal’ economics of lower taxes, 
deregulation, and reduced government spending.  
I have shown what distinguishes the radical left from the centre left, but what distinguishes 
the radical left from the extreme left? The terms ‘extreme right’ and ‘radical right’ have 
sometimes been synonymous with each other, wrongly according to Mudde (2010, p. 1168). 
In my thesis, like the research of Luke March, the radical left is also considered separate from 
the extreme left (March, 2008). I separate the extreme left from the radical left in two ways: by 
their attitudes towards capitalism, and their attitudes towards democracy.  
The role of democracy separating the extreme left from the radical left is an area where I draw 
upon literature on the right. Attitudes towards democracy also separate the radical right from 
the extreme right, according to Mudde (2010). Extremism is considered the antithesis of 
democracy (Backes, 1989); however, the definition of democracy in this context is a matter of 
some debate. A minimal definition of representative democracy as ‘an institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making 
the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order 
to carry out its will’ (Schumpeter, 1949, p. 250) would suggest that extremism is a rejection of 
popular sovereignty.  
When separating the extreme right from the radical right, Mudde takes a more specific 
definition of democracy. There is the more basic, procedural idea of democracy, where people 
vote for representatives in elections. The radical right are not opposed to this, but the extreme 
right are critical of democracy even at its base, procedural level (Mudde, 2010). Above this is 
liberal democracy, which includes protection of minorities and individual rights. The radical 
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right are opposed to liberal democracy, via their plebiscitarian and authoritarian appeals 
(Mudde, 2007, p. 157).  
The radical and extreme left’s relationship with democracy is similar to that of the radical and 
extreme right. At the procedural level, the extreme left reject the idea of compromise with 
“bourgeois” political actors, including social democracy, and support extra-parliamentary 
action (March, 2008, p. 3). In contrast to the extreme left, the radical left accept democracy at 
the procedural level, but combine this with belief in political reform and inclusion of 
marginalised groups into the political system. Through belief in these reforms, the radical left 
are supportive of liberal democracy, in contrast to the extreme left (March, 2012, p. 18).  
The extreme left’s attitudes towards capitalism are again more hard-line than those of the 
radical left. The radical left are defined by their challenge towards the contemporary capitalist 
economic norms of their particular context, but this does not extend to a belief in abolishing 
capitalism entirely. A systemic change of capitalism is what the radical left advocate, not 
supporting a planned economy but rather a mixed one, with private ownership confined to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (March, 2008, p. 3). In contrast, the extreme left’s position 
is one of outright rejection of capitalism, including their complete opposition towards most 
market enterprise (March, 2008, p. 3).  
In sum, existing literature separates the radical left from the extreme left. The radical left are 
challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms, separating them from the 
centre left which converged and accepted these economic norms.  But the radical left and the 
extreme left differ over attitudes towards democracy and capitalism from the extreme left, 
with the extreme left more hostile towards both.  
To help clarify what is meant by the radical left, I offer three example political actors – one 
centre left, one radical left, and one extreme left. All three compete in a single context – Greece. 
I will cite literature discussing these three Greek left-wing political actors – the centre left 
(PASOK), the extreme left (KKE), and the radical left (SYRIZA) – to show the differences 
between them all. The ultimate purpose here is to illustrate the separation of the radical left 
from the centre left and extreme left.  
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In terms of attitudes towards democracy, the KKE are adherents of ‘democratic centralism’ 
instead (Doukas, 1991). Under this Leninist practice, political decisions are taken by the 
party’s members, rather than by the public. Furthermore, the KKE state their opposition 
towards ‘hypocritical bourgeois parliamentary democracy’, stating instead ‘Direct and 
indirect democracy is based on the workers' assembly’ (KKE Central Committee, 2017). In 
contrast to the KKE, SYRIZA in their 2015 Thessaloniki Programme do not state opposition to 
the current electoral and parliamentary democracy in Greece, merely proposing reforms to 
introduce and empower democratic institutions, for example via greater economic autonomy 
(SYRIZA, 2015). Similarly, PASOK do not state opposition towards electoral or parliamentary 
democracy in Greece, with overtures instead to uphold extant political institutions in Greece 
(PASOK, 2019).  
On the subject of economic policies, there are stark differences between the KKE and PASOK. 
Greek efforts to join the Eurozone led to a shift by established political parties, like PASOK, to 
embrace contemporary capitalist economic norms, including privatisation and spending 
restraint (Moschonas, 2001). The result was this political actor converging with the centre right 
ND, gradually becoming a centre left social democratic party (Tsakalotos, 1998). In particular, 
through acceptance of austerity measures in the early 2010s. The extreme left economic 
policies of the KKE include rejection of globalisation and neo-liberal economics, but most of 
all a wholesale rejection of capitalism. The KKE reject free market economics, saying this is 
undesirable for working class Greeks. Instead, the KKE pushed needs-based wages, provision 
for the unemployed, and the creation of agricultural cooperatives (Keith & Charalambous, 
2016).  
SYRIZA fits between both the converged PASOK and the anti-capitalist KKE in terms of 
economic policies. SYRIZA’s economic policies present opposition towards austerity, akin to 
the KKE and in contrast to PASOK (Mudde, 2017). SYRIZA’s policies also included significant 
spending commitments in the Thessaloniki Programme, proposing meal subsidies, taxes on 
large properties, a housing guarantee, and free electricity, amongst other spending promises 
(SYRIZA, 2015). However, SYRIZA’s policies do not extend to the rejection of capitalism in its 




Literature discussing these three left-wing political actors has separated them from each other. 
The radical left reject ‘neo-liberal’ capitalist economic policies supported by the converged 
centre left, such as deregulation and lower taxes. But their rejection of these policies is not 
pursued to the extent of the extreme left’s support for dismantling this economic system 
entirely. Nor does it profess an uprooting of democratic institutions, instead proposing 
reforms to existing institutions. Furthermore, the radical left offers a radicalisation of 
mainstream left-wing values, like internationalism and egalitarianism, pressing these values 
more forcefully compared to the tacit support offered for them by the centre left (March, 2008; 
2012; March & Mudde, 2005; Boldrini, 2018).  
1.1.2: Economic Policy and Support for the Radical Left 
Party-level research was important to my separation of the extreme and centre left from the 
radical left. This party-level research has also looked at the radical left’s shift away from 
Communism (March, 2012; March & Mudde, 2005), and examined environmentalist ideology 
emanating from ‘left-libertarian’ parties (Kitschelt, 1988). Research has also tried to categorise 
the non-mainstream left, based on their differing ideologies and where they draw support 
from (March, 2008; Gomez et al., 2016). Ideology has also been the focus of other research, 
drawing attention to the radical left’s anti-austerity policies (Roca, et al., 2017), and how 
Euroscepticism is a common feature among these political actors (Charalambous, 2011).  
These party-level accounts define the radical left based on their economic ideology. But is it 
that economic ideology that drives voters to support radical left political actors? To look 
further into this question, I now turn to discuss voter-level research that connects voters’ 
economic policy preferences with radical left support.  
One example of radical left literature which considered economic policy preferences comes 
from Visser et al. (2014), who conducted voter-level research considering both demand-side 
factors (e.g. occupation, education, policy preferences) alongside country-level factors (e.g. 
unemployment rate, GDP, authoritarian legacy). Across results from 32 European countries, 
and 175,000 respondents, this research concluded support for income redistribution as the 
main determinant of support for radical left ideologies.  
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Note that Visser et al.’s research did not consider support for radical left political actors, but 
instead looked at voters’ self-identified adherence with radical left ideology. What Visser et. 
al. effectively found was an association between voters supporting income redistribution and 
voters identifying themselves as radically left-wing. That identification with radical left 
ideology may be associated with support for radical left political actors, but Visser et al. did 
not explore this. My focus on voters’ support for radical left political actors means I do 
examine whether this is associated with economic policy preferences. This may be the case, 
particularly under the spatial theory of voting where these left-wing voters are in proximity 
and thus assumed to be supportive of the radical left political actor. However, it may also not 
be the case. Instead, it may be non-economic ideological considerations which determine 
support for the radical left. My thesis investigates this further.  
Economic policy preferences have featured in further research on radical left support. 
Previous voter-level research, utilising survey data, considered factors behind the varying 
success of 39 radical left political parties, across 34 European countries (March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2015). This research found economic attitudes, in particular feelings of 
insecurity arising from unemployment and opposition towards a more globalised economy, 
to be important to explaining support for the radical left. Other factors were also linked with 
radical left support here, including high Euroscepticism, and previous radical left success. 
Competition from Green and radical right parties, and presence of electoral thresholds, were 
found to impede radical left support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 48).  
In addition to this, further research demonstrates links between radical left support and 
economic policy preferences. In a case study of the German radical left Die Linke, again 
utilising survey data, economic attitudes were associated with support for this political party 
(Bowyer & Vail, 2011). Support for Die Linke was associated with concerns over economic 
inequality, and support for government intervention to reduce such disparities. This research 
also shows that economic policy preferences of voters have a greater role in support for the 
radical left than both demographic factors and general ideological left-right positioning (p. 
699). However, Bowyer and Vail do not consider other non-economic ideological 
determinants of support for this radical left political actor, such as cultural and migration 
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policy preferences. Nor do they weigh the possible impact on radical left support of non-
ideological factors.  
Bowyer and Vail built on previous research from Doerschler and Banaszak (2007), who used 
survey data to investigate support for Die Linke’s predecessor – the PDS – finding this was 
associated with ideological beliefs of voters again relating specifically to economics 
(Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007). This research examined four factors and how they related to 
vote choices in a hypothetical election. Those four factors were economic and political 
evaluations, East German identity, identification as the ‘losers of unification’, and ideological 
beliefs. Of these four factors, only the ideological beliefs of voters, with economic policy 
preferences being the focus here, were significantly associated with support for the radical left 
PDS (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007, p. 366).  
The research of Bowyer and Vail, Doerschler and Banaszak, and March and Rommerskirchen 
all examine support for long-established radical left political parties, based on economic 
policy. However, an issue arises from this, which I refer to as ‘persuasion effects’. To expand 
on this, there is uncertainty over whether voters first form their policy preferences and are 
then drawn to support the political actor in closest proximity with these views, or whether 
voters decide to vote for a political actor for whatever reason and then mould their policy 
preferences after the actor they become attached to. This is an issue raised in other research 
looking at support based on policy-proximity, which raised the idea that voters may be 
‘persuaded’ to alter their policy preferences to conform with those of a political actor they 
have already decided to support for whatever reason (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 457).  
In relation to the radical left specifically, voters may have previously decided to support the 
radical left actor, and subsequently altered their policy preferences specifically to match this 
actor. Populist attitudes of voters may also be subject to persuasion effects. Brody and Page 
state that persuasion is the effect of, rather than the cause of, candidate evaluations (Brody & 
Page, 1972, p. 457). Radical left support from persuaded voters is not the product of policy-
proximity or populism. Therefore, to truly understand the causal effects of policy-proximity 
and populism on radical left support, I need to isolate possible persuasion effects of these 




Crucially, that research which identified support for the radical left based on voters’ economic 
policy preferences did not consider potential impacts of persuasion effects. Consequently, the 
associations they identified may not be the result of economic policy-proximity, but of pre-
existing support for a radical left and resulting persuasion effects instead. An important 
contribution my research makes to existing literature is by dealing with persuasion when 
testing how policy-proximity explains radical left support.  
Some existing voter-level research on radicals does consider and control for some persuasion 
effects, in a limited capacity. For example, party ID control variables account for how partisan 
attachments impact on electoral support, with these appearing in some existing research on 
the radical right (Arzheimer, 2008, and on populist political actors (van Hauwert & van Kessel, 
2018). However, if voters’ policy preferences, for example, are measured after they have 
potentially come to identify with a political actor, then their policy preferences would have 
the effects of party identification incorporated into them. This means controls on party ID 
would not remove the potential persuasion effect of this variable on voter policy preferences.  
One of the suggested ways to control persuasion effects is with panel data (Brody & Page, 
1972, p. 458). Much of the existing voter-level research into support for radicals bases its 
analysis off cross-sectional instead of panel data. However, panel data involves asking 
questions to a sample of voters over time, with their responses observable across multiple 
waves of data. This means with panel data there is the potential to draw measurement of voter 
policy preferences and populism from before a political actor’s radical leftism becomes 
evident. Consequently, voters’ policy preferences and populist attitudes would be separated 
from potential persuasion effects arising from a radical left political actor.   
More thorough consideration of persuasion effects, compared to existing literature, is one of 
the contributions of my thesis. I explain the ways I address this issue further in Chapter 3 of 
my thesis.  
I have supplied evidence which suggests that voters’ economic policy preferences may 
determine radical left support. However, there are a number of gaps in existing research in 
this area. The persuasion effects issue is one, but another is the common lack of additional 




An exception to this is the research of Rooduijn et al. (2017), which considered economic and 
non-economic policy preferences alongside each other when explaining support for the 
radical left. This voter-level research focused on the differences between radical right and 
radical left voters. Rooduijn et al. found that radical right supporters and radical left 
supporters differed in their economic and non-economic attitudes. Specifically, supporters of 
the radical right and radical left were distinguished by different attitudes towards 
egalitarianism, altruism, and support for government promotion of equality, with the radical 
left embracing these and the radical right eschewing them (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Note the 
economic nature of these attitudes, particularly over equality and a redistributive role of 
government. But accompanying these attitudes was also consideration for non-economic 
preferences, Euroscepticism, and nativism, finding that attitudes in these areas also 
differentiated support for the radical left from the radical right.  
Rooduijn et al.’s research provides further indication of an association between economic 
policy preferences and support for the radical left. Crucially, Rooduijn et al.’s research varies 
from earlier discussed literature by its added consideration of non-economic factors. 
Continuing in this theme, my thesis also considers how non-economic policy preferences are 
associated with radical left support. This leads me to the next section of this chapter, focused 
on existing literature which has considered how non-economic policy preferences are 
associated with support for radical political actors.  
1.2: Cultural Policy and Migration Policy 
In this section, I discuss research which has identified electoral support based on policy-
proximity on two non-economic policy dimensions. I divide this discussion into three 
subsections, with the overall objective of showing how these non-economic dimensions may 
be important to explaining support for the radical left.  
In the first subsection, I show how voters simply may not be solely concerned with economic 
policy when formulating support for the radical left. Instead, these non-economic policy areas 
are potentially more salient to these voters, and thus have a role in radical left support. The 
research of Ronald Inglehart, stemming from the post-materialism thesis (Inglehart, 1971), 
primarily underpins this idea of a shift in issue salience potentially driving cultural policy 
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salience. From that salience, cultural policy is potentially important to understanding support 
for the radical left.  
Following that, I discuss migration policy as another non-economic dimension with potential 
to explain support for the radical left. Existing literature provides support for migration 
policy, as a potential explanatory factor of radical left support.   
Secondly, previous research has found non-economic policy to be relevant in explaining 
support for the radical right. Given the radical left and radical right’s common challenge 
towards the political mainstream, the relevance of non-economic policy for understanding 
radical right support may also indicate a role explaining support for the radical left.  
1.2.1: (Post-)Materialism and Cultural Policy 
According to Stokes (1963), the most evident criticism of the Downsian model of proximity 
and spatial voting was the reliance on a single policy dimension in his original account. At the 
heart of this criticism was the idea that political competition is not realistically built around a 
single policy dimension, and that in fact there are ‘several dimensions of political conflict’ 
(Stokes, 1963, p. 370). The interests and motivations of voters are diverse, and as such it is 
unreasonable to expect their political preferences to depend on a single issue. Applied to my 
discussion so far, it becomes reasonable to expect some voters to not be primarily concerned 
with economic policy. For these voters, cultural and migration policy may be more salient. 
Subsequently, it is based on these dimensions that these voters would formulate support for 
the radical left.  
That itself raises the question of why it is specifically cultural policy which I include here, as 
one of the alternatives to economics. My rationale behind cultural policy stems from 
Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis. Inglehart originally hypothesised that voters who grew 
up in a time of economic downturn would be primarily concerned with material issues, 
including financial stability and physical security. Whereas voters who grew up in a period 
of economic prosperity would have greater concern for post-material issues, including the 
idea of belonging and self-expression (Inglehart, 1971). Thus, intergenerational shifts between 
material and post-material attitudes explain the rise of new issues, such as the promotion of 
the welfare state (Inglehart, 1977), and also motivate political movements (Inglehart, 2007).  
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The post-materialism thesis draws out potentially salient non-economic issues. Put into more 
specific terms, these ‘cultural’ issues include LGBT rights, views around gender roles, beliefs 
concerning personal rights including free expression and abortion, and attitudes around 
criminal justice. The rise of these post-material issues, being salient to many voters, drives my 
inclusion of them when considering proximity-based support for the radical left. The 
dimension itself spans from ‘culturally-liberal’ voters, who are supportive of individual 
rights, promote rehabilitative justice, and oppose traditional gender norms, to the ‘culturally-
conservative’ where support is for more traditional and hierarchical society with more 
draconian law-and-order policies.  
Ultimately, Inglehart’s post-materialism account motivates my consideration of cultural 
policy when examining support for the radical left. Especially as Inglehart suggests the 
proportion of post-materialists at the millennium was comparable to the proportion of 
materialists in American and Western Europe (Inglehart, 2018). Consequently, these voters 
who are less concerned with economic policy, and more concerned with cultural policy, make 
up a substantial portion of the potential support for the radical left. Finally, the support for 
the post-materialism account from time series data adds greater weight to the idea of non-
economic policy salience, and specifically cultural policy salience, being present and 
widespread amongst voters in Western democracies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  
A final brief point I would make is that I admit the possibility of non-economic policy salience 
being present here amongst voters. That is something I acknowledge, and motivates my 
inclusion of non-economic policy dimensions as part of my consideration of policy-proximity. 
But, to clarify, issue salience itself does not play a role in the empirics of my thesis. This 
concept is important for drawing out non-economic policy dimensions, but when examining 
policy-proximity support for the radical left I instead look at the average effects of proximity 
on each dimension.  
1.2.2: Migration Policy and the Radical Left 
Inglehart’s theory builds towards my inclusion of the cultural policy dimension in my 
research into radical left support. Cultural policy primarily concerns individual rights and 
autonomy, but Inglehart does not extend this explicitly to cover policy relating to migration. 
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Therefore, it is here that I will draw out what previous research says about migration policy 
and the radical left. In particular, how this dimension potentially explains radical left support.  
Party-level examination of the radical left’s positions on migration policy have found that 
these political actors generally push a migrant-inclusive agenda. That said, there is some 
variation between radical left political actors on this issue. In research looking at five radical 
left political actors, spread across Greece, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, all five 
supported more open policies towards asylum seekers, including protections from 
deportations and more humane treatment (McGowan & Keith, 2016). But there was variation 
over the issues of migrant integration, with some linking migrant communities with social 
problems, but others proposing housing and education policies to avoid segregation. There 
was also some variation over immigration policy, with the Dutch radical left SP and Danish 
radical left SF proposing slightly more restrictive policies compared to the other three political 
actors examined (McGowan & Keith, 2016). Finally, the radical left’s migration policy was 
often oriented around its economic proposals. For example, the calls for immigration controls 
were not ethnically based, but rather based on protection of the domestic labour market 
(McGowan & Keith, 2016).  
Furthermore, in research looking specifically at the UK, more migrant-inclusive government 
policies following the European Union’s 2004 enlargement is said to have caused a rise of 
migration policy salience, especially as immigration was perceived as a ‘threat’ (Sobolewska 
& Ford, 2020, p. 41). This sequence also connected the issue immigration with the European 
Union, ultimately driving Eurosceptic attitudes suggested to culminate in the UK’s decision 
to exit the EU (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020, p. 123). This rise in migration policy salience meant 
parties had to adopt positions on this dimension, including the Labour Party (Sobolewska & 
Ford, 2020, pp. 309-311). Crucially, migration policy has become a dimension with an 
important role in political competition. With this dimension becoming salient to voters, it 
becomes plausible for proximity here to explain voters attitudes towards radical left actors.  
At the voter-level, previous research has also identified migration-based support for the 
radical left. When I was discussing the research into holding radical left ideology earlier, from 
Visser et al. (2014), I mentioned this voter-level research included a variable relating to anti-
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immigration attitudes.2 That research, which does not investigate support for radical left 
political actors, but rather adherence with radical left ideology, found that the higher aversion 
was towards immigration the lower were the chances of radical leftism (p. 552). This 
constitutes a voter-level link between the radical left and migration policy preferences. 
However, there is again the downside with this research that it has not tied adherence with 
radical leftism to electoral support for radical left political actors. Furthermore, the research 
of Rooduijn et al. (2017) identified supporters of radical left political actors as being generally 
more pro-immigration, and suggested this to be due to higher levels of education amongst 
radical left voters (Rooduijn, et al., 2017).  
Finally, there has also been voter-level research connecting the migrant-inclusive policies of 
the radical left with greater support for these political actors from migrant communities. The 
Dutch radical left SP was found to receive a significant amount of support from immigrants 
(Wirries, 2012), with this also found in the support for the radical left in both Sweden and 
Denmark (Bird, et al., 2010). Existing literature has also shown the migrant-inclusive policies 
of SYRIZA in Greece to have been reciprocated by higher levels of support for this political 
party from enfranchised migrants (Mason, 2012).  
Coupled with the post-materialism thesis from Inglehart, offering cultural policy as a salient 
non-economic issue, I also have both the party-level and voter-level research in this sub-
section connecting migration policy with support for these political actors. Previous research 
has often overlooked these non-economic issues in policy-based explanations of radical left 
support in the past. Consequently, my consideration of these two non-economic dimensions 
is an important contribution I make through my research. Including these two non-economic 
dimensions is also a relevant feature, as I have shown how both cultural and migration policy 
are feasibly important to understanding support for the radical left.  
That does not necessarily mean it is only these two non-economic dimensions upon which 
policy-proximity potentially explains radical left support. For example, environmental policy 
may also be salient to voters (Achterberg, 2006). That brings me to further justify cultural and 
 
2 Named ‘Perceived Ethnic Threat’. 
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migration policy as potentially important, this time looking to their place explaining support 
for other radicals.  
1.2.3: Evidence from the Radical Right 
The final part of my case for considering these two non-economic dimensions, relating to 
cultural and migration policy, draws upon previous research into the radical right’s support. 
As I noted at the end of the previous sub-section, it is uncommon to find inclusion of non-
economic policy in existing examinations of radical left support. However, these dimensions 
have featured in previous research on the radical right.  
The research of Herbert Kitschelt took both cultural and migration policy into account when 
exploring support for the radical right. Cumulating cultural and migration policy into the 
single ‘authoritarian/libertarian’ dimension, Kitschelt & McGann (1995) suggested increased 
support for the radical right to be a consequence of a shift in the shape of a ‘competitive space’. 
In this space, voters no longer determined their electoral support based on economic policy 
alone, but also began to consider beliefs on the ‘authoritarian/libertarian’ policy dimension 
too.  
In later work with Philipp Rehm, Kitschelt postulated that policy preferences on three 
dimensions, characterised as ‘Greed’, ‘Grid’, and ‘Group’, explained electoral support 
(Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, p. 1671). These three dimensions respectively follow the economic, 
cultural, and migration policy dimensions in my research.  
Kitschelt’s contributions are important, by including all three dimensions that also feature in 
my research. But Kitschelt is also far from the only spatial account to have considered the 
impacts of cultural and migration policy. In one spatial account, support for the radical right 
in nine Western European countries was explained through non-economic (immigration and 
law-and-order) policy preferences of voters (Rovny, 2013). Furthermore, in an adaptation of 
the traditional proximity-based spatial account to also include issue salience, success for the 
radical right (and Green parties) across 17 Western European countries was explained based 
on mainstream party strategies in policy spaces (Meguid, 2005).3  
 
3 Dimensions including law-and-order, national(istic) way of life, traditional morality, and opposition 
towards multiculturalism found ‘indicative of mainstream party accommodation of radical right 
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Further research has also demonstrated policy-proximity on the cultural and migration policy 
dimensions to be relevant to understanding support for radical right political actors. 
Migration policy-proximity finds support as an explanatory factor of electoral support for the 
Belgian radical right Vlaams Blok (Coffé, 2004), the German radical right Die Republikaner 
(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000), and the French radical right Front National (Mayer, 1998). In 
relation to the radical left, the more cosmopolitan attitudes identified from radical left 
supporters in Rooduijn et al.’s research (2017) suggest that support for the radical left can also 
be explained on this policy dimension – with migrant-inclusive voters supporting the radical 
left.  
The case for including the cultural and migration dimensions in my research is primarily 
rooted away from radical right research. Specifically, I motivate the cultural policy dimension 
from Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis, and the migration policy dimension from previous 
research which explored this dimension with the radical left. Aside from these justifications, 
there remains the case that the radical left and radical right bear the commonality of their 
challenge to mainstream political actors. Previous research, including that of Rooduijn et al. 
(2017), contributes towards this case of similarities between the radical right and radical left. 
Arising from that case is the possibility that voters defect from mainstream political actors to 
these radicals due to common sources of dissatisfaction concerning the same policy areas. 
Based on this notion, the cultural and migration policy dimensions found to be relevant to 
explaining radical right support may also have some place in explaining support for the 
radical left.  
1.3: Populism and Radical Left Support 
Populism is the core component of the second account in my examination of support for the 
radical left. This is quite an established area of research, in particular relating populism with 
the radical right. Populism is something which has been noted from both the radical left and 
radical right previously (Akkerman, et al., 2017). Therefore, my discussion here of populism 
in existing literature will cover this both in research on the radical right and the radical left.  
 
parties’. Environmental protection and anti-growth economy similarly related to accommodation of 
Green parties (Meguid, 2005, p. 352).  
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I draw a definition of populism from Cas Mudde’s contributions in this field (2004; 2007; 2010; 
2017). Mudde defines populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’, dividing society into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups – the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 
2007). Prominent research has been undertaken in this area by Mudde, and others. Predating 
the work of Mudde, Margaret Canovan described populism as ‘notoriously vague’, ultimately 
defining this concept as ‘an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of 
power and the dominant ideas and values of the society’ (Canovan, 1999). Mudde’s definition 
follows this theme, by identifying this division as the defining feature of populism. 
Furthermore, Mudde’s definition has been accepted by a range of other scholars (Rooduijn, et 
al., 2012; Aslanidis, 2015; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013; Schulz, et al., 2018).  
The description of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ draws upon research about 
nationalism, itself identified as a thin-centred ideology because it severs itself from wider 
engagement and interpretation of policy and political concepts (Freeden, 1998, p. 750). Thin-
centred ideologies exhibit a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ 
(Freeden, 1998). Mudde relates this description back to populism, where the core concept is 
‘the people’, and by extension also the ‘elites’ as their opponents. Furthermore, populism 
combines with other ideologies, such as nationalism but potentially socialism, ecologism, or 
one of many other ideologies (Mudde, 2004, p. 544).  
Nativism, for example, is an ideology which commonly accompanies the populism of the 
radical right. In this situation, the ‘ordinary people’ represent the native population, and are 
drawn into opposition with migrant groups (Mudde, 2007, p. 22). Populism calls upon these 
‘ordinary people’ to defend the homogeneity of their country from the threat of mass 
migration (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). This represents just one example of a 
populist divide from the literature. More broadly, right-wing populist political actors may 
draw its ‘enemy’ group from multiple facets of society, including LGBT individuals, trade 
unions, mainstream left-wing political parties, Roma people, Jewish people, Muslim people, 
and even those identified as ‘democrats’ or ‘Westerners’ in some former USSR states (Mudde, 
2007).  
Populism from the radical left rests on economic grounds. This economics-based radical left 
populism is the product of substantial evolution by many of these political actors, who moved 
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away from association with the USSR in the atmosphere of the fall of the Iron Curtain, and 
then mutated to embrace ‘social populism’. The radical left profess acceptance of democracy 
and rejection of capitalism (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35), but also make anti-establishment 
appeals, pointing out what they see as a ‘betrayal’ from social democrats and the more 
established left-wing political actors; making populist appeals which have economic themes, 
rather than the nativist or nationalist appeals seen from populists on the right (March, 2007). 
Previous research has found further evidence for this as well, in the context of the Greek 
radical left (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). This further research points out the inclusive 
nature of left-wing populism regarding immigration, as opposed to the exclusionary nature 
of its right-wing counterpart. Emphasis is then shown to be on economics from left-wing 
populist political actors, fundamentally presenting a challenge towards inequality and big 
businesses (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).  
A great deal of literature on the radical right has discussed how these political actors profess 
populist messages. This is something Cas Mudde draws particular attention to, in multiple 
contributions (Mudde, 2004; 2007; 2010), along with other authors in this field (Betz, 1994; 
Rooduijn, et al., 2012; Rydgren, 2005). Mudde’s pan-European research implicitly connects 
support for the radical right with populism, while also considering a wide range of demand-
side and supply-side explanations of radical right success (Mudde, 2007).  
There have been contributions made which look at populism as an explanatory factor of 
support for radicals. For example, research has examined populism-based support for both 
the radical right and the radical left in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014). After first 
identifying levels of populism amongst Dutch voters, Akkerman et al. found that highly 
populist voters were more likely to vote for the radical right PVV and radical left SP than for 
the mainstream political parties. Further voter-level research has also investigated populism 
and support for the radical right and radical left in the Netherlands. From measuring vote 
choice to determine PVV and SP supporters, this research examined how populist, economic, 
cultural, and migration attitudes varied across supporters for the populist radical right and 
radical left. Finding populism to be consistent across supporters for both, with SP’s supporters 
more economically left-wing, PVV’s supporters more intolerant towards immigration, and 
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neither party’s supporters distinguished by cultural policy preferences (Akkerman, et al., 
2017).  
Both Akkerman papers demonstrate measurement of populist attitudes at the voter level, with 
later motivation to also profile supporters of left-wing and right-wing populist political actors. 
Crucially, populism was an explanatory factor of support for both the radical left and radical 
right in the Netherlands. However, there are also downsides to their research. Specifically, in 
the 2017 research there was also consideration of policy preferences alongside populism. 
However, single questions were used to gauge cultural and migration policy preferences, with 
the potential for survey respondents to misunderstand these questions and give an inaccurate 
sense of their beliefs. Multi-item batteries of questions would mitigate this possibility – a point 
made in more detail in the research design of this thesis.  
There are other points to raise in response to Akkerman et al.’s research, such as the 
consideration of only one country – the Netherlands – narrowing the extent to which their 
conclusions can be applied to other radical political actors. Furthermore, recall earlier I cited 
previous research raising possible confounding factors referred to as ‘persuasion effects’, 
where voters are not drawn to support a political actor based, in this case, on their populist 
sentiments, but rather because of pre-existing support for radical left political actors (Brody & 
Page, 1972). Neither piece of research cited from Akkerman et al. includes consideration for 
these persuasion effects, and how they potentially cause voters to shift their policy preferences 
and populist attitudes to match the radical left political actor after pre-existing support.  
Similar research has investigated the links between populist attitudes and electoral support 
in general, with other countries the focus, such as consideration of the impacts of populist 
attitudes on electoral support in Slovakia (Stanley, 2011), and Poland (Stanley, 2018). 
However, in the former, populist attitudes of voters had only a limited impact on voting 
behaviour in Slovakia. In the latter research focusing on voting behaviour in Poland, levels of 
populism impacted on electoral support; however, this played a more secondary role, with 
populist attitudes instead intensifying the roles of ‘cultural attitudes’4 on voting.  
 
4 Relating to social traditionalism and nativist attitudes on immigration.  
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Furthermore, in work across nine European countries, it was found that populist attitudes 
were associated with support for populist parties (van Hauwert & van Kessel, 2018). This 
would be expected, and follows the results of similar research on populist attitudes and 
electoral support (Stanley, 2018). Also found was an association between economic policy 
preferences and support for radical left populists, with culturally-conservative and migrant-
exclusive policy preferences associated with support for radical right populists (van Hauwert 
& van Kessel, 2018).  
Looking at previous research into populism as an explanatory factor specifically of radical left 
support, the anti-establishment and anti-mainstream views emanating from the radical left 
Podemos in Spain was deemed important to explaining their support, in contrast to the relative 
obscurity of their more established but less populist radical left rivals, the IU (Ramiro & 
Gomez, 2016). However, the downside with this research is the lack of accompanying 
consideration of policy preferences, and how these differentiated support for Podemos from 
IU. Different policy preferences of their respective voters may also define support for both 
Podemos and IU. Instead, the only way voters’ ideology is considered in this research is via a 
self-placement 1–10 scale, which does not relate to a specific policy dimension, and has also 
been found to be deficient for predicting electoral support particularly amongst less informed 
voters (Evans, et al., 1996). Further exploration of specific policy preferences and their roles in 
electoral support is therefore a potential avenue for further investigation.  
I have discussed a wealth of existing literature here, including both party-level and voter-level 
accounts. There are two key messages taken from this previous research on populism. Firstly, 
previous research has connected populism with the radical right, with some voter-level 
research here demonstrating levels of populism to be associated with radical right support. 
Potentially arising from this is populism also explaining support for other radical political 
actors, but this time on the left. Secondly, there are ways to build on existing voter-level 
research on populism and support for the radical left; specifically, through also 
simultaneously examining the impacts of policy-proximity on three dimensions, and through 
separating radical left persuasion effects from voters’ populist attitudes and policy 
preferences. Thus, there is both justification for examining populism as a potential 
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explanatory factor of radical left support, and there are areas my thesis can build on and 
contribute to existing literature.  
1.4: Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I will bring together previous research into radical left support, and identify 
three common alternate explanations for support of these political actors. Not only does this 
mean I acknowledge these alternative explanations, it also allows me to justify my focus on 
policy-proximity and populism in my thesis. The three alternative explanations I will explore, 
drawing upon previous research on the radical left, are the socio-structural model, protest-
based support, and the role of issue salience.  
1.4.1: Socio-Structural Voting 
As I showed earlier in this chapter, economics is the key defining factor of the radical left. But 
this does not necessarily only manifest itself as support for these actors based on policy-
proximity. Aside from this, it is also possible that radical left support is a consequence of 
economic hardship found in certain socio-demographic groups. In this case, economically 
deprived voters may be attracted to the radical left based on their redistributive economic 
policies, which can potentially relieve the material hardships of these voters.  
Previous research has explored this possibility, looking at associations between measures of 
economic deprivation and support for the radical left. One common metric of economic 
hardship is class identification; specifically, identification as working class and how predictive 
this is of radical left support. In cross-sectional work across Western Europe, Luis Ramiro 
found that identification as working class was associated with increased likelihood of 
supporting a radical left actor (Ramiro, 2016). Ramiro continued to explore the economic 
insecurity case, through the lens of working-class identification, but found this not to be 
significantly associated with support for the Spanish radical left (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). On 
the one hand, this is potentially down to varying scope of this research – the former being 
cross-sectional, and the latter looking specifically at Spain – but on the other it may be how 




Looking beyond working-class identification, previous research has examined the effects of 
economic insecurity via the national unemployment rate. This feasibly gathers the economic 
deprivation effect, as higher unemployment may indicate negative macroeconomic conditions 
in a country. Examination of the national unemployment level showed this was a significant 
demand-side determinant of higher radical left support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). 
Furthermore, previous research has found that higher personal income is associated with 
reduced support for radical left parties – finding this in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden – showing how economic security reduces susceptibility of voting for the radical left 
(Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2017). However, the same research also tested whether it was 
these structural variables, including economic (class) and non-economic (age, gender) groups, 
or voter attitudes (relating to economics, cultural, and migration policy) that set radical left 
supporters apart from voters for other variants of left-wing political actors. They found that it 
was voter attitudes, rather than these structural factors, which set the radical left’s supporters 
apart from supporters of social democrat and green actors (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 
2017). Other research matches this conclusion, finding in Germany that it is ideology which is 
associated with radical left support, above the impacts of socio-structural demographics, and 
in particular highlighting the role of economic ideology on radical left support (Bowyer & 
Vail, 2011).  
There is evidence to suggest that socio-structural factors are important to understanding 
voting behaviour, although perhaps these factors have less direct effects. For example, that 
socio-economic class does still drive voters to adopt certain policy preferences, with these 
preferences subsequently important to determining vote choices (Evans & Northmore-Ball, 
2018, p. 131). However, in my research I examine the latter part of this course, looking at how 
far voters policy preferences, and their proximity with the radical left, explain their support 
for these actors.  
1.4.2: Protest Voting 
Another alternate explanation identified in existing literature relates to the idea of protest 
voting. Protest voting may arise out of opposition towards policy consensus on issues like 
immigration, economics, or the European Union. Alternately, it may occur out of protest 
against established political parties. In either case, it is conceivable that the radical left will be 
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benefactors of such votes, given these actors are challengers towards mainstream political 
parties and propose economic policies which challenge prevailing capitalist norms. 
Furthermore, the ‘Election Day is Protest Day’ electioneering of the German radical left shows 
how these actors can make explicit appeals to disillusioned voters (March & Mudde, 2005).  
There is evidence that support for the radical left does increase when there is a right-wing 
government, suggesting that incumbency may partly drive this greater support (March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2015). However, the radical left does not make similar gains when the 
mainstream left are in government, whereas the radical right gains support regardless of the 
mainstream right or left being in charge. Thus, evidence suggests protest-based support for 
the radical left is more conditional than for their radical right counterparts (March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 48).  
Further research on this idea has looked cross-sectionally to analyse the extent of protest 
voting with non-mainstream left-wing and right-wing political actors. Looking specifically at 
multi-faceted protests against democracy, it finds that support for the radical left is increased 
amongst voters who express dissatisfaction with the treatment of minorities, and amongst 
those perceiving a democratic deficit linked with economic inequality (Hernandez, 2018).  
There is a strong theoretical case supporting the notion of protest explaining support for 
radicals in general. Summed up briefly, left-wing voters are attracted to radical left actors as 
part of a backlash, in protest against the ‘perceived identical nature of the establishment 
political parties’ (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 36). In addition to the research I have already cited 
in this sub-section, protest has been tied to the radical right in previous research, looking at 
this in Austria (Ignazi, 2003), and France (Mayer, 2005).  
Protest voting literature has identified many factors which cause voters to protest, including 
socio-economic deprivation (Klönne, 1989), opposition towards political institutions or elites 
(Bergh, 2004), and against aspects of the modern geopolitical world – such as protests against 
globalisation (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). But these causes all result in a common protest: a 
backlash against mainstream political parties, who protest voters deem to not adequately 
represent them and their interests (Mair, 2013). No matter the specific causes, protest voting 
comes back to the desire to reject established politics, and enhance the representation of 
popular interests. That relationship is akin to the conflict inherent with populism, between 
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the ‘ordinary people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’. In this case, the conflict is ‘ordinary people’ 
opposing established political actors and elites. Thus, when I explore how levels of populist 
sentiment are associated with radical left support, I can also indirectly make an inference 
about the extent of protest driving this support, as protest is a feature of populism.  
1.4.3: Issue Salience 
The policy-proximity account suggests levels of proximity between voters 
economic/cultural/migration preferences and the radical left explains their levels of support 
for these actors. Issue salience goes beyond this, and adds an extra consideration to the 
baseline concept of support based on policy preferences. What it adds is the notion that voters 
prioritise or value a certain issue more than others.5 For example, a voter who is spatially-
distant from the radical left on economic policy, but still supports them because they are in 
proximity with this actor on another dimension which they are more concerned about. This 
salience may come about for a variety of prevailing reasons: for example, in a time of high 
unemployment the issue of the economy will likely be a salient issue for most voters. To 
illustrate further, during the 2014-15 European refugee crisis the issue of migration became a 
highly salient issue to many voters (Talò, 2017). Therefore, the potential for issues to be more 
salient, to certain voters and in certain periods, is undeniable.  
Previous research has investigated this concept, imbuing issue salience into their policy-based 
explanations of political support. For example, research looking at voting behaviour in 
Canada found that issue salience was the key underpinning factor to the effect of ‘owned 
issues’ on vote choices (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). Further research, looking at the US, 
identified the presence of issue salience amongst voters in their electoral decisions (RePass, 
1971), and research looking at the 2017 German federal election found economically-left and 
culturally-authoritarian voters opted for whichever party was in proximity on their more 
salient dimension (Steiner & Hinnen, 2021). Finally, and specifically to radical political actors, 
previous research has suggested salience is particularly important for these actors. Radical 
actors ‘have an incentive to play up new issues and thereby enable themselves to reap electoral 
 
5 I have summarised the fundamental idea here, although a degree of debate exists around this 
between ‘salience’ referring to issue prominence, or to issue importance, or to the degree that an issue is 
a particularly pressing problem (Wlezien, 2005).  
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gains’ (de Vries & van de Wardt, 2011, p. 178), with empirical evidence of this phenomena 
relating to salience of EU-related issues in response to the Euroscepticism common from 
radical left and right actors (Hooghe, et al., 2002; de Vries & Edwards, 2009).  
It is plausible that voters may find a particular issue, or issues, more important than others, 
and that this specific salience varies between voters and time periods. Furthermore, by 
including multiple policy dimensions in my analysis, I can potentially draw salience-based 
implications from my results. By which I mean I may be able to conclude that greater effect of 
proximity on one dimension compared to others is a result of greater salience voters place on 
that particular policy dimension. 
I have discussed issue salience previously in this chapter, as an important justification behind 
my consideration of two non-economic dimensions in my policy-proximity account: 
specifically, cultural policy and migration policy. In doing so, I acknowledged that voters can 
be more concerned with one dimension than another. My multidimensional approach in the 
policy-proximity account is an acknowledgement that I may observe voters’ support for the 
radical left on different dimensions, with voters valuing some issues more than others.  
1.5: Further Contributions 
The fundamental contribution of my thesis makes to existing literature is the voter-level 
examination of how far policy-proximity and populist attitudes explain radical left support. I 
examine this in a new combination of three diverse case studies, as opposed to existing 
research in this field which has predominantly focused on single cases (for example, 
Akkerman et al. 2013; 2017). In my examination of both policy-proximity and populism-based 
radical left support, I also more strongly deal with persuasion effects compared to previous 
research. Consideration of persuasion effects is important to accurately determining the roles 
of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support.  
Aside from these more fundamental contributions, there are a few other specific areas where 





1.5.1: Independent Variables 
It has not been common for existing literature to consider the impacts of all three of the policy 
dimensions which form my policy-proximity account. Nor is it common to see these three 
policy variables included alongside consideration of voters’ populist attitudes. The downside 
of this is that existing literature has not produced an account of the impacts of policy 
preferences and populism, with control placed on the effects of each on support for the radical 
left.  
To illustrate this further, there is existing research which takes account of voters’ economic 
policy preferences, such as the analysis of radical left support in Germany (Bowyer & Vail, 
2011), and the implicit inclusion of economics via globalisation considered in further analysis 
of support for radical left parties (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). There is also common 
consideration of immigration policy preferences in existing research, including research into 
radical left ideology (Visser, et al., 2014), and research on support for both radical left and 
radical right political actors (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Cultural policy preferences are a less 
common feature of previous studies, but limited indication of policy preferences here are 
included in research into support for populist radical right and radical left in the Netherlands 
(Akkerman, et al., 2017).  
That research from Akkerman et al. represents the only piece of existing literature from those 
cited which includes populism alongside variables relating to policy preferences on all three 
dimensions. At first sight this might make my thesis look similar to Akkerman et al.’s research. 
However, there are some critical differences. The policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts in my thesis are carefully operationalised to three distinct case studies with 
consideration for persuasion effects, whereas Akkerman et al.’s research looked at only one 
case – the Netherlands.  
In terms of the independent variables, the research of Akkerman et al. is an exception. 
Generally existing research has not considered voters’ policy preferences on three separate 
dimensions alongside each other. Nor have they included these policy preferences alongside 
consideration of voters’ populist attitudes, despite these three policy preferences and 
populism potentially being associated with electoral support according to literature on the 
radical right and radical left. This then constitutes a gap in existing literature. My 
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simultaneous consideration of these three policy dimensions, and of populism, addresses this 
existing gap.  
1.5.2: Dependent Variables 
Existing research has also taken different directions with the dependent variables. Most 
research in this field has looked at electoral support via vote choice questions (Jessee, 2012; 
Bowyer & Vail, 2011; Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Rooduijn, et al., 2017; Akkerman, et al., 
2017; Ramiro, 2016).  
Complexities and added considerations arise from the use of vote choice questions. I discuss 
these further in the research design, but in brief there is a wider choice context which feeds 
into vote choice question responses. This wider choice context, including contextual factors 
like competitiveness within an electoral system, and proximity with other political actors, 
feeds into responses to vote choice questions, alongside appraisals of political actors. 
However, in my thesis I want to focus on appraisals of these political actors alone, with this 
choice context left aside as much as possible.  
This leads me to examine support for the radical left through questions which ask respondents 
to evaluate these political actors, rather than whether they voted for them. The use of 
evaluation questions rather than vote choices is in contrast to most previous research in this 
field. Although vote choice questions are more commonly used, my thesis is not alone in 
looking at voter evaluations instead – this appears in other contributions (Cho & Endersby, 
2003). But given the prevalent use of vote choice questions, my use of evaluations instead is a 
deviation from much of this existing literature.  
Less consideration of evaluations for radical left political actors, as the dependent variable, is 
a gap in the literature. I address this gap, not just as part of my original contribution, but also 
because it avoids the complexities which arise with vote choice questions.  
1.6: Literature Conclusions 
From existing research, I first defined the radical left as challengers towards the contemporary 
economic norms of their respective contexts. This sets them apart from the centre left, who 
accept ‘neo-liberal’ economic norms, and the extreme left, who vary from the radical left in 
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their attitudes towards democracy and by the extreme left’s wholesale rejection of capitalism. 
I also illustrated the division of the radical left from its centre left and extreme left counterparts 
in this chapter, through looking at examples of each of these political actors in Greece. To 
clarify, this definition of the radical left is not static. In a different time it is possible that the 
radical left may look different to what I have identified here.  
After defining the radical left, I turned attention to existing voter-level research into support 
for the radical left and radical right. I identified three policy dimensions from this literature, 
where proximity with voters may explain their support for the radical left. These policy 
dimensions relate to voters’ economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences.  
Existing literature has found economic policy preferences of voters to be important to 
explaining support for the radical left (Bowyer & Vail, 2011; Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; 
Akkerman, et al., 2017; March & Rommerskirchen, 2012). Cultural and migration policy 
preferences have been connected with support for radical political actors before – in 
particular, the radical right (Mayer, 1998; Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002; Falter & Schumann, 
1988; Mungui-Pippidi & Krastev, 2004; Coffé, 2004; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000). Based on 
existing voter-level research, which demonstrates the relevance of economic, cultural, and 
migration policy to voters, support for the radical left may be explained by policy-proximity 
on these three dimensions. However, previous research which identified support for radicals 
based on policy preferences did not strongly separate potential persuasion effects from voters’ 
policy preferences. This is an area where I contribute to existing literature, as it is important 
to deal with these persuasion effects when accurately identifying the role of policy-proximity. 
Doing so isolates the specific role of policy-proximity on radical left support, clarifying how 
far this variable is a cause of that support rather than a product of it.  
I then turned attention to existing literature on populism. This was defined from previous 
research, in particular from Cas Mudde (2007), who highlighted the presence of a division 
made by populists, defining one group as the ‘ordinary people’, and opposing them with the 
‘corrupt elite’ group. The radical left’s populism calls upon people to oppose big businesses, 
the wealthy, and a ‘neo-liberal’ economic consensus. I also discussed research which 
explained support for radical right and radical left political actors through voters’ populist 
attitudes (Akkerman, et al., 2013; 2017). With this existing literature showing how populism 
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can explain support for radical political actors, there is the possibility that this will also explain 
support for the radical left in my thesis.  
This brings me to the final section of this literature review, which focused on gaps in existing 
literature. The fundamental contribution of my thesis is its investigation of support for the 
less studied radical left, via the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts, and with 
stronger consideration for persuasion effects relative to existing research. I detailed further 
contributions, including the significance of examining both accounts simultaneously to 
control for possible confounding between the two. Whereas previous research generally had 
not included both together. Furthermore, measuring radical left support with evaluation 


















Chapter 2: Theory 
 
2.0: Introduction 
What explains electoral support for radical left political actors in contemporary Western 
democracies? To answer this research question, I consider two accounts, to see how far they 
explain support for the radical left. The first is the policy-proximity account, based on the spatial 
theory of voting which suggests electoral support is based on levels of proximity voters have 
with political actors on policy dimensions. The second account considered in this thesis is the 
populism-based account, which suggests that populist voters would be supportive of the radical 
left because of the anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric which commonly accompanies 
their economic policies.  
Both policy-proximity and populism are established explanations of electoral support – a 
point which justifies their consideration in this thesis. In particular, the spatial and populism-
based theories have received notable application to the radical right, where they have 
explained support for these political actors. For example, Kitschelt & McGann's (1995) 
explanation of radical right support based on policy-proximity, and Cas Mudde’s (2007) 
discussion of populism-based support for the radical right. Applying these established 
theories now to the radical left, and seeing how far their related accounts explain support for 
radical left political actors, is the core contribution of my thesis.  
The primary objective of this chapter is to explain the general frameworks from which I derive 
both accounts. Consequently, I divide this theory chapter into two main sections: the first 
discussing the spatial theory of voting, and the second section explaining the populism-based 
theory. In both of these sections, I outline how each of these two accounts explains electoral 
support. Accompanying this is also a discussion of critical assumptions in the spatial theory, 
and considerations for the populism theory. Finally, I also discuss features of each account’s 
application in my thesis, for example setting out three policy dimensions which are plausibly 
relevant to the policy-proximity account, with both theories being summarised in a chapter 




2.1: Spatial Theory 
2.1.1: Background and Fundamentals 
The spatial theory of voting has substantial history amongst accounts of electoral support. 
Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) previously discussed application of the spatial theory to the 
radical right is only a small part of it, although notable here because of its application to other 
radical political actors. But beyond Kitschelt and McGann there are many other instances 
where this theory has explained electoral support, and a great deal of research which 
developed this theory in the first place.  
Although well-established in the field of voting behaviour, initially the spatial theory featured 
in an economics setting by Harold Hotelling (1929). Hotelling used this theory to explain the 
effect of spatial positioning of high street retail outlets, relative to each other and customers, 
on sales (Hotelling, 1929); the basic idea being that distance of competing shops from a 
customer’s home would influence where they spend their money. Hotelling theorised that 
customers would be more likely to patronise the shop which is closer to them on the High 
Street than the shop which is further from them.  
Later research expanded the spatial theory’s applications to also explain voting behaviour. 
Black et al. undertook this development for the scenario of committee voting (Black, et al., 
1958), with Downs applying it to a mass electorate (Downs, 1957). The application of this 
theory to voting behaviour turns customers into voters, the High Street into a policy space, 
and each shop into a competing political actor. This yields a logic where voters become more 
likely to support a political actor which is in closer proximity with their own position in a 
policy space.  
This logic has since featured in many accounts of political support, such as in multiple 
accounts of voting behaviour in US presidential elections by Stephen A. Jessee (Jessee, 2009, 
2010, 2012). Evidence is found demonstrating the value of the spatial theory of voting in 
explaining voting behaviour in the context of the US (Jessee, 2012, p. 175). In addition to 
Jessee’s work in the US, Dow sets the explanation this theory provides against one of its main 
rivals – Directional theory – finding greater support for the spatial theory in his research 
(Dow, 1998). Furthermore, applications of the spatial theory have been made to the UK (Cho 
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& Endersby, 2003; Endersby & Galatas, 1998), to Spain (Queralt, 2012), and France (Rosenthal 
& Sen, 1977). Heyne (2019) adopted a spatial account when measuring satisfaction with 
democracy. Further applications of spatial theory by Kitschelt were also undertaken, separate 
from his accounts of radical right support, including on the development of party systems in 
Eastern Europe (Kitschelt, 1992).  
Then there is the application of the spatial theory to explain support for the radical right, 
including the research of Kitschelt and McGann (1995). I discussed Kitschelt and McGann’s 
research in the previous chapter, with focus on the policy dimensions they included. Overall, 
they suggested that changes in the positions of voters, combined with the convergence of 
established parties on two policy dimensions, explained how the radical right made electoral 
breakthroughs in the 1980s and 1990s. Those two policy dimensions expanded to three in later 
research (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Piero Ignazi also contributes to the debate about spatial 
positions and radical right support, with further work on the role of mainstream party 
convergence in policy spaces (Ignazi, 1992; 2003). Overall, the spatial theory has substantial 
background in the field of electoral support, including applications to explain support for the 
radical right.  
In short, the spatial theory is a highly established framework for understanding electoral 
support. Therefore, this theory may plausibly explain electoral support for radical left political 
actors. The question remains, however, of what the spatial theory of electoral support is. 
Discussion of the fundamentals of this theory, its key assumptions, and the underlying logic 
of this theory, now follows.  
I first need to explain two important concepts of this theory: proximity and utility. Proximity 
refers to the degrees of closeness between the views of voters and the policies offered by 
competing political actors. Under the spatial theory, this proximity is what predicts voters’ 
electoral support. Proximity may be viewed on a single policy dimension relating to one issue, 
or this space may consist of multiple policy dimensions each relating to different issues. Voters 
associate utility with different policy positions, and vote for the candidate whose policy 
position maximises this utility.  
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I can illustrate this proximity and utility with a hypothetical policy space. This space includes 
one policy dimension, for example relating to defence policy.6 Assume the left side of this 
dimension symbolises non-interventionism, the right side represents strongly militaristic and 
pro-intervention policy, and between these extremes are more moderate policies – for 
example, supporting limited interventions. Voters are located on policy dimensions at the 
point of their most preferred policy position, known as their ‘ideal point’. Political actors are 
also located on policy dimensions, with their positioning determined by the policies they 
promote. For example, a political actor with an anti-interventionist policy agenda could be 
located well to the left of this example dimension, a pro-interventionist political actor well to 
the right, and a more pragmatic or moderate actor here would be located closer to the middle 
of this dimension.  
Under this theory, voters strive to maximise their utility, and do this by supporting political 
actors whose policies are most in line with their own policy preferences (their ‘ideal point’). 
By extension of this, a political actor that proposes policies which are not in line with voters 
most preferred policy position would receive less support from these voters. In summary, this 
theory suggests voters support the political actor with policies in closest proximity with their 
‘ideal point’ and are less supportive of political actors which offer policies that are spatially-
distant from their ‘ideal point’.  
This operates on the assumption that voters are motivated by self-interest and maximising 
utility by supporting the political actor whose policies are in closest proximity to their own 
‘ideal point’. For example, a voter who supports higher taxes and redistributive economic 
policies would, by their self-interest, be more supportive of a political actor that proposes 
these policies. That voter associates these policies with greater utility, and votes for the 
political actor promoting these policies in order to maximise their utility. In relation to the 
example I offered just now, a voter positioned in closest proximity with a political actor on 
the non-interventionist side of that defence policy dimension would be more supportive of 
that non-interventionist actor. That voter associates this political actor’s policies with higher 
utility than the policies of a moderate actor or a pro-intervention actor on this dimension.  
 
6 To clarify, this dimension is purely an example, and does not itself reflect on the economic, cultural, 
or migration dimensions in my research.  
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Enelow and Hinich (1984) provide support for this first assumption. In their contribution to 
this theory, they state that ‘voters recognize his own self-interest, evaluates alternative policies 
or candidates on the basis of […] self-interest, and casts his vote for the policy of candidate 
most favourably evaluated’ (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). This is a theoretical defence for this 
assumption, but there is also empirical evidence supporting it. From Enelow and Hinich’s 
analysis of voting behaviour in the 1976 and 1980 US presidential elections, they found that 
voters do view candidates as being positioned within a policy space and that voters are more 
supportive of candidates in closest proximity (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). Support for the 
assumption of rational voting, and for the spatial theory as a whole, also comes from Jessee’s 
investigation of voting behaviour in the 2004 and 2008 US presidential elections (Jessee, 2009; 
2012).  
The second assumption is that voters know where competing political actors are located in 
policy spaces, and can therefore identify which political actor is in closest proximity with their 
‘ideal point’. This is important, as unless voters can determine which political actor is closest 
to their own position, their electoral support will not necessarily be based on spatial proximity 
with a political actor, as suggested in this account.  
There is a great deal of debate around this assumption. It is undeniable that some voters will 
have greater knowledge about policy areas and stances of political actors within these policy 
spaces than others. Research from Campbell et al. (1960) suggested around 15 to 30 per cent 
of people who hold opinions were unable to say where political parties stood in these policy 
spaces, and speculate that the prevalence of this lack of knowledge may be higher as voters 
may be embarrassed to admit this (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 181). Amongst informed voters 
too, there is the suggestion that only 40 to 60 per cent of these voters end up perceiving party 
differences, and can hence identify one political actor as being closer to their own position 
than its competitors (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 180).  
Thinking ahead to my application of the policy-proximity account, results that do not follow 
the underlying expectation here – that spatial proximity predicates political support – may be 
explained by the observations of Campbell et al. (1960). If, as that research suggests, a 
significant portion of both informed and uninformed voters are unable to identify where 
57 
 
radical left political actors are located in a policy space, then results may show little evidence 
of a relationship between proximity and support for these political actors.  
Although Campbell et al. expressed doubts over the extent to which voters can identify the 
spatial positions of political actors, there has also been support for this assumption. Other 
research has shown that voters do often know about quite specialist policy areas (Sniderman, 
1993). Voters can also acquire knowledge about political issues, becoming able to understand 
the different policy proposals of political actors on different issues (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998, 
p. 86). This ability of voters to inform themselves can also permeate to quite niche issues, such 
as nuclear power, where voters can become informed of different policy proposals of political 
actors (Kuklinski, et al., 1982).  
Regardless of whether voters are able to acquire knowledge about political issues, and are 
able to then vote rationally based on their proximity relative to competing political actors, 
there are still realistically going to be voters who are not as informed. Previous research has 
examined the extent less-informed voters vote in line with the spatial theory. Although these 
less-informed voters have been found to be less prone to support the political actor they are 
spatially closest to (Palfrey & Poole, 1987), there has still been support observed based on 
policy proximity (Jessee, 2012, p. 145).  
In the case of Jessee’s research finding spatial voting behaviour from less-informed 
respondents, this may be due to what Campbell et al. say is the main determinant of political 
support – partisanship (Campbell, et al., 1960). Jessee further researches this link, finding that 
amongst highly partisan voters there was indeed a strong relationship between their partisan 
attachments and electoral support. However, the electoral support of those who did not have 
partisan attachments was formulated in line with the spatial theory (Jessee, 2012, p. 149). The 
solution to this, according to Jessee, is a hybrid model, which includes the effects of both 
partisanship and ideology. The impacts of voters’ partisan attachments on electoral support 
are firmly established by existing literature. Consequently, I will have to consider and account 
for the impacts of partisan attachments in my analysis if I am to accurately observe the roles 
of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support.  
Overall, the spatial theory assumes that voters are capable of understanding policy issues, and 
thus plausibly have a reasonable understanding of the location of political actors in policy 
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spaces. Voters are then assumed to support the political actor closest to their own position. 
Amongst this discussion, there were some doubts expressed over the core assumptions of 
rational voting and the ability of voters to identify the spatial locations of political actors. I 
cited research supporting these assumptions, but finding results suggesting no relationship 
between spatial proximity and radical left support would suggest the doubts expressed over 
these assumptions may be valid. 
I illustrate the logic of the spatial theory further in Figure 2.1. This demonstrates a 
unidimensional space, unrelated to any specific policy area and drawn from the research of 










represents the mid-point between these two political actors.  
Assuming utility declines symmetrically around the voter’s ideal point, voters positioned on 
this policy dimension to the right of the midpoint are always in closer proximity with y than 
with z. Thus, they would be more supportive of y than z. Equally, those to the left of the 
midpoint will always be in closer proximity with z than y, thus will be more supportive of z 
than y. Voters located at the mid-point itself would, according to this theory, have equal 
appraisals of y and z.  
This expresses the general logic of support in a unidimensional policy space. However, what 
is meant by ‘support’? This is very important when empirically testing the spatial theory. 
There are two possible directions here: measuring utility or choice. Previous spatial research 
has utilised both choice and utility measures. For example, Jessee’s research on the 2004 and 
2008 US elections used measures of choice (2009; 2010; 2012), and Cho & Endersby’s study of 
z y 𝑦 + 𝑧
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Figure 2.1: Unidimensional Spatial Voting Theory 
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spatial voting in the UK opted for measuring utility by examining voter evaluations for 
political actors (2003). 
I discussed these measures of radical left support briefly in Chapter 1, in the context of 
previous voter-level radical left research which has mostly utilised vote choice measures. I 
have preference for measures of evaluation instead, which I then concluded as a further 
contribution to existing literature. In Chapter 3 of my thesis, I explain the reasons behind this 
preference in more detail.  
2.1.2 Dimensions 
Looking back at Figure 2.1, this expresses the spatial theory with a unidimensional policy 
space. Attention now turns to the dimensions which build policy spaces. Existing literature 
provides some indication of which policy dimensions may be important to understanding 
support for the radical left. These dimensions relate to economic, cultural, and migration 
policy. I discussed these in Chapter 1, with focus on their relevance in previous research. What 
I will do here is discuss them again, but in relation to the spatial theory, and drawing out 
broad expectations relating to these dimensions.  
The economic policy dimension is perhaps the most plausibly linked to radical left support, given 
the economics-based definition of the radical left, identifying these political actors as 
challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms. Consequently, it is conceivable 
that I will see support for the radical left based on economic policy preferences.  
On the left of this policy dimension, there is support for higher taxes – particularly on the 
richest and businesses – and opposition towards austerity and privatisation. The right of this 
dimension relates to support for lower taxation, free-market economics, and spending 
restraint. The radical left are generally found well to the left of mainstream political actors on 
this dimension, proposing an anti-corporate and pro-redistribution agenda of higher taxes, 
higher public spending, and public ownership. Social democrats and green parties also share 
some of these policies, broadly supporting egalitarian policies and higher taxes. However, as 
I showed in my literature review chapter, the radical left pursues anti-corporate and 




In general, an economic policy dimension has been a common feature of spatial accounts. 
Downs, in his canonical study, presented his application of the spatial theory with a single 
policy dimension relating to government intervention in the economy (Downs, 1957). A 
further example is Endersby and Galatas (1998), who find links between vote choice and 
policy areas including nationalisations, redistribution of wealth, and taxation vs. services 
(Endersby & Galatas, 1998, p. 375). Previous research has suggested that the decline of class-
based political support has precipitated the rise of economic policy preferences as a 
determinant of political support (Endersby & Galatas, 1998; Franklin, 1985). The earlier 
discussed research of Kitschelt also included an economic policy dimension (Kitschelt & 
McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Other accounts mentioned later in this section which 
also included an economic policy space include Tavits (2007), and Hellwig (2014).  
Radical left political actors will predictably fall on the left side of the economic policy 
dimension. Based on that, I can state two expectations about support for the radical left on 
this dimension.  
Firstly, the policy-proximity account in this thesis predicts that voters to the left on this dimension 
would be more supportive of radical left political actors, and voters to the right of this dimension would 
be less supportive of radical left actors.  
Secondly, and more specifically, the expectation is that voters well to the left of the economic 
dimension (i.e., beyond the centre-left political actors) will be the most supportive of the radical left, 
owing to close proximity with these political actors, and support for these political actors will fall 
monotonically as voters move to the right pole on this dimension, where support will be lowest.  
Expectations stated in this chapter are relatively vague, as these depend on context-specific 
factors such as whether radical left support is measured via vote choices or evaluations, the 
positions of the radical left, and where other political actors are located too if looking at vote 
choices. Therefore, the empirical case study chapters are where I state more precise 
expectations for both accounts.  
The cultural policy dimension runs from the ‘liberal’ to the ‘conservative’ sides. This dimension 
broadly reflects views over criminal justice, traditional gender roles, and issues relating to 
personal rights such as abortion, LGBT rights, and drug legalisation. Those considered 
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‘liberal’ on this dimension will be pro-LGBT rights, abortion, and rehabilitative justice, and 
opposed to things like the death penalty and traditional gender roles. The ‘conservative’ side 
of this dimension takes the opposing positions on these issues, representing a more 
‘traditionalist’ view of society.  
The migration policy dimension runs from the ‘migrant-inclusive’ to the ‘migrant-exclusive’. 
Broadly this dimension considers how voters view the place of immigrants in society. The 
‘migrant-inclusive’ side of this dimension represents the belief that immigration is beneficial 
economically and culturally. At the other end of this dimension, the ‘migrant-exclusive’ voters 
see immigration as a threat to the national economy and cultural identity.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, previous research has shown how cultural 
and migration policy are both potentially salient issues for voters. Consequently, it is possible 
policy-proximity on these dimensions may explain radical left support. Furthermore, the 
cultural and migration dimensions have, like economics, appeared in spatial accounts of 
political support. I also showed this in the previous chapter of this thesis, drawing particular 
attention to the research of Kitschelt. In his original spatial account of the radical right with 
McGann, the competitive space where voters and political actors were located had shifted 
from being unidimensional around economics alone, and had come to also include what they 
refer to as the ‘Authoritarian vs. Libertarian’ policy dimension (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995, p. 
16). The implication of this dimension is that it combined both cultural policy and attitudes 
towards migration, thus involving preferences on both cultural and migration dimensions, 
showing both to be important in addition to economics in understanding electoral support.  
Cultural and migration policy were included separately in later research from Kitschelt, 
where these were referred to as ‘Grid’ and ‘Group’ respectively (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). 
Again, Kitschelt’s research identifies cultural and migration policy preferences as important 
in the minds of voters, and contributing to their electoral support. Away from the various 
contributions of Kitschelt, the cultural policy dimension also features in the account of Laver 
and Garry (2000), in their research aimed at refining how policy positions of political parties 
are conceptualised and measured. Finally, cultural policy also appears as an integral part of 
the spatial account of Tavits (2007), in research looking at how shifts on economic and cultural 
policy impact on support for political actors.  
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In addition to the migration dimension’s role in Kitschelt’s research, there is other research 
where this policy dimension has played a major role. Firstly, research from Merrill (1994) on 
party support in Norway and Sweden included two dimensions, one of which concerned the 
issue of immigration (the other was healthcare). This research explains increased support for 
anti-immigrant parties as a consequence of a concurrent increase in immigration (Merrill, 
1994), showing that voters’ positions on this position have been relevant to their electoral 
support. Furthermore, Hellwig (2014) includes attitudes towards immigration when trying to 
identify how this issue, along with other issues linked to cultural and economic preferences, 
informs positioning of political actors. Migration policy preferences were found to be an 
important determinant of political views in this research, as incidentally were economic and 
cultural policy preferences (Hellwig, 2014).  
Unlike with economic policy, cultural and migration policy are not defining features of the 
radical left. This means the radical left’s positions on both of these policy dimensions is likely 
to be less uniform than their economic policies. Consequently, the expectations I can state here 
are even less specific.  
To offer a broader expectation for policy-proximity support on these two dimensions, radical 
left support is expected to be higher from voters in close proximity with the radical left political actor 
on these dimensions, and lower from voters not in close proximity with the radical left on these 
dimensions.  
I will state more detailed context-specific expectations for radical left support on the cultural 
and migration policy dimensions in the empirical chapters. I will then be able to consider the 
contexts of the case studies, including possible case-specific variance in the radical left’s 
positions on both of these dimensions. As these two issues are not defining ones in relation to 
the radical left, it is possible these actors do not propose radical policies on these dimensions. 
However, radical left actors do not need to propose hard-line policies on these dimensions for 
their support to be explained based on cultural or migration policy-proximity. All that is 
needed is for the radical left to be positioned closer to some voters on these dimensions than 
other political actors, and for voters to care enough about these dimensions for proximity here 
to influence their political behaviour.  
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In broad terms, results would conform with this account if greater support for the radical left 
came from spatially-proximal, and lower support for the radical left from spatially-distant 
voters. If this is the case, I would conclude policy-proximity to explain levels of support for 
the radical left.  
In terms of the causal pathway of this account, radical left support would arise from pre-
existing policy-proximity. Specifically, radical left supporting voters first form their own policy 
preferences, and then subsequently evaluate political actors based on their proximity with these 
preferences. This account assumes it would be actors in closest proximity with the voter’s 
policy preferences that receive this voter’s support. Critically, voters form policy preferences 
first, and then subsequently evaluate actors based on proximity with these. It is important to 
clarify this causal pathway, which is why I make greater efforts to control for potential 
reverse-causality by more thoroughly addressing the persuasion effects issue – a major 
contribution of my thesis. Were it the case that pro-radical left voters first had support for 
these actors, and subsequently came to be in close proximity with them on policy dimensions, 
this is potentially mistaken as radical left support based on policy-proximity. However, 
according to Brody and Page (1972) this reverse-causal relationship would not truly provide 
support for the policy-proximity account.  
There has also been criticism of the spatial theory of voting. Stokes suggested that policy issues 
are not always dominant in election campaigns, with ‘valence issues’ being important instead 
(Stokes, 1963, p. 373). Inclusion of valence issues is just one of the suggestions Stokes offers 
for the Downsian spatial theory, in response to his criticisms including questioning whether 
voters determine their electoral support based on a single policy dimension, as originally 
suggested by this theory (Stokes, 1963, p. 370). To mitigate this criticism, later applications of 
this theory have included consideration of multiple policy dimensions, including me in this 
thesis.  
Despite doubts and criticism levelled at this theory, and particularly at its original Downsian 
application, the spatial theory remains highly established amongst accounts of political 
support; established through frequent application in the field of political support, with some 
of these accounts cited earlier in this chapter. Separate from these other applications of this 
established theory, the spatial theory provides an intuitive account of political support, 
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suggesting that spatial proximity between voters and political actors on policy dimensions 
determines electoral support. Not only is this theory intuitive, but it is also testable using 
responses to election survey questions – something discussed further in each case study and 
the research design chapter.  
2.2 Populism 
To broaden my analysis of support for the radical left, I consider a second account in my thesis. 
Accompanying the policy-proximity account is the populism-based account. To remind, when 
I talk about populism, I am drawing attention to a ‘thin-centred ideology’ which presents a 
‘Manichaean’ division between two homogeneous, antagonistic groups. These groups, the 
‘ordinary (or pure) people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’, are presented as conflicting with each other 
(Mudde, 2010; Akkerman, et al., 2014). I discussed populism as a concept in greater detail in 
Chapter 1 of my thesis. My focus here is instead on populism as an explanation for electoral 
support.  
The primary motivation for including populism in my thesis is because of the relationship 
some voters may draw between the radical left’s anti-elite economic policies and the anti-elite 
nature of populism. In addition to this, the populism-based account is also an established 
account of political support, with particularly frequent application to explain support for the 
radical right (Mudde, 2017, p. 3). To cite some examples, there are studies of radical right 
populism in different contexts such as Scandinavia (Rydgren, 2010), of how the prominence 
of radical right populists has impacted policymaking (Zaslove, 2004), and studies of different 
types of right-wing populist political actors (Betz, 1993). Much of the discussion of populism 
with the radical right has been at the party-level, identifying their populist appeals and 
suggesting these as the reason for their prominence (Mudde, 2007; 2017; Arzheimer, 2015; 
Kioupkiolis, 2016; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Rooduijn, et al., 2012). There are also voter-level 
accounts which include populism as an explanation for electoral support. For example, 
Akkerman et al.’s (2014) examination of levels of populism amongst the electorates of different 
political parties in the Netherlands. Whether party-level or voter-level, the persistent place of 
populism in accounts of radical right support give credence to this theory of political support. 
With populism playing a role in support for the radical right, there is a place for this theory 
in my thesis, where it may also be relevant to understanding support for the radical left.  
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From the supply-side, political actors make populist appeals to the electorate, either exploiting 
or constructing an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ division in society. They turn the ‘ordinary people’ against 
an ‘elite’ or ‘enemy’ group, in a bid to uproot a political or economic establishment and assert 
popular sovereignty. The more commonly studied radical right populism targets groups 
including minority religions, LGBT people, and migrant groups, amongst others, including 
also political ‘elites’ seen as facilitating the interests of these groups (Mudde, 2007). For 
example, encouraging the majority ethnic group (the ‘pure people’) to oppose immigration 
(‘outsiders’) and a ‘corrupt’ pro-immigration political ‘elite’ (Mudde, 2007). However, 
separate from the radical right, the economic policies of the radical left are potentially linked 
to populism.  
The economic policies of the radical left, including support for higher taxation on corporations 
and wealthy people, increased spending on public services, and public ownership of services 
and industries, are often accompanied by rhetoric which is quite populist. For example, the 
Dutch Socialist Party’s opposition towards so-called ‘neo-liberal Ayatollahs’ – making an anti-
neoliberal ideological challenge an intrinsic part of their populist discourse (March & Mudde, 
2005, p. 35). Additionally, the Baltic radical left made calls for ending the elite’s ‘pillage of the 
state […] deception, and flogging off its people to a cabal of foreign capitalists’ (March & 
Mudde, 2005, p. 36). This populist discourse not only highlights the ‘neoliberal’ policies which 
the radical left opposes whilst also making redistributionist overtures, it also presses a 
populist ‘people’ versus ‘elite’ conflict.  
Populist appeals are also made by the Greek radical left SYRIZA, whose appeals to the 
electorate through their newspaper Avgi use headlines such as ‘Do not corrupt the mandate 
of the people’ (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), thus calling upon ‘the people’ as part of 
their appeal to the electorate, while also identifying an enemy in the Troika7 (Mudde, 2017, p. 
16). The radical left Podemos in Spain makes similar appeals, calling upon 'the people' to 
oppose a class called ‘la casta’, representing the traditional political parties and established 
institutions in this context, and blamed for the country’s economic difficulties (Ramiro & 
Gomez, 2016). In Germany, Die Linke use language of ‘a few enrich[ing] themselves at the cost 
of the many’ and of ‘global ruling elites’ not serving the interests of the majority (Die Linke, 
 
7 European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund.  
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2011, pp. 15, 23). In the US, Bernie Sanders castigated a ‘political and economic establishment’, 
and linked them with a ‘rigged economy’ (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018). Finally, in the UK 
the Labour Party shifted to the left upon Jeremy Corbyn’s election to the party’s leadership, 
with Corbyn’s faction of the party also emphasising a division between them and their party’s 
members versus the ‘elite’ of the parliamentary Labour Party who were frequently more 
critical of Corbyn (Watts & Bale, 2019).  
These examples demonstrate the tendency for radical left political actors to adopt populist 
rhetoric when promoting their economic agenda. As a consequence of this tendency, there is 
a conceivable role of populism in radical left support: specifically, where support for radical 
left political actors is a consequence of the populist rhetoric which accompanies their left-wing 
economic policies, rather than for the policies themselves. From this link, between the radical 
left and populism, it is possible that levels of populist sentiment are associated with support 
for the radical left. If this is the case, this would provide an explanation of support for these 
political actors.  
The role of radical left political actors on the supply side, making populist appeals to voters, 
is an important element of this theory’s mechanism of support. However, also important is 
how populist voters react to radical left political actors. On the demand side, these populist 
voters view the world and their own place in society as one where there is this ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ 
division. The existence of these populist voters is also important to this theory. Populist 
attitudes among voters may come about for a variety of reasons, and I will explain some of 
these. The purpose of that discussion is not to argue in favour of a particular reason behind 
voter populism, but rather to show how populist voters come to be present.  
Feelings of insecurity may draw voters to adhere to populism. Under this explanation, large 
parts of the population feel uncertain about their identity, about their job, or about life in 
general (Mudde, 2007, p. 223; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018; Spruyt, et al., 2016). This feeling of 
insecurity may occur because of cultural factors, where mass immigration causes large parts 
of the population to feel threatened about their cultural identity as they see ‘aliens’ or 
‘foreigners’ entering their communities (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1677). These voters are 
on the one hand drawn to populists whose underlying ideology is nativism and migrant-
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exclusive, and on the other hand encouraged to oppose established ‘insider’ political parties 
which have been shown to converge around acceptance of immigration (Mudde, 2007, p. 281).  
Voters may also feel insecure as a result of economic challenges, where more people in 
Western democracies no longer have the right knowledge or skills to be in rewarding 
employment. The increasing lack of low-skilled but rewarding jobs leaves less-educated 
citizens feeling economically vulnerable. The consequence is a group of citizens who are 
simply not suited to functioning in the contemporary, globalised world. These voters, who 
are potentially unemployed or part of a society which has become less equal, are a class of 
economic ‘left-behinds’ who express their anger over inequality and economic insecurity by 
supporting populist political actors (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).  
Political changes may also predicate feelings of insecurity. Developments with political 
institutions have often moved power from the national level to the supranational level. 
Leaving aside the UK’s exit from the European Union, governance across Europe has 
increasingly become supranational and integrated across the continent. According to Kriesi 
(2014), supranational governance structures lead to longer and less transparent chains of 
representation. Combined with this, the ‘mediatisation’ of politicians has linked 
representatives more directly to voters, which has fostered a feeling that established political 
parties and politicians are fundamentally all alike (Kriesi, 2014). This has led to political 
insecurity, cultivating an environment where populist voters are predisposed to vote for 
political outsiders, instead of for established and mainstream political actors.  
The developments in economics, in the movement of people, and the creation of supra-
national political organisations, are all said to increase feelings of insecurity amongst voters. 
These developments are also representations of increasing globalisation. Those members of 
society who feel culturally threatened by immigration, feel insecure as a result of changing 
economic fortunes, or are opposed to European integration or the general internationalisation 
of politics, are dubbed the ‘losers of globalisation’. Under the ‘losers of globalisation’ thesis, it 
is these voters in particular who are most likely to adhere to populism (Kriesi, 2014). This 
constructs a potential electorate for populist political actors to appeal to.  
The reasons behind the development of populism amongst voters are not the focus of my 
thesis. This discussion merely shows how voters may begin to adhere to populism via 
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insecurity. Additionally, voters may begin to adhere to populism simply as a form of political 
resentment, in the protest vote thesis, or through the ‘support thesis’.  
The protest vote thesis suggests that political resentment leads to people adhering to 
populism, including the need to protest against mainstream politics. An example of this is 
observed from the Italian radical right ‘Lega Nord’, and the desire of their voters to protest 
against the national government in Rome (Betz, 1994). Bergh (2004) identified two types of 
protest: ‘system protest’ and ‘elite protest’. The former is rarer, but under ‘system protest’ 
voters are drawn to oppose political institutions. The latter is found to be more common, and 
is where voters protest against political elites, such as mainstream political parties and a 
mistrusted ‘political class’ (Bergh, 2004). This offers another account of how voters come to 
adhere with populism, further outlining a potential electorate for populist political actors to 
attract.  
Voters may also begin to adhere to populism via the ‘support thesis’. Policy preferences are 
important here. In brief, voters conform with populism by agreeing with the underlying 
policies proposed by a populist political actor (Mudde, 2007, p. 219). If a populist political 
actor, for example, was also rigorously anti-austerity, a voter who is also anti-austerity would 
conform with the populism of that political actor. A potential issue for my thesis arises here, 
as there is need to control for the effects of both voters’ policy preferences and populism on 
radical left support. Otherwise, I may incorrectly deduce radical left support to be associated 
with policy-proximity and obscure the potential role of populism.  
Initially, it would seem like this ‘support thesis’ undermines the extent I can view populism-
based support for the radical left. If coexisting policy-preferences draw these voters to adhere 
with populism, how is this populism-based support rather than support based on policy-
proximity? In response to this question, I draw attention to the responses to this ‘support 
thesis’.  
The fundamental flaw with this thesis is that it assumes a direct and causative link between 
radical policy preferences and populism, where voters adhere to populism if their own policy 
preferences match the radical ideology of a populist political actor (Mudde, 2007, p. 220). 
However, previous research into support for the populist radical right has identified evidence 
which counters this entirely. That research finds most supporters of the populist radical right 
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are not in fact ‘extreme right’ when placing themselves on an ideological scale, and that the 
majority of the ‘extreme right’ voters did not vote for populist radical right parties (Billiet & 
De Witte, 1995; Eith, 2003). Furthermore, other research has suggested that support for a 
radical right political actor was in fact due to its anti-elite message, rather than its right-wing 
ideology, further breaking this link between populism-based and policy-based support 
(Rooduijn, 2018, pp. 356-357).  
What this means is that adherence to populism may arise from common policy preferences, 
but previous research has not definitively identified a causal relationship. Crucially, it is 
plausible to imagine that there are populist voters who do not share the stridently left-wing 
policy preferences of radical left political actors. Therefore, it is entirely possible that populism 
attracts people to support the radical left, but these voters do not also share policy preferences 
with these political actors.  
I have explained three ways that voters may adhere to populism. Voters may be drawn to 
become populists and identify with their inherent ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ worldview through 
economic/cultural/political insecurity, through political resentment, or through concurrent 
support for the policies offered by populist political actors. Which of these most explains voter 
adherence to populism is not the focus of my thesis. The purpose of discussing these was 
purely to show how some voters may be more receptive than others to populist rhetoric, 
because they have developed populist-consistent attitudes themselves already.  
To bring this back to the radical left, on the supply side radical left political actors spread their 
economic policies which draw attention to inequality and include anti-elite rhetoric focused 
on big businesses and the rich, while also making redistributive appeals to the ‘ordinary 
people’. On the demand side, voters adhere to the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ nature of populism, and are 
assumed to support political actors which call for opposition towards ‘elites’. In this situation, 
populist voters may be drawn to the anti-elite economic policies of the radical left. There is 
then potential for levels of populism to be associated with support for the radical left.  
Under the populism-based theory, the expectation is that voters who adhere to populism will be 
more supportive of radical left political actors, relative to voters who do not adhere to populism. To 
separate populist voters from voters who are not populists, I use survey questions which ask 
about adherence to anti-elitism, a Manichaean worldview, and support for popular 
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sovereignty. Populist voters would adhere to a Manichaean ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ division of 
the world, would oppose ‘elite’ groups, and would profess support for popular sovereignty.  
Looking at the causal pathway of this account, support for the radical left arises from pre-
existing populist attitudes. More specifically, pro-radical left voters first have populist 
attitudes, and subsequently support the radical left actor. As with policy-proximity, there is 
potential for reverse-causality here, arising from persuasion effects. In this case, support 
occurring first and then subsequently persuading these pro-radical left voters to adhere with 
populism. This situation would appear to support the populism-based account, but in reality 
populist adherence would be a consequence of, rather than a cause of, radical left support. 
This potential for reverse-causality means there is also an imperative here to address 
persuasion effects. Doing so is important to accurately determining whether voter populism 
explains support for the radical left.  
A final point of note is how this account relates to the case studies in my thesis. There is a 
degree of diversity between the cases in my research; between the non-mainstream radical left 
in Germany, versus the radical left in the US and UK cases which have occurred within 
mainstream governmental parties. Although it is possible for mainstream ex-governing 
parties to express populist messages – for example, PASOK in Greece (Pappas, 2015) – this 
does raise the issue of how the wider governing legacies of these parties potentially disrupt 
the populism-based account in my research. Specifically, challenging mainstream political 
actors is a common populist appeal. However, if this appeal instead emanated from a 
mainstream political actor, populist voters would conceivably meet this with scepticism. 
Consequently, this potentially creates a situation where I see more support for the non-
mainstream radical left in Germany, compared to the radical left appearing within 
mainstream parties in the US and UK cases. This is a point I will take into account when 
drawing my final conclusions. The diverse cases in my analysis then potentially become an 
advantage, as I can see how populism-based support compares between the non-governing 





2.3: Theory Chapter: Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, I will summarise both the policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts of radical left support considered in my thesis.  
The spatial theory of voting is well-established in the field of political support and voting 
behaviour. That established nature is an important justification for considering the policy-
proximity account, which derives from that theory. The policy-proximity account suggests 
support for the radical left will be a function of levels of proximity voters have with these 
political actors. The voters in closer proximity with the radical left political actor would be 
more supportive of them, and the voters located further from the radical left would be less 
supportive of them. This broad expectation comes from the assumption of self-interested 
voters wishing to maximise utility, and that voters can identify where competing political 
actors are spatially located relative to their ‘ideal point’ of preferred policy outcomes. The 
application of the spatial theory in my thesis, referred to as the ‘policy-proximity account’, 
focuses on three plausibly relevant policy dimensions, relating to economic, cultural, and 
migration policy preferences.  
The second potential explanation of radical left support which I consider in this thesis is the 
populism-based account. Populism is defined by an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dynamic, appealing to the 
‘ordinary people’ to oppose an ‘elite’ group. Populism as a theory of electoral support has 
been frequently applied to the radical right, making it another established account. The 
primary justification for applying the populism-based account in my thesis is found in the 
connection between the radical left’s economic policies and populism. Specifically, the radical 
left’s economic policies are quite populist through their anti-elite nature. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that support for radical left political actors is associated with levels of populism 







Chapter 3: Research Design 
 
3.0: Introduction 
In the previous chapter I outlined a series of theories that could explain support for the radical 
left. Prior to that, I provided an overview of the current state of research in the field of radical 
political actors. In that literature review I highlighted gaps in existing research. How I test 
both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts, and how I address these gaps in 
existing literature, is explained in greater detail in this chapter.  
The first half of this chapter provides a general overview and explanation of the approach 
arising from the research question. I discuss the survey data, which is necessary to test both 
accounts here. I also explain the modelling approaches which are used in the analysis of this 
survey data. Overall, the early parts of this chapter explain the general methodology of my 
thesis and the rationale behind this.  
The second half of this chapter focuses on case selection. I will discuss the three case studies 
in my thesis: Die Linke in Germany, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign in the US, and the 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn in the UK.  
3.1: Overall Methodology 
In Chapter 1 I identified party-level accounts and voter-level accounts of radical left support. 
Party-level research places the party as the unit of analysis, with research then seeking to 
explain variation in support of these parties. There may then be focus on the party’s policies, 
their leadership, and their levels of organisation, to explain electoral support. However, my 
thesis instead focuses upon voter-level data, which allows me to examine whether voters with 
particular opinions support the radical left, rather than just whether radical left political actors 
do well or badly in certain countries. To be clear, voters become the unit of analysis in the 
voter-level approach of my thesis, with me analysing how their policy preferences and 
populist attitudes are associated with support for radical left political actors.  
The voter-level approach which is present in my thesis relies on survey data. Such data allows 
me to examine how support for the radical left is associated with voters’ policy-proximity 
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with the radical left, and how far levels of populism amongst voters explains support for the 
radical left.  
3.1.1: Survey Data 
Survey data allows for my thesis to take place by providing individual-level data to test both 
accounts of radical left support. Thinking about those two theories brings me to an important 
area of consideration, relating to the requirements of this survey data. There are three core 
requirements of these surveys: the first being inclusion of a measure of support for the radical 
left, and the second and third relating directly to the policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts.  
The first requirement is the most fundamental. The surveys need to ask respondents about 
their attitudes towards a radical left political actor. This is the dependent variable across my 
voter-level analysis. As I said in the previous chapter, attitudes towards the radical left may 
be expressed in different ways – utility (evaluation) of a radical left political actor, or vote 
choice for the radical left political actor.  
I briefly stated my preference for evaluation questions in Chapter 1, in contrast to much of the 
existing literature into radical left support. To explain this preference in greater detail, vote 
choice responses are a function not only of appraisals of a political actor, but also factors like 
voter position relative to other political actors and the competitiveness of those actors in that 
electoral system.This wider choice context adds complexities; for example, with vote choice 
questions there would be the added task of identifying where all competing political actors 
are located on the policy dimensions, including political actors other than the radical left. The 
task of identifying the locations of all political actors can be complex, and incorrect positioning 
of one among several actors could yield misleading results. Evaluation questions are more 
separate from this wider choice context, however, meaning there is no need with these 
questions to identify (and potentially misidentify) the positions of all competing political 
actors.  
An additional area I consider when deciding between evaluations versus choice is how they 
both relate to each other. Both plausibly tap into support for the radical left, but do evaluations 
predict vote choice? Likewise, does vote choice predict evaluations for political actors? 
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Evidence suggests that evaluations are predictive of vote choice, although they do not 
completely map onto these choices, whereas the opposite – vote choice mapping onto 
evaluations – is not the case (Macdonald, et al., 2001, p. 492). Further support for evaluation 
measures, in the form of numerical ratings, is also present in existing literature where these 
were found to be imperfect but suitable measures of utility (Eggers & Vivyan, 2020, p. 473). 
Responses to vote choice questions are impacted upon by multiple contextual factors, such as 
the positions of other political actors and the competitiveness of the radical left given the 
electoral system. However, I do not want these contextual factors feeding into dependent 
variable responses. Consequently, I favour use of evaluation questions in my thesis, instead 
of vote choice questions.8  
The second requirement of the surveys relates to the policy-proximity account. This account 
assumes voter-actor proximity in policy spaces explains candidate evaluations and electoral 
support. In relation to the radical left in my thesis, this account broadly expects voters well to 
the left on economics would be more supportive of radical left political actors, and voters in 
close proximity with these actors on the cultural and migration policy dimensions would also 
have higher support for them. Therefore, examination of this account requires measurement 
of the policy preferences of voters on these three dimensions. Without indication of these 
policy preferences, I would be unable to test the policy-proximity account of radical left 
support.  
I have a preference here for questions asking about policy preferences in the form of multiple-
item batteries of questions. This as opposed to single-item self-placement scales, where 
respondents are asked to indicate their policy preferences in a single question, asking them to 
place themselves on a left/right or libertarian/authoritarian scale. Instead, multiple-item 
batteries ask respondents a series of related questions, often but not always with a five-level 
Likert-type scale of responses.  
 
8 Concurrently analysing radical left support via vote choice questions would require a whole 
separate explanation of the theory in the context of an electoral choice (rather than utility), and 
separate expectations for each case context given different positions of non-radical left actors in each 
country. As this would add complications to my analysis, both in practice and interpretation, I have 
opted not to carry out this concurrent vote choice-based analysis.  
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The preference for multiple-item batteries over single-item questions or scales is founded 
upon research which has tested the explanatory power of both in the context of electoral 
support. This research found that compared to a single nationalisation question, a self-
placement left-right scale, a multi-item left-right scale, and the postmaterialism scale from 
Inglehart (1977), that the multi-item left-right scale was the best predictor of electoral support 
(Evans, et al., 1996). The same research also found that the self-placement left-right scale was 
highly unreliable at predicting voters’ ideological positions on libertarian-authoritarian 
(cultural) and left-right (economic) dimensions, especially amongst respondents who were 
not politically informed (Evans, et al., 1996, p. 107). Respondents potentially misunderstand 
questions in surveys; however, with multiple questions feeding into the policy dimensions 
and populism the consequences of misunderstanding a single question are mitigated. 
Therefore, I have a preference here for multi-item batteries of questions when drawing out the 
populism and policy preferences of survey respondents, instead of single-item self-placement 
ideological scales.  
To draw out economic policy preferences, I look for questions relating to views around 
taxation vs. spending, and about redistribution including whether government should 
encourage greater equality. For cultural policy, I look for questions relating to individual 
rights, including LGBT rights, law and order policies, and abortion. For migration policy, I 
look for questions regarding border policy and treatment of immigrants. These are broadly 
the questions I use, to draw out policy preferences on each of the three policy dimensions. 
However, the questions I end up using is highly dependent on what is available in survey 
data. As a result, there is some variance in questions used – especially when guaging cultural 
policy preferences. For example, the issue of guns is a cultural policy in the US context, and 
in the UK case the concept of traditional ‘British values’ and obedience to authority features 
in survey data. I include these issues when measuring voters cultural policy preferences in 
both cases, but the consequent variability may raise questions over the comparability of 
results across cases. In response, I also run a robustness test in the US and UK cases. In this 
test I look at the role of cultural policy-proximity based on a stripped back set of policy 
measures, not including guns in the US case, and not including ‘British values’ in the UK case.  
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Refraining from single-item self-placement scales sets my thesis apart from many existing 
contributions in this field (Ramiro, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). Furthermore, my use of 
multi-item batteries of questions differentiates my thesis from that of Akkerman et al. (2017). 
That research included a similar range of variables to those considered in my thesis, but 
application of a cultural policy variable was derived from a single question relating to law 
and order, whereas my cultural policy variable is drawn from multiple questions.  
The third requirement of the surveys relates to the populism-based account. This account 
suggests high levels of voter populist sentiment will be associated with support for the radical 
left. Therefore, I need some indication of the populist attitudes of voters. As with the questions 
relating to policy preferences, there is a preference here also for multi-item batteries of 
questions pertaining to populism. These questions ask about support for popular sovereignty, 
attitudes to politics and politicians, adherence with anti-elitism, and how far respondents 
have a ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ Manichaean worldview. These questions are commonly used in 
other voter-level accounts of populism and electoral support, for example Akkerman et al. 
(2014; 2017), and van Hauwaert et al. (2020). The fact that they have appeared in many other 
voter-level accounts of populism and electoral support indicates they provide robust and 
reliable measurement of populist attitudes amongst survey respondents.  
This leads me to the three core requirements of survey data: measures of radical left support, 
of policy preferences, and of populist attitudes. All three of these requirements need to be met 
to test the theoretical accounts of interest in my thesis. Consequently, radical left political 
actors which occur in countries where survey data does not satisfy these three requirements 
cannot be included in my thesis.  
Another consideration with these surveys is control variables. In order to gain a more accurate 
understanding of the roles of preferences on each policy dimension, and the role of populist 
attitudes on radical left support, I also need to control for a range of other factors which 
potentially also impact on support for the radical left. These other factors relate to other 
determinants of electoral support, for example ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and education 
levels. Something else looked for in these surveys is questions relating to other explanatory 
factors, from which the impacts of these can be controlled. Although not a strict requirement 
of the surveys used in my thesis, the inclusion of control variables is still important in order 
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to gain a more precise picture of how policy-proximity and populism impact on support for 
the radical left. The specific control variables which are considered, including case-specific 
controls, are discussed in the chapters on each case study.  
3.1.2: Analysis 
In my thesis, I use multivariate regression to examine the relationship between support for 
the radical left, with populist attitudes and policy-proximity with voters. Also included in 
these regressions are control variables.  
Looking first at the variables of interest, policy preferences and populism, how are these 
variables included in these regressions? Remember I draw indication of the policy preferences 
and populism of each respondent from multiple-item batteries of questions. By averaging 
responses across these multiple questions, I obtain an overall impression of policy preferences 
on each dimension, and of populist attitudes. I then group respondents based on these 
averaged responses to policy and populism questions. I add these groups to the regressions, 
and then observe how radical left support varies based on the differing policy preferences and 
populist attitudes of the respondents reflected in these groups.  
My primary reason for including policy preferences and populism as groups is so I can 
observe non-linear relationships between these and radical left support. I do not necessarily 
expect non-linear relationships to be present, but if they do exist then I can observe them by 
including these as groups. For example, with these groups I would be able to observe greater 
radical left support from voters located at the centre-right of the economic policy dimension, 
if this turns out to be the case contrary to expectations. This is one example of a possible non-
linear relationship, which I would be able to observe by using this grouping methodology. 
The alternative to including these variables as groups would be to simply add voter positions 
as scalar variables into the regressions. From this I would examine how a change in, for 
example, the measured voter position on economic policy impacts on support for the radical 
left. However, that approach would assume a linear association between position on this 
dimension and radical left support.  
Across existing literature, it is more common to forgo grouping, in favour of this alternative 
with scalar variables in the regression models. That being said, I am not alone in pursuing this 
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grouping methodology. Justification for this approach appears in previous research, relating 
to regression analysis specifically – ‘[…] it is appropriate to discretize a continuous variable if a 
simple monotonic or quadratic relation does not seem appropriate.’ (Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 66-67). 
Furthermore, grouping respondents has also featured in previous research on UK voting 
behaviour, where it allowed for easier observation of non-linear relationships between 
demographic groups and strategic voting (Eggers & Vivyan, 2020).  
I group respondents in a way which accounts for the distribution of the data.9 This is 
important for making the groups more comparably sized to each other, as responses across 
policy and populism questions are not uniformly distributed. Without considering the 
distribution of the data when formulating these groups, there would be disproportionately 
small groups, from which there would be less reliable inferences. More comparably sized 
groups would lead to more reliable inferences from these. I form five groups on each policy 
dimension, with five groups also drawn from responses to populism questions. These five 
groups allow me to distinguish between radicals, moderates, and those who have 
intermediate responses to survey questions.  
The grouping methodology allows me to readily observe non-linear relationships, should 
they exist, rather than imposing linear functional form on these variables. Additionally, 
supporting my analysis with groups, I also provide supplementary results following the more 
common scalar methodology. I briefly discuss these supplementary results with scalar 
variables in my analysis of radical left support, and appendicise these regression models.  
The groups here are stated in relative terms, so for example the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group on the 
cultural policy dimension comprises respondents who are, relative to all who answered 
cultural policy questions, the most culturally-liberal. Likewise, respondents in the ‘Centrist’ 
groups on each dimension are those whose positions are in the centre relative to the overall 
distribution of responses. Identifying respondents’ positions and labelling these groups in this 
relative rather than absolute way is also consistent with my defining of the radical left relative 
to the context of these political actors.  
 
9 Using ‘Quantile’ function in R, which provides cut points to divide data into five groups of more 
comparable sizes than if the scale were divided into equal parts (ie. 0–2, 2–4, 4–6, 6–8, 8–10).  
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The regressions include groups relating to policy preferences and populist attitudes. 
Alongside these, I also include control variables. I mentioned these earlier, in the context of 
drawing these from survey data. In the context of analysis, I include these control variables in 
the regressions, in order to separate the impacts of these variables from the roles of policy-
proximity and levels of populist sentiment. Consequently, these control variables clarify the 
respective roles of policy-proximity and populism on support for the radical left.  
Regressions are a staple of voter-level research into electoral support. However, they do not 
represent the sole method of analysis in my thesis. I also include descriptive analysis. In the 
UK case study, I include tables which present average radical left evaluations from policy and 
populism groups. These are similar to the regressions, but do not include control variables, 
and focus on presenting the absolute levels of evaluation for the radical left in that case study.  
3.1.3: Summary of Approach 
The two accounts I consider in my thesis suggest support for the radical left is related to 
proximity in policy spaces and populist attitudes of voters. Therefore, survey data needed to 
include measures of support for the radical left, but also voters’ policy preferences and levels 
of populism. From responses to questions on each policy dimension, and relating to populism, 
I place survey respondents into groups. I explained this grouping methodology previously, 
and justify this approach based on its ability to show possible non-linear relationships 
between these variables of interest and radical left support. Analysis primarily comes via 
regression analysis. These regressions demonstrate relationships between policy preferences 
and populism with radical left support, relative to a baseline group, and with control on the 
roles of other explanatory factors.  
A final point to note is that the period of analysis in my research is between 2015 and 2017. 
All of the survey data that I examine, across the three case studies, comes from that two-year 
period. Following the 2008 financial crisis, and resulting recession, all three case studies 
suffered economic downturns leading to government responses which included austerity 
policies involving substantial and controversial reductions government spending. In this 
unifying context of economic difficulties, there was not only the potential for widespread 
voter discontent but also for a rise in salience around economic policy. Although broadly 
unified by economic downturns, these three cases also differ in some respects. For example, 
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the UK’s decision to exit from the European Union dominates that case study’s politics in this 
period. However, I do not need the cases to be entirely comparable. What I can see is some 
common conditions across them though, especially relating to economics.  
3.2: Case Studies 
Attention in this half of the chapter is on providing an overview of the case studies; 
specifically, how the three case studies in my thesis complement each other and allow me to 
test my theories of interest. Consequently, I divide this section into four parts. In the first three 
of these I discuss each of the three case studies. In the final part I consider other instances of 
the radical left and explain why I do not include them as case studies in my thesis.  
Before that, the inclusion of three cases in my thesis contrasts with the single-country case 
studies (for example, Akkerman et al., 2017). Inclusion of multiple case studies provides a 
stronger test of both theoretical accounts I examine. If I were to find, across all three cases, 
consistent support for either policy-proximity or populism-based account, this would provide 
stronger evidence in favour of that account of radical left support than similar findings from 
one case study alone.  
Another advantage of my case selection here is that it brings together the more established 
radical left, in the multiparty German context, with the more emerging radical left in the US 
and UK contexts which have fewer major parties. The initial advantage of this is examination 
of radical left support between a multiparty versus more limited party contexts, from which 
perhaps there will be notable reflections on findings. Beyond that also, these contexts are 
important when addressing persuasion effects, as with the more emerging radical left it is 
easier to isolate policy-proximity and populism-based effects on support, with these variables 
less likely to have been affected by pre-existing support for less established radical left actors.   
Thus, my consideration of these three case studies is an important contribution made by my 
thesis and builds on previous research into radical left support.  
3.2.1: Germany case study 
My German case study focuses on the Die Linke party. I have previously described this case 
study as the ‘classic’ example of a radical left actor. I use this description for two reasons. 
81 
 
Firstly, because Die Linke is well-recognised as being on the radical left of German politics in 
contrast to its competitors and arising from its position as successor to the GDR’s ruling party. 
Secondly, because existing literature has generally focused on political parties like Die Linke 
before.  For example, the SP in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2017), both radical left 
political parties – Podemos and IU – in Spain (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016), and SYRIZA in Greece 
(Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018). Therefore, Die Linke is similar to the actors focused upon 
in a great deal of existing radical left research.  
Other than its status as a classical case study, a further feature of the German case is its cross-
sectional nature. This means I observe support for Die Linke at a single period, with survey 
data for this case study coming from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). This 
has the advantage that there is one set of prevailing circumstances feeding into stated support 
for this political actor. By ‘prevailing circumstances’ I mean the multiple background factors 
which may affect responses, such as economic performance, unemployment level, and many 
other factors.  
However, the German case study faces the problem of persuasion effects. I discussed this in 
the literature review and explained why it is important to deal with this issue, so I can isolate 
and observe the effects of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support. To counter 
this, I need to separate the policy preferences and populism of voters from pre-existing 
support they may have for radical left political actors. The suggestion of Brody and Page to 
address this is through the use of panel data (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 458), through which I can 
draw voters’ policy preferences and populism from before the radical left came to 
prominence, and thus before the radical left could potentially cause persuasion effects.  
The established nature of Die Linke means voters are plausibly more likely to have supported 
or associated themselves with this party. In turn, this may have caused voters to shift their 
policy preferences or populist attitudes to match those emanating from Die Linke. Panel data 
cannot realistically separate pre-existing Die Linke support from voters’ policy preferences or 
populist attitudes, as it would need to stretch back for decades to allow this. Therefore, I am 
unable to separate Die Linke’s persuasion effects from the policy preferences and populism of 
voters. I can mitigate the impacts of possible persuading factors, such as how identification 
with German political parties may cause voters to have higher or lower evaluations for Die 
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Linke. However, control variables cannot separate the impacts of these effects persuading 
voters to alter their policy preferences and populist attitudes. Therefore, these control 
variables only partially address the issue of persuasion here.  
The German case study has advantages and disadvantages. In its favour is its cross-sectional 
nature. With this, I observe support for the radical left party Die Linke in a single wave with a 
single set of prevailing circumstances. However, a downside of this case study relates to 
persuasion effects. The established nature of Die Linke is important here because this means 
voters are more likely to have had their policy preferences and populist attitudes persuaded 
by this political actor. I also cannot mitigate this with panel data, given Die Linke’s long 
presence in German politics. Overall, the role this case study plays is the classic radical left 
political actor, taking a similar form to radical left political actors which have featured in 
existing research in this field. However, like those other contributions the issue of persuasion 
effects needs to be dealt with more thoroughly. This brings me to the other two case studies 
in my thesis.  
3.2.2: US Case Study 
Unlike the German case study, the US case study does not consider a classic radical left 
political party. Instead, a radical left political candidate is the focus in this case study. 
Specifically, the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries. 
I argue in Chapter 5 that the 2016 Sanders campaign is a radical left political actor, showing 
how it conforms with the minimal definition used in this thesis. In brief, though, the 2016 
Sanders campaign competed against the moderately left-wing presidential campaign of 
Hillary Clinton, which represents the centre left counterpart to Sanders’ radical left candidacy. 
I draw survey data for this case study from two surveys: the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study (CCES) and the American National Election Study (ANES).  
The primaries system present in US elections is an advantage of this case study. It separates 
support for the centre left Clinton campaign from support for the radical left Sanders 
campaign, in the intra-party primaries contest where I can examine support for each 
respective candidacy. This intra-party context addresses one specific persuasion effect – 
partisan attachments. Attachments to the wider Democratic Party are not likely to lead to 
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persuasion where policy preferences or populist attitudes are altered to conform specifically 
with the Sanders campaign. Therefore, the nature of this case study mitigates the impacts of 
partisan attachments as a potential persuasion effect.  
On the other hand, this does not mean attachments to Sanders do not exist, with these 
attachments specifically to Sanders then potentially causing their own persuasion effects. This 
is a possibility because the survey data in the US case study comes from after the 2016 
Democratic presidential primaries. Thus, voters may have recently formed attachments 
specifically to the Sanders campaign, which in turn may impact upon policy preferences and 
populism of voters. Consequently, the US case study is not totally immune to the charge of 
persuasion effects.  
However, in contrast to the German case study the Sanders campaign does not represent an 
established radical left political party. Instead it is a radical left political actor in an intra-party 
context – the 2016 Democratic primaries. The consequence of this political actor not being an 
established feature of US politics is that voters are plausibly less likely to have formed 
attachments to this political actor. Without these long-standing attachments, it is conceivable 
that any persuasion effect which has occurred would be weaker in the US case study than Die 
Linke’s persuasion effect on German voters.  
Like the German case study, the US case study is cross-sectional in nature, drawing 
observations of support for the radical left from a single time period. Again, this has the 
advantage of responses at a single time period. Furthermore, the US primaries system 
presents this case study as an actual electoral choice, where support for the radical left Sanders 
campaign is analysed against support for the centre left Clinton campaign. Focus is then on 
the policy-proximity and populism-based reasons behind voting for one of these candidates 
over the other. This is also reflected by the dependent variable in the US case study. There are 
no measures of evaluation for Sanders as well as Clinton in either the CCES or ANES. 
Therefore, the dependent variable in this case study is a vote choice question, asking 
respondents which candidate they voted for in the 2016 presidential primaries. Although vote 
choice questions raise complexities, like having to identify the positions of competing 
candidates on policy dimensions, with the Democratic primaries in 2016 there are only two 
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candidates to locate – Sanders’ campaign, and Clinton’s campaign.10 Placing two political 
actors is manageable; added to that, the lack of evaluation questions for both Sanders and 
Clinton necessitates the use of vote choice questions instead.  
The US case study forms part of the response to the German case. In particular, through 
greater ability to mitigate persuasion effects. Possible persuasion arising from partisan 
attachments is addressed in this case study, by the intra-party context of the Sanders 
campaign. However, attachments with Sanders himself may have caused persuasion of 
voters’ policy preferences and populism into line with his campaign, but this is plausibly 
limited by the less established nature of this radical left actor. Nevertheless, the US case study 
forms part of my response to persuasion effects, while also providing an examination of 
policy-proximity and populism-based support for a radical left political actor in an intra-party 
context.  
3.2.3: UK Case Study 
Moving to the final case study, the radical left in the UK is the Labour Party under Jeremy 
Corbyn. The surprising rise of Corbyn to Labour’s leadership began the notable shift of that 
political party from the centre left to the radical left. I explain the context of this shift, and 
Labour’s radical leftism under Corbyn’s leadership more in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
In the German and US case studies, cross-sectional data was utilised, with this justified based 
on the single range of prevailing circumstances with the sole wave of data. However, with 
cross-sectional data I cannot separate pre-existing radical left support from voters’ policy 
preferences and populism. In response to this downside, I use panel data in the UK case study 
instead, with this drawn from the British Election Study (BES). Panel surveys track responses 
of a sample over time, allowing me to observe radical left support at multiple points in time 
from the same respondents. These over-time responses are crucial to the way the UK case 
study accounts for the previously discussed issue of persuasion effects.11  
 
10 In 56/57 contests during the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, Sanders and Clinton were the 
only two candidates. 
11 Panel data not used in US case study because it does not include questions related to support for 
Bernie Sanders 2016 campaign. I did not use panel data in the Germany case study for two reasons: 
first, because panel data in the Germany case would not reach back far enough to mitigate persuasion 
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Thoroughly controlling for persuasion effects requires separation of voters’ policy preferences 
and populism from the influence of a radical left political actor. In the UK case study, the panel 
data design better separates pre-existing radical left support from policy preferences. I 
separate them by measuring voters’ policy preferences from before Corbyn became Labour 
leader, thus before Labour shifted to the radical left. Therefore, although support for the 
Labour Party would have existed in this pre-Corbyn wave, with this impacting on policy 
preferences, that support was not for a radical left Labour Party at that point, because Corbyn 
was not yet Labour leader. Consequently, in the pre-Corbyn data there was no radical left 
political actor present for policy preferences to have been persuaded by. I then examine how 
Labour evaluations changed between the 2015 (pre-Corbyn) wave of panel data, and the 2017 
(post-Corbyn) wave of data, from groups of voters with varying policy preferences.  
This separation is possible because the BES includes policy questions on all three dimensions, 
as well as the dependent variable question, in both the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves of 
data. However, I cannot carry out the same separation with voters’ populist attitudes, as the 
BES only includes populism questions in post-Corbyn waves. Therefore, while the UK case 
study does get around radical left persuasion effects in relation to voters’ policy preferences, 
I am unable to take the same approach to separate these from the populist attitudes of voters. 
Using post-Corbyn measures of populism potentially biases results in favour of this account, 
as the persuasion effect of Corbyn’s radical leftism would cause voters to become more 
populist. This is something to be mindful of with the UK case study’s populism-based results.  
The dependent variable in the UK case study is a measure of evaluation, this time for the 
Labour Party, rather than a vote choice dependent variable. In this case study I examine how 
Labour Party evaluations change over time between pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves of 
BES data.  
Crucially, with the UK case study I break the link between possible radical left persuasion 
effects and policy preferences. This is not possible with the German case study, nor wholly 
achievable with the US case study, and is a key advantage of the UK case study. The 
consequence of breaking that link is that I can examine the effects of policy-proximity on 
 
effects from the long-extant Die Linke; and second, because cross-sectional data has the advantage of 
coming from a single period (and a single set of prevailing circumstances).  
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support for the radical left, and mitigate the possible criticism that these policy preferences 
are the product of persuasion effects arising from pre-existing support for a radical left 
political actor.  
3.2.4: Alternative Case Studies 
The German, American, and British case studies in my thesis represent three examples of 
radical left political actors, with each of these case studies serving a different function: 
Germany as the ‘classic’ case study, akin to those in existing literature in this field; the US case 
study examining voting for a radical left political actor in an intra-party context, and thus 
addressing the persuasion effect of Democratic Party attachments; the UK using panel data to 
separate over time potential persuasion effects of the Corbyn-led Labour Party from voters’ 
policy preferences. Yet these three case studies do not represent the full range of radical left 
political actors. In this sub-section, I will address some other well-known radical left political 
actors, and answer the question of why they do not feature in my analysis.  
The radical left Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece have previously been mentioned in 
this thesis; in particular in the literature review, where they have featured in other analyses of 
radical left political actors. Yet they do not feature as case studies.  
The reason Podemos is not included is because the Spanish election study – Centro de 
Investigacione Sociólogicas – does not include measures of populism or policy preferences 
relating to economic, cultural, and migration policy.12 This means I am unable to include this 
case study in my policy-proximity and populism-based analysis of radical left support. 
Furthermore, as a reasonably established radical left political actor – certainly to a greater 
extent than the radical left in the UK and US case studies – there is potential for voters to have 
pre-existing support for or attachments to Podemos, from which there would be a risk of 
persuasion effects causing voters to alter policy preferences and populist attitudes into line 
with this political actor.  
 
12 Closest reference to policy preferences in Spanish election surveys is a single question asking 
respondents to place themselves on a left/right scale which does not specifically refer to economic 
policy preferences. Respondents then judge their position based on econ and non-econ preferences, 
whereas I want to separate the impacts of econ and non-econ policy-proximity.  
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Similar reasons prevent SYRIZA from featuring in my analysis. The ELNES is the Greek 
election survey; however, this also does not meet the requirements for my thesis. Specifically, 
it includes no measures of cultural policy preferences and very limited data on economic and 
migration policy preferences. However, requirements are met by this election survey’s battery 
of populism questions, which broadly mirror those used in each of my three case studies. The 
lack of survey data in Greece forms a practical reason why support for SYRIZA is not 
examined in my thesis. In addition to this, again there are potential persuasion effects arising 
from pre-existing support for this political actor. Difficulties working around that possible 
persuasion form another reason not to include this case study in my thesis.  
Other radical left political actors also fall foul of their national election surveys when 
considered for inclusion in my thesis, including the French radical left La France Insoumise, for 
example, with France’s election study being comparatively tiny in terms of responses – 
numbering at only 1,830 (Gougou & Sauger, 2017), and likely dropping significantly once non-
responses are excluded. Furthermore, this election study contains a rather limited range of 
questions on economic attitudes of respondents. Survey data which does not meet the 
requirements for my analysis is what prevents a French case study. In terms of persuasion 
effects, it might be possible with this relatively new political actor to employ similar controls 
to those used with the UK case study, and draw measures of policy preferences and populism 
from before this political actor existed or became prominent. However, this cannot happen 
with unsuitable survey data.  
The lack of survey data was the issue preventing a French case study. However, this is not the 
case with the Dutch radical left Socialistische Partij (SP). The Netherlands features survey data 
– the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) – which includes measures of economic, 
cultural, and migration policy preferences, levels of populism, and measures of radical left 
support. However, the SP has also received a great deal of attention from previous research, 
for example the research of Akkerman et al. (2014; 2017). The previous attention the Dutch 
radical left has received causes me to consider other radical left political actors which have 
received less coverage.  
Survey data is a major determining factor when including case studies in my thesis. A great 
deal of research similar to mine has utilised data from the European Social Survey (Rooduijn, 
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et al., 2017; Ramiro, 2016; Visser, et al., 2014). However, I do not use ESS data in my thesis. I 
previously discussed this research which used ESS data in the literature review, under voter-
level accounts of the radical left. The ESS includes some measures relating to policy 
preferences; however, a major downside of this survey data relative to my requirements is its 
lack of questions relating to populist attitudes. Consequently, the ESS does not meet all data 
requirements, and thus cannot make up for the deficiencies identified in the country-specific 
surveys present in Greece and Spain, as well as others.  
The chief concern highlighted here in the case selection process is the availability of suitable 
survey data. The three case studies in my thesis all come with appropriate survey data, 
including indication of voter policy preferences on all three dimensions, their populist 
attitudes, and support for the radical left. In addition to this, I have shown how in two of my 
case studies – the US and UK cases – I separate potential radical left persuasion effects from 
voters’ policy preferences or populism. Other case studies discussed here might have been 
able to fill the role of Die Linke in my thesis, as they are also established radical left political 
parties. However, the fact they exist in countries without suitable survey data excludes them 
from appearing as case studies in my thesis.  
3.2.5: Case Study Comparison 
In this final sub-section, I return to the case studies which do feature in my thesis. Specifically, 
drawing out the differences between these cases, but also the crucial set of similarities that 
form the core of my investigation into support for the radical left.  
The three case studies differ by dependent variable, with the German and UK cases looking 
at radical left evaluations, but the US case looking at vote choices. Then there is the cross-
sectional nature of the German and US analysis, versus the panel-based over-time UK case 
study. Also, the cases differ by their wider party contexts: Germany being a multiparty 
system, the US a two-party system, and the UK a limited multiparty system with two 
dominant parties. Finally, there are some differences in survey questions that I draw upon, 
especially when testing cultural policy-proximity. I fully acknowledge these differences, but 
these raise the question of how comparable my findings are across these cases.  
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Some of these differences do alter my analysis slightly. For example, the different dependent 
variables between the German/UK cases and the US case is something I have to account for 
when discussing results. Additionally, robustness testing of cultural policy-proximity from 
the stripped back set of survey measures addresses differences in questions building this 
dimension. Whereas the cross-sectional versus panel-based difference is also something I 
make clear when interpreting results, and brings the advantage in the UK case of more 
rigorously addressing persuasion effects.  
Overriding these points, however, are the common expectations across the three case studies 
which fundamentally unite them. Regardless of the foibles of case context, small alterations 
in design, and noteworthy points when interpreting results, my research remains the same in 
terms of the practical tests of both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. I still test 
how far radical left support is explained by policy-proximity and populist attitudes, and as 
such I remain able to draw broad conclusions in relation to both these accounts.  
My reliance on secondary survey data, which is non-uniform in the questions asked, 
inevitably introduces differences between these three cases. But adopting the approach I have 
here, which respects and accounts for some of the differences in this secondary survey data, 
arguably produces stronger tests of both theories in each case study. The alternative would be 
I, for example, measure radical left support via vote choices in the German and UK cases, to 
match the US case. However, pursuing this course would lead to a disadvantageous trade-off, 
sacrificing theoretical and empirical clarity for the sake of greater case similarity. Furthermore, 
the common expectations across my cases when testing policy-proximity and populism allow 
for comparable results. From that point I can still draw wider conclusions that reflect on both 
those accounts, and provide an answer to my research question.  
3.3: Research Design Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed two major areas of my thesis: the overall methodology, and the 
case studies. To summarise what I said about methodology first, surveys provide voter-level 
data from which I observe whether voters with particular policy preferences or levels of 
populism are more supportive of radical left political actors. I also explained grouping of 
survey respondents here, based on their policy preferences and populist attitudes. Grouping 
90 
 
respondents enables me to readily observe non-linear relationships between these variables 
and radical left support, should they exist. I do not necessarily expect non-linear relationships, 
although this is something I discuss further in each of my three case study chapters. I also 
explained the use of regressions, which are the primary means of analysis in my thesis, with 
control variables also included in these regressions in order to provide a more accurate picture 
of the roles of policy preferences and populism.  
Following that, I discussed the case studies. This section was important in many ways, 
including justifying why it is the radical left in Germany, the US, and UK which feature in my 
thesis and not others. I also showed how these three case studies each make contributions, 
including addressing the issue of persuasion effects.  
The German case study acts as the classic case study with its focus on a radical left political 
party – Die Linke. However, the established nature of this political party means I cannot 
separate its persuasion effects from voters’ policy preferences or populist attitudes. The US 
and UK case studies were set out in response to this charge. The US case study addresses this 
by looking at a radical left political actor in an intra-party context – the Sanders campaign in 
the 2016 Democratic Party presidential primaries. In the UK case study, looking at the UK 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I use panel data to thoroughly separate possible 
persuasion effects from voters’ policy preferences. I do this by taking measures of policy 
preferences from before Labour’s radical left shift under Corbyn’s leadership, and thus before 
a radical left actor was around to potentially cause persuasion. As I explained earlier in my 
thesis, mitigating persuasion effects is not only an important contribution to existing research, 
but it also means the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support are more 








Chapter 4: The Radical Left in Germany 
 
4.0: Introduction 
The first case study investigates policy-proximity and populism-based motivations behind 
radical left support in Germany. The radical left political actor examined here is Die Linke. 
Developing and evolving out of the far-left politics of the GDR, Die Linke remains a significant 
political force in Germany today, currently holding 69 seats in the Bundestag. Furthermore, 
relative to other political actors within Germany, I show how Die Linke is a radical left political 
actor.  
Die Linke’s ideology is the main justification for deeming this political party to be radical left. 
I show how Die Linke propose more radical policies, particularly on economics, compared to 
other left-wing political actors in Germany. In contrast to the other case studies in this thesis, 
Die Linke is an established radical left political party, rather than a primaries candidacy or a 
shifting political party.  
I divide this chapter into four parts. The first section will contextualise Die Linke. In this section 
I will discuss the place of Die Linke within German politics. The objective of this section is to 
argue that Die Linke is the radical left political actor in Germany, meeting the minimal 
definition of the radical left. That minimal definition defines the radical left by their opposition 
towards contemporary capitalist economic norms within their context. This section contrasts 
their more radically left-wing policies with those of the centre-left Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD), and the culturally-liberal Green Party of Germany. In addition to 
qualitative analysis of party manifestos, I draw quantitative support for Die Linke’s radical 
leftism from the Chapel Hill expert surveys.  
In the second part of this chapter, I outline the research design of the German case study. This 
shows how I measure support for Die Linke based on the policy preferences and levels of 
populism of survey respondents in Germany. I draw these responses from the German 
Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). I outline which questions are used to measure economic, 
cultural, and migration policy preferences of respondents. I also show which questions I use 
to derive levels of populism amongst voters, and how I measure support for the radical left 
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Die Linke. I also state control variables here, with these guided by other accounts of electoral 
support in Germany.  
Following this, I discuss empirical expectations for the German case study in the third part of 
this chapter. I draw case-specific expectations relating to the policy-proximity and populism-
based accounts. Consequently, expectations in this chapter are specific to the German case 
study.  
The fourth and final part of this chapter is an analysis section. I use linear regressions to 
present support for Die Linke, from GLES respondents grouped according to their policy 
preferences and levels of populism. I present results of the German case study here. Overall, 
I find little evidence to support the populism-based account of radical left support. However, 
I find support for the policy-proximity account across all three policy dimensions – 
particularly on the economic policy dimension. Relative to voters identified in the centre of 
the policy dimensions, I find higher Die Linke evaluations from voters in proximity with this 
political actor, and lower appraisals for Die Linke from the spatially-distant respondents.  
4.1: Contextualising Die Linke 
To begin, I will discuss the German political context in which Die Linke competes. I will also 
consider here the policy stances of Die Linke, relative to their main counterparts on the left – 
the SPD and the Green Party. This section will first provide context for the German political 
system, including the background of Die Linke, and more generally of the left in Germany. 
This section will first include more qualitative evidence, considering party manifestos and 
policy documents to identify what left-wing parties stand for in Germany. More quantitative 
evidence follows that, which includes placements of Die Linke and other political actors by the 
Chapel Hill expert surveys, along the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions.  
The overall purpose here is to show that Die Linke conforms with the minimal definition of the 
radical left,13 as challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms with these 
norms including policies such as fiscal austerity, privatisation, and low taxes. In respect to the 
 
13 This involves party-level comparison of left-wing German parties. The party-level is where I can 
identify Die Linke’s challenge to the contemporary economic norms of the German context. The radical 
left and radical right may draw on similar pools of voters; however, this comparison lies at the voter-
level, rather than the party-level, and consequently does not help draw out this actor’s radical leftism.  
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German context, I identify Die Linke as more left-wing than the SPD. I also show Die Linke to 
propose distinctly radical economic policies, including strong anti-corporate, pro-worker, and 
anti-austerity themes, in contrast to the more moderate economic policies and rhetoric 
emanating from the SPD and the Greens.  
4.1.1: Development of Die Linke 
Rebranded as Die Linke in 2007, the radical left in Germany has evolved significantly since the 
country’s reunification in 1990. Previously known as the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus 
(PDS), and before that a branch of the East German ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands (SED), Die Linke’s roots go back to the former GDR. Democratisation and 
moderation within the SED forced longstanding East German leader Erich Honecker from 
office (Sarotte, 2014). It was from this moderation that the SED shifted from a rigidly Marxist-
Leninist political organisation, to become the PDS.  
Rebranding as the PDS was part of the party’s evolution following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
This evolution also included the expulsion of many former political figures of the GDR. The 
PDS officially repudiated the ‘Stalinist’ system following a party conference at the end of 1989 
(Priestland, 2010; Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2011).  
The PDS was a divided force, still offering a stridently anti-capitalist message, but including 
factional divisions between pragmatists, modern (Marxist) socialists, and the ‘old left’. These 
divisions resulted in a long-running struggle over the political programme of the PDS (Segert, 
2002). The result of this struggle was the PDS evolving, away from the SED’s extreme left 
Communism, to become what March and Mudde describe as a ‘democratic socialist’ party 
(March & Mudde, 2005); this ‘democratic socialism’ being to the left of social democracy, 
adhering to democratic principles, but still advocating for systematic overhaul both through 
grassroots democracy, and through rejection of capitalism (March & Mudde, 2005).  
Die Linke was born out of the PDS, in combination with SPD defector group Arbeit und soziale 
Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (WASG), in 2005. This unified the anti-capitalism of the PDS 
with radical disaffection from the centre-left SPD in WASG, forming a new political alliance 
in an effort to broaden appeal outside of the former GDR. Die Linke has since become a fixture 
of the Bundestag, meeting Germany’s 5% electoral threshold in successive elections since the 
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party began. However, despite efforts to broaden appeal for the party, most support for Die 
Linke comes from regions which were formerly part of the GDR.  
Despite Die Linke’s connections with the East German ruling party, they do not advocate the 
Communism seen from ‘extreme left’ political actors. Die Linke is not an extreme left political 
actor anymore, but rather a radical left one as a result of this party’s moderation which took 
place decades ago. This radical leftism is a consequence of Die Linke’s left-wing policy agenda, 
which is radical relative to the positions of other German political actors. I explain Die Linke’s 
radical policies in greater detail in the next part.  
4.1.2: The Radicalism of Die Linke 
In Die Linke’s policy document, approved by their membership in 2011, there are numerous 
statements of economic policy preferences and proposals. These policies conform with the 
minimal definition, demonstrating a challenge to the contemporary capitalist economic norms 
within Germany, further showing Die Linke to be a radical left political actor.  
Among Die Linke’s economic proposals is reintroducing a wealth tax, increasing inheritance 
tax, and redistributing income from the richest to the poorest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). Die Linke 
state the purpose of these policies is to mitigate inequality, which the party says is the 
inevitable outcome of the current capitalist economic system (Die Linke, 2011, p. 5). Criticisms 
of capitalism are included throughout this policy document, which is characterised as an 
economic system which has only served to increase the profits of corporations, and the wealth 
of the richest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 4). Critique of these contemporary capitalist economic norms 
I observe here is part of the minimal definition of the radical left. More specifically, this 
criticism focuses on negatives of capitalism, including ecological damage, inequality, and 
undermining of democracy. However, language of ‘overcoming’ and ‘transcending’ 
capitalism is present in Die Linke’s policy document, rather than of replacing or abolishing 
capitalism in its entirety. In fact, the only discussion of ‘abolition’ is in relation to exploitation 
under capitalism, with this followed first by criticism of the Soviet-promoted alternative and 
second by proposal of their ‘democratic socialist’ alternative (Die Linke, 2011, p. 27). Crucially, 
Die Linke’s criticism of capitalism is in line with the minimal definition of the radical left. 
Furthermore, their denunciation of communism separates Die Linke from being a far left 
political actor. Instead, Die Linke present their ‘democratic socialist’ alternative.  
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Die Linke’s alternative includes removal of basic provision (e.g., energy, water, housing, 
health) from ‘capitalist profiteering’, with these instead being ‘publicly organised and 
guaranteed’ (Die Linke, 2011, p. 31). What Die Linke seem to be proposing here is a wider range 
of nationalised services and institutions. However, and further separating Die Linke from the 
far left, they do not indicate wholesale opposition towards private property. They are 
supportive of privately-owned small and medium-sized businesses, and propose merely 
greater regulation of larger banking sector businesses (Die Linke, 2011, pp. 38-39).  
Die Linke’s ‘democratic socialist’ alternative also includes policies targeting the rich and 
private corporations, such as an increase in capital gains tax (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41), a ‘large 
increase’ in the top rate of income tax (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41), and a requirement for company 
bosses to report financial assets held overseas (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41). Combined with these 
policies, which are clearly targeted at the wealthy, are policies of tax relief for middle- and 
low-income workers (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). The overall vision Die Linke present for tax and 
redistributive policy is one which limits the wealth and wealth accumulation of the rich, while 
seeking to benefit the poorest in society (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7).  
From these taxation policies and redistributive agenda, a clear pillar of Die Linke’s economic 
policy is egalitarianism. Egalitarianism itself is not unusual on the left. The centre-left are 
identified by March as also adhering to the overall commitment to equality, but the radical 
left is distinguished by a radicalisation of this belief (March, 2012). To see whether Die Linke 
have radicalised egalitarianism further than their centre-left counterparts, I look to the 
mainstream SPD, to examine the extent of this party’s egalitarianism.  
I also discussed this in the literature review, to demonstrate how the radical left differs from 
its more moderate centre left counterpart. The concept of equality is itself divided between 
commitments to ‘Equality of Opportunity’, and ‘Equality of Outcome’. I see the latter from 
Die Linke, with their redistributionist policies and strident targeting of the richest in favour of 
society’s poorest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 38). From the SPD, their current ‘Hamburg Programme’ 
(ratified in 2007) indicates this centre-left political actor pursuing equality of opportunity 
instead (SPD, 2007, p. 7). This is a rather more moderate position, not targeting the wealthy 
explicitly and merely offering support for equal opportunities for education, employment, and 
social security. There is no explicit commitment to redistribute wealth in the SPD’s platform, 
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which differentiates this party’s more moderate egalitarian policy from the more radical 
proposals of Die Linke. Furthermore, from the previous German election in 2017, the respective 
manifestos of Die Linke and the SPD demonstrated the former’s radicalism over the latter, with 
Die Linke’s redistributionist policies in response to the notion that ‘Inequality is Unsocial’ (Die 
Linke, 2017, pp. 37-39), in contrast to the SPD’s emphasis of social equality over economic 
redistribution (SPD, 2017).  
Another pillar of the radical left’s economic policy concerns the issue of ownership. The 
radical left favours public ownership, opposing privatisation and supporting worker 
collectives and the role of the state instead (Fagerholm, 2015). Die Linke’s policy document 
conforms with radical left beliefs on this issue (Die Linke, 2011, p. 5), including my earlier 
comments on the party’s commitment to publicly organise and guarantee basic provisions  
(Die Linke, 2011, p. 31). All this supports my argument in favour of Die Linke as the radical 
left in Germany. By contrast, the SPD makes no similar commitments to worker collectives 
and public ownership in the ‘Hamburg Programme’, again showing the SPD to be more 
moderately left-wing relative to Die Linke.  
A further key feature of radical left economic policy is their complete opposition to policies of 
fiscal austerity. I would observe this with statements opposing spending cuts, and 
commitments to increase spending on public services. To analyse how far Die Linke conforms 
with this, I look for anti-austerity statements in their policy programme. I also look for 
commitment to increase spending on public services, such as on healthcare, infrastructure, 
and education.  
The SPD’s policy programme makes some scattered and somewhat vague claims supporting 
further funding for public services, with some language even suggesting support for fiscal 
restraint (SPD, 2007, p. 26). In contrast, Die Linke make statements highly critical of spending 
cuts (Die Linke, 2011, p. 22), promising to reverse these with significantly increased 
government funding (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). The anti-austerity nature of Die Linke is well 
documented, with observation of this emanating from Die Linke in previous literature 
(Hartleb, 2015; Scholl & Freyberg-Inan, 2018; Hudson, 2015; Patton, 2017). These previous 
observations provide further evidence for Die Linke’s opposition to austerity, which, combined 
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with equivocation from the SPD, shows additional disparity between these two parties in 
terms of how left-wing they both are.  
In three ways I have shown Die Linke’s economic policy stances to challenge contemporary 
economic norms: specifically, on the issues of egalitarianism, ownership, and government 
spending. On these issues, I have shown Die Linke to consistently take more radically left-wing 
positions than the mainstream-left SPD on economic issues. The economic policies of the SPD 
do not represent as systematic a challenge to contemporary capitalist economic norms as the 
policies presented by Die Linke. According to Die Linke themselves, the SPD has converged 
with the German centre-right on economics. In particular, Die Linke notes the SPD’s 
abandonment of anti-capitalist economic and social realignment since the late 1950s, leaving 
Die Linke as the sole major German political party to challenge these capitalist economic norms 
(Die Linke, 2011, p. 11).  
So far, I have drawn parallels between Die Linke and the SPD, to show the former to be on the 
radical left of German politics. Die Linke’s economic policies conform with the minimal 
definition, showing a challenge to contemporary capitalist economic norms, while the 
mainstream SPD have not made the same commitments. However, the German left does not 
solely consist of these two political parties. Also present here is the Green Party. Broader 
consideration of the German left follows.  
4.1.3: The German Left: Beyond Die Linke 
The modern German left consists of three major political parties – the SPD, Greens, and Die 
Linke. The SPD represents the largest of these political parties, having also historically been a 
governing party of Germany both before and since reunification. However, the SPD’s leftism 
became more moderate in the face of anti-Communism, and major electoral defeats against 
Chancellor Adenauer in 1953 and 1957, which both resulted in the SPD’s convergence. The 
SPD then adopted the ‘Godesberg Programme’, which accepted Adenauer’s market 
economics, rejected nationalisation, repudiated the goal of replacing capitalism, and 
renounced Marxist theories of materialism and class struggle (SPD, 1959; Dyson, 1975). This 
began the course for the SPD to be a moderated left-wing force in Germany – something 
demonstrated with previous analysis of their economic policies.  
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This leaves the SPD as a moderate-left party, with support from the liberal, left-wing middle 
classes, and historical but fading support from working class Germans (Gingrich & 
Häusermann, 2015; Bremer, 2017). Having separated Die Linke from the SPD in terms of their 
roles on the left of German politics, I will now consider the leftism of the Green Party.  
The Green Party (aka Grünen) also deviates from Die Linke. Originally founded in 1980, the 
current Green Party’s economic policies do not include the anti-corporate, pro-worker 
attitudes seen from Die Linke. Instead, this party has undergone a re-orientation, adopting 
radically liberal cultural policies, accompanying their longstanding ecologist politics. 
However, I argue that the Green Party are not a radical left political actor.  
The Green Party in Germany falls closer to what Kitschelt called the ‘left-libertarians’ 
(Kitschelt, 1988). These political actors are left-wing through their support for solidarity and 
equality, with libertarianism through their rejection of centralised bureaucracy, and support 
for individual autonomy and self-governance (Kitschelt, 1988, p. 197). Between what Luke 
March writes about the radical left, and what Kitschelt writes about these ‘left-libertarians’, 
there are key differences separating Die Linke from the German Green Party.  
The minimal definition of the radical left reflects the first of these differences. This states the 
radical left are challengers to contemporary economic norms within their respective contexts. 
Crucially, the defining feature of the radical left is their economic policies. Whereas, for the 
‘left-libertarian’ Green Party radical left economic policies are not their defining feature. 
Historically, their defining issue is the politicisation of environmental politics; however, 
environmental politics could not remain the Green Party’s only major policy area. When other 
parties began to formulate their own ecologist platforms the Greens had to adapt and expand 
their platform in order to remain electorally competitive. To do this, the party evolved, 
remaining outspoken advocates on environmentalist politics, but more recently also adopting 
radical stances on cultural issues (Blühdorn, 2009).  
The Green Party’s cultural policies centre around policies of equality of opportunity, social 
emancipation, and the encouragement and enablement of the social state (Blühdorn, 2009). 
The Green Party adopted this new policy direction in their ‘Nuremberg Resolution’, which 
stated the three pillars of their cultural policies to be ‘access to employment, access to 
education and social goods, and the financial safeguarding of existence’ (Bündnis 90/Die 
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Grünen, 2007). Furthermore, the Green Party’s cultural policies are fundamentally libertarian, 
with vocal support for drug legalisation (Green Party of Germany, 2019a); feminism (Green 
Party of Germany, 2019b), support for LGBT rights (Green Party of Germany, 2019c), and 
statements supporting diversity and free expression (Green Party of Germany, 2019d; Green 
Party of Germany, 2019e). Economics, by contrast, has not been as distinctive an issue for the 
Green Party in recent elections (Williams, et al., 2017). Based on this, it becomes difficult to 
reconcile the Green Party with the minimal definition of the radical left.  
What the Green Party then represents is a party which is relatively moderate in some respects, 
including economic policy, but radical in terms of their cultural policies. This is a product of 
the party emphasising particular issues: in this case, environmental and cultural issues. Parties 
like this will tend to be more radical on the issues they emphasise, and more moderate on 
their less emphasised issues. The same is the case for the radical right AfD, who as a radical 
right actor emphasise migration policy (Mudde, 2007, p. 22), where they pursue radically 
nativist policies (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017, pp. 57-64), but are more moderate in terms 
of their economic policies (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017).14 Furthermore, these stances can 
change over time: the Green Party in Germany demonstrate this, by adopting more radical 
cultural policies in response to the widespread politicisation of the environment (Blühdorn, 
2009).  
The Green Party in Germany does not neglect economics entirely. The Green Party justifies its 
economic policies on environmental sustainability, in contrast to Die Linke’s push towards 
equality of outcome, anti-austerity policies, and public ownership. The Green Party also 
makes commitments towards redistribution regarding taxation policy, expressing the broad 
left-wing commitment towards greater equality, but without the radical, anti-corporate and 
pro-worker case for their economic stances identified from Die Linke earlier (Green Party of 
Germany, 2019g; Green Party of Germany, 2019h). These economic policy differences between 
Die Linke and the Green Party lead me to conclude that the former conforms with the minimal 
definition, with the latter falling short of challenging contemporary capitalist economic 
norms.  
 
14 AfD’s economic policies moderate by being both pro-free market and anti-privatisation (without 
public consent), (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017, p. 66; p. 68).  
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4.1.4: Quantitative Assessments of Spatial Locations 
So far this account of political actors has been purely qualitative, considering the policy 
documents of Die Linke, the SPD, and the Green Party. Quantitative evidence, considering the 
respective policy positions of all German political actors, can further build the case of Die 
Linke’s radical leftism. I make a more quantitative case now. These quantitative assessments 
can also provide some idea of the positions of Die Linke, and other German political parties, 
on all three policy dimensions considered under the policy-proximity account.  
The Chapel Hill expert surveys show where sixteen political analysts place parties on separate 
policy scales for each dimension. These political analysts were asked questions about party 
economic, cultural, and migration policy positions, as well as positions on other policy 
dimensions, with further questions on how populist parties are, and the balance of power 
between members and leadership (Polk, et al., 2017).  
I include the list of questions used from the Chapel Hill expert surveys in Appendix 1.0. To 
briefly allude to the questions which I use, Chapel Hill asks where parties fall on policy 
dimensions, how clear parties are on their policies in a given area, and how important these 
policy areas are to a given party. The former set of questions are what I use here, as they 
provide an impression of party positions on these three dimensions.  
The Chapel Hill surveys provide an idea of Die Linke’s position on each policy dimension. 
With this, I can state expectations for the policy-proximity account by considering which 
voters are closer and further from Die Linke’s position. The German political parties analysed 
in the Chapel Hill expert surveys come from both right and left of the political spectrum. To 
understand the full policy space, and the positions they occupy, I present them all on an 
economic policy scale, a cultural policy scale, and a scale of migration policy positions.  
First, the economic positions of Die Linke. In Figure 4.1 I include the average position of Die 
Linke from across the Chapel Hill expert survey respondents. I include Die Linke’s position 
alongside the averaged locations of other German political parties, for the sake of comparison. 










In Figure 4.1, the Chapel Hill surveys show Die Linke to be markedly more economically left-
wing than all other political actors in Germany. I distinguish the radical left by their leftism 
on economic policy, with Figure 4.1 providing further evidence for Die Linke’s radical leftism 
relative to the German context. Earlier in this chapter, I showed how Die Linke’s economic 
policies are more radically left-wing than those offered by both the Green Party and SPD. The 
Chapel Hill expert surveys reflect this earlier observation, with the respective positions of all 
three of these political parties in Figure 4.1. 
I will look back at Figure 4.1, and others conveying Die Linke’s spatial positions according to 
the Chapel Hill expert surveys, later in this chapter when I state expectations under the policy-
proximity account for radical left support in Germany.  
In Figure 4.2, I provide the cultural policy positions of German political parties. Again, these 
are according to the Chapel Hill expert surveys, with the placement of each party representing 







Figure 4.2 shows Die Linke to be slightly to the liberal side of the centre of this policy space. 
Although economics is the continuing theme throughout Die Linke’s policy document, there 
Figure 4.1: Economic Policy Positions of Die Linke according to the 2017 Chapel Hill 
Expert Surveys 




are also statements showing the party’s support for LGBT rights (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51), drug 
legalisation (Die Linke, 2011, p. 44), and pro-choice stances on abortion (Die Linke, 2011, p. 
50). Consequently, Die Linke’s place to the liberal side of the centre makes sense here. The 
Green Party are notably liberal in Figure 4.2, which also conforms with the cultural policies 
identified from this political actor mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although the radical left 
are not defined by cultural policies, it is possible support for these political actors is associated 
with proximity to voters’ preferences on this policy dimension.  
Figure 4.2 also estimates Die Linke’s position to be similar to both the SDP and FDP on this 
dimension. This may create issues were I looking at radical left support expressed via vote 
choice questions, where proximity-based support would conceivably go to any of these three 
parties from moderately-liberal voters on this dimension. However, as I examine the effects 
of proximity on support via evaluation questions, I can still observe support for Die Linke 
without proximity with these other parties being problematic.  
Figure 4.3 shows positions of German political parties on the migration policy dimension, 







The Chapel Hill expert surveys placed Die Linke to the inclusive side of the migration policy 
space, falling between the slightly more migrant-inclusive Greens, and the slightly less 
migrant-inclusive SPD. Like cultural policy, migration policy is not a defining issue of the 
radical left. However, as with the cultural policy dimension, the purpose of including the 
migration dimension is to examine whether support for the radical left is explained by voter-
actor policy-proximity on this dimension.  




Like their cultural policies, the migration policies of Die Linke are not discussed as thoroughly 
as their economic policy stances. But there is a section of Die Linke’s policy document which 
calls for ‘open borders for persons in need’ (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51). Die Linke also oppose 
migration policy which grants social and political rights to immigrants purely based on 
economic need, tying migration policy to economics while also demonstrating migrant-
inclusiveness (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51).  
The migrant-inclusive positions of the Green Party and SPD in this policy space also conforms 
with the statements each party has made on migration policy (SPD, 2007, p. 20; Green Party 
of Germany, 2019f). Additionally, as with Figure 4.2, the relative closeness of Die Linke with 
other parties – here the Greens and SPD – is not as problematic here because I examine support 
via evaluation questions, rather than vote choices.  
Chapel Hill’s quantitative evidence also brings this contextualising section to a conclusion. I 
have argued in this section that Die Linke is a radical left political actor in the German context. 
I have also drawn this political actor close to the minimal definition, demonstrating this 
political actor’s challenge to the contemporary capitalist economic norms within Germany. 
Comparison was also made with the converged SPD and the less economically-radical Green 
Party, showing how, relative to the wider left-wing political parties in Germany, Die Linke is 
a radical left political actor.  
4.2: Research Design: Data and Measurement 
The German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) provides data to examine this case study. In 
this section, I will explain which survey from the GLES is used, which questions provide 
measurement of voter economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences, which questions 
show me how populist these voters are, and how radical left support is measured.  
The ‘GLES 2017 Pre- and Post-election Cross Section’ is the source of my data. This survey 
contains a total of 4,291 observations,15 from people who were asked questions through a face-
to-face interview (Roßteutscher, et al., 2019). This is a two-wave rolling cross section, with 
different respondents in each wave. Data is pooled between the pre-election and post-election 
 
15 Pre-election n = 2,179, post-election n = 2,112 
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waves. Policy-proximity and populism-based support for the radical left in Germany is 
primarily determined from this pooled data.  
At the heart of my thesis is the need to measure radical left support. In the German case study, 
I measure support for Die Linke from a question asking respondents to evaluate them on a 
scale from +5 to -5. +5 signifies a respondent who has a high opinion of the political actor, with 
-5 signifying a respondent with a negative opinion of the political actor. I include the wording 
of the dependent variable question in Appendix 1.0, alongside all other questions used from 
the GLES surveys.  
The GLES survey asks respondents to evaluate all German political parties, but I only consider 
responses evaluating Die Linke on this +5 to -5 scale. The objective with these responses is to 
examine whether higher evaluations for Die Linke come from voters in close spatial proximity 
with this political actor on three policy dimensions, or from voters who are identified as 
populists.  
I primarily draw results in this chapter from pooled pre-election and post-election responses. 
However, in addition to results from pooled data, I also provide separated pre-election and 
post-election results in the Appendix. Under Appendix 1.4 are pre- and post-election results 
from economic policy groups. Pre- and post-election cultural policy results are under 
Appendix 1.5. Migration pre- and post-election results are under Appendix 1.6.  
4.2.1: GLES: Economic Policy Measures 
Understanding the policy preferences of voters is crucial to measuring policy-proximity 
support for the radical left. What I will detail here is how I measure the economic policy 
preferences of each GLES respondent. Three questions in the GLES survey provide 
measurement of the economic policy preferences of respondents.  
The first two of these questions ask respondents how far they agree with statements in the 
GLES’ ‘Issues Battery’. The five-point Likert scale of responses goes from ‘Strongly Agree’ to 
‘Strongly Disagree’. I draw two economics-related statements from the ‘Issues Battery’, asking 
how far they believe the government should not intervene in the economy, and how far they 
believe the government should take measures to reduce income inequality. Support for 
government economic intervention and measures to reduce income inequality would indicate 
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a left-wing respondent on this dimension, with right-wing respondents taking the opposite 
views. The third and final question used to measure voters’ economic policy preferences 
relates to a 1–11 economic scale. Voters are asked to locate themselves on this 1–11 scale. 1 
indicates favouring lower taxes and less social services, and a response of 11 indicates support 
for more social services and higher taxes.  
Responses to the two ‘Issues Battery’ questions are recoded to match the 1-11 economic self-
placement scale question. I calculate the average of each respondents’ answers to these three 
questions, and with this average I place each respondent into an economic policy group.  
Alongside the test of the policy-proximity account with these policy groups, I also test this 
account with a second set of groups, which I refer to as ‘proximity groups’. To create this 
second set of groups, I draw upon a question similar to the self-placement 1-11 scale. This 
alternate question asks respondents to place political parties on this same scale, rather than to 
place themselves. I combine responses to the party-placement variant of this question with 
self-placement economic policy scale responses. By subtracting respondent self-placement 
from their Die Linke placement I gain a measure of their proximity with Die Linke on this 
dimension. A smaller number from this calculation indicates less difference between self-
placement and Die Linke placement, signifying closer spatial proximity. With these calculated 
differences, I form a series of ‘proximity groups’ each reflecting different levels of proximity 
on the economic policy dimension. 
I include all three questions on voters’ economic policy preferences, and the fourth question 
detailed here relating to party-placement on economics, in Appendix 1.0. I then test the policy-
proximity account with two alternate models – one with the proximity groups, and the other 
with the economic policy groups.  
4.2.2: GLES: Cultural policy Measures 
I use two questions to ascertain preferences from GLES respondents on cultural policy. I draw 
both questions from the ‘Issues Battery’ referenced previously. Again, the GLES asked 
respondents to place themselves onto a five-point scale from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly 
Disagree’. For the sake of consistency across policy scales, these responses are also recoded 
onto a 1–11 scale, like economic policy preferences.  
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The first of these questions asks respondents how far they agree or disagree with a statutory 
quota on women on supervisory boards of large companies. The second of these questions 
concerns same-sex marriage. In response to these questions, I would expect culturally-liberal 
respondents to agree with both questions, with culturally-conservative respondents 
disagreeing with same-sex marriage and quotas on women on company boards. Again, I 
include these questions in Appendix 1.0.  
Both of these questions measure cultural policy preferences of respondents, with no other 
alternative questions in the GLES. The GLES also includes an ‘Authoritarian/Libertarian’ 
measure, which would seem to suit my purposes here but actually asks respondents about 
their views on immigration, and therefore I do not use this to determine cultural policy 
preferences. The limited range of questions measuring cultural policy preferences of 
respondents is not ideal. However, the two other case studies in my thesis include more 
measures of cultural policy preferences.  
Unlike on economics, the GLES does not include questions measuring self-placement and 
party-placement on a 1–11 cultural policy scale. As a consequence, I cannot form proximity 
groups on this policy dimension.  
As with responses to economic policy questions, I also average the responses across the two 
cultural policy questions. With this average, I place each respondent into a cultural policy 
group reflecting their position on this dimension.  
4.2.3: GLES: Migration Policy Measures 
For indication of the migration policy preferences of GLES respondents, I use three GLES 
questions. Two of these questions come from the ‘Issues Battery’, the first of which asks 
respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that immigrants should 
assimilate into German culture. The second question used from the ‘Issues Battery’ asks 
respondents how far they agree or disagree with an annual limit on the number of refugees 
entering Germany (aka Obergrenze). Opposition towards assimilation and towards the 
Obergrenze would indicate a migrant-inclusive respondent. The third question used to 
measure migration policy preferences of voters is another 1-11 scale – the 
‘Authoritarian/Libertarian’ question mentioned previously. Akin to the economic 1–11 scale, 
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this migration policy scale also includes a self-placement question where the GLES asks 
respondents to place themselves on a scale from 1 (migrant-inclusive) to 11 (migrant-
exclusive). Responses to the ‘Issues Battery’ questions are rescaled to match the 1-11 migration 
policy scale self-placement question. All three answers to these questions are then averaged, 
with these averages used to group each respondent into one of the migration policy groups.  
The economic policy self-placement and party-placement 1-11 scales are replicated on the 
migration policy dimension. This allows me to again create a series of proximity groups, this 
time based on migration policy. Once again, I subtract each respondent’s self-placement on 
this policy dimension from their placement of Die Linke, yielding a measure of proximity 
which I use to create migration proximity groups.  
The three questions relating to migration policy preferences and the party-placement question 
are all included under Appendix 1.0. This leads to another two-step test of the policy-
proximity account here, with both policy groups and proximity groups constituting alternate 
tests of this account.  
4.2.4: Policy-Proximity: Groups 
I have shown how I draw voter-level economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences 
from the GLES. I have also indicated a further test of the policy-proximity theory, based on 
proximity groups on economic and migration dimensions. There are two approaches when 
testing the policy-proximity account, differentiated as ‘proximity groups’ and ‘policy groups’.  
I group respondents to analyse the role of economic, cultural, and migration policy-proximity 
on radical left support. Recall from the research design that I defended this approach, as it 
allows me to observe possible non-linear relationships.  
There are 5 proximity groups each on economics and migration policy dimensions, going from 
the ‘closest’ proximity group, to the ‘furthest’. Respondents in the ‘closest’ group have the 
smallest difference between their own economic/migration position and where they placed 
Die Linke. Spatial distance from Die Linke then increases up to the ‘furthest’ proximity group. 
Respondents in the ‘furthest’ group have the least proximity between their own positions and 
where they place Die Linke on the economic and migration dimensions.  
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In Table 4.1 are the proximity groups for the German case study. Below the name of the 
proximity groups is the number of respondents in that group.  
 
Few respondents are to the left of Die Linke on economics, or more inclusive on migration 
policy. Therefore, to make groups more comparably-sized, I group respondents who are on 
one side of Die Linke’s position with those located to their other side by a similar magnitude 
on each policy dimension. For example, I group respondents who are three places more 
inclusive than Die Linke on migration policy with respondents who are three places more 
exclusive than this actor. However, this assumes the three-place more inclusive respondents 
will have the same appraisals for this political actor as those who are similarly more exclusive. 
To account for this, under Appendix 1.1 is an expanded table, with five proximity groups to 
each side of Die Linke’s position. With these unfolded proximity groups, I do not group together 
respondents who are, to continue the example, three places more inclusive than Die Linke with 
those who are three places more exclusive than this actor. Instead, they are in separate, 
unfolded proximity groups in Appendix 1.1.  
I also examine Die Linke evaluations from these unfolded proximity groups. However, with 
fewer respondents to Die Linke’s economically-left or migration-inclusive sides compared to 
the right and exclusive sides, the sizes of these unfolded proximity groups are much less 
comparable than those of the folded groups in Table 4.1. The less comparable sizes of the 
unfolded proximity groups cause me to include results from these in the appendix instead of 
the main text. I briefly appraise results from the unfolded proximity groups in the analysis 
section, but primary results from this test of the policy-proximity account come from the 
folded proximity groups stated in Table 4.1.  
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I draw policy groups from the averaged responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy 
questions. As explained in Chapter 3, I group voters in a way which accounts for the non-
uniform distribution of data, and thus avoid creating groups which have a disproportionately 
small number of respondents in them. There are five policy groups on each of the three 
dimensions. I include the policy groups on each of the three dimensions in Table 4.2. Recorded 
below the names of each group is the number of respondents in each group from the pooled 
pre-election and post-election responses. There is disparity between these group sizes, despite 
my earlier claims the grouping methodology16 would make these comparably sized. This 
disparity most likely arises from the distribution of responses to the questions of policy 
preferences. Although not entirely equal in size, without that grouping methodology the sizes 
of these groups would be even more disproportionate. 
 
Finally, the grouping methodology here also means these groups labels are relative to their 
context. For example, respondents in the ‘Centre-Right’ economic policy group hold views on 
this dimension which are moderately right-wing relative to the German context. This nature of 
the groups is consistent across all three case studies, meaning I consistently examine radical 
left support from respondents labelled in a way which is relative to their context.  
 
 
16 R – Quantile function.  





(n = 532) 
Centre-Left 
(n = 584) 
Centrist 
(n = 632) 
Centre-Right 
(n = 473) 
Radical-Right 





(n = 929) 
Moderate-
Liberal 
(n = 506) 
Centrist 
(n = 502) 
Moderate-
Conservative 
(n = 490) 
Radical-
Conservative 





(n = 275) 
Moderate-
Inclusive 
(n = 298) 
Centrist 
(n = 313) 
Moderate-
Exclusive 
(n = 376) 
Radical-
Exclusive 




4.2.5: GLES: Populism Measurement 
In addition to the policy-proximity account, I also investigate how far levels of populism 
amongst voters explain radical left support. I will now explain my application of this theory 
to the German case study.  
As a reminder: populism divides a society into two groups: with the ‘ordinary’ or ‘pure’ 
people opposing the ‘corrupt elite’. Questions which gauge levels of populist sentiments 
amongst voters would ask about attitudes towards ‘elite’ groups, whether they hold a 
Manichaean ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ worldview where the ‘ordinary people’ oppose the ‘elites’, 
and ask whether they support popular sovereignty. Populist voters would oppose ‘elite’ 
groups, would perceive this Manichaean worldview, and would profess support for popular 
sovereignty.  
To measure voter-level populism in the German case study, I utilise six questions from the 
GLES. These questions, included in the ‘Populism & Efficacy’ battery, measure how far voters 
adhere with populism. Again, I include the questions used from this battery in Appendix 1.0, 
alongside other German case study survey questions. But to briefly describe some of these 
questions, they ask respondents how far they believe in political compromises, whether they 
believe the Bundestag should follow popular will, and about differences between ‘ordinary 
people’ and ‘elites’.  
There is a five-point scale of responses to these questions, running from ‘Strongly Agree’ to 
‘Strongly Disagree’. Once again, I calculate the average response across all these questions, 
giving me an overall impression of each respondent’s level of adherence to populism.  
Having calculated the average response across these six questions from each respondent, I 
group these respondents according to their levels of adherence with populism. I state these 
populism groups in Table 4.3:  
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4.3: Empirical Expectations 
Both the policy-proximity and the populism-based accounts considered in my thesis imply 
certain relationships between Die Linke evaluations and the predictor variables just described. 
For the policy-proximity account, I need to consider where Die Linke are located on the policy 
dimensions relative to GLES respondents. For the populism-based theory, the underlying 
notion is that support for the radical left will come from respondents who adhere more to 
populism. More detailed consideration of expectations follows in this section.  
Expectations under the policy-proximity account consider Die Linke evaluations from both the 
proximity groups and from the policy groups. As I created the proximity groups from 
calculating the difference between self-placement and Die Linke placement on economics and 
migration, these respondents are already positioned relative to this political actor on these 
policy dimensions.  
For the policy groups, I return to the Chapel Hill expert surveys. These surveys provide an 
indication of Die Linke’s location in policy spaces. However, the Chapel Hill surveys do not 
identify the positions of Die Linke on the same scale as GLES respondents are located. 
Therefore, I develop expectations from policy groups through a series of scenarios. In each of 
these scenarios, I suggest Die Linke to be in closest proximity with a plausible range of policy 
groups. I then state expectations in each of these scenarios where Die Linke is in closest 
proximity with a different policy group.  
4.3.1: Expectations: Economic Policy Groups 
To begin, I will state expectations of Die Linke evaluations from groups on the economic 
dimension. I will discuss these from the proximity groups first, before turning attention to the 
policy groups.  
From the five economic proximity groups, I expect the ‘Closest’ group to have the highest 
evaluations for Die Linke. The ‘Furthest’ group would have the lowest evaluations for this 
political actor. This would leave a monotonic relationship between proximity groups and Die 
Linke evaluations: specifically, where evaluations increase with greater proximity between 
respondents and Die Linke. Observing this monotonicity would conform with the policy-
proximity account of radical left support.  
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Expectations from economic proximity groups are summarised in Figure 4.4. This shows how 
I predict evaluations to be highest from the ‘Closest’ group, and fall away to be lowest from 









From the economic policy groups, expectations are partly based on evidence from the Chapel 
Hill expert surveys. Recall that, in Figure 4.1, Chapel Hill identified Die Linke as being notably 
left-wing on the economic policy dimension.  
However, uncertainty about how far Chapel Hill appraisals of Die Linke map onto positions 
of GLES respondents lead me to consider several scenarios of expectations. Across these 
scenarios the common expectation is that there will be a single peak, where one group of 
respondents has highest evaluations of Die Linke due to closest policy-proximity with this 
political actor. There would then be a monotonic decline in evaluations on each side of this 
peak, as policy-proximity reduces. These scenarios consider which group is in closest 
proximity with Die Linke, and how this would impact on evaluations for this political actor 
across the policy dimension.  
The first of these scenarios assumes Die Linke’s radically left-wing position in Chapel Hill 
closely maps onto GLES respondents. I then assume Die Linke to be in closest proximity with 
the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group. Consequently, I would expect highest Die Linke 
evaluations from this group. The ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy group is the most spatially-
distant from Die Linke, and therefore I expect this group to have the lowest Die Linke 
Figure 4.4: Expected Evaluations from Economic Proximity Groups 
113 
 
evaluations. I would observe a monotonic relationship in this scenario, where evaluations of 
Die Linke increase from the economically right-wing groups to the left-wing groups. I reflect 









However, it is possible that Chapel Hill overestimated the economic placement of Die Linke, 
relative to GLES respondents. The second scenario takes this possibility into account, 
suggesting Die Linke is in closest proximity with the ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy group. In 
this scenario, I would observe highest Die Linke evaluations from the ‘Centre-Left’ group 
instead, with lowest evaluations from the ‘Radical-Right’ group. The ‘Radical-Left’ group is 
not closest to Die Linke, so would have lower evaluations than from the ‘Centre-Left’ group. 
This would leave a non-monotonic relationship between economic policy preferences and Die 


















Scenarios where Die Linke is further to the right do not seem plausible, considering the 
economic policies of this political actor I discussed earlier. Therefore, I do not consider any 
scenarios with the premise that Die Linke is in closest proximity with economically centrist or 
right-wing respondents.  
This yields two sets of economic expectations: one set based on the proximity groups, and the 
other for the policy groups. In the latter, I considered two plausible scenarios where Die Linke 
is in proximity with either the ‘Radical-Left’ or ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy groups. 
Observing results which conform with these expectations would provide support for the 
policy-proximity account of radical left support.  
4.3.2: Expectations: Cultural Policy Groups 
Without GLES questions asking respondents to place either themselves or Die Linke on a 
cultural policy dimension, there are no proximity groups on this dimension. Instead, 
expectations relate to policy groups on this dimension only. For these, I again turn to the 
Chapel Hill surveys.  
I previously showed Die Linke’s cultural policy position, according to Chapel Hill, in Figure 
4.2. This suggested Die Linke is slightly less liberal compared to the mainstream-left SPD and 
centrist FDP. Nevertheless, the party represents a moderately-liberal/centrist political actor in 
Figure 4.2. From this, I consider which cultural policy groups this positioning of Die Linke 
maps onto from the GLES respondents.  
Figure 4.6: ‘Centre Left’ Economic Policy Group Expectations 
115 
 
Should Chapel Hill’s placement of Die Linke closely map onto cultural policy groups from the 
GLES, it would be the ‘Centrist’ cultural policy group that is in closest proximity with Die 
Linke. Therefore, the ‘Centrist’ cultural policy group would have the highest evaluations of 
Die Linke. Lowest evaluations of Die Linke would come from the ‘Radical-‘ groups at the fringes 
of this policy space. The relationship between cultural policy positions and Die Linke 











However, it may be that all parties in Figure 4.2, including Die Linke but with the possible 
exception of the radical right Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD), are in fact more liberal than the 
Chapel Hill expert surveys suggest. This would make sense, considering the culturally-liberal 
policies of Die Linke identified earlier in this chapter.  
Under two more scenarios, Die Linke may actually be in proximity with the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ 
or ‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy groups. In the first of these scenarios, highest evaluations 
from the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ group would mean appraisals for Die Linke would be slightly 
lower from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group, and lowest overall from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ 
group. Observing highest evaluations from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group would mean there is 
monotonicity in my results, with appraisals decreasing as policy-proximity reduces, and 
Figure 4.7: ‘Centrist’ Cultural Policy Group Expectations 
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lowest evaluations for Die Linke from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ group. I present both of these 









I have now explained three scenarios for Die Linke evaluations from cultural policy groups. 
Results may conform with either of these scenarios to provide support for the policy-
proximity account, as Die Linke is conceivably in closest proximity with respondents from the 
‘Centrist’ group, ‘Moderate-Liberal’ group, or the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group.  
4.3.3: Expectations: Migration Policy Groups  
First, I state expectations for Die Linke evaluations from the migration proximity groups. Then 
I come to expected evaluations from the migration policy groups, which draw upon Chapel 
Hill’s placement of Die Linke in this policy space.  
The first expectation is that highest Die Linke evaluations would come from the ‘Closest’ 
proximity group. Also expected is that evaluations would get progressively lower across the 
other groups, falling to their lowest from the ‘Furthest’ proximity group. Figure 4.10 reflects 





Figure 4.8: ‘Moderate Liberal’ Cultural Policy 
Group Expectations 
Figure 4.9: ‘Radical Liberal’ Cultural 
Policy Group Expectations 
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The second set of expectations on this dimension relate to the policy groups. I provided 
Chapel Hill’s placement of Die Linke earlier, in Figure 4.3. This showed Die Linke to be a 
moderately migrant-inclusive party, to a greater extent than the SPD, and to a lesser extent 
than the Green Party. I again consider a number of plausible scenarios, where Die Linke is in 
proximity with a plausible range of different policy groups.  
The first of these scenarios again assumes the Chapel Hill survey’s placement of Die Linke 
closely maps onto the migration policy responses in the GLES. This would mean Chapel Hill’s 
identification of Die Linke as moderately-inclusive would put this political actor in closest 
proximity with the ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ migration policy group. Under this scenario, I would 
expect highest Die Linke evaluations from the ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ group, with lowest 
evaluations expected from the most spatially-distant ‘Radical-Exclusive’ group. Evaluations 
would fall on both sides of the ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ group, as policy-proximity reduces. I 

















The second plausible scenario assumes that, relative to GLES respondents, Die Linke is more 
migrant-inclusive than the expert surveys suggested. In this scenario, Die Linke is in closest 
proximity with the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group. The expectation would then be a monotonic 
relationship between migration policy preferences and Die Linke evaluations, where Die Linke 
evaluations progressively increase from the ‘Radical-Exclusive’ group to the ‘Radical-









The underlying notion in both scenarios, where migrant-inclusive respondents have higher 
evaluations of Die Linke, is plausible given Die Linke’s inclusive and internationalist appeals 
noted earlier in this chapter. However, Die Linke’s position in this policy space relative to GLES 
Figure 4.11: ‘Moderate Inclusive’ Migration Policy Group Expectations 
Figure 4.12: ‘Radical Inclusive’ Migration Policy Group Expectations 
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respondents may be in closer proximity with more moderately-inclusive voters, or more 
radically-inclusive voters. Both of these scenarios allow me to observe higher Die Linke 
evaluations from either of these groups, which would plausibly be the result of closer policy-
proximity with this radical left party.  
This covers expectations relating to the policy-proximity account, for both the economic and 
migration proximity groups, and for the policy groups on all three dimensions. Throughout 
all these scenarios, I have demonstrated expectation of a single peak in Die Linke evaluations, 
with highest evaluations from the voters in closest proximity with Die Linke on each of the 
three policy dimensions. Evaluations for this political actor would then be lower as proximity 
with this political actor reduces. Several scenarios have offered different but plausible 
suggestions of which groups Die Linke is in closest proximity with, and the consequences of 
these different scenarios on evaluations for this radical left political actor from all policy 
groups.  
4.3.4: Expectations: Populism-based Account 
Under the populism-based account, I expect a monotonic relationship between levels of 
populism and support for the radical left. It is expected that populist voters, who adhere to 
the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ nature of populism, would be more supportive of the radical left owing 
to the anti-elite economic policies emanating from these political actors.  
In relation to the populism groups in this case study, I would expect the ‘Radical-Populist’ 
group to have significantly higher evaluations of Die Linke compared to the ‘Centrist’ 
populism group’s evaluations. That ‘Centrist’ populism group includes respondents who are 
neither overtly populist nor non-populist. Observing higher Die Linke evaluations from the 
‘Radical-Populist’ group would support the populism-based account, as it would show 
support for the radical left to come from populist voters who are conceivably attracted by the 
anti-elite rhetoric of these political actors.  
4.4: Analysis 
I now have a set of case-specific expectations, drawn from application of both policy-
proximity and populism-based accounts to Die Linke in the German context. Observing results 
which follow these expectations will provide support for their respective accounts as an 
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explanation of radical left support. I will first cover results from testing the policy-proximity 
account. Results from the populism-based account will follow.  
I present all results in the form of linear regressions. Recall that the dependent variable used 
across these regressions is an evaluation scale, from +5 to -5. I include the populism groups, 
policy groups, and proximity groups as dummy variables in these regressions. For the policy 
groups, the ‘Centrist’ group on each dimension acts as the baseline category across economic, 
cultural, and migration policy measures. I also use the ‘Centrist’ group as the baseline 
category with the populism groups. For the proximity groups, the ‘Moderately-Distant’ group 
acts as the baseline category.  
I pool pre-election and post-election data here, with this data then used for the regressions 
with policy groups in this section. Included under Appendices 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 are regressions 
including policy groups from separate pre-election and post-election data, with economic, 
cultural, and migration policy groups, respectively. The purpose of these separate pre-election 
and post-election results is to show how consistent attitudes in each separate wave are to the 
pooled results. I provide brief summaries of results from the separate waves in this analysis 
section, with these results broadly consistent with findings from the pooled data. 
Furthermore, under Appendices 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, and 1.17, I include analysis 
with scalar variables instead of respondent groups. Results with scalar variables also broadly 
follow my findings from respondent groups in this analysis section.   
4.4.1: Control Variables 
The East/West control variable is one that has featured in previous research on political 
behaviour in Germany (Gschwend, 2007), so this is something I also include. I consider 
responses to GLES questions about province of birth and year of birth. With this I create an 
East/West dummy variable. Those born in a West German state before 1990 are recorded as 0, 
and respondents born in an East German region before 1990 are recorded as 1s. I count 
respondents from Berlin – a split entity prior to German reunification – as being from the 
GDR.  
Further controls take account of demographic factors, which also may influence support for 
Die Linke. These include gender, religion, education, and socioeconomic class. The GLES 
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presents education responses, and socioeconomic class responses ordinally. I then see how an 
increase in these scales (i.e., higher educational attainment, higher socioeconomic class) 
impacts on Die Linke support. I include gender and religion as dummy variables, coded as 
either 0 or 1. I code female respondents as 1, and male respondents as 0 on the gender variable. 
I code non-religious respondents as 1, and religious respondents coded as 0 under the religion 
control variable. These factors have also been present in previous research on political support 
in Germany (Schoen & Schumann, 2007).  
Party identification control variables are also included, in order to account for ‘Michigan 
Model’ based support based on partisanship (Campbell, et al., 1960). There are nine dummy 
variables created to control for this, each representing respondents who expressed 
identification with each of the following: Die Linke, CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Grünen, AfD, and 
one of several other smaller political parties. The ninth of these variables accounts for people 
who did not identify with any political party. Respondents recorded as a 1 identified with the 
given political party,17 and those represented by a 0 did not identify with that particular 
option. This provides control on party identification’s effects on Die Linke evaluations, but 
does not address how this variable potentially persuades voters to alter their policy 
preferences or populism.  
4.4.2: Economic Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support 
To begin, I first look at how economic policy preferences and proximity with Die Linke 
impacted upon evaluations for this radical left political party. I will cover results from the five 
proximity groups first, and follow this with results from the policy groups.  
From the proximity groups, the expectation is a monotonic relationship between proximity 
and Die Linke evaluations: specifically, with highest Die Linke evaluations from the group in 
closest proximity, and lowest evaluations from the most spatially-distant proximity group. I 
summarised this in Figure 4.4. Table 4.4 is a linear regression of Die Linke evaluations with 
these proximity groups.  
 




Table 4.4: Regression of Economic Proximity Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Effect of Economic Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Closest 1.206*** 0.682*** 
 (0.105) (0.107) 
2 0.640*** 0.320*** 
 (0.115) (0.117) 
Moderately-Distant (baseline) (baseline) 
4 -0.339*** -0.183 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Furthest -1.179*** -0.729*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.579*** 
  (0.164) 
CDU_PartyID  0.269** 
  (0.135) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.525** 
  (0.234) 
SPD_PartyID  1.726*** 
  (0.136) 
FDP_PartyID  0.208 
  (0.188) 
Greens_PartyID  1.991*** 
  (0.160) 
Afd_PartyID  0.065 
  (0.196) 
Other_PartyID  0.009 
  (0.328) 
No_PartyID  1.370*** 
  (0.135) 
Gender  0.271*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.068) 
Religion  0.480*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.071) 
Education  0.101*** 
  (0.033) 
Social_Class  -0.150*** 
  (0.040) 
EastWest  0.092 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.070) 
Constant 5.516*** 4.081*** 
 (0.087) (0.206) 
Observations 6,562 4,990 
R2 0.085 0.309 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.306 
Residual Std. Error 2.693 (df = 6557) 2.378 (df = 4971) 
F Statistic 153.259*** (df = 4; 6557) 123.264*** (df = 18; 4971) 




The first question to answer is whether a monotonic relationship is present between proximity 
and Die Linke evaluations in Table 4.4. As expected, I do observe a monotonic pattern of Die 
Linke evaluations in this regression. Respondents closest to Die Linke give the party 
significantly higher ratings compared to the respondents in the baseline ‘Moderately-Distant’ 
group. I also find reduced evaluations for Die Linke, relative to that baseline group, from the 
‘Furthest’ group of respondents. These respondents are the most spatially-distant from Die 
Linke; therefore, their lower evaluations for this radical left political actor are in line with the 
policy-proximity account’s expectations. I find this pattern of radical left support in both 
columns of Table 4.4, so both with controls included and not included. Given the importance 
of control variables clarifying the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left 
support, I consider the stronger test of these accounts to come after including these variables. 
Therefore, I primarily interpret results after including controls. Looking across the models 
with and without controls in Table 4.4, the control variables do seem to diminish the effect of 
proximity, but not to a point of statistical insignificance. Therefore, having controlled those 
additional explanatory factors, results still support the policy-proximity account.  
Results in Table 4.4 also follow the expected pattern of Die Linke evaluations in Figure 4.4. The 
pattern of evaluations in Table 4.4 is plotted below, in Figure 4.13, 18 showing the same 









18 In Figure 4.13, and with all plotted results, controls are treated as follows: dummy variables (e.g., 
Gender) set to 0, scalar controls (e.g., Education) set to mode.  















However, as stated earlier, Table 4.4 assumes that voters on both sides of Die Linke’s position 
by similar magnitudes would have comparable evaluations for this political actor. To examine 
this further, in Appendix 1.1 I tabled proximity groups on both sides of Die Linke. In Appendix 
1.2 I included this unfolded range of proximity groups instead. The baseline group is different 
in Appendix 1.2, instead being the group in closest proximity with Die Linke rather than the 
‘Moderately-Distant’, but despite this the pattern of evaluations follows that in Table 4.4: 
specifically, evaluations for Die Linke reduce as spatial distance increases. Consequently, I 
continue to observe results which follow the policy-proximity account’s expectations with the 
unfolded proximity groups. Results without proximity groups, and with the proximity scale 
instead, also show the same monotonic pattern of Die Linke evaluations under Appendix 1.3. 
Specifically, an increase in the economic proximity scale (representing greater spatial 
distance) is still associated with significantly reduced evaluations for Die Linke. Consequently, 
the scalar model does not change my conclusions from Table 4.4.  
Next, I consider whether results from economic policy groups also follow expectations. I 
offered two different scenarios for expected Die Linke evaluations from the economic policy 
Figure 4.13: Plotted Results of Economic Proximity Groups 
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groups. In the first of these scenarios, Die Linke is in closest proximity with, and thus is 
expected to have the highest evaluations from, the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group – as 
reflected in Figure 4.5. The second scenario suggests Die Linke is in closest proximity with the 
‘Centre-Left’ economic policy group, with highest evaluations expected from this group 
instead – as shown in Figure 4.6. Both these scenarios expect lowest Die Linke evaluations to 
come from the ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy group, owing to this group being located 
furthest from Die Linke on this policy dimension. Table 4.5 shows Die Linke evaluations from 











 Table 4.5: Regression of Economic Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Economic Policy Group 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Left 0.924*** 0.409*** 
 (0.164) (0.145) 
Centre Left 0.175 -0.035 
 (0.160) (0.141) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
   
Centre Right -0.598*** -0.366** 
 (0.169) (0.149) 
Rad Right -1.178*** -0.801*** 
 (0.151) (0.134) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.624*** 
  (0.221) 
CDU_PartyID  0.112 
  (0.180) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.442 
  (0.289) 
SPD_PartyID  1.580*** 
  (0.181) 
FDP_PartyID  0.211 
  (0.253) 
Greens_PartyID  1.913*** 
  (0.216) 
Afd_PartyID  0.004 
  (0.267) 
Other_PartyID  0.435 
  (0.443) 
No_PartyID  1.281*** 
  (0.177) 
Gender  0.203** 
(1 = Female)  (0.091) 
Religion  0.427*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.095) 
Education  0.130*** 
  (0.044) 
Social_Class  -0.132** 
  (0.053) 
EastWest  0.117 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.093) 
Constant 5.718*** 4.245*** 
 (0.111) (0.263) 
Observations 2,941 2,941 
R2 0.065 0.284 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.279 
Residual Std. Error 2.772 (df = 2936) 2.431 (df = 2922) 
F Statistic 50.609*** (df = 4; 2936) 64.360*** (df = 18; 2922) 




The coefficients from the economic policy groups do degrade in column two, after including 
controls, but statistical significance remains. Those significant coefficients show the spatially-
proximal ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group to have significantly higher average support 
for Die Linke, and the spatially-distant ‘Centre-Right’ and ‘Radical-Right’ groups to have 
significantly lower average Die Linke support - all relative to the ‘Centrists’. These results are 
in line with expectations, especially those expressed in Figure 4.5. Figure 4.14 graphically 












Looking at the relative magnitude of these coefficients, column two of Table 4.5 shows average 
Die Linke evaluations to be .41 higher from ‘Radical-Left’ respondents, relative to the 
‘Centrists’. At the other end of this dimension, average Die Linke support falls significantly 
relative to the ‘Centrists’ – by .37 and .80 from the ‘Centre-Right’ and ‘Radical-Right’ groups, 
respectively. These results suggest a monotonic relationship between economic policy 
preferences and radical left support in Germany, with both the expected increases and 
decreases in average radical left support.  
Recall that I also include results from separated pre-election and post-election waves, under 
Appendix 1.4. Coefficients in Appendix 1.4 are broadly consistent with the pattern I observe 
Figure 4.14: Plotted Results of Economic Policy Groups 
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above, in Table 4.5. Specifically, relative to the ‘Centrists’ there are positive coefficients from 
the groups in proximity with Die Linke, and negative coefficients from the spatially-distant 
economic policy groups. Also consistent is the pattern of Die Linke evaluations when regressed 
with the scalar variable of economic policy preferences. I include this model under Appendix 
1.5, which shows how an increase in average economic policy responses – representing greater 
leftism on this dimension – is associated with significantly increased Die Linke evaluations. As 
before, the scalar model does not challenge earlier conclusions from economic policy groups.  
Before moving to results from respondents on the next policy dimension, a brief summation 
of the control variables. I find Die Linke evaluations to be higher from more educated voters, 
non-religious voters, female voters, and voters from a lower socioeconomic class. Although 
introducing controls diminished the size of the coefficients from proximity groups and policy 
groups, they generally did not diminish their statistical significance. This means I can more 
reliably conclude observation of support for Die Linke based on economic policy-proximity.  
4.4.3: Cultural Policy Dimension and Radical Left Support 
I drew expectations for Die Linke evaluations from cultural policy groups purely from the 
expert surveys. There are no proximity groups here, as the GLES lacked questions where 
respondents could place themselves and Die Linke on a cultural policy scale.  
I stated three scenarios here, with slightly different expectations in each depending on the 
group assumed to be closest to Die Linke. The first scenario assumed Die Linke to be in closest 
proximity with the ‘Centrist’ cultural policy group. The second scenario suggested closest 
proximity with the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ policy group. Finally, the third scenario suggested 
closest proximity with the ‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy group.  
Under the first scenario, I expected highest Die Linke evaluations from the ‘Centrist’ cultural 
policy group. I then expected lowest Die Linke evaluations from the groups at the fringes of 
this policy dimension – the ‘Radical-Liberal’ and ‘Radical-Conservative’ groups. I reflected 
this in Figure 4.7, with a curvilinear relationship anticipated here between cultural policy 
preferences and radical left support.  
In the second scenario, I expected highest evaluations for Die Linke from the ‘Moderate-
Liberal’ group, with lowest evaluations from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ group. There would 
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not be a monotonic relationship in this scenario, as evaluations would be slightly lower from 
the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group compared to the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ group – reflecting the latter’s 
closer proximity with Die Linke on cultural policy in this scenario. I summarised the expected 
pattern of evaluations in this scenario with Figure 4.8.  
I predicated the final scenario on Die Linke being in closest proximity with the ‘Radical-Liberal’ 
cultural policy group. Under this scenario, I would expect highest Die Linke evaluations from 
that policy group. I also expected lowest Die Linke evaluations from the spatially-distant 
‘Radical-Conservative’ group in this scenario, forming a monotonic pattern between Die Linke 
evaluations and cultural policy preferences. I reflected these expectations with Figure 4.9.  
Across all these scenarios, in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, there is a single peak in evaluations. I 
expected highest Die Linke evaluations from one group – the group in closest proximity with 
this political actor in the cultural policy space. I then stated the expectation that evaluations 
would fall away, as policy-proximity with Die Linke reduces.  
In Table 4.6 is a linear regression of Die Linke evaluations from cultural policy groups.  
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 Table 4.6: Regression of Cultural Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Cultural Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.494*** 0.160 
 (0.156) (0.138) 
Mod Lib 0.190 0.060 
 (0.177) (0.155) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
   
Mod Con -0.459** -0.269* 
 (0.178) (0.157) 
Rad Con -1.204*** -0.752*** 
 (0.171) (0.153) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.758*** 
  (0.220) 
CDU_PartyID  0.167 
  (0.181) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.198 
  (0.294) 
SPD_PartyID  1.623*** 
  (0.181) 
FDP_PartyID  0.056 
  (0.251) 
Greens_PartyID  1.927*** 
  (0.216) 
Afd_PartyID  0.172 
  (0.271) 
Other_PartyID  0.692 
  (0.446) 
No_PartyID  1.329*** 
  (0.178) 
Gender  0.124 
(1 = Female)  (0.092) 
Religion  0.358*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.096) 
Education  0.130*** 
  (0.044) 
Social_Class  -0.161*** 
  (0.053) 
EastWest  0.162* 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.093) 
Constant 5.651*** 4.279*** 
 (0.125) (0.274) 
Observations 2,980 2,980 
R2 0.046 0.272 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.268 
Residual Std. Error 2.799 (df = 2975) 2.451 (df = 2961) 
F Statistic 36.227*** (df = 4; 2975) 61.558*** (df = 18; 2961) 




In Table 4.6, average evaluations of Die Linke from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ group are 
significantly lower compared to the ‘Centrists’ group. I see this both with and without control 
variables, however once again these do have a dampening effect on coefficients. That 
dampening also reduced the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group’s coefficient to statistical insignificance 
in column two. With the roles of policy-proximity and populism more accurately expressed 
after including controls in column two, I conclude that culturally-liberal policy preferences 
are not associated with higher average support for the radical left in Germany.  
However, expectations are followed from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ policy group, who have 
significantly reduced Die Linke evaluations relative to the baseline group. I expected this given 
the spatial distance between Die Linke and these respondents on the cultural policy dimension. 
Column two also shows no significantly increased average evaluations, relative to the 
‘Centrists’, from either culturally-liberal policy group. Consequently, Die Linke evaluations 
from culturally-liberal respondents are statistically indistinguishable from those of the 
‘Centrists’ baseline group in terms of average radical left support. This plausibly fits with 
policy-proximity expectations here, as there was uncertainty about whether Die Linke was in 
proximity with either the ‘Centrist’, ‘Moderate-Liberal’, or ‘Radically-Liberal’ cultural policy 
group. Broadly comparable average evaluations across these groups potentially reflects this 
uncertainty.  
Table 4.6 provided results which conform with the policy-proximity account: specifically, the 
observation of significantly lower average support for Die Linke, relative to the ‘Centrists’, 
from the spatially-distant ‘Radical-Conservatives’ policy group. In all three scenarios this 
observation was expected. The pattern of average Die Linke evaluations in Table 4.6 is plotted 



















Note also in Figure 4.15 how average evaluation levels from the ‘Moderate-Liberal’, and 
‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy groups are all relatively similar to each other, reflecting the 
lack of statistically significant differences in Die Linke evaluations relative to the ‘Centrists’.  
In Appendix 1.6 is the regression of pre-election and post-election cultural policy groups. 
There is variance in attitudes between these two waves. Unlike above, with pre-election data 
there are lower average evaluations for Die Linke from all cultural policy groups, relative to 
the ‘Centrists’. Furthermore, I did not observe the lower Die Linke evaluations from the 
culturally-conservative group with post-election data. However, the combination of relative 
lower evaluations from culturally-conservative pre-election respondents, and relative 
increased evaluations from the culturally-liberal post-election respondents, plausibly yields 
the cumulative results in Table 4.6 and the pattern of radical left support in Figure 4.14. 
Finally, under Appendix 1.7 is the regression of Die Linke evaluations but with the scalar 
cultural policy variable instead. This shows an increase in that scale (representing a shift to 
the culturally-conservative side of that dimension) is associated with lower average Die Linke 
evaluations. This conforms with my findings in Table 4.6, leading me to the same conclusions 
I drew from the group-based model.  
Figure 4.15: Plotted Results from Cultural Policy Groups 
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4.4.4: Migration Policy Dimension and Radical Left Support 
Turning attention to support for Die Linke based on migration policy-proximity, examination 
of radical left support on this dimension returns to proximity groups and policy groups. I 
discuss results from migration proximity groups first. I expected a monotonic relationship 
between proximity and Die Linke evaluations, where the ‘Closest’ proximity group would 
have highest evaluations of Die Linke, and the ‘Furthest’ proximity group would have lowest 





















Table 4.7: Regression of Migration Proximity Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Effect of Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Closest 0.428*** 0.473*** 
 (0.109) (0.111) 
2 0.294** 0.259** 
 (0.121) (0.121) 
Moderately-Distant (baseline) (baseline) 
4 -0.485*** -0.195* 
 (0.111) (0.112) 
Furthest -1.437*** -1.119*** 
 (0.126) (0.128) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.768*** 
  (0.159) 
CDU_PartyID  0.275** 
  (0.134) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.396* 
  (0.225) 
SPD_PartyID  1.640*** 
  (0.134) 
FDP_PartyID  0.274 
  (0.187) 
Greens_PartyID  1.942*** 
  (0.159) 
Afd_PartyID  0.337* 
  (0.196) 
Other_PartyID  0.409 
  (0.335) 
No_PartyID  1.462*** 
  (0.133) 
Gender  0.237*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.068) 
Religion  0.537*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.071) 
Education  0.063* 
  (0.033) 
Social_Class  -0.232*** 
  (0.040) 
EastWest  0.219*** 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.069) 
Constant 5.924*** 4.557*** 
 (0.090) (0.209) 
Observations 6,864 5,154 
R2 0.049 0.303 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.301 
Residual Std. Error 2.764 (df = 6859) 2.405 (df = 5135) 
F Statistic 88.869*** (df = 4; 6859) 124.086*** (df = 18; 5135) 




Looking across the migration proximity groups, from the ‘Closest’ to the ‘Furthest’ group 
there is a monotonic relationship with average Die Linke evaluations. This follows expectations 
when that monotonic relationship shows evaluations are, relative to the ‘Moderately-Distant’ 
baseline group, .47 higher from the group in closest proximity with Die Linke on this policy 
dimension. This is seen from column two, which takes into account the control variables, 
however even without those controls the pattern is the same and the coefficients not hugely 
different from most groups.  
Relative to that ‘Moderately-Distant’ baseline group, average evaluations of Die Linke in 
column two are also on average 1.12 lower from the group with the least policy-proximity 
with this political actor. Results from proximity groups closest and furthest from Die Linke 
conform with the policy-proximity account, supporting this account’s explanation of radical 
left support on the migration policy dimension. Furthermore, they conform with expectations 
as depicted in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.16 presents the pattern of results in Table 4.7 in graphical 














Figure 4.16: Plotted Results from Migration Proximity Groups 
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Table 4.7 includes results from the folded range of migration proximity groups. In Appendix 
1.8 are Die Linke evaluations from the unfolded migration proximity groups that I detailed in 
Appendix 1.1. I observe the same pattern from those unfolded migration proximity groups as 
in Table 4.7. Specifically, relative to the baseline group (the ‘Absolute Closest’ group) 
evaluations for Die Linke declined as policy-proximity reduced. This conforms with the policy-
proximity account of radical left support. Additionally, with the scalar variable of migration 
proximity, under Appendix 1.9, I find the same pattern again. Specifically, increases in that 
migration proximity scale, representing greater spatial distance, is associated with lower Die 
Linke evaluations. Therefore, once again, the scalar model does not alter my substantive 
findings from the group-based model.  
Moving now to the migration policy groups, two scenarios are present here. Each one includes 
the expectation of a single peaked pattern with highest average Die Linke evaluations from the 
migration policy group in closest proximity with this political actor. As before, all expectations 
here are relative to the ‘Centrist’ migration policy group. In the first scenario, that group is the 
‘Moderately-Inclusive’ policy group. In the second, highest average Die Linke evaluations are 
expected from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ policy group. In both scenarios, lowest average 
evaluations for Die Linke are expected from the spatially-distant ‘Radical-Exclusive’ migration 
policy group.  The first scenario’s expected pattern of Die Linke evaluations was summarised 
in Figure 4.11, with the second scenario’s expected monotonicity presented in Figure 4.12.  
I test these expectations for Die Linke evaluations and migration policy preferences in Table 
4.8. In previous regressions of policy groups, the number of responses was roughly the sum 
of pre-election and post-election responses. In Table 4.8, this is not the case. This is a 
consequence of a different distribution of responses across the three migration questions, 




 Table 4.8: Regression of Migration Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Migration Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Inc 1.104*** 0.651*** 
 (0.230) (0.217) 
Mod Inc 0.705*** 0.531*** 
 (0.226) (0.201) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
   
Mod Exc -0.229 -0.222 
 (0.214) (0.189) 
Rad Exc 0.208 -0.073 
 (0.233) (0.213) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.800*** 
  (0.303) 
CDU_PartyID  0.355 
  (0.240) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.247 
  (0.364) 
SPD_PartyID  1.624*** 
  (0.241) 
FDP_PartyID  0.401 
  (0.353) 
Greens_PartyID  1.808*** 
  (0.306) 
Afd_PartyID  0.534 
  (0.380) 
Other_PartyID  -0.136 
  (0.594) 
No_PartyID  1.432*** 
  (0.236) 
Gender  0.277** 
(1 = Female)  (0.127) 
Religion  0.432*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.136) 
Education  -0.023 
  (0.065) 
Social_Class  -0.143** 
  (0.071) 
EastWest  0.254* 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.131) 
Constant 5.048*** 4.140*** 
 (0.158) (0.364) 
Observations 1,513 1,513 
R2 0.030 0.259 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.250 
Residual Std. Error 2.778 (df = 1508) 2.439 (df = 1494) 
F Statistic 11.658*** (df = 4; 1508) 29.039*** (df = 18; 1494) 




Looking after controls in column two, average evaluations for Die Linke rise by .65 and .53 
from ‘Radical-Inclusive’ and ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ groups, respectively. Both represent 
statistically significant increases in average Die Linke evaluations, by comparison with the 
baseline ‘Centrists’ group. However, at the other end of the migration policy space there is no 
statistically significant decrease in Die Linke evaluations from the spatially-distant ‘Radical-
Exclusive’ group, rendering a partial observation of policy-proximity support for the radical 
left in Table 4.8.  
The pattern I observe here, with expected increases in average Die Linke evaluations relative 
to the ‘Centrists’ but not the expected decrease, is seen both with and without control 
variables. These controls have once again dampened the coefficients but have not changed 
significance levels. Therefore, while these controls predictably reduce the effect of policy-
proximity on this dimension, they do not change the conclusion of migrant-inclusive support 
for Die Linke.  
Results from the inclusive migration groups conform most strongly with expectations in 
Figure 4.12, demonstrated by the larger increase in evaluations from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ 
group, rather than the ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ group. However, the difference between each 
inclusive group’s evaluations is quite small. Fundamentally, Die Linke evaluations increased 
from inclusive migration policy respondents, with this radical left support associated with 
greater policy-proximity with the migrant-inclusive Die Linke.  
The pattern of average Die Linke evaluations in Table 4.8 is presented graphically in Figure 
4.17. This reflects the increased average evaluations for Die Linke, relative to the ‘Centrists’, 
from the inclusive groups. It also reflects the lack of statistically significant decreases in 




















Consequently, I conclude a partial link between migration policy-proximity and evaluations 
for the radical left in Germany. This is partial because I did not observe the expected decrease 
in Die Linke evaluations, relative to the ‘Centrists’, from the spatially-distant ‘Radical-
Exclusive’ group, but did see the proximal migrant-inclusive voters evaluating Die Linke more 
positively relative to the same baseline.  
In Appendix 1.10 are results from migration policy groups in pre-election and post-election 
data. When separated by these two waves, the coefficients in each regression conform with 
expectations. However, both demonstrate markedly greater reduction in Die Linke evaluations 
from the migrant-exclusive policy groups, compared with observations in Table 4.8. As results 
in all three of these regressions of migration policy groups conform with expectations, there 
is still support for the policy-proximity account here. Results with the scalar migration policy 
variable, under Appendix 1.11, also conform with Table 4.8. Specifically, increases on the 
migration policy scale, representing greater migrant-exclusive preferences, are associated 
with significantly reduced Die Linke evaluations. Thus, my earlier conclusions from migration 
policy groups in Table 4.8 are not altered by the scalar model.  
Figure 4.17: Plotted Results from Migration Policy Groups 
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4.4.5: Populism and Radical Left Support 
At this point, conclusions have pertained to the policy-proximity account alone. However, I 
now turn attention to the second account tested in my thesis – the populism-based account – 
and appraise how far levels of populism explain radical left support.  
To test this theory, I grouped GLES respondents based on their responses to populism 
questions. The expectation under this account was that the more populist voters would have 
higher evaluations of Die Linke compared to the baseline group. That baseline group is the 
‘Centrists’ group, where respondents did not express either strong populist or non-populist 
sentiments.  
Observing the ‘Radical-Populist’ group having the highest evaluations of Die Linke would 
conform with expectations under the populism-based account, and support this theory’s 
explanation of radical left support. In Table 4.9 is a linear regression of Die Linke evaluations 
from populism groups. The GLES pools pre-election and post-election responses to populism 
questions, leaving no separate pre-election and post-election responses. As a result, there are 
no regressions from the separated waves of GLES respondents in the Appendix.  
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  Table 4.9: Regression of Populism Groups and Die Linke Evaluations 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Populism Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Populist 0.363*** 0.115 
 (0.118) (0.107) 
Mod Populist 0.178 0.129 
 (0.120) (0.105) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
   
Mod Non-Populist 0.068 0.152 
 (0.132) (0.114) 
Rad Non-Populist 0.169 0.186* 
 (0.122) (0.107) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.977*** 
  (0.164) 
CDU_PartyID  0.204 
  (0.136) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.589*** 
  (0.224) 
SPD_PartyID  1.785*** 
  (0.135) 
FDP_PartyID  0.118 
  (0.188) 
Greens_PartyID  2.130*** 
  (0.162) 
Afd_PartyID  0.120 
  (0.201) 
Other_PartyID  0.368 
  (0.338) 
No_PartyID  1.419*** 
  (0.134) 
Gender  0.287*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.069) 
Religion  0.290*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.072) 
Education  0.152*** 
  (0.035) 
Social_Class  -0.191*** 
  (0.041) 
EastWest  0.139** 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.070) 
Constant 5.353*** 3.932*** 
 (0.081) (0.207) 
Observations 5,228 5,228 
R2 0.002 0.269 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.266 
Residual Std. Error 2.879 (df = 5223) 2.468 (df = 5209) 
F Statistic 2.588** (df = 4; 5223) 106.347*** (df = 18; 5209) 




Immediately apparent in Table 4.9 is the lack of statistically significant coefficients, relative to 
the ‘Centrists’ baseline, once control variables are included under column two. This suggests 
levels of populism do not cause notably higher or lower average evaluations of Die Linke 
relative to the baseline group. That being said, in column one – without controls – the ‘Radical-
Populist’ group has significantly higher evaluations for Die Linke compared to the baseline 
group. This perhaps vindicates the control variables, as without them I would be led to 
conclude in favour of the populism-based account, when in fact that association with radical 
left support seems to be bound up with control variable effects.  
After controls, there is limited evidence that the ‘Radical-Non-Populists’ group respondents 
had higher evaluations for Die Linke, compared to the baseline. However, this association is 
directly the opposite of expectations here, as I had expected higher evaluations for Die Linke 
from populist voters rather than non-populists.  













Figure 4.18: Plotted Results from Populism Groups 
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The lack of statistically significant increases in average support for Die Linke from the ‘Radical-
Populists’ group, relative to the ‘Centrists’, suggests that the effects of populism and non-
populism had little reliable impact on evaluations for Die Linke. As a result, findings here did 
not follow expectations under the populism-based account, leaving little evidence supporting 
this explanation of radical left support.  
Finally, under Appendix 1.12 I include the regression of Die Linke evaluations with populist 
attitudes as a scalar variable, rather than populism groups. In that regression, results conform 
with Table 4.9. Specifically, I find no significant association between levels of populism and 
support for Die Linke. This again leaves by substantive findings from Table 4.9 unaltered by 
the scalar model.  
4.4.6: Multiple Linear Regressions and Radical Left Support 
I have so far examined the simple impacts of populism and policy-proximity on radical left 
support in Germany. However, it may be that variables across policy dimensions, and from 
populism groups, have had a confounding role on radical left support. For example, 
uncontrolled preferences on the economic or cultural dimensions may bolster the effects of 
‘Radical-Inclusive’ migration policy-proximity on Die Linke evaluations. To understand the 
roles of each predictor variable more fully – across policy preferences and populism – on 
radical left support, I should control for their respective impacts on Die Linke evaluations. I 
accomplish this with multiple linear regressions.  
I include two multiple linear regressions in this section. The first of these will include the 
economic and migration proximity groups and the populism groups. The second multiple 
linear regression will include the policy groups from all three dimensions with the populism 
groups. Under Table 4.10 is a multiple linear regression of proximity groups, with the 




Table 4.10: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Proximity and Populism Groups 
(Part 1/2) 
Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Econ_Closest 0.908***  0.526***  0.469*** 
 (0.139)  (0.121)  (0.119) 
Econ_2 0.380**  0.231*  0.164 
 (0.152)  (0.132)  (0.130) 
Moderately-
Distant 
(baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Econ_4 -0.593***  -0.307**  -0.312** 
 (0.148)  (0.129)  (0.127) 
Econ_Furthest -1.347***  -0.823***  -0.651*** 
 (0.160)  (0.140)  (0.139) 
Immig_Closest  0.569***  0.486*** 0.446*** 
  (0.145)  (0.124) (0.123) 
Immig_2  0.467***  0.247* 0.241* 
  (0.158)  (0.135) (0.134) 
Moderately-
Distant 
(baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Immig_4  -0.301**  -0.241* -0.184 
  (0.146)  (0.125) (0.124) 
Immig_Furthest  -1.358***  -1.187*** -1.094*** 
  (0.164)  (0.143) (0.144) 
Rad Populist     0.292** 
     (0.118) 
Mod Populist     0.033 
     (0.114) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Non-
Populist 
    0.068 
     (0.122) 
Rad Non-
Populist 
    0.107 
     (0.115) 
Constant 5.648*** 5.712*** 4.268*** 4.537*** 4.333*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.230) (0.230) (0.260) 
Observations 4,106 4,106 4,106 4,106 4,106 
R2 0.075 0.051 0.313 0.321 0.338 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.050 0.310 0.318 0.334 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.776 (df = 
4101) 
2.812 (df = 
4101) 
2.397 (df = 4087) 2.383 (df = 4087) 
2.354 (df = 
4079) 
F Statistic 
83.552*** (df = 
4; 4101) 
55.080*** (df = 
4; 4101) 
103.351*** (df = 
18; 4087) 
107.328*** (df = 
18; 4087) 
80.258*** (df = 
26; 4079) 





Table 4.10: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Proximity and Populism Groups 
(Part 2/2) 
Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DieLinke_PartyID   4.743*** 4.947*** 4.626*** 
   (0.178) (0.175) (0.176) 
CDU_PartyID   0.314** 0.328** 0.299** 
   (0.149) (0.148) (0.146) 
CSU_PartyID   -0.753*** -0.637** -0.685*** 
   (0.259) (0.257) (0.255) 
SPD_PartyID   1.721*** 1.834*** 1.600*** 
   (0.150) (0.148) (0.148) 
FDP_PartyID   0.427** 0.430** 0.450** 
   (0.208) (0.206) (0.204) 
Greens_PartyID   2.044*** 2.125*** 1.876*** 
   (0.178) (0.176) (0.176) 
Afd_PartyID   0.153 0.651*** 0.484** 
   (0.210) (0.212) (0.213) 
Other_PartyID   0.101 0.418 0.156 
   (0.349) (0.347) (0.344) 
No_PartyID   1.447*** 1.663*** 1.461*** 
   (0.149) (0.147) (0.147) 
Gender   0.269*** 0.288*** 0.240*** 
(1 = Female)   (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Religion   0.382*** 0.450*** 0.472*** 
(1 = Non-
Religious) 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) 
Education   0.087** 0.032 0.059 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Social_Class   -0.162*** -0.213*** -0.174*** 
   (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
EastWest   0.097 0.147* 0.166** 
(1 = Born GDR)   (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) 
Constant 5.648*** 5.712*** 4.268*** 4.537*** 4.333*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.230) (0.230) (0.260) 
Observations 4,106 4,106 4,106 4,106 4,106 
R2 0.075 0.051 0.313 0.321 0.338 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.050 0.310 0.318 0.334 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.776 (df = 
4101) 
2.812 (df = 
4101) 
2.397 (df = 4087) 2.383 (df = 4087) 
2.354 (df = 
4079) 
F Statistic 
83.552*** (df = 
4; 4101) 
55.080*** (df = 
4; 4101) 
103.351*** (df = 
18; 4087) 
107.328*** (df = 
18; 4087) 
80.258*** (df = 
26; 4079) 




My focus is on column 5 in Table 4.10, which shows results after simultaneously including as 
predictors the economic and migration proximity groups, populism groups, and the other 
control variables. The previous conclusions identified from proximity groups continue from 
Table 4.10. Specifically, I find that the most spatially-proximal ‘Closest’ groups had 
significantly higher average evaluations for Die Linke compared to the baseline, and lower 
average evaluations for Die Linke from the ‘Furthest’ proximity groups. Both of these findings 
conform with expectations. Looking at the relative magnitudes of these coefficients, proximity 
on both policy dimensions is associated with similarly increased average evaluations for Die 
Linke. At the other end of these dimensions, spatial-distance on migration policy is associated 
with a larger decrease in average Die Linke evaluations than distance on economic policy.  
There is, however, a notable change to the results from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group. Table 
4.10 shows that after controlling for economic and migration proximity groups, as well as the 
control variables, holding radically populist beliefs is associated with a .29 increase in average 
evaluations for Die Linke compared to the baseline. Crucially, this represents a statistically 
significant increase in average Die Linke evaluations. Looking at magnitudes again, radical 
populism’s association with higher average Die Linke evaluations seems to have roughly half 
the effect of close proximity on both economic and migration policy dimensions.  
In summary, I find higher average Die Linke evaluations from respondents who are spatially 
close to this political actor, and lower average Die Linke evaluations from the spatially-distant 
groups – both compared to the baseline voters. Finally, I find evidence supports the populism-
based account’s explanation of radical left support in Germany. The overall outcome from 
Table 4.10 is support for both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. Furthermore, 
when including the unfolded economic and migration proximity groups in the regression, as 
I do in Appendix 1.13, I generally observe the same pattern of evaluations. Figure 4.19 






























Figure 4.19: Plotted Results from Econ and Migration Prox. Groups, and Populism Groups 
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Figure 4.19 displays the crucial conclusions from Table 4.10. Namely, the monotonic patterns 
of average Die Linke evaluations from the economic and migration proximity groups, and the 
significantly higher average Die Linke evaluations from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group relative 
to the baseline. These patterns all conform with their respective accounts.  
Finally, I also find this monotonicity when including scalar proximity variables, rather than 
proximity groups. I include this model under Appendix 1.14. It shows that increases in each 
proximity scale, representing increased spatial distance from Die Linke; and increases in the 
populism scale, representing increasing levels of non-populist attitudes, are associated with 
reduced Die Linke evaluations. This conforms with my findings in Table 4.10, showing both 
policy-proximity and populism-based support for the radical left in Germany. Thus, after 
looking at the scalar models of policy and populism variables, my substantive findings are 
unchanged.  
Moving now to the multiple linear regression of policy groups across all three dimensions and 
populism groups. I include this regression in Table 4.11, working from pooled pre-election 
and post-election data. The baseline in this regression is the ‘Centrists’ groups on all three 
policy dimensions and populism. The sample is significantly smaller here, as respondents 
needed to answer all questions pertaining to the three policy dimensions, populist attitudes, 
control variables, and evaluations of Die Linke. This brings the number of respondents to 1,242.  
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 Table 4.11: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Policy Groups on all Dimensions and Populism Groups 
(Part 1/2) 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 1.077***   0.801*** 0.569***   0.482** 
 (0.243)   (0.239) (0.218)   (0.217) 
Centre Left 0.068   -0.006 -0.082   -0.096 
 (0.237)   (0.232) (0.210)   (0.209) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.544**   -0.423* -0.398*   -0.334 
 (0.254)   (0.250) (0.225)   (0.226) 
Rad Right -1.248***   -1.149*** -0.992***   -0.920*** 
 (0.221)   (0.218) (0.198)   (0.199) 
Rad Lib  0.561**  0.275  0.294  0.144 
  (0.241)  (0.235)  (0.215)  (0.213) 
Mod Lib  0.247  0.160  0.094  0.016 
  (0.276)  (0.266)  (0.243)  (0.240) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con  -0.580**  -0.580**  -0.386  -0.395 
  (0.279)  (0.269)  (0.247)  (0.243) 
Rad Con  -1.050***  -0.767***  -0.711***  -0.541** 
  (0.266)  (0.260)  (0.241)  (0.240) 
Rad Inc   1.062*** 1.117***   0.594** 0.588** 
   (0.251) (0.246)   (0.233) (0.232) 
Mod Inc   0.608** 0.745***   0.406* 0.461** 
   (0.247) (0.238)   (0.219) (0.217) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   -0.247 -0.130   -0.280 -0.168 
   (0.233) (0.224)   (0.206) (0.203) 
Rad Exc   0.255 0.101   -0.024 0.055 
   (0.259) (0.258)   (0.235) (0.237) 
Rad Populist    0.664***    0.094 
    (0.234)    (0.219) 
Mod Populist    0.270    0.125 
    (0.230)    (0.209) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
ModNon-Pop    -0.262    -0.098 
    (0.241)    (0.219) 
Rad Non-Pop    -0.355    -0.118 
    (0.234)    (0.214) 
Constant 5.555*** 5.422*** 5.059*** 5.275*** 4.315*** 4.155*** 4.238*** 4.512*** 
 (0.162) (0.200) (0.173) (0.313) (0.378) (0.402) (0.398) (0.462) 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
R2 0.078 0.048 0.028 0.134 0.291 0.273 0.267 0.308 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.045 0.025 0.123 0.280 0.262 0.257 0.291 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.686 (df = 
1237) 
2.730 (df = 
1237) 
2.758 (df = 
1237) 
2.616 (df = 
1225) 
2.370 (df = 
1223) 
2.399 (df = 
1223) 
2.408 (df = 
1223) 




= 4; 1237) 
15.659*** (df 
= 4; 1237) 
8.970*** (df 
= 4; 1237) 
11.838*** (df = 
16; 1225) 
27.831*** (df = 
18; 1223) 
25.520*** (df = 
18; 1223) 
24.789*** (df = 
18; 1223) 
17.973*** (df = 
30; 1211) 






Table 4.11: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Policy Groups on all Dimensions and Populism Groups 
(Part 2/2) 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DieLinke_PartyID     4.616*** 4.750*** 4.770*** 4.382*** 
     (0.323) (0.326) (0.328) (0.326) 
CDU_PartyID     0.318 0.254 0.337 0.218 
     (0.255) (0.260) (0.260) (0.256) 
CSU_PartyID     -0.426 -0.336 -0.308 -0.325 
     (0.394) (0.398) (0.401) (0.393) 
SPD_PartyID     1.667*** 1.646*** 1.744*** 1.393*** 
     (0.257) (0.263) (0.262) (0.261) 
FDP_PartyID     0.712* 0.464 0.402 0.590 
     (0.364) (0.367) (0.369) (0.363) 
Greens_PartyID     1.967*** 1.990*** 1.939*** 1.566*** 
     (0.323) (0.328) (0.337) (0.334) 
Afd_PartyID     0.504 0.697* 0.585 0.614 
     (0.385) (0.392) (0.394) (0.391) 
Other_PartyID     -0.537 -0.423 -0.466 -0.677 
     (0.667) (0.675) (0.679) (0.665) 
No_PartyID     1.469*** 1.435*** 1.481*** 1.348*** 
     (0.253) (0.257) (0.257) (0.254) 
Gender     0.215 0.111 0.278** 0.127 
(1 = Female)     (0.136) (0.141) (0.139) (0.139) 
Religion     0.305** 0.249* 0.354** 0.294** 
(1 = Non-
Religious) 
    (0.146) (0.148) (0.149) (0.146) 
Education     0.023 0.054 -0.025 -0.021 
     (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.071) 
Social_Class     -0.101 -0.112 -0.161** -0.083 
     (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
EastWest     0.205 0.280** 0.308** 0.247* 
(1 = Born GDR)     (0.140) (0.142) (0.143) (0.140) 
Constant 5.555*** 5.422*** 5.059*** 5.275*** 4.315*** 4.155*** 4.238*** 4.512*** 
 (0.162) (0.200) (0.173) (0.313) (0.378) (0.402) (0.398) (0.462) 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
R2 0.078 0.048 0.028 0.134 0.291 0.273 0.267 0.308 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.045 0.025 0.123 0.280 0.262 0.257 0.291 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.686 (df = 
1237) 
2.730 (df = 
1237) 
2.758 (df = 
1237) 
2.616 (df = 
1225) 
2.370 (df = 
1223) 
2.399 (df = 
1223) 
2.408 (df = 
1223) 




= 4; 1237) 
15.659*** (df 
= 4; 1237) 
8.970*** (df 
= 4; 1237) 
11.838*** (df 
= 16; 1225) 
27.831*** (df 
= 18; 1223) 
25.520*** (df 
= 18; 1223) 
24.789*** (df 
= 18; 1223) 
17.973*** (df 
= 30; 1211) 




Primary interpretation of Table 4.11 comes from column eight, which includes coefficients 
representing average Die Linke evaluations from all policy and populism groups relative to 
the baseline, and after also accounting for the control variables. I will discuss these dimension-
by-dimension, with attention on the populism groups too.  
From the economic policy groups, I find the expected increase in average Die Linke support 
from the ‘Radical-Left’ and decrease in this support from the ‘Radical-Right’ relative to the 
baseline. Therefore, and consistent with earlier conclusions, I find results here which follow 
expectations at each end of this policy dimension. However, I now find this and other 
conclusions, after also accounting for policy preferences on the other two dimensions, having 
taken populism into account, and including the control variables.  
Table 4.11 shows consistency with the earlier results from the cultural policy groups. 
Specifically, I still do not find increased average Die Linke evaluations, relative to the baseline, 
and I again find the significant decrease in Die Linke support from the spatially-distant 
culturally-conservative voters. Consequently, my earlier conclusion of support for the policy-
proximity account, based on lower average Die Linke evaluations from spatially-distant 
cultural-conservatives, is maintained.  
Consistency also continues to be apparent when looking at migration policy groups. In 
column eight I find increased average evaluations for Die Linke, relative to the baseline, from 
the spatially-proximal migrant-inclusive voters, but do not find the equally expected 
decreased Die Linke support from the spatially-distant migrant-exclusive voters. Therefore, 
once again, I conclude partial support for the policy-proximity account on this dimension. 
This is partial because average Die Linke support followed expectations at only one of the two 
ends of this dimension.  
From the populism groups, I find no statistically significant differences between their average 
Die Linke evaluations and those from the baseline voters. Thus, results here do not follow 
expectations even after accounting for policy preferences on all three dimensions and the 
control variables. Consequently, there is little evidence supporting this account of radical left 
support here.  
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In terms of magnitudes, the largest difference in average Die Linke evaluations is from the 
economic ‘Radical-Right’ policy group, with a .92 reduction in average Die Linke evaluations, 
relative to the baseline. Thus, distance from Die Linke on economics is associated with lowest 
levels of support for this political actor, compared to the impacts of spatial distance on both 
other policy dimensions. Looking at magnitudes of average Die Linke evaluation increases, 
these were broadly similar from the ‘Radical-Left’ and ‘Radical-Inclusive’ groups on the 
economic and migration policy dimensions, respectively. Therefore, proximity on both these 
dimensions is roughly equally associated with greater average support for Die Linke, relative 
to the baseline group. ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ positions on the migration dimension are also 
associated with a comparable increase in evaluations of Die Linke, relative to the baseline, 
which further suggests migration policy-proximity is associated with support for the radical 
left.  
Looking at column four, this shows coefficients from all policy and populism groups without 
the control variables. Interestingly, before inclusion of the control variables there was a 
significant increase in average Die Linke support from the ‘Radical-Populist’ voters. However, 
the control variables nullified this significance, as it also did in Table 4.9. Once again, this 
perhaps vindicates the control variables, without which I may have wrongly concluded 
populism-based radical left support.  
Although Table 4.11 has mostly just confirmed my earlier conclusions, it has made an 
important contribution. Results in column eight of Table 4.11 came after controlling for the 
potential confounding roles of policy preferences on the three dimensions, of populist 
attitudes, as well as the control variables. Consequently, Table 4.11 has acted as a robustness 
test of my earlier conclusions, and yielded a set of more reliable findings. Figure 4.20 shows 
the pattern of average Die Linke evaluations across each dimension’s policy groups and across 





















To quickly address the separated pre-election and post-election results under Appendices 1.15 
and 1.16, respectively. Coefficients from both pre-election and post-election data broadly 
followed the patterns I observe in Table 4.11. Specifically, increased evaluations from the 
economically-left and migrant-inclusive respondents, and decreased evaluations from the 
economically-right and culturally-conservative respondents. Consequently, pre-election and 
post-election results broadly conform with previous observations.  
Finally, results also conform under Appendix 1.17, which includes policy preferences and 
populist attitudes as scalar variables. Increases on the economic policy scale, representing 
greater economic leftism, are associated with significantly higher Die Linke evaluations. 
Furthermore, increases on the cultural, migration, and populism scales – representing greater 
conservatism on cultural policy, migrant-exclusiveness, and non-populism, respectively – are 
associated with decreased Die Linke evaluations.  
Figure 4.20: Plotted Results from Policy Groups (all dimensions) and Populism Groups. 
154 
 
This conformity with scalar variable results, and pre-/post-election results, leads me to draw 
overall conclusions for this chapter.  
4.5: Germany Conclusions 
First, I will summarise results for both accounts I examined here. I find little consistent 
evidence to support the populism-based account. More specifically, with regression of the 
populism groups alone, and in multiple regressions with the policy groups on all three 
dimensions, I find no statistically significant coefficients next to the ‘Radical-Populist’ or even 
the ‘Moderate-Populist’ group. On one occasion in my analysis, I did find radical populism to 
be associated with higher evaluations for Die Linke; however, generally my analysis did not 
find evidence supporting this account of radical left support. Examination of this account in 
both other case studies will help me make more definitive conclusions about the possible role 
of populism in support for the radical left.  
I tested the policy-proximity account in two ways: the first way with proximity groups, and 
the second through policy groups. From the former, I observe a monotonic relationship 
between proximity groups and evaluations for Die Linke. This relationship followed 
expectations, as the groups in closest proximity with Die Linke had the highest evaluations for 
this political actor, with these falling as policy-proximity reduced. These proximity groups are 
an advantage of the German case study, as they provide an additional test of the policy-
proximity account. From the policy groups, results broadly conformed with expectations. I 
find the spatially-proximal groups have higher Die Linke evaluations relative to the baseline 
‘Centrists’ group, and lower evaluations for this political actor from the spatially-distant 
groups. I find this most consistently from economic policy groups; however, on all three 
dimensions I observe results which conform with the policy-proximity account. These results 
persisted in multiple linear regressions, which further leads me to conclude support for the 
radical left based on policy-proximity.  
What do these conclusions mean in relation to existing research specifically on electoral 
support in Germany? Previous research has also examined the links between support for the 
radical left Die Linke and voters’ policy preferences, and their populist attitudes. Political 
disaffection, and East/West nostalgia was linked with support for Die Linke, along with left-
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right ideology on the GLES self-placement scale (Campbell, 2018). I also find voter ideology 
to be associated with radical left support, however I expanded on this by looking at more 
specific ideological beliefs relating to three policy dimensions. These three dimensions also 
appeared in previous research, along with populism (Loew & Faas, 2019). Populist attitudes 
are associated with likelihood of voting for Die Linke in that research, unlike my own, however 
this may be the product of different dependent variables meaning voters expressed their 
support for the radical left differently. The conclusions reached by Loew and Faas relating to 
policy preferences and radical left support are in line with my findings, with cultural and 
migration policy linked with Die Linke support, but to a lesser extent than economic policy 
preferences.  
Results of this case study lead me to conclude support for the policy-proximity account of 
radical left support in Germany. However, the nature of this case study leaves me wondering 
whether this substantial support for this account truly arises from policy-proximity. The 
established nature of Die Linke makes it difficult to disentangle possible persuasion effects 
from this political actor’s support. Potentially voters had already decided to support Die Linke 
prior to the GLES data, and that pre-existing support meant voters had shifted their policy 
preferences to conform with Die Linke. According to Brody and Page, such support would not 
equate to backing of the policy-proximity account (Brody & Page, 1972).  
Control variables partly contribute to separating wider persuasion effects here, and I included 
many of these in this case study. These controlled for factors including party identification 
and education, and how these impacted on Die Linke evaluations. However, these variables 
do not control for how they potentially shifted the policy preferences and populism of voters. 
So, while these control variables are useful and important here, for clarifying the roles of 
policy-proximity and populism, they are insufficient for controlling their potential persuasion 







Chapter 5: Support for Sanders – the Radical Left in the US 
 
5.0: Introduction 
During the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, the campaign of Hillary Clinton began 
with many advantages, including huge polling leads (Richinik, 2014), large amounts of money 
and endorsements (The Hill, 2015), and the backing of established Democratic politicians 
(Jensen, 2013). Yet despite winning the Democratic Party’s nomination in 2016, the story of 
the campaign was not entirely of Clinton’s success. Nor did her campaign ultimately receive 
the levels of support expected earlier in the electoral cycle. Instead, the presidential campaign 
of Senator Bernie Sanders became the story (Roy, 2016).  
A little-known Senator from Vermont, Sanders challenged the mainstream Democratic Party 
from the radical left, overcame scarce early media coverage (Patterson, 2016), raised large 
amounts of money while declining corporate donations (Wagner, 2015), and ultimately 
achieved 45% of pledged Democratic delegates following primary victories in 22 states. In this 
chapter I investigate the surprising levels of support for the Sanders campaign in the 2016 
Democratic primaries. 
The primaries system separates support for each contender in the intra-party Democratic 
Party primaries. I examine support for the radical left Sanders campaign versus support for 
the more moderate Clinton campaign. I talked earlier about persuasion effects, and how I seek 
to control for these impacting on voters’ policy preferences and populism. The context of the 
US case study is important here, because it addresses one possible persuasion effect – party 
attachments – by looking at an intra-party electoral choice. Thus, attachments voters have 
with the wider Democratic Party should not persuade voters to alter their policy preferences 
and populism into line specifically with the Sanders campaign. Consequently, the intra-party 
context of the US case study mitigates potential persuasion arising from party attachments.  
In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate the radical leftism of Bernie Sanders, where his 
campaign fundamentally challenged the mainstream Democratic Party in the 2016 primaries. 
This first considers quantitative placements of Sanders, before moving into greater detail by 
discussing the policy positions of his campaign compared to those of the mainstream 
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Democratic candidacy of Hillary Clinton. I also look at the differing rhetoric of each campaign, 
and how this further indicates Sanders’ challenge to the Democratic Party’s establishment.  
Following that, I explain particular details of the research design for the US case study. This 
includes discussion of voter-level data from the CCES and ANES, as well as the grouping of 
respondents by their policy preferences and populism. I also discuss US control variables here. 
Expectations follow from this, relating to the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts.  
Finally, in the analysis section, I find support for the policy-proximity account from the 
radically left-wing economic respondents, who I find to have higher probability of voting for 
Sanders than Clinton compared to centrist voters on this dimension. However, results more 
frequently challenged the policy-proximity account, including increased Sanders voting 
probability from spatially-distant voters, and unexpected associations between support for 
Sanders/Clinton and cultural and migration policy preferences. My conclusion from testing 
the populism-based account follows that made in the German case, with little evidence 
suggesting levels of populism explain radical left support in the US.  
5.1: Contextualising Sanders 
The purpose of this section is to argue that Bernie Sanders represents a radical left political 
actor in the US context. At the root of this is the challenge Sanders posed to the traditional 
Democratic Party in 2016. The Democratic Party itself constitutes a rather loose coalition of 
factions, with these competing interests often leading the party to compromises and marginal-
gains (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Sanders appears here in 2016 as part of the left-wing 
faction, presenting more strident and radical policies in contrast to the more traditional 
incremental and pragmatic approach of the Democratic Party.  
I ultimately show how the Sanders campaign is different from the established Democratic 
Party, in this section. I show this through his more radically left-wing policies compared to 
those of Clinton in 2016, and through his rhetorical challenge to Democratic Party tradition 





5.1.1: Quantitative Appraisals of Sanders 
The first way I examine Sanders in relation to Clinton within the Democratic Party is through 
quantitative measurements of the positions of each of these candidates. I include two 
quantitative measures here, from Crowdpac and from DW-NOMINATE.  
First, a look at how Crowdpac assesses both Sanders and Clinton. The methodology for this 
measurement is based on donors to each candidate. By comparison with Sanders, and broadly 
representing the mainstream Democratic Party, is Clinton. Clinton historically had a generally 
liberal voting record, according to Crowdpac’s ideological scores for the 2016 candidates 
(Willis, 2015). They place each candidate on a scale from -10 (very liberal) to +10 (very 
conservative). Crowdpac places Clinton on this scale at -6.4, with Sanders placed on the same 
scale further to the left of Clinton, with a score of -8.3.  
The second quantitative measure included here is from DW-NOMINATE. This measurement 
analyses roll call patterns to infer a position on an ideological dimension which underpins 
legislative voting. When compared to Clinton in the last Congress where she was a member 
(2007-2009), Sanders was placed as the most liberal Senator on this dimension, while Clinton 
was placed as thirteenth most liberal member of the Senate (Poole & Rosenthal, 2015).  
These quantitative placements provide an overall impression of where Sanders falls in US 
politics. Both quantitative measures here show Sanders to be on the radical left of US politics, 
and to be more left-wing than Clinton. However, these measures are limited by the fact that 
they measure the positions of politicians on a single left/right scale. This conflates different 
policy areas into just one dimension. To look beyond single-dimensional measures of 
ideology, I now look more specifically at the policies proposed by both Sanders and Clinton 
in the 2016 primaries.  
5.1.2: Sanders vs. Clinton: Policy Divisions within the Democratic Party 
I will try to link qualitative analysis here with the three policy dimensions considered under 
the policy-proximity account in my thesis. I will then not only make the case of Sanders’ 
leftism compared to Clinton, but also gain some idea of where both candidates are located on 
the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. This will be useful for when I come 
to state case-specific expectations for radical left support under the policy-proximity account.  
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First, I will look at the respective positions of both candidates on economic policy. Remember 
the minimal definition of the radical left adopted in this thesis, where I defined the radical left 
as political actors which oppose contemporary capitalist economic norms. For example, with 
the radical left proposing significantly higher taxes on the rich and big businesses, supporting 
greater regulation of businesses, and greater government provision and spending in areas like 
education and healthcare. To see how Sanders and Clinton diverge on economic policy, with 
Sanders radically to Clinton’s left, I will look at their respective policies in these areas.  
Sanders placed economic policy at the heart of his campaign, regularly denouncing Wall 
Street (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016),20 large corporations (Bernie Sanders 
Presidential Campaign, 2016),21 the ‘super rich’ (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 
2016),22 and income inequality in the US (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016).23 These 
attitudes all conform with the minimal definition, by demonstrating strident redistributionist 
and regulatory policies. However, to compare Sanders’ stances to those taken by Clinton, two 
areas with evident divisions between both candidates are healthcare and college education. 
On these two issues, Sanders routinely proposed policies which were notably more left-wing 
compared to the mainstream-Democratic policies of Clinton.  
On healthcare, Clinton committed to upholding the Affordable Care Act (also known as 
‘Obamacare’) were she elected as President (Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2019).24 
Obamacare was the flagship healthcare policy of President Obama, and in brief it offered 
discounts on government-sponsored healthcare plans to the point where all Americans would 
have access to affordable health insurance (Neporent, 2013).  
Obamacare was a compromise when originally formulated, and represents an example of a 
marginal-gains approach of the Democratic Party (Oberlander, 2010). Originally more left-
wing Democrats identified Obamacare as being too moderate (Cusack, et al., 2016). The left of 
the Democratic Party wanted a single-payer healthcare system, but reluctantly supported 
Obamacare as the best alternative at that time (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). When the time 
 
20 ‘Reforming Wall Street’ 
21 ‘Making the Wealthy, Wall Street, and Large Corporations Pay their Fair Share’ 
22 ‘Income and Wealth Inequality’ 
23 ibid 
24 ‘Health Care’ 
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came in the 2016 election for a radical left Democrat to propose their own healthcare policy, 
Sanders unsurprisingly moved to Clinton’s left. He proposed expanding existing healthcare 
provisions to offer universal single-payer healthcare (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 
2016).25  
The comparison between the two on this issue was characterised as Clinton’s commitment to 
‘Medicare for more’, while Sanders offered ‘Medicare for all’ (Harrop, 2016). Manoeuvring to 
Clinton’s left flank on this issue further highlights the radical leftism of Sanders. Further 
support for this radical leftism comes from the break from the previous marginal-gains 
approach of the Democratic Party. The avowed commitment to radical reform by Sanders on 
healthcare policy diverges from the Democratic Party’s more traditional incremental 
approach, and further highlights Sanders’ challenge to the established Democratic Party.  
Another issue where Sanders took more radically left-wing policy positions compared to 
Clinton’s mainstream Democratic presidential campaign is college education. Again, Clinton 
offered a liberal policy, typical of a mainstream Democratic presidential candidate. She 
proposed lowering the interest rates on student loans, and additional investment in higher 
education (Zurchner, 2016). Sanders again manoeuvred to Clinton’s left on this issue, by 
proposing free college tuition, funded by taxes on Wall Street financial transactions (CBS 
Democratic Primary Debate, Nov. 14 2015).  
Sanders’ general commitment to subsidise healthcare and college education is funded through 
a more progressive tax system targeting the wealthy and corporations (Bernie Sanders 
Presidential Campaign, 2016). Additionally, Sanders has supported greater regulation of Wall 
Street businesses, including a new Glass-Steagall Act to separate corporate and savings banks 
(Stein, 2018). Sanders has also proposed legislation to curb the size of corporations, and 
expressed desire to regulate their practices (Lane, 2018; FeelTheBern.Org, 2019). It is 
conventional for a radical left political actor to adopt stances opposed to large corporations 
and propose higher taxation to increase public expenditure (March, 2008). Consequently, this 
provides further proof of Sanders’ radical leftism.  
 
25 ‘Medicare for All: Leaving No One Behind’ 
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A final monetary-related issue where Sanders and Clinton differed was on the issue of 
campaign finance. Donations to political campaigns in the US is a controversial issue, because 
contributions from large businesses and wealthy individuals to campaigns are commonly 
seen as buying influence (Smith, 2014). It is typical for corporations to donate to political 
campaigns, and during the 2016 election the Clinton campaign alone raised over $1 billion 
with much of that money coming from wealthy individuals and corporations (Gold & 
Narayanswamy, 2016).  
Sanders did not accept any money from these wealthy donors, however; a position which 
further shows how Sanders challenged the established Democratic Party. Instead, he funded 
his campaign through smaller contributions from individual Americans. The campaign 
received and was funded by more than 2 million of these donations (Wagner, 2015), resulting 
in a cumulative total of over $230 million raised (OpenSecrets.Org, 2017). This followed 
Sanders’ commitment from the outset of his campaign to reject corporate donations (Bradner, 
2015). This demonstrates another substantial difference from Clinton, who accepted these 
donations, and shows again Sanders’ anti-corporatist attitude which is typical of a radical left 
political actor.  
Despite profound disagreements between Sanders and Clinton on economics, both candidates 
did not disagree on all policy areas. Moving to consider cultural policy positions of both 
candidates, Sanders and Clinton expressed similar policy preferences here. Both supported 
liberal cultural policies, including protecting rights to abortions (OnTheIssues.Org, 2019), 
both now supporting LGBT causes (Jacobs, 2015; Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 
2016),26 and both now generally favouring increased background checks on firearms (Ye Hee 
Lee, 2016; Flores, 2016).  
In relation to migration policy, both Sanders and Clinton support paths to citizenship and 
believe in immigration reform (Gambino, 2015; Min Kim, 2015). Therefore, as with cultural 
policy, Sanders and Clinton agree here also.  
The divergence between Clinton and Sanders over economics, and the similar positions of 
Sanders and Clinton on cultural and migration policy, will impact upon empirical 
 
26 ‘Fighting for LGBT Equality’ 
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expectations later, as I will need to indicate expectations of which voters would be more likely 
or less likely to have supported Sanders versus Clinton depending on their policy-proximity 
with both candidates. For now, the more salient conclusion is that Sanders is in policy terms 
on the radical left of US politics, and of the Democratic Party. This is based on Sanders’ 
economic policies, which include outward opposition to deregulation, support for increased 
taxation on businesses and the rich, and radical policies for government provision of 
healthcare and education placing him to Clinton’s left on these issues.  
5.1.3: Sanders, Socialism, and the Democratic Party 
Moving from quantitative assessments of Sanders, and more qualitative arguments around 
the policy proposals of Sanders relative to those of Clinton, an analysis of candidate rhetoric 
also demonstrates Sanders’ challenge to the Democratic Party. This comes about through his 
embracing of the description ‘Socialist’.  
Despite the Democratic Party’s position on the left within US politics, in contrast with 
European leftist parties who adopt and embrace the term ‘socialism’, the Democratic Party 
has long rejected this terminology. Instead, Democrats more often use the term ‘liberal’.  
In the US, socialism has long held negative political connotations. Prior to 2016, to negatively 
paint a candidate for political office as a socialist was a common tactic (Barreto, et al., 2011; 
Engler, 2017). Furthermore, in 2015 50% of Americans surveyed by Gallup said they would 
not support a socialist candidate for President, compared to 47% who said they would. In 
relative terms, this made socialists less popular as candidates for President than an atheist, a 
Muslim, or a gay/lesbian candidate (McCarthy, 2015). This demonstrates how the American 
public has previously looked at socialists and socialism with a degree of distrust.  
America’s fear of socialism developed historically, partly from the ideological conflict 
between the US and USSR in the Cold War, but also the connection Americans make between 
socialism and authoritarian communist regimes (Leibovich, 2007). Additionally, the class-
based foundations of socialism have also been at odds with the base American beliefs of self-
reliance and self-governance (Romance, 2018). Consequently, the Democratic Party has not 
only always avoided identification with socialism, but also has a history of anti-socialism as a 
patriotic and popular endeavour in US politics (Heing, 2018).  
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Ever since the New Deal of the 1930s, the Democratic Party has made explicit efforts to oppose 
socialism by maintaining and promoting broadly pro-capitalist policies and rhetoric. The New 
Deal coalition of the Democratic Party was itself avowedly pro-capitalist (Le Blanc, 2003). This 
pro-capitalism persisted in the Democratic Party, until Sanders’ campaign in 2016.  
Amongst the mainstream Democratic Party, it was rare for political figures to identify 
themselves as socialists, in response to the common aversion to socialism amongst the 
American public. However, in 2016 Sanders did not follow this pattern. Instead of simply 
branding himself a ‘liberal’, Sanders described himself as a ‘Democratic Socialist’ on 
numerous occasions (Kruse, 2015; Dreier, 2017). In doing so, he broke from tradition, and 
challenged the Democratic Party mainstream.  
The purpose of this section was to show how Sanders challenged the mainstream Democratic 
Party in 2016. I observe this through policy proposals from Sanders, which deviated from the 
common marginal-gains and compromise-based approach of the Democratic Party, offering 
more radical proposals compared to those of Hillary Clinton. Additionally, the use of the term 
‘socialist’ by Sanders to describe himself and his policies is another way he challenged 
Democratic Party tradition in 2016.  
The additional purpose here was to argue that Sanders represents a radical left political actor 
within the US political context. To conclude this case, I recall the minimal definition of the 
radical left in my thesis, with these political actors identified as challengers towards the 
contemporary capitalist economic norms of their particular context. By Sanders’ policy 
preferences proposing higher taxation on corporations and the wealthy to pay for 
government-provided healthcare and college education, he breaks from mainstream policy of 
both the Democratic and Republican parties. Additionally, support for a new regulatory 
Glass-Steagall Act, overtures to curb the size of corporations, and rejection of donations from 
large businesses represent further ways in which Sanders has rejected established economic 
norms of deregulation, low taxation, and support for corporations in the US. Having provided 
evidence to support the argument of Sanders’ status as a radical left political actor, my 




5.2: US Research Design  
For the US case study, I obtain voter-level data from two sources: the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES), and the American National Election Survey (ANES). 
The CCES provides measures of policy preferences and support for the radical left, but not 
populism. The ANES includes populism questions, so I use data from this survey to test the 
populism-based account. Compared to the CCES, the ANES is a much smaller survey in terms 
of number of respondents. Other than its populism questions, the ANES includes a set of 
‘Feeling Thermometers’ asking respondents to indicate attitudes towards socioeconomic 
groups. Although those thermometers could provide indication of attitudes towards groups 
which relate to the three policy dimensions (e.g., wealthy people, LGBT people, immigrants), 
questions relating to specific policies seem like stronger gauges of respondent policy 
preferences. The CCES includes such questions relating to specific policies and attitudes 
towards them, and is also a much larger survey in terms of its sample size – enhancing its 
explanatory power. Therefore, for testing the policy-proximity account, I draw upon CCES 
responses in this chapter.  
CCES data comes from their ‘Common Content 2016’. This comes from as an internet survey 
of over 64,000 people (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017). ANES data comes from their ‘2016 
Time Series Study’, which had a total of 4,270 responses, gained through a combination of 
face-to-face and internet interviews (American National Election Studies, 2017).  
When measuring support for the radical left in the German case study, the dependent variable 
was a question of evaluations for Die Linke. However, in the US case study neither survey 
includes a similar measure of evaluations for both Sanders and Clinton. Therefore, the 
dependent variable is instead a question of vote choice in the presidential primaries. Possible 
responses to this question include Sanders and Clinton, with other candidates from the 
Republican Party also included as possible responses. My analysis includes only those who 
supported Sanders or Clinton, with respondents who supported neither Clinton nor Sanders 
recoded as NA. With the dependent variable in my analysis considering both Democratic 
candidates, the US case effectively considers the probability of supporting the moderate-left 
Clinton campaign or the radical left Sanders campaign, instead of measuring changes in 
evaluation as with the German case study. I include the dependent variable questions, from 
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both CCES and ANES, in Appendix 2.0, alongside all questions used from surveys in the US 
case study.  
The German case study was open to the criticism of persuasion effects, which are difficult to 
mitigate due to Die Linke’s status as a long-established radical left political party. Given Die 
Linke’s long existence, it is more probable voters came to identify with or support that party, 
for whatever reason. Whereas the Sanders campaign began with the 2016 Democratic Party 
primaries, meaning voters are less likely to have formed attachments with this newer radical 
left political actor in the US. The primaries system is important, because it allows me to 
examine support specifically for the intra-party radical left Sanders campaign versus for his 
more moderate opponent. Looking at an intra-party radical left actor means Democratic Party 
attachments – a potential persuasion effect – would not plausibly cause voters to alter their 
policy preferences or populism into line with the Sanders campaign specifically.  
Under this design, attachments to the Democratic Party should not cause a persuasion effect 
in relation to the Sanders campaign specifically. However, this design does not rule out voters 
forming attachments directly with Sanders, rather than the Democratic Party. These Sanders 
attachments may also be a persuasion effect, as both CCES and ANES data comes from after 
the 2016 primaries have concluded. Therefore, voters may have recently formed attachments 
to Sanders, from which there may have been impacts on their policy preferences and populist 
attitudes. Although I cannot control this possible persuasion effect arising from attachments 
specifically to Sanders, the fact that his candidacy is a less established political actor than Die 
Linke still leads me to suggest the US case study is more immune to persuasion effects than 
the German case study.  
5.2.1: US Voter Attitudes: Economics 
I draw three questions from the CCES to measure economic policy preferences. These 
questions are all included in Appendix 2.0. The first of these asks respondents to state their 
preference for higher taxation, or reduced government spending. The CCES places responses 
to this on a scale from 0 – indicating support for higher taxation – to 100, which indicates 
support for cutting government spending instead. Considering the policy preferences 
indicated at each end of this scale, those with responses close to 0 are considered to be more 
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left-wing economically, and those with responses close to 100 hold right-wing economic 
policy preferences.   
Two additional questions used to determine voter economic beliefs ask whether respondents 
support or oppose certain policies. These policies include repealing the Affordable Care Act 
(aka Obamacare), and increasing the federal minimum wage to $12 per hour. Economically 
left-wing respondents would indicate opposition to repealing Obamacare, and support for an 
increased federal minimum wage, with the economically right-wing respondents taking the 
opposite perspectives on both of these questions. The scale for both questions differs from the 
tax vs. spending question, being binary instead. I recode the left-wing responses to 0, and the 
right-wing responses to 100 to take this into account, matching the scale of the tax vs. spending 
question above. Like in the Germany case study, I calculate the average economic position of 
each respondent from their answers over these economic policy questions, and locate each 
respondent’s economic policy preferences on this common 0 to 100 scale.  
5.2.2: US Voter Attitudes: Cultural 
Cultural policy preferences are determined from fourteen questions, over a range of cultural 
issues including abortion, gun control, crime, and gay marriage. I have included these 
questions under Appendix 2.0. Respondents indicate their support or opposition to policy 
proposals in these areas on a binary scale. I recode the data to place all culturally-liberal 
responses at one end of this scale, and all culturally-conservative responses at the other. I 
calculate the average response from across these fourteen questions, giving me an indication 
of each respondent’s overall cultural policy preferences. I also modify the scale here to become 
0 to 100, thus matching that of economic policy responses. Averages close to 0 indicate 
culturally-liberal respondents, with those close to 100 demonstrating culturally-conservative 
policy preferences.  
Of these fourteen questions, three concern gun control, six concern abortion, four relate to 
crime, and one on gay marriage. I do not use all CCES questions on each of these issues.27 
Some of the questions here do not have a clear liberal or conservative response – I do not 
include responses to these questions. The number of questions on each issue varies in this case 
 
27 Unused question: CC16_330b (Support or oppose: Prohibit state and local governments from 
publishing the names and addresses of all gun owners).  
167 
 
study – something which is present within the CCES itself. I reflect the weighting by the CCES 
on these four issues in my own research, where there are not equal numbers of questions 
across gun control, abortion, crime, and gay marriage.  
Given the context-specific nature of the gun issue, and the need for a degree of comparability 
across tests of cultural policy-proximity on radical left support in each case, I also perform a 
robustness check without using questions related to this issue. I still include responses to the 
questions related to abortion, crime, and gay marriage. I appendicise results from this stripped 
back test of cultural policy-proximity, and discuss these in the analysis section of this chapter.  
5.2.3: US Voter Attitudes: Migration 
I derive migration policy preferences from four questions, again asking respondents whether 
they support or oppose a set of policies. I include them all under Appendix 2.0. There are nine 
migration-related questions in the CCES overall; however, two of these do not have clear 
inclusive and exclusive responses, and the three others were put to much smaller subsamples 
of respondents. Including these three other questions would have limited the amount of data 
considered here, so I do not use their responses. 
There are two possible responses to each of the four questions I use: one which is supportive 
of immigration and migrants, and the other which indicates opposition towards immigration. 
I calculate the average response to these four migration policy questions from each 
respondent, ensuring the same value for pro-migration responses across these questions, and 
a different value for anti-migration responses. Again, I modify the scale here to match the 0 to 
100 scale of both other policy dimensions. Average responses close to 0 indicate migrant-
inclusive respondents, and an average response close to 100 indicates migrant-exclusive 
respondents.  
So far, I have shown how I draw out policy preferences from the CCES. Later, I will summarise 
theoretical expectations for respondents across all three of these policy dimensions. First, 
though, I will explain how I determine levels of populism amongst respondents.  
5.2.4: US Voter Attitudes: Populism 
For measures of populism, I turn to the American National Election Survey (ANES), and their 
‘2016 Time Series Study’. This survey had a total of 4,270 responses, gained through a 
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combination of face-to-face and internet interviews (American National Election Studies, 
2017). The dependent variable question drawn from the ANES matches that of the CCES. I 
include it alongside other survey questions, in Appendix 2.0.  
Seven ANES questions pertain directly to populism. They ask how far voters agree with 
certain statements, including ‘What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out 
on one’s principles’, ‘Most politicians do not care about the people’, ‘The people, and not 
politicians, should make our most important policy decisions’, and others which are detailed 
in Appendix 2.0. The same and similar questions to these have featured in other studies of 
populism (Akkerman, et al., 2014; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018), including in the other 
empirical chapters of this thesis.  
Responses to these questions range on a five-point Likert-type scale from ‘Agree Strongly’ to 
‘Disagree Strongly’. The ANES codes these responses numerically, allowing me to average 
responses across these questions. Unlike non-populist respondents, populists would express 
cynicism towards politics, believe politicians are unprincipled, and believe in popular 
majoritarian sovereignty.  
Once levels of populism amongst the respondents are known, I test how holding populist and 
non-populist attitudes is associated with probability of supporting Sanders versus Clinton in 
the 2016 Democratic Party primaries.  
5.2.5: Grouping Respondents 
With the average responses I have alluded to, on economic, cultural, and migration policy, 
and populism questions, I again group respondents. CCES respondents are grouped by their 
economic policy, cultural policy, and migration policy preferences. I also group ANES 
respondents, by their levels of populism.  
I continue this grouping methodology from the German case study. I justified this in the 
research design, with this methodology allowing me to observe non-linear relationships 
should they be present. With average responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy, 
and populism questions, I bring respondents together into groups. I detail these groups 
below, in Table 5.1, with the number of respondents in each group in parentheses below.  
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Recall that possible dependent variable responses include Sanders, Clinton, and other 
candidates including those who competed for the Republican Party’s nomination in 2016. The 
groups detailed in Table 5.1 come from before the data is subset to include Clinton and Sanders 
supporters. This means, for example, the Radical-Right group’s economic views are radically 
right-wing relative to the whole survey sample, rather than relative to just those who voted 
for Sanders or Clinton. The latter would be the case if I created these groups after filtering 
dependent responses to only Clinton or Sanders voters, but would not truly represent Radical-
Right economic policy preferences in the US. This also explains why the number of 
observations is much lower in some of these groups – where Radical-Right, Radical-
Conservative and Radical-Exclusive policy preferences are not likely to be as common 
amongst Clinton and Sanders supporters as amongst the whole survey sample.  
As with my previous analysis of radical left support, I label these groups relative to their 
context. Thus, respondents in the ‘Centre-Right’ economic policy group here, for example, 
hold moderately right-wing economic policy preferences relative to the US case context. And as 
Table 5.1: Summary of Respondent Groups on each dimension  




































































I said previously, this is also relative to the wider context of CCES respondents, rather than 
relative to just Sanders/Clinton voters.  
I also labelled these groups relative to the wider survey respondents in my German case study. 
Obviously, Germany is not entirely the same as the US, or my later UK case study, and as a 
result these groups are not going to be exact equivalents across all three case studies. But these 
groups do not have to be entirely equivalent for me to test both policy-proximity and 
populism-based accounts. With both these theories I am testing how far people with relative 
policy positions/populism adherences – relative to their contexts – support radical left actors.  
5.2.6: Control Variables 
Policy-proximity and populism are not the only factors with potential impacts on radical left 
electoral support. I acknowledged this in the German case study, which led me to control 
variables for that chapter’s analysis. I also include a range of control variables in this US case 
study.  
First, two control variables which are more specific to the US context, relating to racial groups 
and church attendance. Previous research has associated both the former (Abramowitz, 1994; 
Finn & Glaser, 2010), and the latter (Manza & Brooks, 1997), variables with electoral support 
in the US. Therefore, I have grounds to also control for these factors in this chapter. Both are 
drawn from measures in the ANES and CCES, with these detailed further in Appendix 2.0. 
My analysis in this chapter also includes control on the gender of respondents, and their level 
of education. Both of these variables also appeared in the German case study.  
I include Race and Gender in my analysis as dummy variables. For the former, 0 signifies a 
white respondent, while 1 represents a non-white respondent. With the gender control 
variable, 1 indicates a female respondent, and 0 a male one. Responses to the education and 
church attendance questions are ordinal, with these variables then demonstrating the impacts 
of higher education levels and more frequent church attendance on probability of voting for 
Sanders versus for Clinton.  
An important factor that I controlled for in the previous case study was party identification. 
However, I have already indicated that this chapter addresses the roles of partisan 
attachments by examining support for political actors in the intra-party context of the 
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Democratic Party primaries. The impacts of identifying with the Democratic Party should not 
then be a persuasion effect altering voter policy preferences or populism to match those intra-
party candidacies specifically. With the potential persuasion of party identification controlled 
by the nature of the US case study, including a PartyID control variable should not be 
necessary. To further ensure respondents have more equal identification with the Democratic 
Party, I subset US case study data to include Democrat-identifiers and Democrat-leaners only.  
5.2.7: Empirical Expectations 
I will outline expectations under the policy-proximity account first, with expectations of the 
populism-based account following these.  
In the US case study, I state expectations along the lines of probability of voting for Sanders 
versus for Clinton in the 2016 primaries. This reflects the different dependent variable in this 
case study, which concerns vote choices rather than evaluations, and sub-setting to only 
include voters for these two candidates.  
That different dependent variable also changes how I think about voters’ utility. As this 
variable looks at support for both candidates, the respective positions of both Sanders and 
Clinton impacts on how voters view proximity with each of them. I illustrate what I mean 







Note that Figure 5.1 applies only to the economic policy groups. I will come to expectations 
from cultural and migration policy groups afterwards. Assuming Sanders is in proximity with 
 
28 Assumes linear gain/loss of utility. 
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the ‘Radical-Left’ policy group – a reasonable assumption given the economic policies of 
Sanders outlined earlier – then voters in the ‘Radical-Left’ group would have higher 
probability of supporting Sanders instead of Clinton, relative to the baseline group 
(‘Centrists’). I assume Clinton to be in proximity with the group one place to the right of the 
Sanders campaign – the ‘Centre-Left’ group in Figure 5.1. Probability of supporting Sanders 
falls as proximity with his campaign reduces, and voters are then in closer proximity with the 
Clinton campaign instead. They would then be more likely to support Clinton than Sanders. 
This would continue from the ‘Centrist’, ‘Centre-Right’, and ‘Radical-Right’ voters. Compared 
to Sanders, Clinton is one place in closer proximity with voters in those three economic policy 
groups. Given Clinton is equally closer to these voters compared to Sanders, I expect them to 
all be equally more likely to have supported Clinton than Sanders.  
This assumes Clinton is in closest proximity with the ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy group, 
and Sanders is closest to the ‘Radical-Left’ policy group. Although this is a reasonable 
assumption considering the earlier discussion of the economic policies of the Sanders and 
Clinton campaigns, it is also possible the leftism of each candidate on this policy dimension 
has been overestimated. Both candidates may actually be located one place to the right of their 







Figure 5.2 demonstrates the same drop in probability of supporting Sanders as there was in 
Figure 5.1, but positions this decline between both candidates in different positions. In this 
scenario, the ‘Radical-Left’ and ‘Centre-Left’ voters would have higher probability of 
supporting Sanders than Clinton, relative to the baseline group. The ‘Centrist’, ‘Centre-Right’, 
and ‘Radical-Right’ groups would have higher probability of supporting Clinton instead of 
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Sanders, with this being equal across these three groups – again because they are equally 
closer to Clinton relative to the location of Sanders on this economic policy dimension.  
Both these scenarios demonstrate specific expectations for probability of supporting Sanders 
and Clinton, based on economic policy-proximity. Despite not being completely certain 
exactly where Sanders is positioned in this policy space, relative to Clinton and to 
respondents, I still assume probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton is higher from the 
‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group. That probability falls as policy-proximity reduces, but 
remains constant to Clinton’s right.  
Expectations for cultural and migration policy groups, and their probability of voting for 
Sanders versus for Clinton, are similar across these two dimensions. Therefore, I discuss 
expectations of policy-proximity support on both these dimensions together.  
Recall that in the first section of this chapter I showed that both Clinton and Sanders support 
similarly culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive policies on the cultural and migration 
dimensions. From this, I consider both of these candidates to be in proximity with each other 
on both policy dimensions. This does not mean I cannot test the policy-proximity theory here, 
but it does change expectations. Instead, under this theory I would expect that cultural and 
migration policy preferences will not be associated with changes in the probability of supporting 
Sanders or Clinton in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries. If both candidates deliver the same 
policy outcomes, then voters should treat both Sanders and Clinton the same on these two 
policy dimensions. Thus, no cultural policy or migration policy group would have 
significantly higher probability of supporting Sanders or Clinton, relative to the baseline 
‘Centrists’ group. Despite the proximity between both of these candidates, I can still 
potentially observe support which conforms with the policy-proximity account. Specifically, 
if I find support for Sanders based on preferences on these two dimensions, this would be 
inconsistent with the policy-proximity account. Furthermore, to exclude analysis of these two 
dimensions here, because of this proximity, would also create inconsistency with my other 
two case studies, where I do include analysis of these two dimensions.  
On populism, there is the underlying notion that populist voters would be more supportive 
of a radical left political actor than voters who are not populists. I draw this expectation from 
the anti-elite nature of the radical left’s economic policy, which conceivably attracts voters 
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who adhere to populism. Based on that underlying notion of the populism-based theory, the 
expectation here is that, on average, the respondents in the ‘Radical-Populist’ group would have been 
significantly more likely to have supported Sanders in 2016.  
5.3: Analysis 
In this section, I first examine support for the radical left in the US based on voter-actor policy-
proximity on the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. Following that, I 
examine the impacts of voter populism on radical left support in the US.  
Again, I present results with linear regressions. These regressions allow me to test how 
probability of supporting Sanders and Clinton varies by policy group and levels of 
populism.29 Despite the dependent variable being categorical in this case study, I do not 
present results in logistic regressions, opting instead for linear regressions. When processing 
data in the US case study, I analysed both logistic and linear models, with the trend of radical 
left support the same across the two. For the sake of consistency with results in both other 
case studies, I include results in linear models here too. To demonstrate this shared trend of 
results, I include logistic models of the same data under Appendices 2.6 and 2.7. These 
appendicised regressions include all policy groups with the sample of Democrat-identifiers 
and leaners, and results from populism groups, respectively. I also include models with scalar 
policy and populism variables, rather than respondent groups, under Appendices 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 
2.5, and 2.8.  
To give an impression of the responses to the dependent variable in the CCES, the number of 
respondents who stated they supported Sanders in this survey is 9,012, with 12,661 stating 
they supported Clinton. These numbers drop in the regressions, as respondents needed to 
have also answered questions relating to policy preferences, and also because of the sub-
setting to Democrat-identifiers and leaners. As in the previous chapter, the ‘Centrist’ group 




29 The scale of regressions runs from 0 (supported Clinton) to 1 (supported Sanders).  
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5.3.1: Economic Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support 
Under Table 5.2 is a linear regression of economic policy groups and their radical left support 
in the US. The scale of the dependent variable in this regression runs from 0 (supported 
Clinton) to 1 (supported Sanders). In total, there are 64,000 responses to the CCES. Of these 
respondents, 25,988 did not vote in the 2016 presidential primaries, thus leaving no dependent 
variable response. Once I subset respondents to include Sanders/Clinton voters, and 
Democrat-identifiers and Democrat-leaners, the number of responses comes to just over 
13,500.  
Table 5.2: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Economic Policy Groups  
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Economic Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton) 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Left 0.137*** 0.094*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Centre Left -0.015 -0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.035* -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Rad Right 0.084** 0.099*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Gender  0.021*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.008) 
Race  -0.074*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.009) 
Education  -0.003 
  (0.003) 
Church Attendance  0.046*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.351*** 0.195*** 
 (0.011) (0.021) 
Observations 13,750 13,695 
R2 0.023 0.055 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.054 
Residual Std. Error 0.485 (df = 13745) 0.477 (df = 13686) 
F Statistic 81.615*** (df = 4; 13745) 99.025*** (df = 8; 13686) 




Recall that the expectation here was that probability respondents voted for Sanders over 
Clinton would be higher from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group, and potentially also 
from the ‘Centre-Left' group, relative to the baseline. I also expected this probability to fall 
and remain constant across the ‘Centrist’, ‘Centre-Right’, and ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy 
groups, with voters in these three groups having higher probability of supporting Clinton 
instead of Sanders. Both before and after including controls, I find that probability of voting 
for Sanders instead of Clinton was significantly higher from the ‘Radical-Left’ group, relative 
to the baseline. This conforms with the policy-proximity account, given the greater closeness 
of these voters with the Sanders campaign. The negative coefficient from the ‘Centre-Left’ 
group in column 2 signifies respondents there were significantly more likely to have voted for 
Clinton over Sanders, relative to the baseline. I assume this is due to greater proximity 
between these ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy voters and the Clinton campaign.  
However, from the groups at the other end of this dimension, results do not conform with this 
account. On average, voters in the ‘Radical-Right’ group have significantly higher probability 
of supporting Sanders over Clinton, despite being spatially-distant from his radical left 
candidacy. This curvilinear pattern of support for the radical left does not fit with expectations 
of the policy-proximity account. The reasons behind the ‘Radical-Right’ respondents’ higher 
probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline, is not explained by 
economic policy-proximity.  
Appendix 2.1 replicates my analysis in Table 5.2, except with a scalar variable of economic 
policy preferences rather than groups. I find increase on the economic policy scale, 
representing greater right-wing policy preferences on this dimension, is associated with 
significantly lower probability of supporting Sanders instead of Clinton. However, with my 
group-based analysis I identified a curvilinear pattern with greater radical left support at 
opposing ends of this dimension. From the scalar variable model, my conclusion would be 
closer to expectations, as this curvilinear pattern – a pattern which fundamentally challenges 
expectations – is harder to spot. Given the non-linear pattern I find in Table 5.2, it seems 
inappropriate to impose linear functional form with the scalar variable, leaving my primary 
conclusions from the group-based model.  
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To briefly review the control variables, these diminished the coefficients from the ‘Radical-
Left’ group, but not to the point that group’s higher probability of voting for Sanders over 
Clinton, relative to the baseline, becomes statistically insignificant. Therefore, I can reliably 
infer that holding radically left-wing or radically right-wing economic policy preferences is 
associated with increased probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the 
baseline group. Results in Table 5.2 are generally consistent between the models with and 
without controls, although I do again consider the stronger test of both theories to come after 
including these control variables. Looking at what these say about radical left support, being 
female, white, and a frequent churchgoer was associated with higher probability of voting for 
Sanders over Clinton.  
5.3.2: Cultural policy Preferences and Radical Left Support 
In Table 5.3 is the linear regression of cultural policy groups and radical left support in the 
US. The number of responses here is slightly higher than in Table 5.2 – a product of higher 
response rates across the questions used to create the cultural policy groups.  
Recall that I judged Sanders and Clinton to be in similar positions on the cultural policy 
dimension. As a result, the expectation is that cultural policy preferences will not be associated 
with significantly increased or decreased probability of voting for Sanders or Clinton relative 
to the baseline group. The logic here being that if both candidates offer the same policy 
outcomes, there would not be a reason under the policy-proximity account to favour one over 











First, the statistically significant positive coefficients next to the ‘Radical-Liberal’ and 
‘Moderate-Liberal’ cultural policy groups suggest on average these voters have higher 
probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Meanwhile, the 
significant negative coefficient from the ‘Moderate-Conservative’ group suggests on average 
these respondents had greater probability of supporting Clinton than Sanders, again relative 
to the baseline group. I find these results both with and without including the control 
variables. Thinking about initial interpretations of this, it is possible that voters did perceive 
Table 5.3: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Cultural Policy Groups  
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Cultural Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton) 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.202*** 0.131*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Mod Lib 0.062*** 0.028** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Cons -0.073*** -0.054*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Rad Cons -0.035 -0.015 
 (0.034) (0.033) 
Gender  0.012* 
(1 = Female)  (0.007) 
Race  -0.068*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.007) 
Education  -0.009*** 
  (0.002) 
Church Attendance  0.042*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.284*** 0.197*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
Observations 18,671 18,564 
R2 0.045 0.072 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.071 
Residual Std. Error 0.475 (df = 18666) 0.468 (df = 18555) 
F Statistic 221.947*** (df = 4; 18666) 178.700*** (df = 8; 18555) 




differences between Sanders and Clinton on this dimension, despite both candidates offering 
similarly culturally-liberal policies.  
Crucially, none of these outcomes conform with the expectations of the policy-proximity 
account. In contrast to the expectation that cultural policy preferences would not be associated 
with greater probability of voting for either candidate, I instead find that cultural policy 
preferences are linked with support for Sanders and Clinton. Therefore, results from cultural 
policy groups in Table 5.3 do not follow the policy-proximity account in the US case study. I 
speculate on possible explanations for these unexpected results in the conclusion of this 
chapter.  
With a scalar variable of cultural policy preferences, under Appendix 2.2, the pattern of 
support for Sanders and Clinton follows that in Table 5.3. Specifically, an increase in the scale 
– representing increasingly conservative cultural views – is associated with significantly lower 
probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton. That follows the reduced radical left support 
moving from the liberal to the conservative end of this dimension in Table 5.3, meaning the 
scalar model does not substantively alter my findings from the group-based model.  
Finally, with the stripped back measures of cultural policy preferences (in this case, removing 
questions relating to guns), I produce the model under Appendix 2.3. Arguably, these cultural 
policy groups are more comparable to the ones in the German case study. Without the context-
specific issue of guns, observed probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton is comparable to 
what I find in Table 5.3. Specifically, I still find the curvilinear pattern of radical left support 
on this dimension, with probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton increased from the 
opposing ends of this dimension, and the increase from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group being 
statistically significant. Consequently, my conclusions are unchanged after testing this 
measure of cultural policy excluding the issue of guns.  
5.3.3: Migration Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support 
Continuing my analysis, to consider the impacts of migration policy preferences on radical 
left support, see Table 5.4.  
Like with cultural policy, the expectation here was that migration policy preferences would 
not be associated with greater probability of voting for either Sanders or Clinton. This is again 
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due to Sanders and Clinton offering the same policies on this dimension, thus voters should 
not – under the policy-proximity account – have higher probability of voting for one of these 
candidates over the other. However, what I find in Table 5.4 does not follow that expectation.  
Again, I find statistically significant coefficients, this time from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’, 
‘Moderate-Inclusive’ and ‘Radical-Exclusive’ groups both before and after including control 
variables. These show respondents in these groups had significantly higher probability of 
voting for Sanders than Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Consequently, I find these 
policy preferences to be associated with voting for the radical left in the US – a conclusion 
which does not conform with expectations.  
Table 5.4: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Migration Policy Groups  
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Migration Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton) 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Inc 0.177*** 0.129*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Mod Inc 0.056*** 0.040*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc -0.003 0.007 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Rad Exc 0.068*** 0.056*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Gender  0.012* 
(1 = Female)  (0.007) 
Race  -0.075*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.007) 
Education  -0.005** 
  (0.002) 
Church Attendance  0.053*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.288*** 0.125*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
Observations 19,019 18,907 
R2 0.023 0.067 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.067 
Residual Std. Error 0.480 (df = 19014) 0.469 (df = 18898) 
F Statistic 110.786*** (df = 4; 19014) 170.736*** (df = 8; 18898) 




When testing this with a scalar variable of migration policy preferences, instead of groups, as 
I do in Appendix 2.4, I find an increase in the migration policy scale – representing more 
migrant-exclusive attitudes – is associated with significantly lower probability of having 
supported Sanders over Clinton. This broadly matches with Table 5.4 – in particular, the 
smaller positive coefficient from the ‘Radical-Exclusive’ group. However, the scalar results do 
not indicate the curvilinearity I find in Table 5.4. Given that curvilinearity, the non-linear 
pattern I find in Table 5.4 suggests that the scalar variable’s imposition of linear form is 
inappropriate here. Regardless, as findings from the scalar model broadly match with Table 
5.4, my fundamental conclusions here are unchanged.  
5.3.4: Multiple Linear Regression of Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support 
So far, I only find support for the policy-proximity account from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic 
policy group, with those voters having significantly greater probability of voting for Sanders 
over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. However, I also find a curvilinear pattern of 
radical left support across the economic policy groups – where probability of voting for 
Sanders over Clinton was also higher from the spatially-distant ‘Radical-Right’ group. Also 
unexpected was my observation of a link between voters’ cultural and migration policy 
preferences and higher probability of voting for either Sanders or Clinton. I find this despite 
both candidates offering the same policies here, so voters should have treated both candidates 
the same.  
A possible explanation for this is that voters with radically left-wing economic policy 
preferences are also in the cultural and migration policy groups associated with greater 
probability of supporting Sanders than Clinton. The ‘Radical-Inclusive’ and ‘Radical-Liberal’ 
respondents, in particular, may also be in the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group, and 
drawn to support Sanders by that economic policy-proximity rather than their cultural and 
migration preferences. To control for any potential confounding of policy preferences across 
dimensions, and thus clarify the respective roles of these variables on Sanders/Clinton vote 
probability, I include them all in a multiple linear regression.  
Under Table 5.5 is this multiple linear regression of policy groups on all three dimensions, 
alongside the previous four control variables. The full model, with all controls and policy 
groups included, falls under column 8 of Table 5.5.  
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 Table 5.5: Probability Voting Sanders vs. Clinton - Policy Groups on all Dimensions 
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups 
 Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.137***   0.040*** 0.092***   0.038*** 
 (0.013)   (0.014) (0.013)   (0.014) 
Centre Left -0.015   -0.059*** -0.029**   -0.054*** 
 (0.013)   (0.013) (0.013)   (0.013) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.029   -0.003 -0.016   -0.001 
 (0.019)   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.019) 
Rad Right 0.071*   0.097** 0.083**   0.098** 
 (0.039)   (0.039) (0.038)   (0.038) 
Rad Lib  0.181***  0.141***  0.115***  0.084*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Mod Lib  0.044***  0.037**  0.011  0.006 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Cons  -0.066***  -0.067***  -0.048***  -0.049*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Rad Cons  0.027  0.008  0.045  0.031 
  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Rad Inc   0.145*** 0.064***   0.105*** 0.061*** 
   (0.013) (0.014)   (0.013) (0.014) 
Mod Inc   0.033** 0.001   0.020 0.003 
   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   -0.024 -0.003   -0.013 -0.004 
   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.019) (0.019) 
Rad Exc   0.058** 0.082***   0.050** 0.063*** 
   (0.023) (0.023)   (0.023) (0.023) 
Gender     0.021** 0.010 0.006 0.014* 
(1= Female)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Race     -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.064*** 
(1=NonWhite)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Education     -0.003 -0.006* -0.002 -0.010*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ChurchAttend     0.046*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.035*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.352*** 0.309*** 0.332*** 0.301*** 0.196*** 0.224*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
R2 0.023 0.034 0.017 0.047 0.054 0.055 0.051 0.066 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.034 0.017 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.050 0.064 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.486 (df = 
13460) 
0.483 (df = 
13460) 
0.487 (df = 
13460) 
0.480 (df = 
13452) 
0.478 (df = 
13456) 
0.478 (df = 
13456) 
0.479 (df = 
13456) 




= 4; 13460) 
119.682*** (df 
= 4; 13460) 
58.871*** (df 





= 8; 13456) 
97.121*** (df 
= 8; 13456) 
90.204*** (df 








Looking primarily to the full model in column 8, the ‘Radical-Left’, ‘Radical-Liberal’, and 
‘Radical-Inclusive’ policy groups all continue to demonstrate significantly higher probability 
of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. I find this even after including the 
policy groups on all these dimensions, and thus controlling for possible confounding between 
them. The result is US case study data clearly demonstrates the policy preferences of these 
groups to be associated with support for the radical left Sanders campaign. I expected this 
from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group, but not from cultural policy or migration 
policy groups. Thus, my earlier conclusion continues, where results only partially follow 
expectations.  
Although the conclusion remains the same, this does not mean introducing all policy groups 
together with the controls has had absolutely no impact. Looking across from coefficients in 
the simpler models, to those in column 8, introducing all these variables together has reduced 
their impacts on probability of voting for Sanders versus Clinton. However, most of these 
coefficients continue to be statistically significant, relative to the baseline.  
Amongst these significant conclusions, there also persists the curvilinear pattern of 
Sanders/Clinton vote probability from policy groups. Specifically, from the ‘Radical-Right’ 
economic policy group, and the ‘Radical-Exclusive’ group on the migration policy dimension. 
Again, I observe this despite including all policy groups together in Table 5.5. The increased 
probability of these voters supporting Sanders over Clinton, significantly relative to the 
baseline, continues to challenge expectations of the policy-proximity account.  
Furthermore, under Appendix 2.5 I include the model with scalar variables, rather than policy 
groups. This model largely replicates previous scalar models in its results. Specifically, 
culturally-conservative and migrant-exclusive shifts on those dimensions are associated with 
lower support for Sanders vs. Clinton. However, the curvilinear patterns I find in Table 5.5 
again suggest it is inappropriate to enforce linear functional form with the scalar variables. 
Regardless, the scalar model does not challenge my earlier conclusions. Most importantly, my 
observation of curvilinear radical left support, with this greater from opposing ends of the 
policy dimensions, challenges the policy-proximity account in my research.  
Overall, this leaves expectations followed in only one area – from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic 
policy group. This group’s proximity with the Sanders campaign on the economic policy 
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dimension explains their greater support for this political actor over the more moderate 
Clinton campaign. To sum up the patterns of Sanders/Clinton vote probability from policy 






















Figure 5.3: Plotted Results – Table 5.5. 
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The first thing to draw attention to is the wide 95% confidence interval for the ‘Radical-
Right’/’-Conservative’/’-Exclusive’ groups, reflecting the much smaller size of these groups 
relative to the others. Given their small size, it is arguably difficult to make truly reliable 
conclusions from these groups. However, their small size is a consequence of truly 
representing these economically-right, culturally-conservative, and migrant-exclusive policy 
preferences, which are simply less common amongst this subset sample of Democrat-
identifiers, Democrat-leaners, and Sanders/Clinton voters.  
Figure 5.3 reflects the curvilinear relationships I found earlier, where spatially-distant groups 
on the economic and migration policy dimensions had significantly higher probability of 
voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. Although not statistically significant, 
the point estimate from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ group also suggests these voters have 
greater probability of voting for Sanders than Clinton as well. Figure 5.3 also reflects this.  
I continue to observe a curvilinear pattern where voters at opposing ends of the policy 
dimensions have higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline.  
Although the ‘Radical-Left’ group’s higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton 
follows expectations, that curvilinear pattern, and the cultural and migration dimension 
results, persistently challenge the policy-proximity account.  
5.3.5: Populism and Radical Left Support 
I use ANES data to analyse the populism-based account – examining how far levels of voter 
populism are associated with voting for the Sanders campaign versus the Clinton campaign. 
The expectation here is that the ‘Radical-Populist’ group would have higher probability of 
voting for the Sanders campaign than the Clinton campaign, compared to the baseline group. 
Once again, that baseline group is the ‘Centrists’ group, made up of respondents who 
expressed neither strong populist nor non-populist attitudes.  
I provide a linear regression of populism groups under Table 5.6, showing the probability that 
each group voted for either Sanders or Clinton on the same 0 to 1 scale also present in the 
ANES. The number of respondents overall is substantially lower in the ANES. This reduction 
in the number of respondents is not ideal; however, it is a product of the ANES being a much 
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smaller election study than the CCES. This does reduce the explanatory power of the ANES, 
which will impact on my interpretation of results.  
Immediately apparent when examining results in Table 5.6 is the lack of statistically 
significant coefficients. This suggests little difference, relative to the baseline group, in 
probability of voting for Sanders or Clinton across the populist and non-populist groups. This 
runs contrary to populism-based account expectations, where higher probability of voting for 
Sanders over Clinton was expected from the populist groups. However, this is in line with 
Table 5.6: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Populism Groups  
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton) 
 (1) (2) 
Radical Populist 0.056 0.094 
 (0.060) (0.075) 
Moderate Populist 0.029 0.046 
 (0.067) (0.083) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Moderate Non-Populist 0.018 0.101 
 (0.058) (0.077) 
Radical Non-Populist -0.056 -0.004 
 (0.047) (0.061) 
Gender  -0.091* 
(1 = Female)  (0.048) 
Race  -0.185*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.048) 
Education  0.002 
  (0.011) 
Church Attendance  0.037* 
  (0.019) 
Constant 0.382*** 0.299** 
 (0.036) (0.144) 
Observations 741 381 
R2 0.007 0.074 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.054 
Residual Std. Error 0.484 (df = 736) 0.444 (df = 372) 
F Statistic 1.326 (df = 4; 736) 3.695*** (df = 8; 372) 




results of the previous case study, where I find levels of voter populism did not predict 
support for the radical left in Germany.  
However, the small amount of data in Table 5.6 diminishes certainty around the conclusions 
I can make here. It is harder to draw reliable inferences about the effects of populism on radical 
left support when there is such a small amount of data here. Therefore, while Table 5.6 points 
to levels of voter populism not being associated with greater or lesser probability of voting 
for Sanders/Clinton, I cannot say this definitively. Review of this theory may be an avenue for 
future research, should more data become available. But what I find from available data in 
Table 5.6 suggests levels of populism amongst voters does not explain support for the radical 
left in the US.  
Under Appendix 2.8 is the test of the effect of populism on Sanders/Clinton voting probability, 
but with a scalar populism variable rather than groups. What it shows, albeit short of 
significance at the .05 level, is that an increase on that scale (representing greater populism) is 
associated with a decrease in probability of supporting Sanders over Clinton. This conflicts 
somewhat with point estimates in Table 5.6. More fundamental, however, is that neither 
model provides results which conform with expectations under the populism-based account. 
This means the scalar model does not fundamentally challenge my conclusions from group-
based analysis in Table 5.6.  
5.3.6: Results with PartyID Control Variable 
My intent with Democrat-identifier/leaner sub-setting in this case study was to minimise 
variance in Democratic Party identification. It is possible that party identification may have 
had an effect on probability of supporting either Sanders or Clinton. For example, Democrat-
identifiers/leaners may associate Clinton more closely with that party, and subsequently be 
more supportive of her candidacy. The role of party identification has a long-established 
history in the field of political behaviour – including in research on electoral support in the 
US (Jessee, 2012).  
The possibility of an effect of party identification on probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton 
leads me to also include a second set of results. This second set of results includes a party 
identification control variable, alongside the other four controls that appeared earlier, and the 
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policy and populism groups. In this second set of results, the sample is not subset to 
Democrat-identifiers or Democrat-leaners, but still only includes those who either voted for 
Sanders or Clinton. I include the party identification control variable as a dummy variable in 
this regression.30  
These alternate results effectively act as a robustness test of my sub-setting to Democrat-
identifiers and leaners, versus using a PartyID control variable to separate effects of partisan 
attachments on Sanders/Clinton support. If results with a party identification control variable 
do not markedly differ against my earlier results from Democrat-identifiers and leaners, this 
would enhance my confidence in those earlier findings.  
I include the first regression with the party ID control variable under Appendix 2.9, which 
includes all policy groups in a multiple linear regression. Results in Appendix 2.9 conform 
with those I found earlier in this analysis section. Specifically, the curvilinear pattern in 
probability of supporting Sanders is still present in Appendix 2.9. The PartyID control 
coefficient does obtain statistical significance, but that does not change the pattern of support 
for Sanders versus Clinton from policy groups.  
Results from data subset to Democrat-identifiers and leaners, and results in the non-subset 
Appendix 2.9 regression with the PartyID control, are broadly consistent. Thus, the alternate 
way of accounting for partisan attachment effects, via the PartyID control variable, yields 
similar Sanders/Clinton support compared to results with sub-setting to Democrat-identifiers 
and leaners. That similarity gives me further confidence in the results I found earlier in this 
analysis section.  
In Appendix 2.10 is a regression of populism groups with a PartyID control variable. The data 
in that regression was also not sub-set to Democrat-identifiers and leaners. Results also match 
between this regression and the earlier results from populism-groups in Table 5.6. I still do 
not find a statistically significant increase in Sanders voting probability, relative to the 
baseline, from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group. Once again, this similarity of results gives me 
further confidence in my conclusions from Table 5.6.  
 
30 Variable cumulates ‘Strong Democrats’, ‘Not Strong Democrats’, and ‘Lean Democrats’ together 
with responses of 0. ‘Strong Republicans’, ‘Not Strong Republicans’, ‘Lean Republicans’, and 
‘Independents’ all coded as 1.  
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5.4: US Conclusions 
Firstly, to sum up how far results conformed with the populism-based account. I did not find 
levels of populism to be associated with greater probability of voting for either Sanders or 
Clinton; however, this was based off the limited data available in the ANES. My conclusion 
here conforms with German case study results, where I also did not find consistent support 
for the populism-based account. Although the small sample size introduces an element of 
uncertainty into this conclusion, it does present an opportunity for future research to examine 
this account for US radical left support again, should more data become available.  
I find some support for the policy-proximity account, with radically left-wing respondents on 
the economic policy dimension having significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders 
over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Although results from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic 
policy group conform with the policy-proximity account, generally my results in this case 
study do not follow expectations. Despite being spatially-distant from the Sanders campaign, 
and thus expected to have greater probability of supporting Clinton’s campaign instead, I find 
that the ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy group’s voters actually on average have higher 
probability of supporting Sanders, relative to the baseline. I also find, contrary to expectations, 
that cultural and migration policy preferences are associated with higher probability of 
supporting either Clinton or Sanders, despite both these candidates offering the same policies 
on these dimensions.  
Existing research has also found cultural policy preferences to be associated with support for 
Sanders versus Clinton, and explained it with the more traditional nature of the Clinton 
candidacy attracting more ‘authoritarian’ voters than the non-traditional Sanders campaign 
(Wronski, et al., 2018). Previous research has also reached similar conclusions to me over 
economic policy and Sanders/Clinton voting, specifically in relation to labour policies and 
regulation of businesses (Lyon, 2019). Finally, existing research also did not find populist 
attitudes to be reliably associated with greater probability of voting for Sanders, suggesting it 
was Donald Trump who benefitted from these voters’ support in the 2016 US presidential 
election (Rudolph, 2019). Alongside potential future examination of populism-based radical 
left support in the US, future research may also examine how support for Sanders in his 2020 
primaries campaign varied from his 2016 support. This may shed further light on radical left 
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support in the US, as in 2020 this would be examined amongst a far more crowded and diverse 
field of candidates.  
What I find from policy groups presents quite a nuanced picture, where there is some support 
for policy-proximity but also many areas where results do not conform with this account. 
Compared to the German case study, results in the US case do not as consistently follow 
policy-proximity expectations. What could potentially explain this variation in results 
between the German and US cases?  
In relation to unexpected results from the cultural and migration policy groups, it is possible 
voters on those dimensions perceived Sanders to be more culturally-liberal/migrant-inclusive 
than Clinton. If this is the case, it would explain why these liberal and inclusive voters had 
greater probability of supporting Sanders than Clinton, despite both candidates proposing the 
same policies on these dimensions. Furthermore, the different dependent variable in this 
chapter, which asks about vote choices rather than evaluations, may also explain variation in 
results. These vote choice responses include a wide range of background factors, such as 
immutable traits of each candidate. For example, maybe the fact Hillary Clinton is a woman 
led radically right-wing voters to have higher probability of supporting Sanders. Evaluation 
questions could have mitigated these background effects, but they are not available in US 
survey data.  
Finally, the US case study has made an important contribution to my thesis. The German case 
study focused on a well-established radical left political party, which left it open to persuasion 
effects. However, the US case study’s focus on an intra-party election with a radical left 
candidate mitigates the impacts of one persuasion effect – party identification – on voters’ 
policy preferences and populist attitudes. Reflecting on the effects of this, it is possible the US 
case’s mitigation of partisan persuasion effects also explains why the policy-proximity 







Chapter 6: From Convergence to Corbyn: the UK Radical Left  
 
6.0: Introduction 
In the final empirical chapter of this thesis, I turn attention to the radical left in the UK. The 
UK’s radical left political actor is the Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. 
The UK Labour Party itself is an established party, and firmly a part of the UK’s political 
mainstream. However, my focus is on the UK Labour Party specifically under the leadership 
of Jeremy Corbyn, because under Corbyn this mainstream centre left political party shifted 
ideologically and began to promote more radically left-wing policies, relative to the UK 
context. This shift ended a period of convergence towards the centre ground by Labour before 
Corbyn’s leadership.  Between Corbyn’s rise to become the party’s leader in September 2015, 
and until his departure in 2020, Labour professed a more radically left-wing message relative 
both to Labour prior to Corbyn’s leadership, and to the prevailing economic norms of the UK.  
Like the US case study, in the UK case I again look at a less conventional instance of the radical 
left, as this arose here from an intra-party faction. Perhaps the most notable contribution of 
this case study is the way persuasion effects are rigorously addressed by the research design. 
I touched on this in Chapter 3 of this thesis, including how via use of panel data in the UK 
case study I separate voters’ policy preferences and populism from the potential persuasion 
effect of the radical left Corbyn-led Labour Party.  
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the context of the UK case further. This includes 
justifying the treatment of Corbyn-led Labour as a radical left actor. I first do this in a 
qualitative way, before using the BES expert surveys to quantitatively show Labour’s shift 
under Corbyn towards the radical left.  
In the second part, I outline the UK case study’s research design. This includes measures of 
voter policy preferences, populism, and radical left evaluations from British Election Study 
(BES) survey data. I also discuss the panel data design further here, including how this is 
utilised to control potential persuasion effects by drawing measures of policy preferences 
from prior to Corbyn’s leadership of Labour. The second section concludes with expectations 
for Labour Party evaluations from both policy groups and populism groups.  
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In the third section I discuss results of the UK case study. Working through each policy 
dimension, before including all policy preferences in a multiple linear regression, I show 
results of tests of the policy-proximity account. I follow this with analysis of the populism-
based account, which I also consider in a multiple linear regression alongside policy groups. 
Following this analysis section, I conclude the UK empirical chapter.  
In this chapter, I find many results which did not follow expectations of the policy-proximity 
account. In particular, observation of increased radical left support even from spatially-distant 
voters. However, closer examination of the magnitudes of evaluation increases mean I 
conclude limited support for the policy-proximity account on all three dimensions. I also offer 
a few possible explanations for the unexpected evaluation increases. Finally, I also find no 
statistically significant relationship between high levels of populism and radical left support 
in the UK – a conclusion broadly matching that of the German and US case studies.  
6.1: Contextualising Corbyn  
There are two ways I contextualise the UK case study. First, qualitative discussion sets the 
context of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, including how this political actor shifted 
from convergence to the radical left under his leadership. Following that, I undertake more 
quantitative contextualisation, drawing upon expert surveys to demonstrate the Labour 
Party’s shift under Corbyn’s leadership.  
6.1.1: Qualitative Context of the Corbyn Case 
Firstly, I will discuss the Labour Party in context. Labour’s policy platform has evolved 
significantly over recent decades, moving from more radical policy in the early 1980s, to 
converge with the centre-ground in the 1990s and 2000s. From there, Labour shifted again, 
returning to radical leftism under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. Discussion of these shifts 
forms the qualitative explanation of the UK Labour Party as a radical left political actor when 
Corbyn was its leader.  
Economic difficulties and industrial strife in the late 1970s led to the ascent of Margaret 
Thatcher to the office of Prime Minister in 1979. Thatcher introduced a new agenda of 
monetarist economic policies, which at the time challenged most conventional economic 
thought (Gamble, 1989). Prior to this, many UK industries were nationalised, and taxation was 
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typically much higher. The economic agenda of the Conservatives under Thatcher reformed 
both of these key features of the pre-neoliberal economy of the UK (Edwards, 2017), which 
meant the political context of the UK shifted to the right.  
Meanwhile, the leftist wing of Labour, led mainly by Tony Benn and Michael Foot, swept to 
the party’s leadership in 1980. The agenda offered by Labour at this point was firmly on the 
left of British politics. Its proposals included unilateral nuclear disarmament, re-
nationalisation of recently privatised industries, abolition of the House of Lords, and raised 
taxation (The Labour Party, 1983). In total, the Labour Party’s agenda of that period strongly 
contrasted with the UK’s political context, which was shifting to the right (Deeming & 
Johnston, 2018). This was a period of divergence in UK politics.  
Following defeat in the 1983 election, Labour began an ideological shift, moving away from 
their more radical policies and towards the political centre (Thorpe, 2008). Labour’s 
convergence with the political centre culminated with the election of Tony Blair as leader in 
1994. When Labour won the 1997 general election, continued policies of low taxation and low 
public spending were emblematic of the party’s convergence. By this point, Labour had 
decisively shifted, away from previous leftism, and converged with the political centre-
ground (Kachel, 2012; Perryman, 2017).  
This convergence was a key moment in the development of Corbyn’s Labour. At this point a 
context has developed where the two main parties – Labour and Conservative – had both 
accepted – or at least did not challenge – underlying capitalist economic norms of lower 
taxation, reduced public spending, privatisation, and deregulation.  
Labour’s defeat in the 2010 general election, amidst a struggling economy, led to the election 
of Ed Miliband as leader. Meanwhile, the Conservative-led coalition government enacted 
policies which continued these accepted economic norms, including fiscal austerity, 
privatisation of Royal Mail, and reductions in taxes on corporations and high earners (Burton-
Cartledge, 2017). Therefore, these prevailing economic norms continued to be present in the 
UK context. In this context, the Corbyn-led Labour Party later appears as a radical left 
challenger to these policies.  
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Ed Miliband did not explicitly challenge this economic consensus. His Shadow Chancellor, 
Ed Balls, announced he would not reverse Conservative spending cuts (Prince, 2015). Deputy 
Leader Harriet Harman encouraged Labour to abstain on a vote cutting government spending 
on welfare (Wintour, 2015). Ed Miliband continued to describe austerity as going ‘too far and 
too fast’ – critically not rejecting austerity itself (Doran, 2017). Furthermore, the Labour 
manifesto of 2015 did not pledge to take key utilities or services back into public ownership 
(The Labour Party, 2015).  
Continued tacit support for Conservative economic policies meant Labour’s convergence 
continued right up to Corbyn’s ascent to the leadership (Seymour, 2016). With Labour’s defeat 
in the 2015 general election, Ed Miliband resigned as Labour leader. In the resulting leadership 
contest, Jeremy Corbyn stood as an initial outsider. His campaign barely managed to get onto 
the election’s ballot, having just minutes to spare whilst receiving the necessary nominations 
from MPs intending to ‘broaden the conversation’ rather than out of genuine support for 
Corbyn (Wintour & Mason, 2015; Page, 2019). The longshot status of the Corbyn campaign 
was also recognised in betting odds, as his chances of winning the leadership election initially 
stood at 980-1 (Odell, 2015). Nevertheless, Corbyn’s leadership campaign was ultimately 
successful, and the previously little-known backbench MP took up the Labour leadership in 
September 2015.  
Following the rise of Corbyn to party leadership, Labour again shifted ideologically, this time 
breaking from convergence to become challengers to the now long accepted economic norms. 
With this leftward shift, breaking from convergence, the Labour Party became a radical left 
political actor.   
I can see Labour’s shift by looking at the party’s manifesto for the UK’s 2017 general election. 
The policies in that manifesto diverge markedly from their proposals in the 2015 general 
election. Labour’s 2017 manifesto proposed an agenda which explicitly opposed the long-
running economic consensus which had persisted since the early 1980s. This included 
promises to increase taxes on the rich and on corporations (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 9), to 
increase funding for multiple public services (The Labour Party, 2017, pp. 37, 69, 73, 80, 86, 93, 
104), and to end public sector pay freezes (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 38). Labour also 
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proposed a broad agenda of public ownership, promising nationalisation of rail, Royal Mail, 
water, and energy (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 19).  
With the party’s 2017 manifesto, Labour broke away from the long-running trend of 
convergence. Through breaking from this trend, the Corbyn-led Labour Party meets the 
minimal definition of the radical left, by challenging the prevailing capitalist economic norms 
of austerity, privatisation, and low taxes in the UK context. The Labour Party’s 2017 manifesto 
demonstrates how this party began challenging these prevailing economic norms after 
Corbyn’s rise to its leadership. First, the 1980s saw development of these economic norms. 
Then the Labour Party accepted these until 2015. Finally, under Corbyn’s leadership the 
Labour Party began challenging these economic norms.  
The full path of the Labour Party over this period: from divergence, to convergence, and back 
to divergence under Corbyn, is important. Previous research into the effects of convergence 
on support for radical actors suggested that, when convergence followed divergence, as with 
Labour in the UK, this creates conditions where a radical challenger can flourish (Ignazi, 2003). 
Although Ignazi’s research focused on the rise of new challenger parties, it may also apply in 
this case where there is instead a radical challenger within a governmental party. The wider 
context of the Labour Party’s ideological shifts potentially create conditions where this party’s 
policies under Corbyn draw substantial support. As a result, there is even greater potential 
here for policy-proximity to explain support for this radical left actor.  
The case of Corbyn’s Labour is particularly interesting, because it is a mainstream political 
party which has moved to the radical left, unlike the non-mainstream radical left political 
party in Germany and the intra-party context of the US radical left actor. The nature of the UK 
case study, as a shifting political party, raises the prospect of investigating how their 
ideological shift has impacted upon voters’ appraisals of them. Additionally, research on the 
Corbyn case follows a context of predictions that Corbyn had moved Labour too far to the left 
to be electorally successful in the UK (Cowley, 2017; Jones, 2016; Jones, 2017; Freedland, 2017; 
Cohen, 2017). In the context of defied expectations around Corbyn’s Labour, I can provide 
indication of where support for this actor came from, and how far policy preferences and 




6.1.2: Quantitative Contextualisation of Labour under Corbyn 
I continue to build the case of the Labour Party’s radical leftism under Jeremy Corbyn here, 
this time from quantitative analysis of this case study. Focus here is on how the Labour Party 
under Jeremy Corbyn shifted on the three policy dimensions which have featured in earlier 
parts of this thesis. From looking at Labour’s shifts on these three dimensions, I can later draw 
expectations for the policy-proximity account in this case study. Looking at Labour’s positions 
on these dimensions will give me an impression of which voters are in proximity with this 
political actor, and I would therefore expect to be more supportive of Labour.  
In previous case studies, I thought of the policy-proximity account in terms of proximity 
alone. The same is true in the UK case study, but added to this is also consideration of how 
voters reacted to the leftward shift of the Labour Party. As Labour shifts closer to some voters, 
I would expect these voters to evaluate this party more positively, and (all else equal) this 
voter would become more likely to vote for this political actor. This is a consequence of rising 
levels of utility for these voters, as Labour ideologically shifts towards them. Additionally, 
Labour’s shift away from other voters would diminish utility from supporting this political 
actor. As a result, they would become less likely to support Labour as this shift takes place.  
In the UK case, I derive the policy positions of Labour, and this party’s policy shifts, from the 
British Election Study’s Expert Surveys. The BES administers these Expert Surveys as online 
surveys, and they show where political analysts place Labour on policy dimensions. The 
cultural policy position of Labour is taken from an 11-point scale,31 while the economic 
position of Labour is from another 11-point scale asking how pro-redistribution the party is.32 
Finally, the migration position of Labour comes from two sets of questions, both with a 7-
point scale. These questions ask how far Labour considers immigration to be an economic 
benefit/threat33 and how far immigration is a cultural benefit/threat.34  
 
31 Referred to as the ‘Libertarian-Authoritarian scale’ – 0 = libertarian, 10 = authoritarian. 
32 ‘Pro-Con Redistribution’ – 0 = pro-redistribution, 10 = not pro-redistribution. 
33 ‘Immigration Good-Bad for Economy’ – 1 = immigration is bad for economy, 7 = immigration is 
good for economy. 
34 ‘Immigration Good-Bad for Cultural Life’ – 1 = immigration undermines cultural life, 7 = 
immigration enriches cultural life. 
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I examine expert survey data from two periods: a Pre-Corbyn period, and a Post-Corbyn 
period. The pre-Corbyn data comes from April/May 2015. I draw post-Corbyn data from the 
May 2017 survey. As these expert surveys draw upon the views of multiple analysts, I average 
the appraisals of Labour’s positions on each dimension, with both the pre-Corbyn and post-
Corbyn data.  
In Table 6.1 I include Labour’s average positions on these dimensions, both pre- and post-
Corbyn. The 2015–2017 changes are determined by subtracting one year’s average placement 
of Labour from that in the other year.  
Looking at Table 6.1, under Corbyn’s leadership Labour shifts to become substantially more 
pro-redistribution, moderately more culturally-liberal, and marginally more migrant-
inclusive compared to their pre-Corbyn positions.  
I have demonstrated policy shifts by the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, with this shown 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Of particular importance is how this political actor has 
challenged the UK’s contemporary economic norms, with this supporting the observation of 
the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn being a radical left political actor. Labour’s policy shift 
was also demonstrated from the BES Expert Surveys, on all three policy dimensions of 
interest.  
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6.2: UK Research Design 
As with the previous two case study chapters, I will again detail a case-specific research 
design. I will first cover questions drawn upon from the BES, before coming to policy and 
populism groups, expectations, and control variables in the UK case study.  
6.2.1: Voter Data in the UK 
I draw the policy preferences of voters and their Labour evaluations from the British Election 
Study’s panel surveys. These surveys occur as an internet panel, measuring attitudes of voters 
over time through multiple waves. Each wave has around thirty thousand respondents. The 
panel surveys provide both pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn data from a group of respondents. 
This gives me the opportunity to measure changing attitudes towards Labour from the same 
group of voters across the pre- and post-Corbyn waves. The downside of panel data, however, 
is that there are different prevailing circumstances in each wave, with these potentially 
impacting on responses in each wave, above the impacts of Labour’s leftward shift between 
2015 and 2017.  
On the other hand, the existence of pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn data with the panel surveys 
is also a critical advantage of this case study. It allows me to measure policy preferences of 
voters from a pre-Corbyn wave of data. Consequently, the radical left nature of the Labour 
Party under Corbyn would not have impacted on voter policy preferences in this case study, 
as I draw these preferences from the pre-Corbyn wave of BES data and Labour was not radical 
left in that wave. This leaves separation between voter policy preferences and any possible 
effects upon these arising from Labour’s radical leftism. However, there are no pre-Corbyn 
measures of populism in the BES, so while I can separate policy preferences over time from 
radical left attachments, it is not possible to also separate populist attitudes of voters from 
radical left attachments.  
Added to pre-Corbyn data’s role in separating policy preferences from radical left 
attachments, this data also provides a baseline level of support for Labour, from which I can 
observe how evaluations of this political actor change as it shifted to the left under Corbyn’s 
leadership. This will provide an answer to a specific question in the UK case study: how do 
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voters react to Labour’s radical left shift? The BES panel surveys provide the data to 
investigate this.  
6.2.2: Measuring Voters’ Attitudes 
Below, in Table 6.2, is a summary of the BES panel survey waves used in this case study. 
Justification of the use of each wave and battery of questions follows in this section.  
 
The waves which are most important to this case study are Wave 6 and Wave 13, because they 
both provide measures of Labour evaluation. Wave 6 provides Labour evaluations before 
Corbyn’s leadership, and Wave 13 provides Labour evaluations after almost two years of 
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Corbyn’s Labour leadership. The retention rate of respondents between these two waves is 
52.6%. This signifies how many pre-Corbyn respondents also answered the post-Corbyn wave 
(Fieldhouse, et al., 2017).  
For the policy-proximity account, I observe how evaluations of Labour from respondents 
change between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves. The BES measures Labour 
evaluations with a 0–10 scale, where a higher score indicates higher Labour evaluation. The 
Labour evaluations of voters are the dependent variable in this case study, as with the German 
case study in Chapter 4. Recall my preferences for evaluation questions to which, unlike vote 
choice questions, their responses are more separate from a wider choice context where factors 
like the electoral system and candidate competitiveness also have a role.  
To test the policy-proximity account, I need to determine where voters are located on the three 
policy dimensions. I still have a preference here for multi-item batteries of questions when 
gauging the policy preferences of voters. Remember I drew upon previous research in this 
field which found these multi-item batteries to be more reliable for identifying the beliefs of 
respondents and predicting their electoral support, when compared to single-item measures 
(Evans, et al., 1996, p. 94).  
I draw economic policy preferences from the five-item ‘Values1’ battery. This comes as a 1–5 
Likert-type scale, asking how far respondents agree or disagree with five statements. These 
five statements relate to redistribution of wealth and attitudes towards big businesses, among 
other economics-related subjects. I include these five questions under Appendix 3.0 of this 
thesis, along with all other measures used from the BES. Previous research has identified this 
economic attitude scale as providing a reliable and stable measure of preferences over time 
(Evans, et al., 1996; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). The BES records the Likert scale of responses 
numerically. As with the previous case studies, I calculate the average response across these 
five questions from each respondent, yielding me a measure of where each respondent is 
located on the economic policy dimension.  
I identify cultural policy preferences from another five-item battery of questions, called 
‘Values2’ in the BES. The ‘Values2’ battery again asks voters how far they agree or disagree 
with five statements. These statements relate to criminal justice and attitudes towards 
traditional values. Again, the BES numerically records responses on another 1-5 Likert-type 
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scale. As with the economic dimension, I again take the average response to these cultural 
policy statements, to deduce where each respondent falls on this policy dimension. Alongside 
this, and as a robustness test, I again provide a stripped back test of this dimension, building 
this dimension from a set of questions which are arguably more comparable to the other case 
studies. Specifically, leaving out the questions relating to obedience towards authority, moral 
standards, and ‘British values’, and including the death penalty question (‘al2’) and the 
criminal sentencing question (‘al5’). I also look at results from cultural policy based on these 
two questions, as a test which is arguably more comparable to both other case studies.  
Migration policy preferences are determined with two questions, pertaining to views of the 
impacts of migrants on the British economy and culture. Specifically, whether respondents 
believe immigration undermines or enhances the UK’s economy and culture. Respondents 
indicate their views here on a 1–7 scale. These questions have history in other research to 
ascertain attitudes towards migrants (Kappe, 2015; Kawalerowicz, 2017).  
Economic and cultural policy preferences are drawn from wave 6 of the BES panel surveys, 
but migration policy preferences are drawn from wave 4 instead. This is because wave 6 does 
not include these migration policy questions. Wave 4 was fielded just two months before wave 
6, and offers the most recent pre-Corbyn data on this policy dimension.  
The way respondents answer the migration policy questions differs from the economic and 
cultural policy batteries, too. Economic and cultural policy questions were answered with a 
Likert scale, with responses between 1 and 5. With these migration policy questions, 
respondents are asked instead to indicate their policy preferences on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 
indicates a migrant-exclusive and 7 a migrant-inclusive position. I again average responses to 
these two questions, providing me an indication of the overall migration policy preferences 
of each respondent, from across these two questions.  
Looking now to the populism-based account, remember that this suggests that the anti-elite 
economic messages of the radical left will draw populist voters to support these political 
actors. As in the previous case studies, testing this theory requires measurement of the 
populist attitudes of voters, in order to see how levels of populism are associated with radical 
left support. The BES panel surveys include measures of populist attitudes of each respondent, 
with questions relating to popular sovereignty, attitudes towards politicians, and feelings 
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about compromises in politics. However, unlike the policy questions, pre-Corbyn BES waves 
do not include populism questions.  
Responses to questions in the BES populist battery return to a 1–5 Likert scale, where 
respondents indicate their levels of agreement/disagreement with five statements included in 
Appendix 3.0. This battery includes a familiar set of questions, which are slight variants on 
the questions used to measure levels of populism in both the German and US case studies. 
These are an established range of questions, featuring in other research which measures levels 
of populism amongst voters (Akkerman, et al., 2014; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018).  
I measure voter populism from the ‘Populism’ battery in Appendix 3.0, with responses to 
these drawn from Wave 10 of the BES. This wave took place in November/December 2016 – 
just over a year after Corbyn became Labour leader. With no pre-Corbyn wave including the 
Populism battery, I tried to use measures of populism from earlier post-Corbyn waves of data, 
where possible persuasion by the radical left Labour Party would be less likely or less 
pronounced. The earliest wave where responses to populism questions are available is wave 
7, which took place in April/May of 2016. However, the number of responses to populism 
questions in wave 10 was almost four times greater than in wave 7. In order to balance radical 
left attachments with number of responses, I instead opted to draw measures of voter 
populism from wave 10. At the cost of occurring a few months after wave 7, I examine the 
relationship between levels of populism and radical left support from a much larger number 
of respondents.  
As with the policy questions referenced earlier, I also calculate the average responses to the 
questions in the Populism battery. Thus, I gain an overall impression of the populist attitudes 
of each respondent.  
6.2.3: Grouping of Voters 
With the averaged responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy questions, I have 
measures of the policy preferences of respondents on these three dimensions. I also know the 
populist attitudes of BES respondents. This brings me to the grouping of respondents, which 
I also did in the two previous case studies. Consequently, I can also observe possible non-
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linear relationships between policy preferences and populism on support for the radical left 
in the UK case study.  
As I explained in the research design chapter, I created these groups in a way which accounts 
for the non-uniform distribution of responses.35 The result of this is the created groups are 
more comparably sized than they would have otherwise been. I will discuss the policy groups 
first, with these included in Table 6.3. Beneath the names of each group are the number of 
respondents in that group.  
As in my previous analysis, I label these groups relative to the case context. The ‘Centre-Right’ 
economic policy group, for example, includes respondents with moderately right-wing 
economic policy preferences relative to the UK context. This has been my practice with groups 
throughout my analysis, meaning these groups have the same meaning across all three case 
studies in my thesis.  
I examine Labour evaluations, and how these evaluations change between 2015 and 2017, 
from each of these policy groups. With the respondent groups known, I can state more specific 




35 Quantile function in R.  
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Radical-
Exclusive 




6.2.4: Expectations: Policy-Proximity Account 
The first set of expectations are for which groups would have the highest Labour evaluations, 
and which groups would have the lowest evaluations for this political actor. In 2015, these 
expected evaluation levels are different from those in 2017, because of Labour’s leftward shift. 









Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show expected average Labour evaluation levels from five groups across 
a generic left/right policy dimension in 2015 and 2017, respectively. To be clear, the x-axis 
policy dimension in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 does not pertain to either economic, cultural, or 
migration policy. It is purely generic and designed to demonstrate expectations for Labour 
evaluation levels under the policy-proximity account.  
Figure 6.1 includes the expectation that the group in the mid-left of that generic dimension 
would have the highest average Labour evaluation levels. This is because, prior to Corbyn’s 
Labour leadership, Labour was in its converged position, and therefore in proximity with 
these voters in the centre-left of this generic policy space. Consequently, I expect these voters 
to have had the highest evaluations of Labour in 2015. I would expect the lowest evaluations 
from the rightmost group, as these respondents are the most spatially-distant group from 
Labour’s pre-Corbyn position.  
Figure 6.2 shows the expected Labour evaluation levels with this political actor now further 
to the left of this generic policy dimension. This is meant to reflect the shift of the Labour Party 
Figure 6.1: Pre-Corbyn Labour Evaluation 
Levels 
 





after Corbyn rose to the party’s leadership. Under Corbyn, I would expect highest Labour 
evaluations from the leftmost group, as Labour moved into proximity with this group by 2017. 
Meanwhile the rightmost group is still located the furthest from Labour, therefore I would 
expect them to still have the lowest evaluation levels for this political actor in 2017.  
That covers the broad expectations of evaluation levels, which I illustrated with a generic 
policy space in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The second set of expectations concern evaluation changes. 
I assume these changes to have occurred in response to Labour’s radical left shift under 
Corbyn’s leadership. Depending on the location of voters in a policy space, there is 
expectation that Labour evaluations will rise from some respondents, and fall from others. I 
refer to these as absolute evaluation changes. Additionally, there are also expectations for the 
magnitudes of Labour evaluation increases and decreases. I refer to these as relative evaluation 
changes.  
I explain both sets of expectations – for absolute and relative evaluation changes – from the 









Figure 6.3 depicts another generic left/right policy dimension on the x-axis, and on the y-axis 
the change in Labour evaluations. Once again, this diagram is not for the purpose of showing 
how specific respondent groups will appraise the Labour Party, nor does it pertain to any of 
the three policy dimensions. Instead, it allows me to demonstrate broad expectations of the 
policy-proximity account.  
Figure 6.3: Expected Changes in Labour Evaluations 
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Included in Figure 6.3 are the rough positions of the Labour Party both prior to and after 
Corbyn’s rise to the party leadership, displayed in this generic left/right space. In their pre-
Corbyn position, Labour is indicated in a centre-left position. The post-Corbyn position of the 
Labour Party is further to the left of this policy dimension, representing the leftward shift of 
this political actor. I used the earlier discussed expert surveys to approximately place Labour 
both before and after Corbyn’s leadership in Figure 6.3.  
The line plotted along the diagram shows how I expect Labour evaluations to change from 
voters at different points along the x-axis. Voters in the leftmost segment of the x-axis witness 
Labour move towards their position (their ‘ideal point’) on this dimension. Consequently, the 
utility these voters associate with Labour rises as this party’s policies shift towards their own 
‘ideal point’. Thus, post-Corbyn Labour’s policies are associated with greater utility by these 
leftmost voters, compared to the policies of pre-Corbyn Labour. This leads to the expectation 
that these voters will have increased Labour evaluations in the 2017 post-Corbyn wave, 
compared to the 2015 pre-Corbyn wave. Voters to the right of pre-Corbyn Labour’s position 
witness the Labour Party shifting away from their positions. As a result, utility associated 
with Labour’s policies by these voters declines as the party shifts ideologically, leading to the 
expectation that Labour evaluations fall between 2015 and 2017 from voters located on the 
right of this dimension.  
For the voters whose ‘ideal points’ are located between pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn Labour’s 
respective positions, expectations are less certain. Some of those voters’ ‘ideal points’ are 
closer to Labour’s post-Corbyn position, while others are in less proximity with Labour 
following the party’s leftward ideological shift. Additionally, Labour shifts through the 
positions of these voters. This theoretically causes Labour evaluations to first rise, before then 
falling if Labour continues shifting to subsequently move further from this voter’s ‘ideal point’ 
compared to the actor’s initial position. As a result, expectations for the voters located between 
Labour’s pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn positions are less certain.36  
 
36 If I was measuring support with vote choices, a pertinent factor here would be positions of competing 
parties. However, using evaluation questions mitigates the effects of these positions. With vote choices, 
respondents indicate a single preference, and that preference is made in a specific context which factors 
in the positions of competing parties. With evaluation questions instead, respondents are not restricted 
to a single choice, nor are they constrained by the wider electoral contextual factors, including the 
positions of competing parties.  
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This has covered expectations for absolute Labour evaluation changes. I can also draw 
expectations of relative Labour evaluation changes from Figure 6.3. Remember that I assume 
Labour shifts towards and away from certain voters by a similar magnitude. Specifically, 
Labour shifts by equal magnitude towards all voters who are located to the left of the post-
Corbyn Labour position. Subsequently, I expect voters in the leftmost segment of the x-axis to 
have the largest relative evaluation increase between 2015 and 2017 – a consequence of 
Labour’s consistent shift towards these voters. Labour also, by equal magnitude, shifts away 
from all voters who are located to the right of Labour’s pre-Corbyn position. Therefore, I 
expect voters located to the right of pre-Corbyn Labour’s location in Figure 6.3 to have the 
largest relative evaluation decrease between 2015 and 2017 – again, a reflection of Labour’s 
consistent shift away from these voters.  
Recall the voter groups on each policy dimension, which I summarised in Table 6.3. So far, I 
have presented expectations in a general context. There are also expectations which are more 
specific to the respondent groups on the policy dimensions which I set out earlier.  
First, group-specific expectations for Labour evaluation levels. I assume Labour was in closest 
proximity with the ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy, ‘Moderate-Liberal’ cultural policy, and 
‘Moderate-Inclusive’ migration policy groups in 2015. Therefore, in the pre-Corbyn wave I 
would expect these groups to have the highest evaluation levels for Labour. Labour then shifts 
after Corbyn assumes the party’s leadership, leading to the party’s new proximity with the 
‘Radical-Left’ economic, ‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural, and ‘Radical-Inclusive’ migration policy 
groups in 2017. The expectation would then be that the highest Labour evaluation levels in 
the post-Corbyn data would come from these policy groups, owing to their new proximity 
with this political actor. The smaller shifts by Labour on the cultural and migration 
dimensions, according to the expert surveys, may also leave this party in closer proximity 
with the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ and ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ groups. Thus, highest Labour 
evaluation levels from these two groups would also be conceivable under the policy-
proximity account.  
In terms of absolute Labour evaluation changes, I expect evaluations to increase from the 
‘Radical-Left’, ‘Radical-Liberal’, and ‘Radical-Inclusive’ policy groups. This expectation arises 
from Labour’s ideological shift towards these groups between 2015 and 2017, resulting in 
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greater policy-proximity with these voters. I also expect Labour evaluations to fall from the 
‘Centrist’ groups on all dimensions, and from the ‘Centre-Right’, ‘Radical-Right’, ‘Moderate-
Conservative’, ‘Radical-Conservative’, ‘Moderate-Exclusive’, and ‘Radical-Exclusive’ 
respondent groups. I expect these negative evaluation changes because Labour shifted away 
from these groups on their respective policy dimensions between 2015 and 2017.  
Looking now to expectations for relative Labour evaluation changes, which focus on the 
magnitudes of these shifts. I expect the largest Labour evaluation increases from the ‘Radical-
Left’, ‘Radical-Liberal’, and ‘Radical-Inclusive’ respondent groups, owing to Labour’s shift 
towards these groups between 2015 and 2017. From the ‘Centrist’, ‘Centre-Right’, ‘Radical-
Right’, ‘Moderate-Conservative’, ‘Radical-Conservative’, ‘Moderate-Exclusive’, and ‘Radical-
Exclusive’ respondent groups, I expect Labour evaluations to decline by the largest 
magnitudes between 2015 and 2017, with this reflecting Labour’s shift away from these 
respondents over that period. To clarify, I expect this decline in evaluations to be of similar 
magnitude across these spatially-distant groups on each dimension, because Labour becomes 
equally more distant from them between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves.  
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To summarise all of these expectations, I have tabled them below, in Table 6.4.  
6.2.5: Populism-Based Account and Expectations 
To reiterate briefly, the populism-based account suggests that voters who are populists will 
be more supportive for radical left political actors. I previously tested this account with both 
other case studies in this thesis, finding that in neither of those previous cases was radical left 
support associated with higher levels of populism. However, I now explore this with the UK 
case study.  
Table 6.4: Summary of Expectations – Policy-Proximity Account, UK Case Study 
 
Expectations 
Economic Policy Groups 
‘Radical-Left’ ‘Centre-Left’ ‘Centrist’ ‘Centre-Right’ ‘Rad-Right’ 
Evaluation 
Levels 
2017: Highest Labour 
eval levels 
2015: Highest Labour 
eval levels 
2015: Similar to 
‘Rad-Left’ 
2017: Reduced 
2015 & 2017: Second-
lowest Labour eval levels 
2015 & 2017: Lowest 
Labour eval levels 
 
 











 2015: Highest 
Labour eval levels 
2015: Similar to 
‘Rad-Left’ 
2017: Reduced 
2015 & 2017: Second-
lowest Labour eval 
levels 
2015 & 2017: Lowest 
Labour eval levels 
2015 & 2017: Either group conceivably has 
highest Labour evaluation levels.  
 All Policy Groups 
‘Rad-Left/Lib/Inc’ ‘Cen-Left/Lib/Inc’ ‘Centrist’ ‘Cen-Right/Cons/Exc’ ‘Rad-Right/Cons/Exc’ 
Absolute Eval 
Changes 
Labour evals increase Labour evals 
increase or decrease 
Labour evals 
decrease 
Labour evals decrease Labour evals decrease 
Relative Eval. 
Changes 




2nd-largest Lab. eval 
decrease 





Doing so requires measures of the populist attitudes of voters. I previously showed these 
measures from the BES, with indication of populist attitudes from a battery of five questions 
in the BES panel surveys. I again group respondents based on their averaged responses to the 
five populism questions, creating the populism groups detailed below in Table 6.5:  
Under the populism-based account the expectation is for increased Labour Party evaluations 
from respondents in the ‘Radical-Populist’ group. Observing this will demonstrate support 
for the radically left-wing post-Corbyn Labour Party as a function of populist attitudes 
amongst voters.  
6.2.6: Control Variables 
As with both the German case study and the US case study, I control for a series of explanatory 
factors in my investigation. The purpose of these is the same as in those previous cases – to 
separate the effects of these factors, and thus clarify the roles of policy-proximity and 
populism on radical left support. Some of the control variables applied in the UK case are 
more general, and follow those applied in both previous case studies, with some which are 
more specific to the UK and informed by previous investigations of electoral support in this 
context.  
Continuing from both the German and US case studies, I control for the impacts of gender 
and education levels with the UK case study. Also included here are controls on respondent 
age, obtained through an age grouping variable in the BES. I control for respondent age here, 
with this previously identified as a defining feature of political preferences in the UK (Curtice, 
September 2017; Bell, 2019), as opposed to class, which has faded as an explanatory factor of 
electoral support in the UK (Evans & Tilley, 2012). In addition to these, variables relating to 
respondents’ ethnicity and their beliefs about the European Union have also featured in these 
accounts (Holbolt, 2016; 2018; Kaufmann, 2017; Swales, 2016). Beliefs in relation to EU 
Table 6.5: Respondents Grouped by Populism 
Populism Groups 
Radical-Populist 
(n = 686) 
Moderate-
Populist 
(n = 730) 
Centrist 
(n = 841) 
Moderate-
Non-Populist 
(n = 1,226) 
Radical-Non-Populist 




membership plausibly have particular importance, as over the 2015–2017 period considered 
in this chapter the UK’s EU membership referendum took place, and the matter of remaining 
or leaving the European Union became a highly salient issue. This control variable, drawing 
upon support or opposition towards EU membership, represents a context-specific control 
variable.  
Another control variable which features in this case study relates to party identification. 
Control on party ID in the UK considers respondents who identify with the Labour Party, 
Conservative Party, Liberal Democrats, SNP/PC, and UKIP. I cumulate SNP and PC 
identifiers together, as they stand in separate regions of the UK – presenting candidates solely 
in Scotland and Wales, respectively. In controlling for party ID, my research follows previous 
examination of UK electoral support which also controlled for party identification 
(Kaufmann, 2017).  
This provides a cumulative total of twelve control variables. To control for each of these 
variables, I consider responses to BES questions relating to each of them. I include these 
questions under Appendix 3.0. Some of these responses are ordinal, for example age and 
education. Other responses are nominal, including beliefs over EU membership (Remain vs. 
Leave), ethnicity (white vs. non-white), gender (male vs. female), and party identification, 
which is split into identifiers vs. non-identifiers for one of the seven specific parties 
considered. I include the EU beliefs, ethnicity, gender, and party identification controls as 
dummy variables.  
 
6.3: Analysis 
As in previous analysis sections, my attention is first on results from testing the policy-
proximity account, and followed by analysis of the populism-based account.  
I first report the average Labour evaluation levels from each policy group, drawn from both 
the 2015 and the 2017 waves of data. I also detail changes between these average evaluations. 
Examination of the policy-proximity account then continues, with linear regressions 
demonstrating how Labour evaluations changed between 2015 and 2017, and taking into 
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account a series of control variables. From these, I examine results relating first to expectations 
of absolute evaluation changes (i.e., whether Labour evaluations went up or down), followed 
by a focus on expectations of relative evaluation changes (i.e., the magnitude of evaluation 
changes). The regressions demonstrate Labour evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017 
relative to a baseline group. As in previous analysis, the baseline group in all regressions is 
the ‘Centrist’ group.  
In addition to this main analysis, I also provide a series of appendicised models. These include 
models with scalar variables replacing respondent policy groups and populism groups. Recall 
I have included these scalar variable models as supplementary results in both my German 
and US case studies previously, with these supporting my analysis by showing patterns of 
radical left support with the more conventional scalar variable approach, as opposed to 
including discretised respondent groups. I continue these supporting scalar results here as 
well, under appendices 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.  
6.3.1: Policy-Proximity: Economics 
Table 6.6 shows Labour evaluations from each economic group in 2015 and 2017, and how 
each group’s Labour evaluations changed over that period. All tables in this section show 
responses by BES respondents who answered the evaluation questions in 2015 or 2017. Some 
will have answered the evaluation questions in both years, given the retention rate,37 but not 
all. The evaluation changes in the rightmost column of these tables are simply the mean 2015 
evaluations subtracted from the 2017 evaluations.  
 
37 52.6% retention rate between Wave 6 and Wave 13. 
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The third column of Table 6.6 shows average Labour evaluation levels in 2017 are highest 
from the ‘Radical-Left’ group. This follows expectations for evaluation levels because Labour 
under Corbyn moves into proximity with these voters. Furthermore, support for Labour 
progressively becomes lower working across this dimension, and moving away from 
Labour’s position, towards the ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy group with lowest 
evaluations. This monotonic pattern in Table 6.6 is one where Labour evaluations reduce as 
policy-proximity on economics reduces, which is entirely in line with the policy-proximity 
account.  
However, the second column also shows highest average Labour evaluation levels from the 
‘Radical-Left’ group in 2015, despite it being the ‘Centre-Left’ economic policy group 
considered to be in closest proximity with Labour pre-Corbyn. The observation here, of 
highest average evaluation levels from voters not in proximity with pre-Corbyn Labour, does 
not conform with the policy-proximity account.  
Looking quickly at the evaluation changes in column four of Table 6.6, average Labour 
evaluations increased by the largest magnitude from the ‘Radical-Left’ group. This is in line 
with expectations, given the increasing proximity of this group with Labour between 2015 
and 2017. However, average Labour evaluations did not decrease from the ‘Centrist’, ‘Centre-
Right’, or ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy groups, despite Labour’s shift away from them over 
this period. The general increase in average Labour evaluations, from policy groups across 
this dimension, including groups Labour shifts away from, does not conform with 
expectations.  
Moving now to the regression of economic policy groups, these show differences in the 
dependent variable (Labour evaluation change) from each policy group relative to a baseline 
Table 6.6: Table of Economic Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy group (n = 6,930) 





in mean evaluation 
Radical-Left 5.676 6.577 +0.901 
Centre-Left 5.167 5.924 +0.757 
Centrist 4.879 5.332 +0.453 
Centre-Right 3.290 3.768 +0.478 




group (‘Centrists’). I include policy groups as mutually exclusive dummy variables here, as 
in the previous case studies.  
Unlike the tables of evaluations from each group, the regressions only include respondents 
who answered evaluation questions in both the pre-Corbyn wave and the post-Corbyn wave. 
Of the thirty thousand responses in the pre-Corbyn wave, this drops to around fifteen 
thousand due to the retention rate (52.6%) between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves. 
Remaining observations halve again, because the BES only presented the party evaluation 
question to around half of BES respondents. The BES gave the other half of the sample 
questions relating to propensity to vote instead. Accordingly, the number of observations left 
in regressions of policy groups is around seven thousand. This number drops further after 
including control variables, leaving around four and a half thousand observations. I include 
the simple linear regression of economic groups under Table 6.7. The dependent variable is 
Labour evaluation changes, on a scale of +10 to -10.  
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 Table 6.7: Regression of Economic Policy Groups and Labour Evaluation Changes 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Economic Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Left 0.449*** 0.395*** 
 (0.083) (0.097) 
Cen Left 0.274*** 0.260** 
 (0.093) (0.107) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right 0.025 0.009 
 (0.086) (0.104) 
Rad Right -0.389*** -0.309*** 
 (0.079) (0.104) 
Education  0.012* 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.334*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.075) 
gender  0.228*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.065) 
ageGroup  -0.053** 
  (0.025) 
Ethnicity  0.188 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.126) 
Cons_ID  -0.425*** 
  (0.113) 
Lab_ID  -0.850*** 
  (0.107) 
LD_ID  -0.239 
  (0.150) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.960*** 
  (0.154) 
UKIP_ID  -0.161 
  (0.151) 
Greens_ID  1.068*** 
  (0.210) 
Other_ID  0.790*** 
  (0.265) 
Constant 0.452*** 0.924*** 
 (0.054) (0.201) 
Observations 6,930 4,574 
R2 0.015 0.088 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.084 
Residual Std. Error 2.319 (df = 6925) 2.172 (df = 4557) 
F Statistic 26.896*** (df = 4; 6925) 27.377*** (df = 16; 4557) 




To quickly address the controls, average Labour evaluations increased by a smaller amount 
relative to the ‘Centrists’ from voters who supported leaving the EU, from older respondents, 
and from those who identified with either the Conservative or Labour parties. Attachments 
with the SNP/PC, the Green Party, or one of the ‘Others’ political parties are associated with 
increased average Labour evaluations, relative to the ‘Centrists’, along with being female. 
There are no statistically significant links (at the .05 level) between Labour evaluation changes 
and education levels, ethnicity, and identification with either UKIP or the Liberal Democrats. 
Inclusion of controls in column two predictably dampens the coefficients from the economic 
policy groups. As the purpose of these controls is to clarify the impacts of policy-proximity, I 
draw my main conclusions from after including these variables.  
Evaluations rose from the ‘Radical-Left’ group, with this increase also representing the largest 
positive evaluation change across all economic policy groups in this regression. In absolute 
terms, Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group increased by 1.329.38 
This increase in Labour evaluations, and its magnitude, conform with expectations under the 
policy-proximity account. Thus, I find support for the policy-proximity account in Table 6.7, 
suggesting policy-proximity on the economic dimension is associated with support for the 
radical left in the UK.  
However, contrary to expectations, evaluations rise from all five groups, irrespective of 
proximity and Labour’s shifts. Note that the ‘Radical-Right’ group’s negative coefficient does 
not exceed the Constant in absolute value. This means Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-
Right’ group increased by an average of .615 pre-Corbyn to post-Corbyn.39 Labour evaluations 
also increased from the ‘Centrist’ and ‘Centre-Right’ groups. Therefore, continuing from Table 
6.7, I find a general increase in average Labour evaluations from economic policy groups.  
In Figure 6.4, I summarise the pattern of Labour evaluation changes from Table 6.7. Note that 
this pattern does not dip below 0 on the y-axis, thus reflecting the lack of negative changes in 
Labour evaluations between 2015 and 2017.  
 
 
38 I reach this number by combining the ‘Constant’ coefficient with the ‘Radical-Left’ coefficient (0.924 
+ 0.395 = 1.319). 













The pattern of Labour evaluation changes in Figure 6.4 is markedly different from the 
expected pattern in Figure 6.3. The policy-proximity account’s expectations included falling 
average Labour evaluations from the groups Labour shifted away from – the ‘Centrist’, 
‘Centre-Right’, and ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy groups. However, there is instead this 
average Labour evaluations increase across the board.  
However, I find this general increase in evaluations becomes smaller as policy-proximity 
reduces. The ‘Radical-Right’ economic policy group, who are most spatially-distant from 
Labour, has the smallest increase in Labour evaluations. These Labour evaluation increases 
are slightly larger from the ‘Centre-Right’ group, larger still from the ‘Centrists’, and ‘Centre-
Left’ groups, and reach their zenith from the ‘Radical-Left’ economic policy group. This 
largest increase in average Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Left’ group conforms with 
the policy-proximity account, given Labour’s shift towards these voters between 2015 and 
2017. If any group’s evaluations were going in increase the most under this account it would 
be the ‘Radical-Left’ group, and if any group were to have the smallest evaluation increase it 
would be the spatially-distant ‘Radical-Right’ group. I observe this pattern, and as such I 
conclude limited observation of support for the UK radical left based on economic policy-
proximity.  
Figure 6.4: Plotted Results of Economic Policy Groups (UK) 
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Finally, under Appendix 3.1 I test the effect of economic policy proximity on Labour 
evaluation changes again, but here with a scalar variable of economic preferences instead of 
policy groups. The basic effect here is the same as in Table 6.7 – greater leftism on this 
dimension is associated with significantly increased evaluations of the Labour Party over the 
2015-2017 period. Consequently, the scalar model does not change any of my substantive 
findings from my group-based analysis in Table 6.7.  
6.3.2: Policy-Proximity: Cultural 
Below is a table of average Labour evaluations, and changes between these in 2015 and 2017 
by cultural policy position.  
Average Labour evaluation levels from cultural policy groups in Table 6.8 broadly follow 
those I observe from economic policy groups in Table 6.6. Specifically, in both pre-Corbyn and 
post-Corbyn waves, there is a trend where evaluation levels are higher from the group Labour 
shifts towards: the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group here. These evaluation levels are lower as spatial-
distance increases between Labour and the policy groups, culminating with the lowest Labour 
evaluation levels from the ‘Radical-Conservative’ group. The fact that I observe this trend in 
both pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves presents the same challenge to the theory as I saw 
earlier. Specifically, the ‘Radical-Liberals’ had the highest evaluations for Labour in 2015, 
despite the assumption of the ‘Moderate-Liberal’ group being in closest proximity with the 
pre-Corbyn Labour Party.  
Looking at evaluation changes in column four of Table 6.8, Labour evaluations rise from the 
‘Radical-Liberal’ group. This follows expectations, as Labour shifted towards this group 
Table 6.8: Table of Cultural Policy Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy group (n = 
6,762) 





in mean evaluation 
Radical-Liberal 5.356 6.374 +1.018 
Moderate-Liberal 4.510 5.084 +0.574 
Centrist 3.758 4.062 +0.304 
Moderate-
Conservative 
3.427 3.689 +0.262 
Radical-
Conservative 




between 2015 and 2017. In terms of magnitude, this positive shift of evaluations from the 
‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy group is the largest increase in Labour evaluations on this 
dimension. This also conforms with expectations and corresponds with Labour’s culturally-
liberal shift on this dimension. However, contrary to expectations, Table 6.8 also demonstrates 
the previously characterised general increase in evaluations. As I see Labour evaluations 
increasing from cultural policy groups which Labour shifted away from – the ‘Centrist’, 
‘Moderate-Conservative’, and ‘Radical-Conservative’ groups, results in Table 6.8 do not 
entirely follow expectations.  
I include a linear regression of cultural policy groups and Labour evaluation changes in Table 
6.9, alongside the control variables, to see how average evaluations for Labour changed from 
these groups compared to a baseline group. Once again, that baseline group is the ‘Centrists’.  
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  Table 6.9: Regression of Cultural Policy groups and Labour evaluation changes 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.714*** 0.416*** 
 (0.080) (0.103) 
Mod Lib 0.270*** 0.156 
 (0.084) (0.101) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con -0.043 -0.086 
 (0.090) (0.106) 
Rad Con -0.167* -0.155 
 (0.091) (0.110) 
Education  -0.001 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.190** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.080) 
gender  0.206*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.067) 
ageGroup  -0.046* 
  (0.026) 
Ethnicity  0.244* 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.129) 
Cons_ID  -0.523*** 
  (0.109) 
Lab_ID  -0.716*** 
  (0.108) 
LD_ID  -0.212 
  (0.152) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.115*** 
  (0.156) 
UKIP_ID  -0.024 
  (0.153) 
Greens_ID  1.123*** 
  (0.217) 
Other_ID  0.832*** 
  (0.271) 
Constant 0.304*** 0.893*** 
 (0.055) (0.208) 
Observations 6,762 4,453 
R2 0.019 0.083 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.080 
Residual Std. Error 2.323 (df = 6757) 2.178 (df = 4436) 
F Statistic 31.933*** (df = 4; 6757) 25.236*** (df = 16; 4436) 




As before I draw conclusions primarily from column two, after control variables are taken 
into account. Conforming with expectations, I find the largest pro-Labour evaluation change 
from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy group – rising by an average of 1.309 – in column 
two.40 This represents a statistically significant association between ‘Radical-Liberal’ policy 
preferences and increased evaluations for Labour post-Corbyn, relative to the ‘Centrists’, 
which is conceivably the result of greater policy-proximity between these ‘Radical-Liberal’ 
respondents and the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017. However, the expectation that 
‘Centrists’, ‘Moderate-Conservative’ and ‘Radical-Conservative’ policy groups would 
experience a decline in Labour evaluations from pre- to post-Corbyn is still not followed. After 
including the controls, evaluations from the ‘Centrists’ increased by .893, with no statistically 
significant difference between this and the coefficients of the latter two groups. Consequently, 
results conform with the policy-proximity account from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ group, but not 
from groups at the culturally-conservative end of this dimension.  
This leaves similar conclusions between the regressions of economic policy and cultural policy 
groups. The evaluation changes, particularly their magnitudes, do suggest there is some 
policy-proximity effect on radical left here, although this account is limited by the unexpected 
evaluation increases from the three spatially-distant cultural policy groups. To summarise 






















Figure 6.4 reflects the statistically significant increase in average Labour evaluations from the 
‘Radical-Liberal’ cultural policy group, relative to the ‘Centrists’, with these increases getting 
smaller towards the culturally-conservative end of this policy dimension. Increased average 
Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Liberal’ policy group conforms with the policy-
proximity account; however, continued observation of a persistent general increase in average 
Labour evaluations means results still do not consistently follow expectations.  
Cultural policy results in this case study come with two sets of supplementary results, 
included in the appendix.  
First, under Appendix 3.2 I include results with a scalar variable of cultural policy preferences 
rather than policy groups. An increase in that scale, signifying greater cultural conservatism, 
is associated with a significant decrease in Labour evaluations. That follows with expectations, 
and conforms with the overall pattern I identified in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.5. As a result, this 
scalar model does not change my conclusions from the group-based model.  
Second, under Appendix 3.3 I test the effects of cultural policy-proximity from the stripped 
back set of questions – excluding responses to the ‘British values’, authority obedience, and 
moral standards questions – finding results which are consistent with those in Table 6.9. 
Specifically, I continue to find the general increase in Labour evaluations from groups across 
Figure 6.5: Plotted Results of Cultural Policy Groups (UK) 
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this dimension. As a result, my conclusions are unchanged after testing cultural policy 
without the issue of ‘British values’.   
6.3.3: Policy-Proximity: Migration  
In Table 6.10, I include Labour evaluation levels from migration voter groups, again alongside 
the changes in these evaluations calculated by taking the 2015 evaluations from those in 2017:  
Observations from Table 6.10 remain similar to those in Table 6.8 and 6.6, with cultural and 
economic policy groups, respectively. In the third column, the group Labour moves into 
proximity with – the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group – demonstrated highest average evaluations 
for the Labour Party in the 2017 wave, as expected. However, in the second column these 
average evaluations are also highest from this group in the 2015 wave, despite Labour’s 
assumed proximity with the ‘Moderate-Inclusive’ group in 2015.  
Another conclusion which continues from the earlier tabled evaluation levels is the lack of 
lower average Labour evaluations from the groups this political actor shifts away from. In the 
fourth column of Table 6.10, I instead find the spatially-distant ‘Centrist’, ‘Moderate-
Exclusive’, and ‘Radical-Exclusive’ groups had smaller average evaluation increases. The 
magnitude of these changes suggests there is still some policy-proximity effect here, as the 
size of these evaluation increases got smaller as policy-proximity reduced. However, the fact 
that their evaluation shifts are positive does not follow expectations.  
Once again, this brings me to regression analysis, where I introduce control variables and 
observe average Labour evaluation changes from a consistent sample of BES respondents. 
Again, I present these average evaluation shifts relative to a baseline group, representing the 
‘Centrist’ migration policy group. I include this linear regression of migration policy groups 
below, under Table 6.11.  
Table 6.10: Table of Migration Policy Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy 
groups (n = 6,742) 





in mean evaluation 
Radical-Inclusive 5.579 6.664 +1.085 
Moderate-Inclusive 5.019 5.653 +0.634 
Centrist 4.142 4.637 +0.495 
Moderate-Exclusive 3.559 3.801 +0.242 




 Table 6.11: Regression of Migration Policy groups and Labour evaluation changes 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Migration Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Inclusive 0.591*** 0.359*** 
 (0.089) (0.108) 
Mod Inclusive 0.139 0.063 
 (0.090) (0.106) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exclusive -0.253*** -0.239** 
 (0.093) (0.113) 
Rad Exclusive -0.400*** -0.318*** 
 (0.079) (0.101) 
Education  0.005 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.123 
(1 = Leave)  (0.085) 
gender  0.195*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.066) 
ageGroup  -0.035 
  (0.026) 
Ethnicity  0.020 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.128) 
Cons_ID  -0.579*** 
  (0.107) 
Lab_ID  -0.752*** 
  (0.107) 
LD_ID  -0.202 
  (0.152) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.127*** 
  (0.157) 
UKIP_ID  -0.039 
  (0.154) 
Greens_ID  1.233*** 
  (0.219) 
Other_ID  0.896*** 
  (0.271) 
Constant 0.495*** 0.909*** 
 (0.057) (0.206) 
Observations 6,742 4,410 
R2 0.021 0.087 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.084 
Residual Std. Error 2.329 (df = 6737) 2.169 (df = 4393) 
F Statistic 35.883*** (df = 4; 6737) 26.276*** (df = 16; 4393) 




Labour evaluations rose from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group, as expected. In column two, 
evaluations from these respondents increase on average by 1.268.41 Results also meet 
expectations for relative evaluation changes, because I see the largest positive evaluation 
change from this voter group. The highest evaluations for Labour from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ 
group is plausibly the result of greater proximity between these respondents and Labour, as 
Labour shifts towards them between 2015 and 2017. Again, the controls dampened the effect 
of policy-proximity variables, but after these I still find significantly increased average Labour 
evaluations, in line with expectations from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group.  
However, as has been the pattern throughout this section so far, results do not consistently 
follow expectations. Once again, I observe this general increase in Labour evaluations, 
including from groups Labour shifts away from between 2015 and 2017 – the ‘Centrist’, 
‘Moderate-Exclusive’, and ‘Radical-Exclusive’ groups. The magnitude of these evaluation 
increases provides some support for the policy-proximity account. I again find the largest 
increase in Labour evaluations from the proximal ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group, and the smallest 
increase from the distant ‘Radical-Exclusive’ group, this provides some support for the policy-
proximity account.  
The pattern of average Labour evaluations from migration policy groups is summarised 
below, in Figure 6.6. Of particular note is this downward curve in average Labour evaluations 
as policy-proximity reduces. However, that curve does not drop below 0 on the y-axis, 
demonstrating the unexpected general increase in average Labour evaluations from all five 



















Results have not consistently followed expectations of the policy-proximity account. In 
particular, the direction of evaluation changes does follow expectations, with evaluations for 
this political actor increasing even from spatially-distant voters. However, the magnitude of 
these evaluation changes does bring results slightly closer to conforming with the theory, as I 
find the largest positive evaluation changes from the groups Labour moved towards between 
2015 and 2017. These increases in average Labour evaluations also became smaller as spatial-
proximity reduced. This pattern conforms with the policy-proximity account.  
Finally, with a scalar variable of migration policy in Appendix 3.4, I find the same basic 
pattern as in Table 6.11. Specifically, Labour evaluations increasing with more inclusive policy 
preferences. Hence, the scalar model does not change my findings from group-based analysis. 
6.3.4: Policy-Proximity Observations: Multiple Linear Regression 
As in the previous two case studies, I look now to multiple linear regression, which clarifies 
the roles of preferences on all three dimensions on support for the radical left. I include this 
under Table 6.12. My focus is primarily on column eight. That column includes Labour 
evaluations changes with control on all policy groups and control variables. Note that the 
number of observations is significantly lower in column eight. This is a consequence of 
respondents needing to have answered questions on Labour evaluation in both waves of data, 
plus answering policy questions on all three policy dimensions and the control variables.   
Figure 6.6: Plotted Results from Migration Policy Groups (UK) 
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 Table 6.12: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from policy groups on all three dimensions. 
(Part 1/2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.706*** 0.583***     0.629*** 0.558*** 
 (0.132) (0.131)     (0.133) (0.131) 
Cen Left 0.359** 0.314**     0.300** 0.284** 
 (0.148) (0.145)     (0.148) (0.144) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right 0.121 0.096     0.159 0.074 
 (0.142) (0.141)     (0.141) (0.141) 
Rad Right -0.235* -0.188     -0.170 -0.246* 
 (0.126) (0.137)     (0.126) (0.137) 
Rad Lib   0.853*** 0.634***   0.530*** 0.476*** 
   (0.127) (0.136)   (0.140) (0.141) 
Mod Lib   0.295** 0.244*   0.189 0.207 
   (0.133) (0.132)   (0.134) (0.132) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con   -0.059 -0.031   -0.025 -0.017 
   (0.140) (0.137)   (0.141) (0.138) 
Rad Con   -0.096 -0.089   -0.066 -0.100 
   (0.146) (0.146)   (0.152) (0.150) 
Rad Incl     0.492*** 0.290** 0.150 0.124 
     (0.137) (0.140) (0.146) (0.144) 
Mod Incl     0.032 -0.006 -0.085 -0.045 
     (0.140) (0.138) (0.140) (0.138) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Excl     -0.403*** -0.359** -0.297** -0.314** 
     (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) 
Rad Excl     -0.431*** -0.411*** -0.350*** -0.385*** 
     (0.125) (0.133) (0.133) (0.136) 
         
Constant 0.256*** 0.680** 0.171* 0.652** 0.487*** 0.891*** 0.227 0.631** 
 (0.090) (0.268) (0.089) (0.272) (0.090) (0.270) (0.140) (0.285) 
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 
R2 0.022 0.089 0.027 0.088 0.022 0.086 0.047 0.103 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.083 0.025 0.082 0.020 0.081 0.042 0.095 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.168 (df = 
2541) 
2.236 (df = 
2553) 
2.169 (df = 
2541) 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.171 (df = 
2541) 
2.216 (df = 
2545) 




= 4; 2553) 
15.505*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
17.440*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.369*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
14.123*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.013*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
10.441*** (df 
= 12; 2545) 
12.149*** (df 
= 24; 2533) 






Table 6.12: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from policy groups on all three dimensions. 
(Part 2/2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education  0.012  -0.002  0.003  -0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
EU_Vote  -0.320***  -0.141  -0.079  -0.004 
(1 = Leave)  (0.099)  (0.105)  (0.111)  (0.112) 
Gender  0.189**  0.171*  0.155*  0.198** 
(1 = Female)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.088) 
ageGroup  -0.046  -0.027  -0.030  -0.028 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Ethnicity  0.112  0.107  0.081  0.039 
(1 = Non-
White) 
 (0.170)  (0.170)  (0.171)  (0.170) 
Cons_ID  -0.337**  -0.474***  -0.541***  -0.252* 
  (0.149)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.149) 
Lab_ID  -0.774***  -0.725***  -0.722***  -0.846*** 
  (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.141) 
LD_ID  -0.133  -0.165  -0.189  -0.202 
  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.196) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.971***  1.077***  1.066***  0.896*** 
  (0.208)  (0.206)  (0.206)  (0.207) 
UKIP_ID  -0.146  -0.092  -0.061  -0.030 
  (0.207)  (0.208)  (0.208)  (0.208) 
Greens_ID  1.318***  1.318***  1.384***  1.096*** 
  (0.298)  (0.299)  (0.298)  (0.300) 
Other_ID  1.175***  1.264***  1.305***  1.144*** 
  (0.359)  (0.358)  (0.359)  (0.357) 
Constant 0.256*** 0.680** 0.171* 0.652** 0.487*** 0.891*** 0.227 0.631** 
 (0.090) (0.268) (0.089) (0.272) (0.090) (0.270) (0.140) (0.285) 
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 
R2 0.022 0.089 0.027 0.088 0.022 0.086 0.047 0.103 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.083 0.025 0.082 0.020 0.081 0.042 0.095 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.168 (df = 
2541) 
2.236 (df = 
2553) 
2.169 (df = 
2541) 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.171 (df = 
2541) 
2.216 (df = 
2545) 




= 4; 2553) 
15.505*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
17.440*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.369*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
14.123*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.013*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
10.441*** (df 
= 12; 2545) 
12.149*** (df 
= 24; 2533) 





I observe statistically significant coefficients from the ‘Radical-Left’, ‘Centre-Left’, ‘Radical-
Liberal’, ‘Moderate-Exclusive’ and ‘Radical-Exclusive’ policy groups, relative to the baseline. 
Looking further at these, higher Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Left’ and ‘Radical-
Liberal’ groups are consistent with expectations of the policy-proximity account. Also 
expected was a similar increase in evaluations from the ‘Radical-Inclusive’ group, but I did 
not observe this. I do not see an over-time decrease in average evaluations of Labour from any 
policy group, thus there is again this general increase in Labour evaluations despite this 
political actor shifting away from many policy groups. Consequently, results remain mixed 
relative to expected evaluation changes.  
From Table 6.12, I can conclude associations between radical left support in the UK with left-
wing economic policy preferences and radically-liberal cultural policy preferences. At the 
other end of these dimensions, the level of statistical significance from the ‘Radical-Right’ 
economic policy group diminishes from the .01 level observed in Table 6.7 to the .1 level in 
Table 6.12. This drop in significance suggests uncontrolled positions on cultural and migration 
policy had bolstered this group’s coefficient earlier. At the spatially-distant end of the 
migration policy dimension, the statistically significant negative coefficient remains after 
including the economic and cultural policy preferences. Although, the migrant-exclusive 
groups average Labour evaluations still increased, relative to the ‘Centrists’ – maintaining this 
unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations, despite spatial-distance from Labour.  
Results conform with expectations of absolute evaluation changes in two areas. First, with 
increased Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Left’ group, and second from the ‘Radical-
Liberal’ group. Looking to relative evaluation changes, I see broadly the same pattern as 
before, with generally increased Labour evaluations across the board, but these evaluation 
increases becoming smaller as spatial-distance from Labour increases. Largest evaluation 
increases from the spatially-proximal groups suggest there is some validity to the policy-
proximity account here.  
Once again, I graphically summarise this pattern of average Labour evaluation changes. I do 
this in Figure 6.7. Note again the y-axis, which tracks positive evaluation changes alone. This 



























Figure 6.7: Plotted Results (Table 6.12) from Economic, Social, and Migration Policy Groups 
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It would be disingenuous to suggest that results in Table 6.12 consistently followed 
expectations of the policy-proximity account. I still find this general increase in Labour 
evaluations, which remains contrary to policy-proximity expectations. Although, as I have 
stated throughout my UK case analysis, there is still limited support for the policy-proximity 
account after looking at the magnitudes of these evaluation increases.  
Appendix 3.5, which includes preferences on the three dimensions as scalar variables, 
provides results which mirror the basic pattern of Labour evaluations in Table 6.12. 
Consequently, my conclusions from group-based analysis are unchanged by the scalar 
models. 
6.3.5: Populism-Based Observations 
The expectation for this account is that average evaluations of Labour would be significantly 
higher from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group. This expectation was predicated upon the radical 
left’s anti-elite economic appeals, which potentially draw support from voters who adhere to 
the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ division inherent to populism. Observing results which follow this 
expectation would lead me to conclude radical left support to be a function of higher levels of 
populism. However, I acknowledge that even if I find results which conform with the 
populism-based account, the extent this theory can answer the research question would be 
limited by a lack of consistent evidence supporting this account in both other case studies.  
I again grouped BES respondents, this time according to their responses to questions related 
to populism. I include a linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from each populism 
group in Table 6.13.42 The baseline in column one is ‘Centrist’ respondents who indicated 
neither strong populism nor non-populist attitudes. In column two, the baseline continues to 
be the ‘Centrist’ respondent group, plus respondents who scored zero on the control variables.  
 
 




Table 6.13: Regression of Populism Groups and Labour evaluation changes 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Populism Groups 
 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
 
Radical Populists -0.057 -0.019 
 (0.120) (0.141) 
Moderate Populists -0.195* -0.202 
 (0.118) (0.138) 
Centrists (baseline) (baseline) 
Moderate Non-Populists -0.048 -0.029 
 (0.104) (0.123) 
Radical Non-Populists -0.230** -0.436*** 
 (0.112) (0.133) 
Education  0.015* 
  (0.008) 
EU_Vote  -0.405*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.100) 
gender  0.185** 
(1 = Female)  (0.083) 
ageGroup  -0.056* 
  (0.033) 
Ethnicity  0.225 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.159) 
Cons_ID  -0.565*** 
  (0.132) 
Lab_ID  -0.674*** 
  (0.131) 
LD_ID  -0.130 
  (0.184) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.077*** 
  (0.193) 
UKIP_ID  -0.147 
  (0.195) 
Greens_ID  1.253*** 
  (0.280) 
Other_ID  0.972*** 
  (0.339) 
Constant 0.543*** 1.044*** 
 (0.080) (0.258) 
 
Observations 4,372 2,931 
R2 0.001 0.077 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.072 
Residual Std. Error 2.324 (df = 4367) 2.195 (df = 2914) 
F Statistic 1.598 (df = 4; 4367) 15.249*** (df = 16; 2914) 
 




What Table 6.13 shows is contrary to expectations of the populism-based account but 
conforms with findings in both other case studies. Specifically, I do not find an increase in 
average Labour evaluation levels from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group, relative to the baseline, 
nor even from the ‘Moderate-Populist’ group. Therefore, populist attitudes are not associated 
with significantly increased average Labour evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017. I do 
find a statistically significant coefficient from the ‘Radical Non-Populist’ group, showing 
average Labour evaluations to have fallen from this group relative to the baseline. However, 
this was not one of the expectations under this account.  
I could not separate Corbyn’s potential radical left persuasion effect from voters reported 
populist sentiments here, due to those sentiments being expressed in post-Corbyn BES waves. 
I suggested earlier that this potentially biases results in favour of the populism-based account. 
However, upon observation of average Labour evaluation changes from populism groups, it 
seems their populism is not strongly associated with Labour Party support despite this 
potential bias.  
Looking between columns one and two of Table 6.13, the coefficients are not markedly 
different once I include control variables in the regression model. To summarise results of this 
regression graphically, I have provided this pattern of average evaluation changes in Figure 
6.8. This demonstrates the significant decrease in average Labour evaluations from the 
‘Radical-Non-Populists’ group in particular, relative to the baseline. This also demonstrates 
the lack of significantly increased Labour evaluations from the ‘Radical-Populist’ group, again 




















Under Appendix 3.6, I test the role of populism with a scalar variable rather than groups. I 
find that an increase in the populism scale, representing greater populism, is associated with 
a significant increase in Labour evaluations. At first glance, this conflicts somewhat with my 
findings from Table 6.13, as it provides a result following expectations, with higher Labour 
evaluations from respondents with more populist attitudes. However, looking at Figure 6.8, 
it seems less appropriate to impose linear functional form with the scalar variable, considering 
the non-linear pattern in this figure. Furthermore, there is not a major difference in the 
magnitude of the populism effects implied by each of the two models,43 meaning Appendix 
3.6 does not present as fundamental a challenge to Table 6.13 as would initially appear.  
 
43 It is not straightforward to compare the magnitude of the estimated populism effect across a model 
that includes populism as a categorical predictor and a model that includes populism as a scalar 
predictor. But I can compare the magnitude of the predicted difference in Labour evaluation changes 
from opposing ends of the populism scale for the group-based model versus the predicted difference 
from the scalar model. For the group-based model (Table 6.13), I can calculate the predicted difference 
in Labour evaluation change for the ‘Radical-Populist’ and ‘Radical-Non-Populist’ groups as 0.417, 
which is the difference in the estimated coefficients for these two groups (-0.19 and -0.436). To get a 
comparable quantity from the scalar model (Appendix 3.6), I calculate the predicted difference in 
Labour evaluation change for a person with an “average” populism scale score for the ‘Radical-
Populist’ group (4.68), and a person with an “average” populism scale score for the ‘Radical-Non-
Populist’ group (2.42). A shift from 2.42 to 4.68 on the populism scale is a shift of 2.26. Multiplying this 
by the estimated populism coefficient in Appendix 3.6, yields a predicted difference in Labour 
Figure 6.8: Plotted Results from Populism Groups (UK). 
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The lack of a major difference in magnitudes between both the scalar and group-based model, 
combined with Figure 6.8 showing enforcing linear form with the scalar variable to be 
inappropriate when there is a non-linear pattern, leads me back to my original conclusions. 
Namely, that populist sentiments are not strongly associated with higher support for the UK 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. 
6.3.6: Policy and Populism – Multiple Linear Regression 
Finally, I control the respective impacts of voter policy preferences on all three dimensions, 
and the populism groups. The intention here is to yield a final, more accurate picture of the 
impacts of both policy-proximity and populism on radical left support in the UK. I provide 
the multiple linear regression of policy and populism groups under Table 6.14.  
 
evaluation changes of 0.337. This is similar in magnitude to the predicted difference in the grouping 




 Table 6.14: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from all policy groups and populism groups 
(Part 1/2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Rad Left 0.706*** 0.583***       0.586*** 0.537*** 
 (0.132) (0.131)       (0.134) (0.133) 
Cen Left 0.359** 0.314**       0.305** 0.298** 
 (0.148) (0.145)       (0.148) (0.145) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right 0.121 0.096       0.172 0.084 
 (0.142) (0.141)       (0.140) (0.140) 
Rad Right -0.235* -0.188       -0.100 -0.189 
 (0.126) (0.137)       (0.127) (0.138) 
Rad Lib   0.853*** 0.634***     0.766*** 0.646*** 
   (0.127) (0.136)     (0.145) (0.146) 
Mod Lib   0.295** 0.244*     0.283** 0.264** 
   (0.133) (0.132)     (0.134) (0.132) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con   -0.059 -0.031     -0.027 -0.006 
   (0.140) (0.137)     (0.141) (0.138) 
Rad Con   -0.096 -0.089     -0.073 -0.083 
   (0.146) (0.146)     (0.153) (0.151) 
Rad Incl     0.492*** 0.290**   0.238 0.179 
     (0.137) (0.140)   (0.146) (0.144) 
Mod Incl     0.032 -0.006   -0.032 -0.022 
     (0.140) (0.138)   (0.140) (0.138) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Excl     -0.403*** -0.359**   -0.368** -0.346** 
     (0.149) (0.148)   (0.149) (0.148) 
Rad Excl     -0.431*** -0.411***   -0.421*** -0.397*** 
     (0.125) (0.133)   (0.134) (0.136) 
Rad Pop       -0.196 -0.139 -0.144 -0.183 
       (0.150) (0.148) (0.155) (0.152) 
Mod Pop       -0.220 -0.210 -0.138 -0.166 
       (0.152) (0.147) (0.149) (0.146) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Non-
Pop 
      -0.032 -0.074 -0.192 -0.154 
       (0.135) (0.131) (0.133) (0.130) 
Rad Non-Pop       -0.294** -0.468*** -0.823*** -0.704*** 
       (0.138) (0.141) (0.146) (0.145) 
           
Constant 0.256*** 0.680** 0.171* 0.652** 0.487*** 0.891*** 0.555*** 1.014*** 0.427*** 0.787*** 
 (0.090) (0.268) (0.089) (0.272) (0.090) (0.270) (0.102) (0.276) (0.161) (0.294) 
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 
R2 0.022 0.089 0.027 0.088 0.022 0.086 0.003 0.083 0.061 0.113 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.083 0.025 0.082 0.020 0.081 0.001 0.077 0.055 0.103 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.168 (df = 
2541) 
2.236 (df = 
2553) 
2.169 (df = 
2541) 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 




2.175 (df = 
2541) 
2.201 (df = 
2541) 




= 4; 2553) 
15.505*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
17.440*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.369*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
14.123*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.013*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
1.716 (df 
= 4; 2553) 
14.363*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
10.271*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
11.481*** (df 
= 28; 2529) 





Table 6.14: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from all policy groups and populism groups 
(Part 2/2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Education  0.012  -0.002  0.003  0.012  0.002 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
EU_Vote  -0.320***  -0.141  -0.079  -0.401***  -0.100 
(1 = Leave)  (0.099)  (0.105)  (0.111)  (0.106)  (0.115) 
Gender  0.189**  0.171*  0.155*  0.141  0.175** 
(1 =Female)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.088) 
ageGroup  -0.046  -0.027  -0.030  -0.038  -0.022 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Ethnicity  0.112  0.107  0.081  0.134  0.007 
(1=NonWhite)  (0.170)  (0.170)  (0.171)  (0.171)  (0.169) 
Cons_ID  -0.337**  -0.474***  -0.541***  -0.553***  -0.236 
  (0.149)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.149) 
Lab_ID  -0.774***  -0.725***  -0.722***  -0.652***  -0.821*** 
  (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.141) 
LD_ID  -0.133  -0.165  -0.189  -0.097  -0.153 
  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.198)  (0.196) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.971***  1.077***  1.066***  1.113***  0.863*** 
  (0.208)  (0.206)  (0.206)  (0.206)  (0.206) 
UKIP_ID  -0.146  -0.092  -0.061  -0.126  -0.013 
  (0.207)  (0.208)  (0.208)  (0.208)  (0.207) 
Greens_ID  1.318***  1.318***  1.384***  1.533***  1.072*** 
  (0.298)  (0.299)  (0.298)  (0.297)  (0.299) 
Other_ID  1.175***  1.264***  1.305***  1.294***  1.074*** 
  (0.359)  (0.358)  (0.359)  (0.360)  (0.357) 
Constant 0.256*** 0.680** 0.171* 0.652** 0.487*** 0.891*** 0.555*** 1.014*** 0.427*** 0.787*** 
 (0.090) (0.268) (0.089) (0.272) (0.090) (0.270) (0.102) (0.276) (0.161) (0.294) 
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,558 
R2 0.022 0.089 0.027 0.088 0.022 0.086 0.003 0.083 0.061 0.113 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.083 0.025 0.082 0.020 0.081 0.001 0.077 0.055 0.103 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 
2.168 (df = 
2541) 
2.236 (df = 
2553) 
2.169 (df = 
2541) 
2.241 (df = 
2553) 





2.175 (df = 
2541) 
2.201 (df = 
2541) 




= 4; 2553) 
15.505*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
17.440*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.369*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
14.123*** (df 
= 4; 2553) 
15.013*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
1.716 
(df = 4; 
2553) 
14.363*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
10.271*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 
11.481*** (df 
= 28; 2529) 





My focus here is on column ten, which includes coefficients for all policy groups and populism 
groups alongside the control variables. What I find in column ten of Table 6.14 is generally 
consistent with my earlier conclusions. There are increased Labour evaluations across policy 
groups on all three dimensions, which does not follow the policy-proximity account. There 
are also the larger Labour evaluation increases from the groups this party shifted towards 
between 2015 and 2017, compared to the groups Labour shifted away from on each dimension. 
As I have said throughout this analysis section, where I have consistently observed this 
pattern of Labour evaluations, this offers partial support for the policy-proximity account.  
Returning to the two accounts examined in my thesis, I can also make a final assessment of 
populism-based results in the UK case study. I observe the same pattern of results from 
populism groups as I did from Table 6.14. Specifically, relative to the baseline, respondents in 
the ‘Radical-Populist’ group do not on average have significantly increased support for the 
Labour Party. Therefore, once again, populist attitudes are not associated with significantly 
increased radical left support.  
After taking policy preferences on all three dimensions into account, levels of voter populism, 
and the control variables, I still find mixed support for the policy-proximity account in the 
UK. I also find little to suggest support for the radical left in the UK is a function of populist 
attitudes amongst voters.  
Finally, I find the same basic pattern of Labour evaluation changes when tested with scalar 
policy variables, rather than policy groups, in Appendix 3.7. The result is that the scalar results 
broadly underscore my primary policy-proximity findings. Appendix 3.7 shows the same 
direction of radical left support that I find in Table 6.14, with Labour evaluation increases 
higher from the more proximal policy groups. With regard to populism, the scalar results 
appear to conflict with my primary findings; however, my impression remains the same as 
with Appendix 3.6.  
6.3.7: Alternative Analysis – Labour Leader Evaluations 
To complement my previous examination of changes in Labour party evaluations, I also look 
at how policy-proximity and populist attitudes are associated with changes in evaluation of 
Labour’s leaders. To produce this dependent variable, I subtract evaluations for Ed Miliband 
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in 2015 from evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn in 2017.44 This provides a measure of changes in 
Labour leader evaluations. Looking at changes in Labour leader evaluations this time, instead 
of changes in evaluation for this party, acts as a robustness test of my previous conclusions. 
The previous conclusion of a general increase in Labour evaluations, regardless of policy-
proximity, are potentially driven at least partly by impressions of Labour’s new leadership. 
Thus, I want to also see what pattern of Labour leader evaluation changes is seen from the 
policy and populism groups. It is possible voters favoured Corbyn as a political outsider, 
conforming with previous research that has identified a ‘maverick’ effect (Ditto & 
Mastronarde, 2009). It may also be that voters saw Corbyn as more honest or more 
trustworthy, which would also have driven up support for Labour from voters across the 
policy dimensions. If this was the case, then I would see the same general increase in the 
dependent variable that I saw from policy groups earlier.  
I have included results with this ‘LikeLeader’ dependent variable in the thesis appendix. 
Under Appendices 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 are regressions of changes in Labour leader evaluations 
from economic, cultural, and migration policy groups, respectively. The trend of results from 
these appendicised regressions matches those in the corresponding analysis included earlier 
in this section – Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6, respectively. Crucially, the same general increase in 
evaluations was present, meaning it may have been impressions of Labour’s leadership 
change in 2015, from Miliband to Corbyn – an effect that I cannot completely disentangle from 
Labour Party evaluations – which explains this unexpected general increase in Labour 
evaluations.  
There was some variance in conclusions between the multiple linear regressions of Labour 
evaluations (Tables 3.7 and 3.9) and these with the ‘LikeLeader’ dependent variable 
(Appendices 3.11 and 3.13). Specifically, whereas the levels of significance from the ‘Radical-
Right’ and ‘Radical-Inclusive’ groups dropped with party evaluations, it remained with the 
‘LikeLeader’ variable. Therefore, leader evaluations seem to emphasise the effect of some 
variables. However, and most importantly, the generally positive trend of Labour leader 
evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017 broadly follows that of Labour Party evaluation 
changes. Therefore, respondents may have incorporated their increased impressions of 
 
44 Question included under Appendix 3.0. 
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Labour’s leadership into their evaluations of the Labour Party. This potentially accounts for 
the unexpected general increases in Labour Party evaluations that I have observed in this 
analysis section.  
That being said, identification of Labour support based on leadership appraisals, including a 
potential ‘maverick’ effect and perceptions of honesty/trustworthiness, are outside of the 
policy-proximity account. Consequently, what this potentially shows is a need to account for 
these valence-type effects impacting upon radical left support, alongside the limited role of 
policy-proximity which I identify in this chapter.  
6.4: UK Conclusions 
First, I will summarise results in relation to both the policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts. I did not find support for the populism-based account, having not seen significantly 
increased average evaluations for the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017 from the ‘Radical-
Populist’ respondents. Therefore, support for the UK’s radical left does not seem to be 
associated with levels of voter populism. Looking to the policy-proximity account, I find a 
general increase in Labour evaluations from all policy groups. This itself does not conform 
with this account, as I expected Labour’s leftward shift to mean decreased evaluations for this 
party from spatially-distant policy groups. However, looking at the relative magnitude of 
these evaluation changes provided some support for the policy-proximity account, as the 
larger positive evaluation shifts came from the groups Labour shifted towards, with these 
increases being smaller from the groups Labour shifted away from. Overall, this left partially 
followed expectations, and limited observation of radical left support based on policy-
proximity.  
To further explore the unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations, I looked to alternate 
analysis with the ‘LikeLeader’ dependent variable. The notion here was that impressions of 
Corbyn as more honest or trustworthy potentially drove higher Labour evaluations across 
these policy groups. I find that evaluations also rose from across policy groups, regardless of 
proximity, once the dependent variable pertained to Labour’s leaders. Thus, a potential 
valence-effect of Corbyn seems to be present here, where voters view him more positively 
maybe due to perceptions of greater honesty or as a maverick outsider. This potentially 
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explains the unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations that I find in the analysis 
section of this chapter.  
Similar to my findings here, previous research also identified a general increase in support for 
the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017, with this explained by evaluations of Corbyn 
relative to incumbent Prime Minister Theresa May (Mellon, et al., 2018). Evaluations for the 
former rose throughout the 2017 campaign, whereas for the latter they declined. Thus, 
Corbyn’s popularity relative to May’s is another possible explanation for this unexpected 
general increase in evaluations. Further existing research here has suggested a shift in issue 
salience, from the economy to cultural and migration policy, when explaining how the Labour 
Party’s support increased. Labour’s manifesto is suggested to have won them a great deal of 
support based on their more culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive policies (Curtice, 
September 2017). I also find stronger support for Labour from culturally-liberal and migrant-
inclusive voters in this chapter. This previous research identified two non-policy-proximity 
factors – leader evaluations and issue salience – as important explanations of electoral support 
in the UK. Perhaps this demonstrates limitations of the policy-proximity account in this case 
context.  
The UK case study makes the important contribution of separating persuasion effects from 
voters’ policy preferences. What this means is results of the UK case study are more reliably 
the result of genuine policy-proximity, rather than this proximity arising from radical left 
persuasion. This is an important conclusion, but it should not distract from the unexpected 
patterns of Labour Party evaluations that I find here. I will look further at potential 








7.0: Conclusions and Implications 
 
My intention in this thesis was to provide an account of support for the radical left, with focus 
on how far policy-proximity and populist attitudes explain support for radical left political 
actors. I highlighted the relevance of this right at the beginning of this thesis, where I set the 
radical left in the context of substantial (and often surprising) levels of electoral support and 
the need to explain this phenomenon. Having now carried out this voter-level research, I come 
to the concluding part of this thesis. It is here that I will reflect on my results across all three 
case studies and draw implications from these findings. These implications reflect not just on 
the question of radical left support, but also on the policy-proximity and populism-based 
accounts of electoral support.  Prior to that, I will draw out the key messages of the component 
chapters in this thesis.  
In the first chapter I demonstrated gaps in existing voter-level literature on support for the 
radical left. One of the more fundamental gaps I showed here is how existing literature has 
generally focused on the radical right instead of the radical left, meaning my research 
contributes by looking at support for less-studied political actors. A further area of 
contribution in my thesis includes my simultaneous examination of the roles of policy-
proximity on three dimensions and populism. Finally, I explained how my thesis has gone to 
greater lengths to deal with persuasion effects, compared to existing literature, with this 
leaving a more accurate picture of the specific roles of policy-proximity and populism on 
voters’ support for the radical left.   
My focus in Chapter 2 was theory. In this chapter, I explained the fundamentals and 
assumptions of both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. In brief, the policy-
proximity account assumes electoral support is the result of voter-actor proximity in policy 
spaces, with the theory here previously found to explain support including for the radical 
right (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). That research also identified three 
policy spaces linking proximity with radical right support. Those three dimensions relate to 
economics, cultural policy, and migration policy. Given their relevance in the research of 
Kitschelt, as well as many others cited in chapters 1 and 2, these three dimensions also feature 
in my thesis. The populism-based account suggests that support for the radical left comes 
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from populist voters. The populism these voters adhere to is defined by an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
division in society, where one group of ‘ordinary people’ are set against a ‘corrupt elite’ 
(Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004). The overall expectation under this account is that populist 
voters would be more supportive of the radical left, as a result of the radical left’s anti-elite 
rhetoric being akin to the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ appeal inherent to populism (Mudde, 2007).  
Chapter 3 formed the research design of this thesis. I focused on methodology here, 
highlighting the use of survey data and regression analysis. I explained how my study would 
require survey data including measures of radical left support, policy preferences on the three 
dimensions, and populist attitudes. I then outlined how I measured the impacts of policy 
preferences and populism on radical left support, with these included in multivariate 
regressions alongside control variables. Also included in Chapter 3 was explanation of all 
three case studies and their respective contributions, including how I deal with persuasion 
effects in the US and UK cases. In addition to discussing the three case studies, I also touched 
on alternative examples of the radical left and why they do not feature in my thesis, with the 
lack of suitable survey data being the most common reason for ruling out those cases.  
This brings me to summarise Chapter 4 – the first of three empirical chapters in my thesis. In 
this chapter, I analysed support for Die Linke – the radical left in Germany. I argued this case 
was a classic example of the radical left, via its status as an established political party like 
those appearing in existing research on radical left support. Under the policy-proximity 
account, the expectation was for a monotonic relationship between proximity and radical left 
support. I find results which broadly conform with this account, through a monotonic pattern 
of Die Linke evaluations which I most consistently observed from voters on the economic 
policy dimension. From this, I concluded policy-proximity to explain support for the German 
radical left. I also concluded this based primarily on economic policy-proximity, with cultural 
and migration policy also having more limited links with radical left support. From populism 
groups, I did not find results which conform with the expectation that radical left support 
would come from more populist voters. Overall, therefore, I find support for the policy-
proximity account in Germany, with little evidence supporting the populism-based account.  
The established nature of Die Linke led me to consider two other case studies, where I could 
more thoroughly separate the radical left actor’s potential persuasion effects from the policy 
244 
 
preferences and populism of voters. The first of these two case studies focused on support for 
the radical left in the US, in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 5 I analysed support for the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign, versus for his 
opponent – the more moderate centre left candidacy of Hillary Clinton – in the Democratic 
Party’s presidential primaries. I did not find higher probability of voting for Sanders from the 
populist respondents, meaning again the populism-based account receives little support. 
Meanwhile, what I find from policy groups generally does not conform with the policy-
proximity account. Policy-proximity does not explain the curvilinear pattern of radical left 
support, with higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton from spatially-distant 
voters on the economic and migration dimensions. Nor does this account explain the greater 
support for Sanders over Clinton, and vice versa, from voters on the cultural and migration 
dimensions, given both candidates offer similarly liberal and inclusive policies on these two 
dimensions. I do find support for the policy-proximity account from the economically 
‘Radical-Left’ policy group, who have significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders 
over Clinton, relative to the baseline. However, findings in this case study generally challenge 
the policy-proximity account.  
In the US case, I dealt with one specific potential persuasion effect – partisan attachments – 
via the intra-party context of the Sanders campaign. However, it is still conceivable that some 
voters formed attachments to Sanders himself in 2016 with these potentially causing 
persuasion of voters’ policy preferences and populism. This brought me to Chapter 6, where 
I could make further progress in mitigating persuasion effects through the UK case study.  
In the UK case study of Chapter 6 I examined changes in support for the Labour Party between 
2015 and 2017, as this party shifted to the radical left under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. In 
this chapter I continued to consider and rigorously deal with potential persuasion effects, this 
time through use of panel data instead of the cross-sectional analysis undertaken in the 
German and US cases. That panel data design in the UK case study allowed me to draw 
measures of voter policy preferences from data waves before Corbyn became Labour leader. 
Thus, I separated over time the policy preferences of respondents from persuasion by the 
radical left Labour Party. Unfortunately, however, I could not do the same with measures of 
populism, owing to those questions only appearing in post-Corbyn data. Nevertheless, the 
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panel data design, and its role addressing persuasion effects, is an important feature of the 
UK case study.  
In the UK case, I observed some results which conform with expectations of the policy-
proximity account and some results which do not. Challenging the policy-proximity account, 
I find a general increase in Labour evaluations between 2015 and 2017 from voters across each 
of the three policy dimensions, despite Labour’s policy position shifting away from many of 
these voters over that period. The relative magnitude of voters’ evaluation changes shows the 
largest increases in these came from the spatially-proximal voters on all three policy 
dimensions. This provides some support to the policy-proximity account, however that 
account still does not explain why spatially-distant voters had increased evaluations for 
Labour over the 2015-2017 period. Overall, some UK case results adhered with the policy-
proximity account, but unexpected findings limit that account’s explanation of radical left 
support. Looking at the populism groups, once again I did not observe support for the radical 
left from populist voters. Therefore, from the UK case study too results did not conform with 
expectations of the populism-based account.  
Putting together these case studies and their empirical findings, what can I say about the 
factors that determine electoral support for radical left actors?  
First, I can say that high levels of populism do not seem to be associated with greater support 
for the radical left. This was a common conclusion across all three case studies, despite the 
diversity between them. I raised this case diversity issue in relation specifically to populism 
in my theory chapter, saying how the governing legacies of the US and UK radical left 
potentially disrupts how far I can observe populism-based support. It was there that I 
acknowledged the need to consider the impact of the US and UK cases’ institutional legacies. 
As I consistently found little evidence supporting the populism-based account, across cases 
where the radical left actor was part of a mainstream political party (US and UK cases) and 
where the actor was a non-mainstream party (Germany), it does not seem that institutional 
legacies have had an effect on my observations.  
Although existing literature and the potentially populist nature of radical left rhetoric 
provided motivation for my testing this theory, I did not find evidence associating high levels 
of voter populism with support for the radical left. That being said, future research may revisit 
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populism-based radical left support in the US, if more data becomes available as my 
conclusion here was limited by a small sample.  
Second, mixed conclusions over policy-proximity indicate this account offers a limited 
explanation of radical left support. In all three case studies I find voters in proximity with the 
radical left on the economic dimension to be more supportive of these political actors, 
compared to economically centrist voters. Furthermore, in the German and UK cases I find 
radical left support falling as policy-proximity reduced towards the right-wing economic 
voters. I also find policy-proximity on the cultural policy and migration policy dimensions to 
explain radical left support, albeit less consistently. Countering this are unexpected findings, 
such as the increased radical left support from spatially-distant voters in the US and UK cases. 
Another unexpected finding occurred when voter positions on cultural and migration policy 
dimensions were associated with higher probability of supporting Sanders versus Clinton, or 
vice versa, despite both candidates’ proximity with each other. These are two of the areas 
where results did not follow expectations, which in turn limits the extent this account explains 
radical left support.  
Overall, I do not find consistent evidence in support of the populism-based account, and I find 
only limited explanation of radical left support based on policy-proximity. In relation to the 
contribution of my thesis, I have reached these findings having tested both the impacts of 
populism and proximity on three policy dimensions simultaneously. Thus, I have identified 
how both accounts are related with radical left support while also controlling for any potential 
confounding between them. My thesis has also included more rigourous efforts to deal with 
persuasion effects. The purpose of this was to observe the roles of policy-proximity and 
populism more accurately, with each of these variables separated from potential persuasion 
by the radical left actor. Finally, my thesis has also tested both these accounts in three case 
studies – a range of cases which varied by multiparty versus limited party context, and by the 
more established German radical left versus the emerging US and UK radical left – building 






I have concluded that levels of voter populism do not explain radical left support. Alongside 
this I have concluded radical left support is explained, albeit to a limited extent, by proximity 
with voters’ positions on three policy dimensions: in particular, the economic policy 
dimension. But why are my findings important? I said in the introduction how the radical left 
has risen to sometimes surprising prominence and gained significant electoral support. With 
the radical left on the rise, it is important to explain and understand where this support has 
come from. I provided an account of this here, finding this support to be partly associated 
with proximity with voters in policy spaces. A simplistic explanation of the radical left’s 
success might be to suggest voters are further to the left than previously imagined, and this is 
how these political actors received such substantial support. However, what I find instead is 
that policy-proximity does not completely explain support for the radical left. The increases 
in radical left support I find from spatially-distant voters in the US and UK cases potentially 
explains strong electoral performances from these actors, but crucially does not reflect policy-
proximity effects on the three dimensions I considered.  
Looking now more case-specifically, I find the most consistent results relative to policy-
proximity expectations in the German case study. Why was it the German case study where 
results most closely conformed with policy-proximity expectations? I suspect this is down to 
persuasion effects, which I could not as thoroughly account for in the German case compared 
to the other two case studies. The result of not being able to control for these persuasion effects 
as thoroughly may be those results not being purely the result of proximity in policy spaces, 
but rather pre-existing support or attachment with Die Linke. Persuasion effects aside, I still 
find evidence supporting the policy-proximity account of radical left support in Germany.  
If German results most closely conformed with expectations of the policy-proximity account, 
the US case study was the opposite. Although results followed expectations from the 
economically left-wing voters, what I also find is a curvilinear pattern of radical left support, 
with groups at opposing end of the dimensions more supportive of the radical left relative to 
the ‘Centrists’. I also find voters on the cultural policy and migration policy dimensions 
supporting Sanders over Clinton or vice versa, despite proximity between these two 
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candidates suggesting voters would not treat one of these candidates differently from the 
other. This raises the question of what explains the unexpected results of the US case study?  
Perceptions of voters may explain some of these unexpected results. For example, voters may 
have perceived Sanders to be more culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive than Clinton, 
despite their campaign platforms not supporting this. If this was the case, then culturally-
liberal and migrant-inclusive voters would have been more likely to support Sanders than 
Clinton, relative to ‘Centrists’ on these dimensions. Voters’ perceptions may explain some of 
these unexpected results, however this was not something I was able to explore further 
without survey data asking respondents to place these two candidates on policy dimensions.  
Another possible factor is the use of vote choice questions to measure radical left support, as 
opposed to evaluation questions used in both the UK and German cases. Therefore, 
background factors, such as candidate competitiveness, were potentially embroiled with 
responses to the dependent variable, whereas I mitigated these with evaluation questions in 
both other cases. The difference in dependent variables, between the US and German/UK 
cases, does substantially alter the interpretation of US case study results. With this case, my 
interpretation had to shift from looking at appraisals, to looking at actual votes within a 
context of an election and voting rules. As a result, the dependent variable difference would 
credibly explain some variation with this case’s results. More specifically, it is plausible that 
economically right-wing, culturally-conservative, and migrant-exclusive respondents, when 
having to cast a single vote in an actual election, behaved differently from respondents in 
other case studies. As a result, it is important to remember the US case study is one of vote 
choices, rather than one of radical left evaluations.  
A further possibility, which may explain this pattern of US case study radical left support, 
may be a protest effect where, for example, economically right-wing respondents were 
supportive of Sanders out of protest at the converged ‘neoliberal’ policies of more mainstream 
candidates, such as Hillary Clinton. This possibility would explain why I found higher 
probability of supporting Sanders, over Clinton, from economically right-wing voters. Finally, 
it may be that these dimensions were not salient enough to voters, with Sanders and Clinton 
not providing adequate cues as to their positions here, potentially leading voters to support 
the spatially-distant Sanders. 
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In the final empirical chapter in this thesis – the UK case study – what could have caused the 
consistent observation of a general increase in Labour evaluations? One possibility is a 
regression to the mean effect, where in this case evaluations of Labour may have been 
particularly low in the pre-Corbyn wave and rose to return closer to the mean level of 
evaluations by the 2017 post-Corbyn wave. Regression to the mean is one possibility, and 
would mean Labour evaluations increase from voters across the policy dimensions. Another 
possibility is valence-type effects, where voters potentially saw Corbyn as more honest or 
trustworthy compared to the pre-Corbyn leadership, leading to higher evaluations for Labour 
as a result. I examined this further with the Labour leader evaluations dependent variable, 
and find the same pattern of support in this alternate analysis. This suggests positive 
perceptions of Corbyn may have driven the general increases in Labour evaluations, despite 
spatial-distance between many of these voters and the Corbyn-led Labour Party. I examined 
those leader perceptions merely as a potential explanation for results which did not follow the 
policy-proximity account. These ‘maverick’ or honesty perceptions of Labour’s leadership are 
not part of the policy-proximity account, and instead constitute valence-type effects. 
Consequently, possible valence effects do not provide support for the policy-proximity 
account, and potentially need further examination as a potential explanatory factor of radical 
left support.  
Looking more broadly now, what do these results say about the explanatory power of the 
policy-proximity account? I find limited evidence, across three case studies, that policy-
proximity explains support for the radical left. In particular, economic policy-proximity is 
associated with support for the radical left – a conclusion which is also in line with previous 
research Bowyer & Vail (2011), Doerschler & Banaszak (2007), and Akkerman, et al. (2017). I 
also find cultural and migration policy-proximity to explain radical left support, albeit less 
consistently. The pattern of results across these three cases also suggests that once persuasion 
effects are dealt with more thoroughly, in the US and UK cases, support for the policy-
proximity account becomes less apparent. In both those cases, I better isolated the effects of 
policy-proximity on radical left support. From this, future research needs to reappraise the 
traditional Downsian conception of proximity, and better control persuasion effects to more 
accurately understand the effects of policy-proximity on electoral support.  
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Moving now to discuss implications of the populism-based account’s results, my overall 
conclusion here was more simple: high levels of populism are not associated with radical left 
support. This conclusion was consistent across all three case studies, which leads me to 
conclude that populism does not explain support for the radical left. Thus, I do not find strong 
evidence to suggest the radical left has benefitted from a populist backlash against 
mainstream political parties; however, that does not mean this account is totally rejected.  
Given the relevance of populism as an explanatory factor of electoral support in previous 
research (Akkerman, et al. 2014; 2017; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018; Stanley, 2018; 
Mazzoleni & Ivaldi, 2020), I do not reject this account entirely. However, the fact I find little 
evidence in support of its explanation of radical left, across all three case studies, leaves me to 
consider some possible factors which may explain why I did not find populism to explain 
radical left support strongly or consistently.  
Firstly, although there is evidence supporting populism-based electoral support in previous 
research, that is not necessarily a ubiquitous finding. For example, previous research of 
electoral support in Slovakia found the role of populism on electoral support to be much 
smaller than expected (Stanley, 2011). Therefore, although my findings here conflict with a 
great deal of existing literature, I am not the first to have identified limits to the extent 
populism explains electoral support. Secondly, it may be that levels of populism are 
associated with support for the radical left, but only when there is more overt populist rhetoric 
emanating from these political actors. Future research may investigate this possibility, 
applying the populism-based account to other contexts where perhaps voters more widely 
see the radical left as making populist appeals. Thirdly, it may be that populism is associated 
more with radical right actors, and not the radical left. Thus, populist voters are drawn to 
support the radical right instead, and not to support the actors in my research.  
I would also want to respond to two potential methodological points raised to explain my 
populism-based findings. Firstly, the survey questions I used to measure levels of populism 
may have had some role here, by inaccurately measuring respondent adherence with 
populism. However, I would dispute these measures being responsible here, as these 
questions have also featured in previous voter-level applications of populism to explain 
political behaviour. Secondly, it may be the fact I have looked at the effect of populism via 
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respondent groups which explains me finding less support for this account than previous 
research. That previous research examined the effect of populism as a scalar variable, instead 
of with respondent groups, and this difference may potentially explain variance in findings 
here. However, when testing this account with scalar variables I still did not consistently find 
support for populism across all of my case studies. Furthermore, I compared the magnitude 
of effects in the scalar versus the group-based models, and did not find a major difference in 
magnitude between both models.  
Finally, I want to address the common context across the three case studies in my thesis. I 
mentioned in my research design chapter how I analyse radical left support in the 2015-2017 
period – a period defined by backlash against ‘neoliberal’ economic policies, including 
deregulation, austerity, and lower taxes. I suggested there how the radical left’s economic 
policies, especially in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 ‘Great Recession’, potentially draw 
support to radical left actors, or perhaps simply increase the salience of this issue amongst 
voters. Ultimately, I more consistently found economic policy-proximity to explain radical left 
support, compared to less consistent findings from the two non-economic dimensions.  
My consistent observation of economic policy-proximity support for the radical left, across all 
three cases, reinforces the idea that the radical left has benefitted from its stridently 
redistributive and anti-austerity policies in this 2015-2017 environment. Looking to the future, 
and responses to the Covid-19 economic downturn, the radical left’s strength may continue 
in response to imposed or maintained fiscal austerity. Alternately, state intervention in the 
economy may alleviate desires for this shift in policy, which may indicate a shrinking of the 
pool of potential radical left support.  
7.2: Limitations 
There have been points throughout my analysis where I have noted challenges and 
limitations. I want to emphasise these in relation to the case studies and their research designs, 
as well as touching briefly on the limitations of the theories.  
The policy-proximity account assumes voters know their own position in policy spaces, and 
where competing political actors are located. This issue potentially has ramifications where 
these perceptions cause voters to incorrectly imagine themselves closer to or further from 
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where the radical left is located. These voters then give greater support to the radical left 
without close proximity, or lower support despite being close to the radical left’s location. I 
would have consistently taken these perceptions into account, along the lines of the ‘proximity 
groups’ in the German case study; however, available data in the US and UK did not allow 
for this. The perceptions issue is potentially very important here, as I suggested it as a factor 
which may account for some of the unexpected US case study results. I also acknowledge the 
wider criticisms of the Downsian spatial model from Stokes (1963); however, I was not trying 
to argue that spatial explanations like my policy-proximity account are perfect or explain all 
support for the radical left.  
The populism-based account, meanwhile, perhaps labours under the view that populism is a 
right-wing phenomenon. I mentioned this possibility briefly earlier, when listing potential 
reasons for not finding strong support for the populism-based account. Voters may simply 
identify only right-wing political actors as populist, and not associate populism with left-wing 
political actors at all. This potentially results in populist voters being attracted to right-wing 
political actors as populists rather than political actors on the left. The fact that all three case 
studies in my thesis also feature right-wing populist political actors – AfD, Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign, and UKIP – would support this, with these right-wing political actors 
drawing support from populist voters, instead of these voters following expectations. This is 
a possibility; however, it did not stop populism being associated with radical left support in 
the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014; 2017), where there is also a right-wing populist 
political party. Nevertheless, the impacts of the radical left’s coexistence with radical right 
political actors is something which may have impacted on results here. Future research could 
potentially mitigate this, by examining support for a radical left political actor in a country 
where there is no major radical right competitor.  
Looking to limitations in the three case studies, in the German case I find strongest support 
for the policy-proximity account. However, I speculated earlier how persuasion effects, which 
I had less control over here, are potentially behind the relative strength of the policy-proximity 
account here, compared to in the other two case studies. The limitation here is that I was not 
able to thoroughly account for these persuasion effects, because of the established nature of 
Die Linke. This can also be viewed as an advantage, however, as the resulting comparison 
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between cases where I could mitigate persuasion effects, and the German case where I could 
not, provides an impression of how these effects impact on radical left support.  
A further limitation of the German case, in relation to available data, is the limited range of 
cultural policy questions. The GLES included only two measures of cultural policy – one 
relating to women in the workplace, and the other to same-sex marriage. I would have liked 
more questions relating to this policy dimension, in particular relating to law-and-order issues 
where opinion is more divided than the issue of same-sex marriage, where opinion is now 
overwhelmingly liberal in the GLES. Scales of cultural policy self-placement and Die Linke 
placement, like those of economics and migration, would also have been a welcome feature 
here, from which I could have formed ‘proximity groups’ on all three dimensions. These 
issues aside, I was still able to provide an account of radical left support in Germany from the 
available data.  
The first limitation of the US case study was the lack of evaluation questions for Sanders in 
the CCES and ANES, which meant I relied instead on vote choice questions to gauge voters’ 
support for the radical left. I mentioned these vote choice questions earlier and their 
disadvantage where background factors, such as candidate competitiveness, may also be 
present in responses to these questions. In the German and UK cases, I used evaluation 
questions instead, which are less susceptible to these background factors; however, this was 
not possible given the US survey data. The first limitation of this case, therefore, is that I could 
not use evaluation questions to measure radical left support in the US case study. I would 
have preferred to use these questions here too, both to mitigate these background factors and 
to be consistent across all three cases. A second limitation was the need to use two different 
surveys, with a lack of populism questions in the CCES but less data available in the ANES. 
The use of two surveys meant I was not able to include variables relating to both the policy-
proximity and populism-based accounts in multiple regression at the end of my analysis. In 
both other case studies this was possible and left me an impression of the impacts of both 
theories with control on possible confounding between the two. Thirdly, the available data in 
the US also limited how far I could draw conclusions from the populism-based variables, 
given how few responses the ANES has relative to other surveys used in this thesis. Overall, 
my inclusion of the US case study was ambitious, given the differences of this case study from 
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its European counterparts. Although there have been issues with this, I was able to produce 
an account of radical left support here. Furthermore, results here conformed with my 
conclusions on populism, and partially conformed with the policy-proximity account on the 
economic policy dimension.  
The UK case study faced fewer limitations from the voter-level data. The panel data design 
here relied on retention of questions relating to policy preferences, populist attitudes, and the 
dependent variable across different waves of data. This was possible in the desired ‘pre-
Corbyn’ and ‘post-Corbyn’ way with the policy-proximity variables, which was important to 
my accounting for persuasion effects. Unfortunately, the available data in the UK did not 
allow for this to take place with the populism variables. This was a downside of the UK case 
study, but without populism questions in pre-Corbyn BES waves I could not address this.  
These three case studies enable me to draw conclusions about policy-proximity and populism-
based radical left support in three distinct contexts. This included a classic example of the 
radical left in Germany, a radical left candidacy in an intra-party election in the US, and a 
shifting radical left political party in the UK. Crucially, I have drawn a set of common 
conclusions from all three of these cases, which have pointed to proximity in policy spaces 
(particularly economics) offering a limited explanation of radical left support, and suggested 
that populism does not explain support for these actors. However, this does not mean my 
conclusions here apply across all radical left political actors, although these three case studies 
are an improvement in that regard compared to previous research which included more 
limited ranges of case studies.  
7.3: Future Research 
One of the important contributions of my thesis was dealing with persuasion effects. This may 
have had a significant impact here, as it was in the cases where I could more thoroughly 
separate persuasion effects that conclusions relating to the policy-proximity account were 
more mixed. Future research into policy-proximity and radical left support should similarly 
account for these persuasion effects, if they want to isolate the effects of policy-proximity and 
more accurately understand how this relates to radical left support. Panel data is particularly 
helpful here, given its ability to separate voters’ policy preferences from the possible 
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persuasion of an extant radical left actor. However, I admit this is difficult when examining 
support for established radical left parties like Die Linke.  
On that subject, another point I made in this thesis was that research should not merely 
consider support for established radical left political parties, like Die Linke. Future research 
should acknowledge that the radical left, and radicals in general, have not merely occurred in 
such established forms. I showed this in my thesis through focus on a radical left candidacy 
in the US, and on an established but leftward shifting party in the UK. Future research may 
follow here, with further examination of radicals in their wider forms.  
In relation to both accounts of radical left support explored here, future research may re-
examine the roles of policy-proximity and populism on support for the radical left. Future 
policy-proximity accounts may also look beyond the three dimensions in my thesis. Those 
three dimensions have long been prominent areas of political discussion, but in the future 
other areas may also be relevant. For example, environmental policy and membership of 
supranational unions may be policy areas where proximity with voters explains their electoral 
support.  
Future applications of the populism-based account may also occur. This may take place along 
the lines I alluded to earlier, with focus on support for the radical left in a country without a 
radical right competitor potentially drawing off this support. This account may also be 
pursued in explanation of support for the radical left where these political actors have used 
more overtly populist rhetoric, as I suggested it may be in this instance that populism-based 
electoral support is found.  
Finally, in relation to radical left support, I only considered two accounts here. Future research 
may revisit these, in particular applying them to explain support for the radical left in different 
and new case studies as I have done. Future research may also examine other possible 
explanations radical left support in these case studies, with the policy-proximity and 
populism-based accounts being far from the only potential explanations. For example, future 
research may follow up on the suggestions of Stokes (1963), including integration of valence 
issues to examine how far voter perceptions of competence or trust for the radical left 
impacted on their electoral support. I investigated this briefly in the UK case, as a potential 
explanation for unexpected results, but future research may carry out more dedicated testing 
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of these valence-type effects on radical left support. There may also be future research into 
support for Bernie Sanders in the US, perhaps with a comparison between support for Sanders 
in 2016 and for his later presidential campaign amongst a wider field of candidates in 2020.  
Although I have demonstrated how far voter-actor policy-proximity and populist attitudes 
are related to radical left support, there are further avenues when seeking to answer the 
question of support for these political actors. As the radical left remains prominent in many 
countries, including the cases I have examined in this thesis, it also remains important to 
continue to explain how the radical left gains their substantial electoral support. I would go 
as far as to argue that continued research in this area is as important as the already plentiful 
attention given to the radical right.  
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Appendix 1.0: Germany 
 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) Questions: 
LRECON = position of the party in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties 
can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left 
want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right 
emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less 
regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state: 
0= Extreme left 
5= Center 
10= Extreme right 
GALTAN = position of the party in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. 
“Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, 
access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. 
287 
 
“Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, 
and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social 
and cultural issues: 
0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist 
5 = Center 
10 = Traditional/Authoritarian 
IMMIGRATE_POLICY = position on immigration policy: 
0= Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration. 




CHES Positions of Each Party on Economic, Social, and Migration Policy Dimensions: 
GLES Questions: 
 Dependent Variable:  
‘vn20’ - Scalometer, political parties: 
‘What do you think of the different parties in general? Please tell me using this scale. 
-5 means that you do not think much of the party at all, +5 means that you think a 
great deal of the party. Use the values in between to express your opinion more 
precisely. What do you think of the …?’ 
d) Die Linke 








 Die Linke CDU CSU SPD Grünen FDP AfD 
Econ 1.06 6.06 6.13 3.44 3.25 8.25 7.53 
Social 4.13 5.80 7.47 3.67 1.40 3.80 9.47 





(1) -5 I do not think much of the party at all 
 Economic Questions: (pre-election) 
 ‘vn59’ – Own position, socio-economic dimension: 
  ‘And what position do you take on taxes and social services? Please use this scale. 










(11) 11 More social services, although this results in raising taxes.’ 
 
‘v32c’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘The state should stay out of the economy.’ 
 
(all ‘Issue Battery’ questions use the following scale): 
‘(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Neither agree nor disagree 
(4) Disagree 
(5) Strongly disagree’ 
 
‘v32d’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘The government should take measures to reduce the differences in income levels.’ 
 
Economic Questions: (post-election) 
 
‘vn59’ – Own position, socio-economic dimension: 
  ‘And what position do you take on taxes and social services? Please use this scale. 














‘n32c’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘The state should stay out of the economy.’ 
‘n32d’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘The government should take measures to reduce the differences in income levels.’ 
Cultural policy questions: (pre-election) 
 
‘v32b’ – Issue Battery: 
‘There should be a statutory quota of women for the supervisory boards of large 
companies.’ 
 
‘v32j’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.’ 
 
Cultural policy questions: (post-election) 
 
‘v32b’ – Issue Battery: 
‘There should be a statutory quota of women for the supervisory boards of large 
companies.’ 
 
‘v32l’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.’ 
 
Migration policy questions: (pre-election) 
 
‘vn60’ – Own position, libertarian/authoritarian dimension: 
  
 ‘And what position do you take on immigration for foreigners? Please use the scale. 
 










(11) 11 Immigration for foreigners should be more difficult.’ 
 
‘v32a’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘Immigrants should be obliged to assimilate into the German culture.’ 
 
‘v32i’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘Germany needs an annual upper limit (“Obergrenze”) for refugees.’ 
 




‘vn60’ – Own position, libertarian/authoritarian dimension: 
  
 ‘And what position do you take on immigration for foreigners? Please use the scale. 
 
 










(11) 11 Immigration for foreigners should be more difficult.’ 
 
‘n32a’ – Issue Battery: 
 ‘Immigrants should be obliged to assimilate into the German culture.’ 
 
 
‘n32k’ – Issue Battery: 




‘vn66a’ – Populism battery: 
 ‘What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.’ 
 
‘vn66b’ – Populism battery: 
 ‘The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.’ 
 
 
‘vn66c’ – Populism battery: 
 ‘The politicians in the German Bundestag need to follow the will of the people.’ 
 
‘vn66d’ – Populism battery: 
‘Differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the 
people.’ 
 
‘vn66e’ – Populism battery: 
 ‘I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.’ 
 
‘vn66f’ – Populism battery: 








Now, several political issues. Some people prefer lower taxes, although this results in less 
social services. Others prefer more social services, although this results in raising taxes. What 
do you think are the positions of the political parties on this issue? Please use the scale from 1 
to 11. What do you think is the political point of view of the ... 
 
 (D) DIE LINKE 
 










(11) 11 More social services, although this results in raising taxes 
 
  
‘vn57a-g’ – Party positions, libertarian-authoritarian dimension 
  
And what about immigration? Should it be easier or more difficult for foreigners to 
immigrate? What do you think are the positions of the political parties on this issue? Please 
use the scale from 1 to 11. What do you think is the political point of view of the ... 
 
(D) DIE LINKE 
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 Appendix 1.2: Left/Right (unfolded) Economic Proximity Groups: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
 
Furthest (Left) -1.575*** -0.725** 
 (0.314) (0.319) 
4 (Left) -1.103*** -0.570** 
 (0.237) (0.247) 
Moderately-Distant (Left) -0.996*** -0.411* 
 (0.238) (0.241) 
2 (Left) -0.518** -0.183 
 (0.213) (0.225) 
Closest (Left) -0.106 0.041 
 (0.212) (0.222) 
Absolute-Closest (baseline) (baseline) 
Closest (Right) 0.048 0.221 
 (0.194) (0.200) 
2 (Right) -0.617*** -0.324 
 (0.191) (0.201) 
Moderately-Distant (Right) -1.356*** -0.707*** 
 (0.206) (0.213) 
4 (Right) -1.735*** -0.858*** 
 (0.182) (0.190) 
Furthest (Right) -2.493*** -1.395*** 
 (0.198) (0.205) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.546*** 
  (0.232) 
CDU_PartyID  0.254 
  (0.192) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.577* 
  (0.331) 
SPD_PartyID  1.682*** 
  (0.193) 
FDP_PartyID  0.224 
  (0.267) 
Greens_PartyID  1.963*** 
  (0.227) 
Afd_PartyID  0.074 
  (0.279) 
Other_PartyID  -0.025 
  (0.463) 
No_PartyID  1.386*** 
  (0.192) 
Gender  0.235** 
(1 = Female)  (0.097) 
Religion  0.054*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.011) 
Education  0.120** 
  (0.047) 
Social_Class  -0.151*** 
  (0.057) 
EastWest  0.069 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.099) 
Constant 6.733*** 4.650*** 
 (0.134) (0.298) 
Observations 3,260 2,478 
R2 0.086 0.310 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.303 
Residual Std. Error 2.682 (df = 3249) 2.372 (df = 2453) 
F Statistic 30.560*** (df = 10; 3249) 45.954*** (df = 24; 2453) 





Appendix 1.3: Economic Proximity and Die Linke Evaluations – Scalar Variable: 
Effect of Economic Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Econ_Proximity -0.664*** -1.086*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.609***  
 (0.169)  
CDU_PartyID 0.348**  
 (0.141)  
CSU_PartyID -0.538**  
 (0.247)  
SPD_PartyID 1.717***  
 (0.142)  
FDP_PartyID 0.401**  
 (0.197)  
Greens_PartyID 1.992***  
 (0.167)  
Afd_PartyID 0.060  
 (0.202)  
Other_PartyID 0.087  
 (0.341)  
No_PartyID 1.431***  
 (0.142)  
Gender 0.233***  
(1 = Female) (0.072)  
Religion 0.478***  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.074)  
Education 0.096***  
 (0.034)  
Social_Class -0.139***  
 (0.042)  
EastWest 0.095  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.073)  
Constant 4.852*** 6.786*** 
 (0.204) (0.067) 
Observations 4,586 4,586 
R2 0.310 0.083 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.083 
Residual Std. Error 2.387 (df = 4570) 2.747 (df = 4584) 
F Statistic 136.803*** (df = 15; 4570) 415.131*** (df = 1; 4584) 




 Appendix 1.4: Pre-election and Post-Election Results – Economic Policy Groups: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Rad Left (Pre) 1.183  0.596  
 (0.865)  (0.870)  
Centre Left (Pre) 0.066  -0.134  
 (0.842)  (0.839)  
Centrist (baseline)  (baseline)  
Centre Right (Pre) -1.335  -1.177  
 (0.915)  (0.909)  
Rad Right (Pre) -1.333*  -1.122  
 (0.794)  (0.798)  
Rad Left (Post)  1.454**  0.795 
  (0.728)  (0.723) 
Centre Left (Post)  -0.197  -0.579 
  (0.712)  (0.704) 
Centrist  (baseline)  (baseline) 
Centre Right (Post)  -0.763  -0.397 
  (0.736)  (0.730) 
Rad Right (Post)  -1.318**  -0.999 
  (0.670)  (0.675) 
DieLinke_PartyID   5.157*** 3.622*** 
   (1.303) (1.146) 
CDU_PartyID   -0.311 -1.814* 
   (1.022) (0.969) 
CSU_PartyID   0.258 -0.295 
   (1.580) (1.639) 
SPD_PartyID   1.463 1.133 
   (1.029) (0.972) 
FDP_PartyID   0.959 -0.489 
   (1.483) (1.311) 
Greens_PartyID   2.226* 1.516 
   (1.293) (1.110) 
Afd_PartyID   -0.160 -0.502 
   (1.617) (1.347) 
Other_PartyID   0.761 0.609 
   (2.422) (2.516) 
No_PartyID   -0.652 0.299 
   (1.006) (0.954) 
Gender   -0.361 -0.983** 
(1 = Female)   (0.543) (0.452) 
Religion   0.053 0.071 
(1 = Non-Religious)   (0.064) (0.052) 
Education   0.169 0.466** 
   (0.262) (0.222) 
Social_Class   0.365 0.015 
   (0.309) (0.275) 
EastWest   0.296 0.788* 
(1 = Born GDR)   (0.560) (0.458) 
Constant 4.652*** 5.229*** 1.984 3.063** 
 (0.586) (0.491) (1.498) (1.405) 
 
Observations 1,506 1,460 1,506 1,460 
R2 0.008 0.011 0.035 0.053 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.009 0.023 0.041 
Residual Std. Error 10.512 (df = 1501) 8.653 (df = 1455) 10.418 (df = 1487) 8.510 (df = 1441) 
F Statistic 2.987** (df = 4; 1501) 4.168*** (df = 4; 1455) 2.968*** (df = 18; 1487) 4.472*** (df = 18; 1441) 
 





Appendix 1.5: Economic Proximity and Die Linke Evaluations – Scalar Variable: 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Economic Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Cumulative_Econ_Scale 0.250*** 0.434*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.594***  
 (0.221)  
CDU_PartyID 0.116  
 (0.180)  
CSU_PartyID -0.441  
 (0.289)  
SPD_PartyID 1.575***  
 (0.180)  
FDP_PartyID 0.252  
 (0.253)  
Greens_PartyID 1.900***  
 (0.216)  
Afd_PartyID 0.023  
 (0.267)  
Other_PartyID 0.413  
 (0.443)  
No_PartyID 1.284***  
 (0.177)  
Gender 0.197**  
(1 = Female) (0.090)  
Religion 0.432***  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.095)  
Education 0.132***  
 (0.044)  
Social_Class -0.125**  
 (0.053)  
EastWest 0.119  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.093)  
Constant 2.210*** 2.495*** 
 (0.322) (0.192) 
Observations 2,941 3,916 
R2 0.284 0.068 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.067 
Residual Std. Error 2.430 (df = 2925) 2.720 (df = 3914) 
F Statistic 77.423*** (df = 15; 2925) 283.393*** (df = 1; 3914) 




 Appendix 1.6: Pre-election and Post-election Results – Cultural Policy Groups: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rad Lib (Pre) -0.563  -0.895  
 (0.759)  (0.757)  
Mod Lib (Pre) -0.554  -0.581  
 (0.870)  (0.861)  
Centrist (baseline)  (baseline)  
Mod Con (Pre) -0.563  -0.401  
 (0.885)  (0.879)  
Rad Con (Pre) -1.124  -0.644  
 (0.839)  (0.848)  
Rad Lib (Post)  0.821  0.618 
  (0.722)  (0.715) 
Mod Lib (Post)  1.004  1.087 
  (0.813)  (0.798) 
Centrist  (baseline)  (baseline) 
Mod Con (Post)  -0.193  -0.010 
  (0.811)  (0.795) 
Rad Con (Post)  -0.271  0.261 
  (0.791)  (0.788) 
DieLinke_PartyID   5.551*** 5.992*** 
   (1.175) (1.193) 
CDU_PartyID   -0.179 -1.060 
   (0.932) (1.005) 
CSU_PartyID   0.483 0.958 
   (1.442) (1.765) 
SPD_PartyID   2.464*** 2.366** 
   (0.940) (1.013) 
FDP_PartyID   0.810 0.338 
   (1.342) (1.355) 
Greens_PartyID   2.725** 2.809** 
   (1.166) (1.159) 
Afd_PartyID   -0.264 1.060 
   (1.480) (1.425) 
Other_PartyID   1.223 2.017 
   (2.254) (2.568) 
No_PartyID   -0.228 1.416 
   (0.917) (0.991) 
Gender   -0.384 -1.190** 
(1 = Female)   (0.502) (0.482) 
Religion   0.039 -0.011 
(1 = Non-Religious)   (0.059) (0.055) 
Education   0.151 0.471** 
   (0.236) (0.234) 
Social_Class   0.083 0.331 
   (0.278) (0.289) 
EastWest   0.560 1.125** 
(1 = Born GDR)   (0.508) (0.484) 
Constant 5.131*** 4.547*** 3.035** 0.251 
 (0.625) (0.568) (1.422) (1.507) 
Observations 1,522 1,482 1,522 1,482 
R2 0.001 0.003 0.037 0.060 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.001 0.026 0.048 
Residual Std. Error 9.625 (df = 1517) 9.240 (df = 1477) 9.493 (df = 1503) 9.018 (df = 1463) 
F Statistic 0.453 (df = 4; 1517) 1.224 (df = 4; 1477) 3.239*** (df = 18; 1503) 5.149*** (df = 18; 1463) 





Appendix 1.7: Cultural Policy and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variable: 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Cultural Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Cumulative_Social_Scale -0.126*** -0.244*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.763***  
 (0.220)  
CDU_PartyID 0.187  
 (0.180)  
CSU_PartyID -0.193  
 (0.294)  
SPD_PartyID 1.628***  
 (0.181)  
FDP_PartyID 0.047  
 (0.251)  
Greens_PartyID 1.935***  
 (0.216)  
Afd_PartyID 0.140  
 (0.270)  
Other_PartyID 0.685  
 (0.446)  
No_PartyID 1.337***  
 (0.178)  
Gender 0.114  
(1 = Female) (0.092)  
Religion 0.357***  
(1 = Non-Religious_ (0.096)  
Education 0.137***  
 (0.044)  
Social_Class -0.161***  
 (0.053)  
EastWest 0.166*  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.093)  
Constant 4.691*** 6.759*** 
 (0.270) (0.089) 
Observations 2,980 3,994 
R2 0.271 0.048 
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.048 
Residual Std. Error 2.451 (df = 2964) 2.750 (df = 3992) 
F Statistic 73.571*** (df = 15; 2964) 202.853*** (df = 1; 3992) 




 Appendix 1.8: Inclusive/Exclusive (unfolded) Migration Proximity Groups: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Furthest (Inclusive) -2.296*** -1.564*** 
 (0.426) (0.443) 
4 (Inclusive) -1.613*** -1.352*** 
 (0.324) (0.334) 
Moderately-Distant (Inclusive) -0.674** -1.087*** 
 (0.303) (0.319) 
2 (Inclusive) -0.607** -0.778*** 
 (0.244) (0.244) 
Closest (Inclusive) -0.101 -0.201 
 (0.225) (0.237) 
Absolute-Closest (baseline) (baseline) 
Closest (Exclusive) -0.241 -0.306 
 (0.199) (0.205) 
2 (Exclusive) -0.070 -0.169 
 (0.198) (0.200) 
Moderately-Distant (Exclusive) -0.505** -0.514** 
 (0.201) (0.202) 
4 (Exclusive) -0.804*** -0.672*** 
 (0.182) (0.184) 
Furthest (Exclusive) -1.750*** -1.509*** 
 (0.177) (0.183) 
DieLinke_PartyID  4.798*** 
  (0.225) 
CDU_PartyID  0.326* 
  (0.190) 
CSU_PartyID  -0.338 
  (0.319) 
SPD_PartyID  1.700*** 
  (0.189) 
FDP_PartyID  0.281 
  (0.265) 
Greens_PartyID  1.992*** 
  (0.226) 
Afd_PartyID  0.312 
  (0.278) 
Other_PartyID  0.333 
  (0.474) 
No_PartyID  1.470*** 
  (0.188) 
Gender  0.257*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.096) 
Religion  0.058*** 
(1 = Non-Religious)  (0.011) 
Education  0.061 
  (0.047) 
Social_Class  -0.231*** 
  (0.057) 
EastWest  0.200** 
(1 = Born GDR)  (0.099) 
Constant 6.467*** 5.164*** 
 (0.140) (0.300) 
Observations 3,429 2,574 
R2 0.053 0.306 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.299 
Residual Std. Error 2.762 (df = 3418) 2.407 (df = 2549) 
F Statistic 19.037*** (df = 10; 3418) 46.816*** (df = 24; 2549) 





Appendix 1.9: Migration Proximity and Die Linke evaluations: Scalar Variable: 
Effect of Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Immig_Proximity -0.645*** -0.766*** 
 (0.042) (0.047) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.819***  
 (0.166)  
CDU_PartyID 0.356**  
 (0.140)  
CSU_PartyID -0.379  
 (0.246)  
SPD_PartyID 1.833***  
 (0.140)  
FDP_PartyID 0.346*  
 (0.196)  
Greens_PartyID 2.067***  
 (0.165)  
Afd_PartyID 0.554***  
 (0.203)  
Other_PartyID 0.405  
 (0.338)  
No_PartyID 1.620***  
 (0.140)  
Gender 0.271***  
(1 = Female) (0.071)  
Religion 0.534***  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.074)  
Education 0.033  
 (0.034)  
Social_Class -0.210***  
 (0.042)  
EastWest 0.183**  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.073)  
Constant 5.197*** 6.568*** 
 (0.207) (0.067) 
Observations 4,586 4,586 
R2 0.316 0.055 
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.055 
Residual Std. Error 2.376 (df = 4570) 2.788 (df = 4584) 
F Statistic 140.865*** (df = 15; 4570) 267.702*** (df = 1; 4584) 




 Appendix 1.10: Pre-election and Post-election Results – Migration Policy Groups: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Rad Inc (Pre) 1.411  0.684  
 (0.985)  (1.026)  
Mod Inc (Pre) 0.779  0.497  
 (0.969)  (0.974)  
Centrist (baseline)  (baseline)  
Mod Exc (Pre) -1.312  -0.910  
 (0.892)  (0.891)  
Rad Exc (Pre) -1.899**  -1.597*  
 (0.861)  (0.885)  
Rad Inc (Post)  1.998**  1.998** 
  (1.000)  (1.000) 
Mod Inc (Post)  0.497  0.497 
  (1.003)  (1.003) 
Centrist  (baseline)  (baseline) 
Mod Exc (Post)  -2.351**  -2.351** 
  (0.985)  (0.985) 
Rad Exc (Post)  -2.861***  -2.861*** 
  (0.982)  (0.982) 
DieLinke_PartyID   5.567***  
   (1.334)  
CDU_PartyID   -0.166  
   (1.053)  
CSU_PartyID   0.241  
   (1.603)  
SPD_PartyID   2.007*  
   (1.060)  
FDP_PartyID   0.682  
   (1.554)  
Greens_PartyID   1.862  
   (1.351)  
Afd_PartyID   0.464  
   (1.667)  
Other_PartyID   0.532  
   (2.620)  
No_PartyID   -1.300  
   (1.032)  
Gender   -0.618  
(1 = Female)   (0.557)  
Religion   -0.010  
(1 = Non-Religious)   (0.066)  
Education   0.005  
   (0.284)  
Social_Class   -0.032  
   (0.314)  
EastWest   -0.171  
(1 = Born GDR)   (0.575)  
Constant 4.751*** 4.845*** 4.525*** 4.845*** 
 (0.683) (0.709) (1.640) (0.709) 
 
Observations 1,530 1,501 1,530 1,501 
R2 0.013 0.022 0.041 0.022 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.020 0.030 0.020 
Residual Std. Error 10.871 (df = 1525) 12.072 (df = 1496) 10.764 (df = 1511) 12.072 (df = 1496) 
F Statistic 5.105*** (df = 4; 1525) 8.582*** (df = 4; 1496) 3.629*** (df = 18; 1511) 8.582*** (df = 4; 1496) 





Appendix 1.11: Migration Policy and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variable: 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Migration Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Cumulative_Immig_Scale -0.145*** -0.216*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.797***  
 (0.302)  
CDU_PartyID 0.344  
 (0.239)  
CSU_PartyID -0.267  
 (0.363)  
SPD_PartyID 1.610***  
 (0.241)  
FDP_PartyID 0.376  
 (0.352)  
Greens_PartyID 1.761***  
 (0.305)  
Afd_PartyID 0.593  
 (0.378)  
Other_PartyID -0.108  
 (0.592)  
No_PartyID 1.442***  
 (0.235)  
Gender 0.294**  
(1 = Female) (0.127)  
Religion 0.435***  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.136)  
Education -0.032  
 (0.065)  
Social_Class -0.149**  
 (0.071)  
EastWest 0.261**  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.131)  
Constant 5.476*** 7.196*** 
 (0.474) (0.196) 
Observations 1,513 2,036 
R2 0.259 0.038 
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.037 
Residual Std. Error 2.437 (df = 1497) 2.741 (df = 2034) 
F Statistic 34.836*** (df = 15; 1497) 79.847*** (df = 1; 2034) 





Appendix 1.12: Populism and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variable: 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Populism 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) 
Populism_Scale 0.022 -0.012 
 (0.020) (0.018) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.986***  
 (0.164)  
CDU_PartyID 0.205  
 (0.136)  
CSU_PartyID -0.585***  
 (0.224)  
SPD_PartyID 1.784***  
 (0.135)  
FDP_PartyID 0.112  
 (0.188)  
Greens_PartyID 2.134***  
 (0.162)  
Afd_PartyID 0.157  
 (0.201)  
Other_PartyID 0.395  
 (0.338)  
No_PartyID 1.431***  
 (0.135)  
Gender 0.288***  
(1 = Female) (0.069)  
Religion 0.296***  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.072)  
Education 0.146***  
 (0.035)  
Social_Class -0.197***  
 (0.041)  
EastWest 0.142**  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.070)  
Constant 3.961*** 5.715*** 
 (0.197) (0.095) 
Observations 5,228 6,944 
R2 0.268 0.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.266 -0.0001 
Residual Std. Error 2.468 (df = 5212) 2.829 (df = 6942) 
F Statistic 127.465*** (df = 15; 5212) 0.439 (df = 1; 6942) 




 Appendix 1.13: Left/Right and Incl/Excl (unfolded) Prox. Groups & Populism Groups: MLR (1/2) 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Unfolded Proximity Groups and Populism Groups 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EconFurthest (Left) -1.727***   -0.754**   
 (0.410)   (0.358)   
Econ_4 (Left) -1.268***   -0.638**   
 (0.308)   (0.268)   
EconModDistant 
(Left) 
-0.650**   -0.348   
 (0.304)   (0.264)   
Econ_2 (Left) -0.532*   -0.105   
 (0.282)   (0.245)   
EconClosest (Left) -0.251   -0.032   
 (0.283)   (0.244)   
Absolute Closest (baseline)   (baseline)   
EconClosest (Right) 0.069   0.203   
 (0.254)   (0.221)   
Econ2 (Right) -0.602**   -0.322   
 (0.254)   (0.221)   
EconMod-Distant 
(Right) 
-1.194***   -0.561**   
 (0.277)   (0.242)   
Econ4 (Right) -1.666***   -0.848***   
 (0.236)   (0.208)   
EconFurthest (Right) -2.323***   -1.309***   
 (0.252)   (0.225)   
ImmigFurthest (Incl)  -2.036***   -1.719***  
  (0.603)   (0.512)  
Immig4 (Inclusive)  -1.618***   -1.210***  
  (0.428)   (0.365)  
ImmigModDistant 
(Incl) 
 -0.829**   -0.885**  
  (0.422)   (0.359)  
Immig2 (Inclusive)  -0.559*   -0.801***  
  (0.322)   (0.273)  
ImmigClosest (Incl)  -0.219   -0.126  
  (0.313)   (0.267)  
Absolute Closest  (baseline)   (baseline)  
ImmigClosest (Excl)  -0.232   -0.279  
  (0.265)   (0.225)  
Immig2 (Excl)  -0.055   -0.146  
  (0.260)   (0.221)  
ImmigModDistant(Excl)  -0.667**   -0.544**  
  (0.264)   (0.227)  
Immig4 (Excl)  -0.770***   -0.701***  
  (0.241)   (0.206)  
ImmigFurthest (Excl)  -1.752***   -1.494***  
  (0.234)   (0.206)  
Constant 6.602*** 6.411*** 5.600*** 4.718*** 5.200*** 4.341*** 
 (0.176) (0.187) (0.131) (0.329) (0.332) (0.325) 
Observations 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 
R2 0.075 0.049 0.003 0.315 0.322 0.293 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.045 0.001 0.307 0.314 0.286 
Residual Std. Error 2.766 (df = 2024) 2.805 (df = 2024) 
2.869 (df = 
2030) 
2.389 (df = 2010) 2.376 (df = 2010) 2.425 (df = 2016) 
F Statistic 
16.483*** (df = 
10; 2024) 
10.483*** (df = 
10; 2024) 
1.427 (df = 
4; 2030) 
38.574*** (df = 
24; 2010) 
39.863*** (df = 
24; 2010) 
46.315*** (df = 
18; 2016) 




 Appendix 1.13: Part 2/2 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Unfolded Proximity Groups and Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rad Populist   0.388**   0.077 
   (0.191)   (0.170) 
Mod Populist   0.054   -0.015 
   (0.193)   (0.166) 
Absolute Closest   (baseline)   (baseline) 
Mod Non-Populist   -0.007   0.148 
   (0.209)   (0.178) 
Rad Non-Populist   0.020   0.125 
   (0.193)   (0.168) 
       
DieLinke_PartyID    4.716*** 4.924*** 5.035*** 
    (0.252) (0.247) (0.253) 
CDU_PartyID    0.294 0.340 0.314 
    (0.211) (0.211) (0.215) 
CSU_PartyID    -0.807** -0.663* -0.786** 
    (0.367) (0.364) (0.371) 
SPD_PartyID    1.701*** 1.836*** 1.956*** 
    (0.213) (0.210) (0.213) 
FDP_PartyID    0.385 0.385 0.275 
    (0.295) (0.293) (0.299) 
Greens_PartyID    2.014*** 2.139*** 2.270*** 
    (0.253) (0.250) (0.253) 
Afd_PartyID    0.173 0.580* 0.194 
    (0.299) (0.301) (0.309) 
Other_PartyID    0.061 0.288 0.313 
    (0.493) (0.490) (0.500) 
No_PartyID    1.475*** 1.655*** 1.675*** 
    (0.212) (0.210) (0.214) 
Gender    0.241** 0.293*** 0.321*** 
    (0.108) (0.107) (0.109) 
Religion    0.043*** 0.049*** 0.038*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Education    0.103* 0.039 0.075 
    (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) 
Social_Class    -0.163** -0.228*** -0.210*** 
    (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) 
EastWest    0.071 0.115 0.041 
    (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) 
Constant 6.602*** 6.411*** 5.600*** 4.718*** 5.200*** 4.341*** 
 (0.176) (0.187) (0.131) (0.329) (0.332) (0.325) 
Observations 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 
R2 0.075 0.049 0.003 0.315 0.322 0.293 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.045 0.001 0.307 0.314 0.286 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.766 (df = 
2024) 
2.805 (df = 
2024) 
2.869 (df = 
2030) 
2.389 (df = 
2010) 
2.376 (df = 
2010) 
2.425 (df = 
2016) 
F Statistic 
16.483*** (df = 
10; 2024) 
10.483*** (df = 
10; 2024) 
1.427 (df = 
4; 2030) 
38.574*** (df = 
24; 2010) 
39.863*** (df = 
24; 2010) 
46.315*** (df = 
18; 2016) 





 Appendix 1.14: Econ./Immig. Proximity and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variables: 
Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Econ_Proximity -0.664*** -1.086***   -0.515*** -0.891*** 
 (0.049) (0.053)   (0.051) (0.057) 
Immig_Proximity   -0.645*** -0.766*** -0.570*** -0.668*** 
   (0.042) (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) 
Populism_Scale     -0.021 -0.108*** 
     (0.022) (0.023) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.609***  4.819***  4.656***  
 (0.169)  (0.166)  (0.175)  
CDU_PartyID 0.348**  0.356**  0.327**  
 (0.141)  (0.140)  (0.146)  
CSU_PartyID -0.538**  -0.379  -0.651**  
 (0.247)  (0.246)  (0.254)  
SPD_PartyID 1.717***  1.833***  1.621***  
 (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.147)  
FDP_PartyID 0.401**  0.346*  0.473**  
 (0.197)  (0.196)  (0.203)  
Greens_PartyID 1.992***  2.067***  1.894***  
 (0.167)  (0.165)  (0.174)  
Afd_PartyID 0.060  0.554***  0.533**  
 (0.202)  (0.203)  (0.211)  
Other_PartyID 0.087  0.405  0.191  
 (0.341)  (0.338)  (0.342)  
No_PartyID 1.431***  1.620***  1.487***  
 (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.147)  
Gender 0.233***  0.271***  0.236***  
(1 = Female) (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.075)  
Religion 0.478***  0.534***  0.471***  
(1 = Non-
Religious) 
(0.074)  (0.074)  (0.078)  
Education 0.096***  0.033  0.054  
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.038)  
Social_Class -0.139***  -0.210***  -0.178***  
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044)  
EastWest 0.095  0.183**  0.174**  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.076)  
Constant 4.852*** 6.786*** 5.197*** 6.568*** 5.673*** 7.864*** 
 (0.204) (0.067) (0.207) (0.067) (0.229) (0.149) 
Observations 4,586 4,586 4,586 4,586 4,106 4,106 
R2 0.310 0.083 0.316 0.055 0.340 0.116 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.083 0.314 0.055 0.338 0.116 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.387 (df = 
4570) 
2.747 (df = 
4584) 
2.376 (df = 
4570) 
2.788 (df = 
4584) 
2.348 (df = 
4088) 




= 15; 4570) 
415.131*** (df 
= 1; 4584) 
140.865*** (df 
= 15; 4570) 
267.702*** (df 
= 1; 4584) 
124.132*** (df 
= 17; 4088) 
180.288*** (df 
= 3; 4102) 





Appendix 1.15: Pre-election Multiple Linear Regression (part 1/2) 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 1.077***   0.824*** 0.569***   0.498** 
 (0.243)   (0.239) (0.218)   (0.217) 
Centre Left 0.068   0.014 -0.082   -0.089 
 (0.237)   (0.232) (0.210)   (0.210) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.544**   -0.442* -0.398*   -0.339 
 (0.254)   (0.250) (0.225)   (0.226) 
Rad Right -1.248***   -1.146*** -0.992***   -0.918*** 
 (0.221)   (0.218) (0.198)   (0.199) 
Rad Lib  0.561**  0.297  0.294  0.148 
  (0.241)  (0.235)  (0.215)  (0.214) 
Mod Lib  0.247  0.161  0.094  0.012 
  (0.276)  (0.266)  (0.243)  (0.240) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con  -0.580**  -0.555**  -0.386  -0.394 
  (0.279)  (0.268)  (0.247)  (0.243) 
Rad Con  -1.050***  -0.750***  -0.711***  -0.544** 
  (0.266)  (0.260)  (0.241)  (0.240) 
Rad Inc   1.024*** 0.982***   0.631** 0.575** 
   (0.275) (0.268)   (0.251) (0.249) 
Mod Inc   0.634** 0.812***   0.354 0.437* 
   (0.273) (0.261)   (0.241) (0.238) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   -0.362 -0.291   -0.208 -0.160 
   (0.251) (0.240)   (0.223) (0.219) 
Rad Exc   0.099 0.0003   -0.119 -0.033 
   (0.245) (0.245)   (0.224) (0.226) 
Rad Populist    0.619***    0.074 
    (0.233)    (0.218) 
Mod Populist    0.236    0.099 
    (0.229)    (0.208) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Non-Pop    -0.263    -0.105 
    (0.242)    (0.219) 
Rad Non-Pop    -0.372    -0.132 
    (0.235)    (0.215) 
         
Constant 5.555*** 5.422*** 5.148*** 5.390*** 4.315*** 4.155*** 4.277*** 4.575*** 




Appendix 1.15: Part 2/2 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DieLinke_Party
ID 
    4.616*** 4.750*** 4.759*** 4.366*** 
     (0.323) (0.326) (0.329) (0.327) 
CDU_PartyID     0.318 0.254 0.333 0.212 
     (0.255) (0.260) (0.260) (0.256) 
CSU_PartyID     -0.426 -0.336 -0.309 -0.324 
     (0.394) (0.398) (0.401) (0.393) 
SPD_PartyID     1.667*** 1.646*** 1.755*** 1.397*** 
     (0.257) (0.263) (0.262) (0.262) 
FDP_PartyID     0.712* 0.464 0.394 0.576 
     (0.364) (0.367) (0.369) (0.363) 
Greens_PartyI
D 
    1.967*** 1.990*** 1.940*** 1.566*** 
     (0.323) (0.328) (0.337) (0.334) 
Afd_PartyID     0.504 0.697* 0.583 0.611 
     (0.385) (0.392) (0.394) (0.391) 
Other_PartyID     -0.537 -0.423 -0.478 -0.694 
     (0.667) (0.675) (0.680) (0.665) 
No_PartyID     1.469*** 1.435*** 1.487*** 1.352*** 
     (0.253) (0.257) (0.257) (0.254) 
Gender     0.215 0.111 0.277** 0.123 
(1 = Female)     (0.136) (0.141) (0.139) (0.139) 
Religion     0.034** 0.028* 0.039** 0.032* 
(1 = Non-
Religious) 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Education     0.023 0.054 -0.025 -0.021 
     (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.071) 
Social_Class     -0.101 -0.112 -0.160** -0.082 
     (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
EastWest     0.205 0.280** 0.304** 0.243* 
(1 = Born 
GDR) 
    (0.140) (0.142) (0.143) (0.140) 
Constant 5.555*** 5.422*** 5.148*** 5.390*** 4.315*** 4.155*** 4.277*** 4.575*** 
 (0.162) (0.200) (0.194) (0.322) (0.378) (0.402) (0.414) (0.473) 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
R2 0.078 0.048 0.029 0.135 0.291 0.273 0.266 0.307 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.045 0.026 0.124 0.280 0.262 0.255 0.290 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.686 (df = 
1237) 




2.615 (df = 
1225) 
2.370 (df = 
1223) 
2.399 (df = 
1223) 
2.411 (df = 
1223) 




df = 4; 
1237) 
15.659*** (
df = 4; 
1237) 
9.175*** (
df = 4; 
1237) 
11.938*** (
df = 16; 
1225) 
27.831*** (
df = 18; 
1223) 
25.520*** (
df = 18; 
1223) 
24.614*** (
df = 18; 
1223) 
17.903*** (
df = 30; 
1211) 




Appendix 1.16: Post-election Multiple Linear Regression (part 1/2) 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.626**   0.427* 0.202   0.138 
 (0.264)   (0.258) (0.231)   (0.232) 
Centre Left 0.067   -0.053 -0.150   -0.227 
 (0.257)   (0.249) (0.224)   (0.223) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.941***   -0.740*** -0.509**   -0.486** 
 (0.263)   (0.255) (0.231)   (0.229) 
Rad Right -1.349***   -1.078*** -0.816***   -0.750*** 
 (0.241)   (0.235) (0.214)   (0.213) 
Rad Lib  0.663***  0.369  0.283  0.151 
  (0.252)  (0.244)  (0.221)  (0.220) 
Mod Lib  0.407  0.389  0.297  0.267 
  (0.277)  (0.265)  (0.241)  (0.238) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con  -0.403  -0.306  -0.069  -0.049 
  (0.278)  (0.266)  (0.242)  (0.238) 
Rad Con  -1.181***  -0.766***  -0.579**  -0.426* 
  (0.274)  (0.266)  (0.243)  (0.241) 
Rad Inc   1.356*** 1.107***   0.743*** 0.593** 
   (0.259) (0.261)   (0.244) (0.248) 
Mod Inc   0.496* 0.512**   0.314 0.289 
   (0.260) (0.253)   (0.230) (0.230) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   -0.413 -0.450*   -0.234 -0.248 
   (0.257) (0.249)   (0.225) (0.223) 
Rad Exc   -0.765*** -1.063***   -0.719*** -0.815*** 
   (0.262) (0.262)   (0.234) (0.238) 
Rad Populist    0.785***    0.430* 
    (0.247)    (0.227) 
Mod Populist    0.543**    0.391* 
    (0.236)    (0.214) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Non-Populist    0.199    0.365 
    (0.265)    (0.238) 
Rad Non-Populist    -0.050    0.288 
    (0.244)    (0.221) 
Constant 6.070*** 5.727*** 5.549*** 5.732*** 4.414*** 4.278*** 4.809*** 4.803*** 






Appendix 1.16: Part 2/2 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DieLinkePartyID     4.686*** 4.706*** 4.634*** 4.361*** 
     (0.356) (0.359) (0.356) (0.360) 
CDUPartyID     -0.077 -0.152 -0.117 -0.149 
     (0.306) (0.307) (0.305) (0.303) 
CSUPartyID     -0.656 -0.621 -0.705 -0.573 
     (0.545) (0.547) (0.544) (0.540) 
SPDPartyID     1.508*** 1.462*** 1.415*** 1.287*** 
     (0.304) (0.306) (0.305) (0.303) 
FDPPartyID     -0.102 -0.261 -0.280 -0.135 
     (0.415) (0.416) (0.414) (0.411) 
GreenPartyID     1.787*** 1.786*** 1.543*** 1.286*** 
     (0.346) (0.350) (0.356) (0.357) 
AfdPartyID     -0.464 -0.343 -0.164 -0.140 
     (0.424) (0.428) (0.429) (0.431) 
OtherPartyID     0.807 0.626 0.379 0.503 
     (0.733) (0.734) (0.731) (0.729) 
NoPartyID     1.140*** 1.091*** 1.144*** 1.053*** 
     (0.301) (0.303) (0.301) (0.300) 
Gender     0.282* 0.215 0.379*** 0.237 
(1 = Female)     (0.144) (0.147) (0.143) (0.146) 
Religion     0.030* 0.023 0.035** 0.032* 
(1 = Non-
Religious) 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Education     0.224*** 0.242*** 0.113 0.100 
     (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.075) 
Social_Class     -0.174* -0.214** -0.270*** -0.191** 
     (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) 
EastWest     0.072 0.109 0.141 0.137 
(1=Born GDR)     (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.144) 
Constant 6.070*** 5.727*** 5.549*** 5.732*** 4.414*** 4.278*** 4.809*** 4.803*** 
 (0.176) (0.199) (0.185) (0.317) (0.448) (0.460) (0.452) (0.514) 
Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 
R2 0.063 0.052 0.065 0.146 0.302 0.297 0.307 0.330 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.049 0.062 0.135 0.291 0.287 0.296 0.312 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.827 (df = 
1193) 
2.842 (df = 
1193) 
2.823 (df = 
1193) 
2.712 (df = 
1181) 
2.454 (df = 
1179) 
2.462 (df = 
1179) 
2.445 (df = 
1179) 




= 4; 1193) 
16.498*** (df 
= 4; 1193) 
20.771*** (df 
= 4; 1193) 
12.630*** (df 
= 16; 1181) 
28.309*** (df 
= 18; 1179) 
27.731*** (df 
= 18; 1179) 
28.992*** (df 
= 18; 1179) 
19.132*** (df 
= 30; 1167) 




 Appendix 1.17: Econ./Social/Immig. Policy and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variables: 
Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Die Linke Evaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cumulative_Econ_Scale 0.250*** 0.434***     0.265*** 0.343*** 
 (0.028) (0.026)     (0.040) (0.038) 
Cumulative_Social_Scale   -0.126*** -0.244***   -0.105*** -0.156*** 
   (0.019) (0.017)   (0.028) (0.026) 
Cumulative_Immig_Scale     -0.145*** -0.216*** -0.113*** -0.224*** 
     (0.030) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) 
Populism_Scale       -0.064 -0.200*** 
       (0.043) (0.039) 
DieLinke_PartyID 4.594***  4.763***  4.797***  4.362***  
 (0.221)  (0.220)  (0.302)  (0.325)  
CDU_PartyID 0.116  0.187  0.344  0.237  
 (0.180)  (0.180)  (0.239)  (0.254)  
CSU_PartyID -0.441  -0.193  -0.267  -0.356  
 (0.289)  (0.294)  (0.363)  (0.389)  
SPD_PartyID 1.575***  1.628***  1.610***  1.386***  
 (0.180)  (0.181)  (0.241)  (0.260)  
FDP_PartyID 0.252  0.047  0.376  0.594  
 (0.253)  (0.251)  (0.352)  (0.361)  
Greens_PartyID 1.900***  1.935***  1.761***  1.506***  
 (0.216)  (0.216)  (0.305)  (0.332)  
Afd_PartyID 0.023  0.140  0.593  0.620  
 (0.267)  (0.270)  (0.378)  (0.386)  
Other_PartyID 0.413  0.685  -0.108  -0.587  
 (0.443)  (0.446)  (0.592)  (0.660)  
No_PartyID 1.284***  1.337***  1.442***  1.340***  
 (0.177)  (0.178)  (0.235)  (0.252)  
Gender 0.197**  0.114  0.294**  0.120  
(1 = Female) (0.090)  (0.092)  (0.127)  (0.138)  
Religion 0.432***  0.357***  0.435***  0.312**  
(1 = Non-Religious) (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.136)  (0.146)  
Education 0.132***  0.137***  -0.032  -0.012  
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.065)  (0.071)  
Social_Class -0.125**  -0.161***  -0.149**  -0.071  
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.071)  (0.078)  
EastWest 0.119  0.166*  0.261**  0.269*  
(1 = Born GDR) (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.131)  (0.139)  
Constant 2.210*** 2.495*** 4.691*** 6.759*** 5.476*** 7.196*** 4.022*** 6.462*** 
 (0.322) (0.192) (0.270) (0.089) (0.474) (0.196) (0.659) (0.490) 
Observations 2,941 3,916 2,980 3,994 1,513 2,036 1,242 1,643 
R2 0.284 0.068 0.271 0.048 0.259 0.038 0.306 0.132 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.067 0.268 0.048 0.251 0.037 0.295 0.130 
Residual Std. Error 
2.430 (df = 
2925) 
2.720 (df = 
3914) 
2.451 (df = 
2964) 
2.750 (df = 
3992) 
2.437 (df = 
1497) 
2.741 (df = 
2034) 
2.345 (df = 
1223) 




= 15; 2925) 
283.393*** (df 
= 1; 3914) 
73.571*** (df 
= 15; 2964) 
202.853*** (df 
= 1; 3992) 
34.836*** (df 
= 15; 1497) 
79.847*** (df 
= 1; 2034) 
29.899*** (df 
= 18; 1223) 
62.119*** (df 
= 4; 1638) 





Appendix 2.0: US 
 
List of questions –  
CCES: 
 Dependent Variable – CC16_328 
  ‘In the Presidential primary or caucus, who did you vote for?’ 
 
Economic Questions –  
CC16_415r – ‘If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it 
would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as 
on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would 
you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point 
along the scale from 100’ 
‘Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress would you vote FOR or 
AGAINST each of the following?’:   
CC16_351I – ‘Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care 
Act of 2009 (also known as Obamacare).’ 
CC16_351K – ‘Minimum wage. Raises the federal minimum wage to $12 an 
hour by 2020.’ 
 Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_330 – Gun Control: 
‘On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following 
proposals?’ 
 CC16_330a – ‘Background checks for all sales, including at gun shows and 
over the Internet’ 
   CC16_330d – ‘Ban assault rifles’ 
   CC16_330e – ‘Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit’ 
 Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_332 – Abortion: 
  ‘Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?’ 




   CC16_332b – ‘Permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the 
woman's life is in danger’ 
   CC16_332c – ‘Prohibit all abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy’ 
CC16_332d – ‘Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance 
plans’ 
   CC16_332e – ‘Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated 
by federal law for any abortion’ 
   CC16_332f – ‘Make abortions illegal in all circumstances’ 
 Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_334 – Crime: 
  ‘Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?’ 
CC16_334a – ‘Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug 
offenders’ 
CC16_334b – ‘Require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of 
their activities while on duty’ 
   CC16_334c – ‘Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even 
if it means fewer funds for other public services’ 
   CC16_334d – ‘Increase prison sentences for felons who have already 
committed two or more serious or violent crimes’ 
 Cultural Policy Question – CC16_335 – Gay Marriage 
  ‘Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?’ 
 Migration Questions – CC16_331 
‘What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that 
apply.’ 
CC16_331_1 – ‘Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs 
and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes’ 
CC16_331_2 – ‘Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican 
border’ 
CC16_331_3 – ‘Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US 
illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school’ 
CC16_331_7 – ‘Identify and deport illegal immigrants’ 
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Control Variable – Race: 
  ‘What racial or ethnic group best describes you?’ 
 Control Variable – Party Identification: 
  ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?’ 
 Control Variable – Church Attendance: 
  ‘Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?’ 
 Control Variable – Education: 
  ‘What is the highest level of education you have completed?’ 
 Control Variable – Gender: 
  ‘Are you male or female?’ 
ANES: 
 Populism Question – V162259 
‘What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.’ 
 Populism Question – V162260 
  ‘Most politicians do not care about the people.’ 
 Populism Question – V162261 
  ‘Most politicians are trustworthy.’ 
 Populism Question – V162262 
  ‘Politicians are the main problem in the United States’ 
 Populism Question – V162264 
‘The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.’ 
 Populism Question – V162265 
  ‘Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.’  
 Populism Question – V162267 
  ‘The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.’ 
 Control Variable: Race – V161310x 
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‘Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be: - white, - black or 
African-American, - American Indian or Alaska Native, - Asian, or - Native Hawaiian 
or other Pacific Islander?’ 
 Control Variable: Party ID – V161158x 
[Derived Variable] - V161155, V161156, V161157 
 Control Variable: Church Attendance –  
‘Do you go to religious services [every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, 
a few times a year, or never/ never, a few times a year, once or twice a month, almost 
every week, or every week]?’ 
 Control Variable: Education –  
‘What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?’ 
 Control Variable: Gender –  




























Appendix 2.1: Economic Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable: 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Economic Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group 
 (1) (2) 
econ_scale -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
gender  0.013 
(1 = Female)  (0.008) 
race  -0.085*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.009) 
educ  0.001 
  (0.003) 
pew_churatd  0.048*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.460*** 0.240*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 
R2 0.010 0.045 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.045 
Residual Std. Error 0.489 (df = 13463) 0.480 (df = 13459) 
F Statistic 132.202*** (df = 1; 13463) 127.087*** (df = 5; 13459) 















Appendix 2.2: Cultural Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable: 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Cultural Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group 
 (1) (2) 
cultural_scale -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Gender  0.008 
(1 = Female)  (0.008) 
Race  -0.075*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.009) 
Educ  -0.006** 
  (0.003) 
pew_churatd  0.036*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.522*** 0.372*** 
 (0.007) (0.024) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 
R2 0.035 0.055 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.054 
Residual Std. Error 0.482 (df = 13463) 0.478 (df = 13459) 
F Statistic 494.508*** (df = 1; 13463) 156.110*** (df = 5; 13459) 











Appendix 2.3: Cultural Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting (Excluding Guns): 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Cultural Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.169*** 0.136*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Mod Lib 0.053*** 0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Mod Cons -0.033** -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Rad Cons -0.026* 0.022 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Gender  -0.0005 
(1 = Female)  (0.008) 
Race  -0.083*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.009) 
Education  -0.011*** 
  (0.003) 
Church Attendance  0.037*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.388*** 0.296*** 
 (0.010) (0.022) 
Observations 15,221 15,221 
R2 0.029 0.051 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.051 
Residual Std. Error 0.490 (df = 15216) 0.484 (df = 15212) 
F Statistic 113.000*** (df = 4; 15216) 102.744*** (df = 8; 15212) 















Appendix 2.4: Migration Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable: 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Migration Policy Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group 
 (1) (2) 
immig_scale -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Gender  0.008 
(1 = Female)  (0.008) 
Race  -0.086*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.009) 
Educ  -0.001 
  (0.003) 
pew_churatd  0.048*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.451*** 0.250*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 
R2 0.011 0.047 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.047 
Residual Std. Error 0.489 (df = 13463) 0.480 (df = 13459) 
F Statistic 147.385*** (df = 1; 13463) 132.895*** (df = 5; 13459) 












Appendix 2.5: Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable: 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Policy Groups on all Dimensions 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
econ_scale -0.002*** -0.001***  0.00003    0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002)    (0.0002) 
cultural_scale   -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004***   -0.003*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)   (0.0003) 
immig_scale    -0.001***  -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
    (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Gender  0.013   0.008  0.008 0.007 
(1 = Female)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Race  -0.085***   -0.075***  -0.086*** -0.075*** 
(1 = Non-
White) 
 (0.009)   (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Education  0.001   -0.006**  -0.001 -0.007** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Church 
Attendance 
 0.048***   0.036***  0.048*** 0.036*** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.460*** 0.240*** 0.522*** 0.527*** 0.372*** 0.451*** 0.250*** 0.381*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.006) (0.021) (0.024) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
R2 0.010 0.045 0.035 0.036 0.055 0.011 0.047 0.056 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.045 0.035 0.036 0.054 0.011 0.047 0.055 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.489 (df = 
13463) 
0.480 (df = 
13459) 
0.482 (df = 
13463) 
0.482 (df = 
13461) 
0.478 (df = 
13459) 
0.489 (df = 
13463) 
0.480 (df = 
13459) 




= 1; 13463) 
127.087*** (df 
= 5; 13459) 
494.508*** (df 
= 1; 13463) 
168.743*** (df 
= 3; 13461) 
156.110*** (df 
= 5; 13459) 
147.385*** (df 
= 1; 13463) 
132.895*** (df 
= 5; 13459) 
113.559*** (df 
= 7; 13457) 





 Appendix 2.6: Multiple Logistic Regression of all policy groups and probability of voting for 
Sanders/Clinton (Sample = Dem-identifiers + Dem-leaners) 
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups on all Dimensions 
 Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.564***   0.155** 0.388***   0.149** 
 (0.055)   (0.060) (0.057)   (0.062) 
Centre Left -0.065   -0.265*** -0.130**   -0.249*** 
 (0.057)   (0.060) (0.059)   (0.061) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right -0.130   -0.013 -0.075   -0.007 
 (0.083)   (0.085) (0.085)   (0.086) 
Rad Right 0.301*   0.432*** 0.369**   0.444*** 
 (0.162)   (0.166) (0.165)   (0.167) 
Rad Lib  0.765***  0.608***  0.488***  0.364*** 
  (0.056)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.065) 
Mod Lib  0.199***  0.172***  0.056  0.039 
  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.066) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Cons  -0.330***  -0.342***  -0.252***  -0.266*** 
  (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.083) 
Rad Cons  0.122  0.036  0.210  0.142 
  (0.201)  (0.203)  (0.204)  (0.206) 
Rad Inc   0.605*** 0.273***   0.454*** 0.265*** 
   (0.056) (0.060)   (0.058) (0.061) 
Mod Inc   0.145** 0.009   0.094 0.016 
   (0.059) (0.061)   (0.061) (0.062) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   -0.109 -0.017   -0.061 -0.022 
   (0.085) (0.087)   (0.087) (0.088) 
Rad Exc   0.254** 0.365***   0.227** 0.284*** 
   (0.099) (0.101)   (0.101) (0.103) 
Gender     0.091** 0.043 0.024 0.062* 
(1=Female)     (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Race     -0.340*** -0.330*** -0.371*** -0.291*** 
(1=NonWhite)     (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) 
Education     -0.013 -0.025* -0.007 -0.043*** 
     (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Church 
Attendance 
    0.205*** 0.167*** 0.206*** 0.160*** 
     (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant -0.609*** -0.803*** -0.700*** -0.841*** -1.333*** -1.207*** -1.421*** -1.173*** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.078) (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.114) 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
Log 
Likelihood 
-8,942.069 -8,859.330 -8,979.215 -8,768.926 -8,717.292 -8,714.085 -8,740.586 -8,637.142 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 
17,894.140 17,728.660 17,968.430 17,563.850 17,452.580 17,446.170 17,499.170 17,308.280 












Appendix 2.7: Logistic Model of Populism Groups and Sanders/Clinton Voting Probability 
(Sample = Dem-identifiers + Dem-leaners) 
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Radical Populist 0.353 0.505 
 (0.368) (0.384) 
Moderate Populist 0.164 0.269 
 (0.412) (0.429) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Moderate Non-Populist 0.440 0.528 
 (0.371) (0.390) 
Radical Non-Populist 0.109 -0.004 
 (0.298) (0.321) 
Gender  -0.457* 
(1 = Female)  (0.241) 
Race  -0.954*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.251) 
Education  0.009 
  (0.055) 
Church Attendance  0.195** 
  (0.098) 
Constant -1.046*** -0.942 
 (0.228) (0.737) 
Observations 381 381 
Log Likelihood -229.812 -216.276 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 469.624 450.551 









Appendix 2.8: Populism and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Populism 
 Dependent variable: 
 Likelihood of Supporting Sanders 
 (1) (2) 
Populism_scale -0.072*** -0.063* 
 (0.026) (0.035) 
Gender  -0.097** 
(1 = Female)  (0.048) 
Education  0.005 
  (0.011) 
Race  -0.187*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.048) 
Church  0.035* 
  (0.019) 
Constant 0.590*** 0.489*** 
 (0.079) (0.161) 
Observations 741 381 
R2 0.010 0.073 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.060 
Residual Std. Error 0.482 (df = 739) 0.442 (df = 375) 
F Statistic 7.827*** (df = 1; 739) 5.864*** (df = 5; 375) 




 Appendix 2.9: Multiple Linear Regression of Policy Groups and Probability of Voting Sanders/Clinton. With PartyID control.  
Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups on all Dimensions 
 Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.081***   0.004 0.084***   0.036*** 
 (0.012)   (0.013) (0.012)   (0.013) 
Centre Left -0.063***   -0.094*** -0.037***   -0.057*** 
 (0.012)   (0.013) (0.012)   (0.012) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Centre Right 0.007   0.021 -0.012   -0.003 
 (0.017)   (0.017) (0.016)   (0.016) 
Rad Right 0.254***   0.251*** 0.139***   0.138*** 
 (0.028)   (0.028) (0.027)   (0.027) 
Rad Lib  0.138***  0.132***  0.110***  0.085*** 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Mod Lib  0.021  0.033**  0.008  0.007 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Cons  -0.022  -0.044***  -0.024  -0.031** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Rad Cons  0.232***  0.132***  0.148***  0.103*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Rad Inc   0.107*** 0.052***   0.099*** 0.058*** 
   (0.012) (0.013)   (0.012) (0.013) 
Mod Inc   0.004 -0.013   0.013 -0.001 
   (0.013) (0.013)   (0.012) (0.012) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exc   0.004 0.007   -0.012 -0.009 
   (0.018) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017) 
Rad Exc   0.141*** 0.125***   0.082*** 0.079*** 
   (0.020) (0.020)   (0.020) (0.020) 
Gender     0.015* 0.005 0.0002 0.010 
(1 = Female)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Race     -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.068*** 
(1=NonWhite)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Education     -0.006** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.012*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ChurchAttend     0.045*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 
     (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
PartyID     0.337*** 0.354*** 0.344*** 0.343*** 
(1=Non-Dem)     (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 0.425*** 0.372*** 0.391*** 0.371*** 0.220*** 0.232*** 0.201*** 0.243*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Observations 15,221 15,221 15,221 15,221 15,221 15,221 15,221 15,221 
R2 0.021 0.020 0.012 0.042 0.097 0.096 0.093 0.108 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.019 0.012 0.042 0.097 0.095 0.093 0.107 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.492 (df = 
15216) 
0.492 (df = 
15216) 
0.494 (df = 
15216) 
0.487 (df = 
15208) 
0.472 (df = 
15211) 
0.473 (df = 
15211) 
0.473 (df = 
15211) 




= 4; 15216) 
76.622*** (df 
= 4; 15216) 
46.128*** (df 
= 4; 15216) 
55.928*** (df 
= 12; 15208) 
181.742*** (df 
= 9; 15211) 
179.337*** (df 
= 9; 15211) 
173.546*** (df 
= 9; 15211) 
108.570*** (df 
= 17; 15203) 






Appendix 2.10: Probability of Supporting Sanders vs. Clinton – Populism Groups  
With PartyID control. 
Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Populism Group 
 Dependent variable: 
 Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Radical Populist 0.055 0.081 
 (0.056) (0.070) 
Moderate Populist 0.070 0.108 
 (0.063) (0.076) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Moderate Non-Populist 0.011 0.113 
 (0.056) (0.073) 
Radical Non-Populist -0.070 0.015 
 (0.045) (0.057) 
Gender  -0.035 
(1 = Female)  (0.045) 
Race  -0.199*** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.045) 
Education  -0.001 
  (0.010) 
PartyID  -0.324*** 
(1 = Non-Democrat)  (0.065) 
Church Attendance  0.033* 
  (0.018) 
Constant 0.413*** 0.622*** 
 (0.034) (0.142) 
Observations 831 437 
R2 0.011 0.128 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.109 
Residual Std. Error 0.490 (df = 826) 0.448 (df = 427) 
F Statistic 2.291* (df = 4; 826) 6.955*** (df = 9; 427) 




Appendix 3.0: UK 
 
British Election Study – Panel Surveys: 
Dependent Variable: 
‘How much do you like or dislike each of the following parties?’ – Labour 
 Economic Policy Variables: 
 Values1 – ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ 
lr1: ‘Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are 
less well off’ 
lr2: ‘Big business takes advantage of ordinary people’ 
lr3: ‘Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’ 
lr4: ‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’ 
lr5: ‘Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the 
chance’ 
  Scale:45  ‘Strongly disagree’ 
‘Disagree’ 
‘Neither agree nor disagree’ 
‘Agree’ 
‘Strongly agree’ 
Cultural policy Variables: 
Values2 – ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ 
 al1: ‘Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values’ 
al2: ‘For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’ 
al3: ‘Schools should teach children to obey authority’ 
 
45 Scale of responses matched with cultural policy and populism questions.  
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al4: ‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’ 
al5: ‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’ 
Migration Policy Variables: 
ImmigEcon – ‘Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain’s economy?’ 
    7 (Good for economy) – 1 (Bad for economy) 
ImmigCultural – ‘And do you think that immigration undermines or enriches  
        Britain’s cultural life?’ 
    7 (Enriches cultural life) – 1 (Undermines cultural life) 
Populism Variables: 
populism1:  ‘The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the 
people’ 
populism2:  ‘The people, and not politicians, should make our most important 
policy decisions’ 
populism4:  ‘I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized 
politician’ 
populism5:  ‘Elected officials talk too much and take too little action’ 
populism6:  ‘What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out 
on one’s principles’ 
 Control Variables: 
 ageGroup – ‘What is your age?’ 
    Under 18, 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66+ 
 Education – ‘What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?’ 
No formal qualifications, Youth training 
certificate/skillseekers, Recognised trade apprenticeship 
completed, Clerical and commercial, City and Guild certificate, 
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City and Guild certificate – advanced, ONC, CSE grades 2-5, 
CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate, Scottish 
Ordinary/ Lower Certificate, GCE A level or Higher 
Certificate, Scottish Higher Certificate, Nursing qualification, 
Teaching qualification (not degree), University diploma, 
University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed), 
University or CNAA higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D), Other 
technical, professional or higher qualification. 
euRefVote – ‘If you do vote in the referendum on Britain’s membership of the   
          European Union, how do you think you will vote?’ 
   Remain in the EU, Leave the EU 
 euRefVotePost – ‘Which way did you vote?’ 
    Remain in the EU, Leave the EU 
 Gender – ‘Are you male or female?’ 
    Male, Female 
 Profile_Ethnicity – ‘To which of these groups do you consider you belong?’ 
White British, Any other white background, White and Black 
Caribbean, White and Black African, White and Asian, Any 
other mixed background, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Any 
other Asian background, Black Caribbean, Black African, Any 
other black background, Chinese, Other ethnic group 
Recoded as dummy variable: 0 = White-British, 1 = 
Non-White British 
PartyID – ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative,  
       Liberal Democrat or what?’ 
Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru, 
UKIP, Green Party, BNP, Other 
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Recoded as series of dummy variables, 1 representing 
identifiers with each of the above. SNP and Plaid 
Cymru cumulated together. ‘BNP’ and ‘Other’ 
cumulated together also.  
LikeLeader – ‘How much do you like or dislike each of the following party leaders?’ 
   Miliband, Corbyn 







 Appendix 3.1: Economic Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: 
Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Economic Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change 
 (1) (2) 
Econ_scale 0.309*** 0.258*** 
 (0.031) (0.044) 
Education  0.013* 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.328*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.075) 
Gender  0.220*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.065) 
ageGroup  -0.053** 
  (0.025) 
Ethnicity  0.188 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.126) 
Cons_ID  -0.416*** 
  (0.113) 
Lab_ID  -0.850*** 
  (0.107) 
LD_ID  -0.239 
  (0.150) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.966*** 
  (0.154) 
UKIP_ID  -0.161 
  (0.151) 
Greens_ID  1.079*** 
  (0.210) 
Other_ID  0.817*** 
  (0.265) 
Constant -0.681*** -0.031 
 (0.120) (0.263) 
Observations 6,930 4,574 
R2 0.014 0.086 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.084 
Residual Std. Error 2.320 (df = 6928) 2.173 (df = 4560) 
F Statistic 100.568*** (df = 1; 6928) 33.169*** (df = 13; 4560) 





Appendix 3.2: Cultural Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: 
Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change 
 (1) (2) 
Social_scale -0.364*** -0.236*** 
 (0.032) (0.045) 
Education  -0.001 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.184** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.080) 
Gender  0.211*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.066) 
ageGroup  -0.043* 
  (0.026) 
Ethnicity  0.249* 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.129) 
Cons_ID  -0.518*** 
  (0.109) 
Lab_ID  -0.709*** 
  (0.107) 
LD_ID  -0.205 
  (0.152) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.115*** 
  (0.156) 
UKIP_ID  -0.011 
  (0.153) 
Greens_ID  1.114*** 
  (0.216) 
Other_ID  0.821*** 
  (0.270) 
Constant 1.784*** 1.805*** 
 (0.116) (0.248) 
Observations 6,762 4,453 
R2 0.019 0.084 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.081 
Residual Std. Error 2.322 (df = 6760) 2.177 (df = 4439) 
F Statistic 133.258*** (df = 1; 6760) 31.201*** (df = 13; 4439) 




 Appendix 3.3: Alternate Test of Cultural Policy and Labour Evaluation Changes 2015-2017 
(Excluding ‘British Values’, obedience to authority, moral standards). 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy Groups 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.509*** 0.315*** 
 (0.075) (0.095) 
Mod Lib 0.105 0.076 
 (0.097) (0.117) 
Mod Con -0.171* -0.048 
 (0.097) (0.114) 
Rad Con -0.197** -0.194* 
 (0.085) (0.102) 
Education  0.0003 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.193** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.081) 
Gender  0.177*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.067) 
ageGroup  -0.054** 
  (0.026) 
Ethnicity  0.256** 
  (0.129) 
Cons_ID  -0.548*** 
  (0.108) 
Lab_ID  -0.718*** 
  (0.108) 
LD_ID  -0.224 
  (0.152) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.140*** 
  (0.156) 
UKIP_ID  -0.029 
  (0.153) 
Greens_ID  1.153*** 
  (0.216) 
Other_ID  0.857*** 
  (0.271) 
Constant 0.385*** 0.971*** 
 (0.053) (0.207) 
Observations 6,762 4,453 
R2 0.014 0.082 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.079 
Residual Std. Error 2.329 (df = 6757) 2.179 (df = 4436) 
F Statistic 23.842*** (df = 4; 6757) 24.920*** (df = 16; 4436) 




 Appendix 3.4: Migration Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: 
Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Migration Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change 
 (1) (2) 
Immig_scale 0.181*** 0.129*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) 
Education  0.004 
  (0.007) 
EU_Vote  -0.114 
(1 = Leave)  (0.085) 
Gender  0.193*** 
(1 = Female)  (0.066) 
ageGroup  -0.035 
  (0.026) 
Ethnicity  0.019 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.128) 
Cons_ID  -0.583*** 
  (0.107) 
Lab_ID  -0.750*** 
  (0.107) 
LD_ID  -0.203 
  (0.152) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.127*** 
  (0.157) 
UKIP_ID  -0.018 
  (0.153) 
Greens_ID  1.243*** 
  (0.219) 
Other_ID  0.904*** 
  (0.270) 
Constant -0.200*** 0.384* 
 (0.064) (0.219) 
Observations 6,742 4,410 
R2 0.020 0.087 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.084 
Residual Std. Error 2.329 (df = 6740) 2.169 (df = 4396) 
F Statistic 139.637*** (df = 1; 6740) 32.292*** (df = 13; 4396) 




 Appendix 3.5: Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Econ_scale 0.309*** 0.258***     0.235*** 0.274*** 
 (0.031) (0.044)     (0.040) (0.057) 
Social_scale   -0.364*** -0.236***   -0.240*** -0.220*** 
   (0.032) (0.045)   (0.051) (0.063) 
Immig_scale     0.181*** 0.129*** 0.092*** 0.100*** 
     (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) 
Education  0.013*  -0.001  0.004  0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
EU_Vote  -0.328***  -0.184**  -0.114  -0.005 
(1 = Leave)  (0.075)  (0.080)  (0.085)  (0.111) 
Gender  0.220***  0.211***  0.193***  0.187** 
  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.088) 
ageGroup  -0.053**  -0.043*  -0.035  -0.027 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
Ethnicity  0.188  0.249*  0.019  0.050 
  (0.126)  (0.129)  (0.128)  (0.170) 
Cons_ID  -0.416***  -0.518***  -0.583***  -0.243 
  (0.113)  (0.109)  (0.107)  (0.149) 
Lab_ID  -0.850***  -0.709***  -0.750***  -0.852*** 
  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.141) 
LD_ID  -0.239  -0.205  -0.203  -0.210 
  (0.150)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.196) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.966***  1.115***  1.127***  0.917*** 
  (0.154)  (0.156)  (0.157)  (0.207) 
UKIP_ID  -0.161  -0.011  -0.018  -0.028 
  (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.207) 
Greens_ID  1.079***  1.114***  1.243***  1.111*** 
  (0.210)  (0.216)  (0.219)  (0.299) 
Other_ID  0.817***  0.821***  0.904***  1.150*** 
  (0.265)  (0.270)  (0.270)  (0.357) 
Constant -0.681*** -0.031 1.784*** 1.805*** -0.200*** 0.384* 0.060 0.089 
 (0.120) (0.263) (0.116) (0.248) (0.064) (0.219) (0.299) (0.452) 
Observations 6,930 4,574 6,762 4,453 6,742 4,410 3,817 2,558 
R2 0.014 0.086 0.019 0.084 0.020 0.087 0.033 0.098 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.084 0.019 0.081 0.020 0.084 0.033 0.093 
Residual 
Std. Error 
2.320 (df = 
6928) 
2.173 (df = 
4560) 
2.322 (df = 
6760) 
2.177 (df = 
4439) 
2.329 (df = 
6740) 
2.169 (df = 
4396) 
2.278 (df = 
3813) 




= 1; 6928) 
33.169*** (df 
= 13; 4560) 
133.258*** (df 
= 1; 6760) 
31.201*** (df 
= 13; 4439) 
139.637*** (df 
= 1; 6740) 
32.292*** (df 
= 13; 4396) 
43.758*** (df 
= 3; 3813) 
18.443*** (df 
= 15; 2542) 






Appendix 3.6: Populism and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Populism 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Populism_scale 0.062 0.149** 
 (0.046) (0.059) 
Education  0.016* 
  (0.008) 
EU_Vote  -0.400*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.100) 
Gender  0.199** 
(1 = Female)  (0.083) 
ageGroup  -0.059* 
  (0.033) 
Ethnicity  0.221 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.159) 
Cons_ID  -0.543*** 
  (0.132) 
Lab_ID  -0.682*** 
  (0.131) 
LD_ID  -0.139 
  (0.185) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.062*** 
  (0.193) 
UKIP_ID  -0.178 
  (0.194) 
Greens_ID  1.237*** 
  (0.280) 
Other_ID  0.953*** 
  (0.339) 
Constant 0.224 0.385 
 (0.164) (0.322) 
Observations 4,372 2,931 
R2 0.0004 0.074 
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.070 
Residual Std. Error 2.325 (df = 4370) 2.198 (df = 2917) 
F Statistic 1.840 (df = 1; 4370) 17.985*** (df = 13; 2917) 




 Appendix 3.7: Policy Proximity & Populism, and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Econ_scale 0.309*** 0.258***       0.162*** 0.225*** 
 (0.031) (0.044)       (0.042) (0.058) 
Social_scale   -0.364*** -0.236***     -0.349*** -0.295*** 
   (0.032) (0.045)     (0.054) (0.067) 
Immig_scale     0.181*** 0.129***   0.125*** 0.114*** 
     (0.015) (0.022)   (0.025) (0.031) 
Populism_scale       0.062 0.149** 0.333*** 0.249*** 
       (0.046) (0.059) (0.058) (0.069) 
Education  0.013*  -0.001  0.004  0.016*  0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
EU_Vote  -0.328***  -0.184**  -0.114  -0.400***  -0.087 
(1 = Leave)  (0.075)  (0.080)  (0.085)  (0.100)  (0.113) 
Gender  0.220***  0.211***  0.193***  0.199**  0.188** 
(1 = Female)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.083)  (0.088) 
ageGroup  -0.053**  -0.043*  -0.035  -0.059*  -0.028 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Ethnicity  0.188  0.249*  0.019  0.221  0.036 
(1 = Non-
White) 
 (0.126)  (0.129)  (0.128)  (0.159)  (0.169) 
Cons_ID  -0.416***  -0.518***  -0.583***  -0.543***  -0.211 
  (0.113)  (0.109)  (0.107)  (0.132)  (0.149) 
Lab_ID  -0.850***  -0.709***  -0.750***  -0.682***  -0.812*** 
  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.131)  (0.141) 
LD_ID  -0.239  -0.205  -0.203  -0.139  -0.162 
  (0.150)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.185)  (0.196) 
SNP.PC_ID  0.966***  1.115***  1.127***  1.062***  0.892*** 
  (0.154)  (0.156)  (0.157)  (0.193)  (0.206) 
UKIP_ID  -0.161  -0.011  -0.018  -0.178  -0.038 
  (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.194)  (0.206) 
Greens_ID  1.079***  1.114***  1.243***  1.237***  1.115*** 
  (0.210)  (0.216)  (0.219)  (0.280)  (0.299) 
Other_ID  0.817***  0.821***  0.904***  0.953***  1.045*** 
  (0.265)  (0.270)  (0.270)  (0.339)  (0.357) 
Constant -0.681*** -0.031 1.784*** 1.805*** -0.200*** 0.384* 0.224 0.385 -0.569* -0.400 
 (0.120) (0.263) (0.116) (0.248) (0.064) (0.219) (0.164) (0.322) (0.317) (0.471) 
Observations 6,930 4,574 6,762 4,453 6,742 4,410 4,372 2,931 3,817 2,558 
R2 0.014 0.086 0.019 0.084 0.020 0.087 0.0004 0.074 0.042 0.103 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.084 0.019 0.081 0.020 0.084 0.0002 0.070 0.041 0.097 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.320 (df = 
6928) 
2.173 (df = 
4560) 
2.322 (df = 
6760) 
2.177 (df = 
4439) 
2.329 (df = 
6740) 





2.198 (df = 
2917) 
2.269 (df = 
3812) 




= 1; 6928) 
33.169*** (df 
= 13; 4560) 
133.258*** (df 
= 1; 6760) 
31.201*** (df 
= 13; 4439) 
139.637*** (df 
= 1; 6740) 
32.292*** (df 






= 13; 2917) 
41.334*** (df 
= 4; 3812) 
18.195*** (df 
= 16; 2541) 




 Appendix 3.8: Changes in Evaluations of Labour Leaders 2015-2017, by Economic policy groups 
2015-2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Economic Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Left 0.659*** 0.577*** 
 (0.075) (0.088) 
Cen Left 0.401*** 0.392*** 
 (0.084) (0.098) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right -0.259*** -0.128 
 (0.078) (0.094) 
Rad Right -0.775*** -0.540*** 
 (0.072) (0.095) 
Education  0.013** 
  (0.006) 
EU_Vote  -0.437*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.069) 
gender  0.068 
(1 = Female)  (0.060) 
ageGroup  -0.096*** 
  (0.023) 
Ethnicity  0.200* 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.116) 
Cons_ID  -0.569*** 
  (0.103) 
Lab_ID  -0.890*** 
  (0.097) 
LD_ID  -0.043 
  (0.136) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.764*** 
  (0.141) 
UKIP_ID  -0.372*** 
  (0.138) 
Greens_ID  1.675*** 
  (0.187) 
Other_ID  0.921*** 
  (0.255) 
Constant 0.988*** 1.704*** 
 (0.049) (0.182) 
Observations 13,951 9,246 
R2 0.028 0.109 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.108 
Residual Std. Error 2.985 (df = 13946) 2.827 (df = 9229) 
F Statistic 98.826*** (df = 4; 13946) 70.657*** (df = 16; 9229) 




 Appendix 3.9: Changes in Evaluations of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Cultural policy groups 
2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Cultural Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Lib 0.944*** 0.287*** 
 (0.073) (0.094) 
Mod Lib 0.368*** 0.153* 
 (0.077) (0.093) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con -0.137* -0.091 
 (0.082) (0.097) 
Rad Con -0.315*** -0.168* 
 (0.083) (0.100) 
Education  0.002 
  (0.006) 
EU_Vote  -0.326*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.074) 
gender  0.046 
(1 = Female)  (0.061) 
ageGroup  -0.098*** 
  (0.024) 
Ethnicity  0.255** 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.119) 
Cons_ID  -0.826*** 
  (0.099) 
Lab_ID  -0.694*** 
  (0.097) 
LD_ID  -0.015 
  (0.139) 
SNP.PC_ID  2.021*** 
  (0.143) 
UKIP_ID  -0.276** 
  (0.140) 
Greens_ID  1.838*** 
  (0.192) 
Other_ID  1.065*** 
  (0.262) 
Constant 0.725*** 1.758*** 
 (0.050) (0.187) 
Observations 13,629 9,017 
R2 0.022 0.101 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.099 
Residual Std. Error 3.006 (df = 13624) 2.845 (df = 9000) 
F Statistic 75.767*** (df = 4; 13624) 63.197*** (df = 16; 9000) 




 Appendix 3.10: Changes in Evaluations of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Migration policy groups 
2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Migration Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Rad Inclusive 0.924*** 0.502*** 
 (0.082) (0.100) 
Mod Inclusive 0.374*** 0.211** 
 (0.082) (0.099) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Exclusive -0.365*** -0.229** 
 (0.085) (0.104) 
Rad Exclusive -0.519*** -0.284*** 
 (0.072) (0.094) 
Education  0.003 
  (0.006) 
EU_Vote  -0.201** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.079) 
gender  0.036 
(1 = Female)  (0.061) 
ageGroup  -0.069*** 
  (0.024) 
Ethnicity  0.139 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.119) 
Cons_ID  -0.878*** 
  (0.098) 
Lab_ID  -0.790*** 
  (0.097) 
LD_ID  -0.130 
  (0.140) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.935*** 
  (0.145) 
UKIP_ID  -0.247* 
  (0.142) 
Greens_ID  1.777*** 
  (0.194) 
Other_ID  1.047*** 
  (0.261) 
Constant 0.904*** 1.640*** 
 (0.052) (0.189) 
Observations 13,536 8,867 
R2 0.028 0.103 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.101 
Residual Std. Error 2.997 (df = 13531) 2.844 (df = 8850) 
F Statistic 98.331*** (df = 4; 13531) 63.574*** (df = 16; 8850) 




 Appendix 3.11: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by policy groups on all dimensions 
(Part 1 of 2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rad Left 0.758***   0.699*** 0.653***   0.649*** 
 (0.121)   (0.121) (0.119)   (0.120) 
Cen Left 0.593***   0.546*** 0.572***   0.564*** 
 (0.138)   (0.137) (0.133)   (0.133) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right -0.247*   -0.171 -0.165   -0.177 
 (0.131)   (0.130) (0.129)   (0.129) 
Rad Right -0.690***   -0.575*** -0.496***   -0.526*** 
 (0.118)   (0.118) (0.127)   (0.127) 
Rad Lib  1.073***  0.485***  0.567***  0.316** 
  (0.118)  (0.131)  (0.125)  (0.131) 
Mod Lib  0.397***  0.218*  0.245**  0.192 
  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.123)  (0.123) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con  -0.100  -0.084  -0.018  -0.054 
  (0.132)  (0.131)  (0.128)  (0.127) 
Rad Con  -0.155  -0.228*  -0.017  -0.145 
  (0.136)  (0.138)  (0.133)  (0.135) 
Rad Incl   0.881*** 0.419***   0.480*** 0.307** 
   (0.129) (0.138)   (0.130) (0.135) 
Mod Incl   0.263** 0.069   0.117 0.059 
   (0.133) (0.133)   (0.130) (0.130) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Excl   -0.404*** -0.283**   -0.273** -0.246* 
   (0.139) (0.138)   (0.136) (0.136) 
Rad Excl   -0.466*** -0.372***   -0.308** -0.317** 
   (0.117) (0.122)   (0.123) (0.126) 
         
Constant 0.856*** 0.600*** 0.876*** 0.776*** 1.613*** 1.601*** 1.740*** 1.508*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.130) (0.246) (0.250) (0.249) (0.263) 
Observations 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 
R2 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.056 0.113 0.103 0.105 0.121 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.054 0.111 0.101 0.102 0.117 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.968 (df = 
5159) 
2.978 (df = 
5159) 
2.977 (df = 
5159) 
2.933 (df = 
5151) 
2.844 (df = 
5147) 
2.859 (df = 
5147) 
2.857 (df = 
5147) 




= 4; 5159) 
33.121*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
34.618*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
25.326*** (df 
= 12; 5151) 
41.089*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.115*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.665*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
29.427*** (df 
= 24; 5139) 





Appendix 3.11: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by policy groups on all dimensions 
(Part 2 of 2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education     0.016** 0.0003 0.003 0.004 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
EU_Vote     -0.495*** -0.333*** -0.236** -0.185* 
(1 = Leave)     (0.092) (0.098) (0.103) (0.104) 
Gender     0.002 -0.027 -0.032 0.006 
(1 = Female)     (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
ageGroup     -0.096*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.079** 
     (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Ethnicity     0.128 0.173 0.105 0.075 
(1=NonWhite)     (0.157) (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) 
Cons_ID     -0.467*** -0.757*** -0.795*** -0.359*** 
     (0.136) (0.130) (0.129) (0.137) 
Lab_ID     -0.960*** -0.793*** -0.806*** -1.007*** 
     (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
LD_ID     0.001 -0.053 -0.062 -0.054 
     (0.184) (0.185) (0.184) (0.183) 
SNP.PC_ID     1.753*** 1.962*** 1.941*** 1.704*** 
     (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) 
UKIP_ID     -0.164 -0.114 -0.067 -0.031 
     (0.194) (0.196) (0.197) (0.195) 
Greens_ID     1.813*** 1.904*** 1.908*** 1.626*** 
     (0.257) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) 
Other_ID     1.078*** 1.226*** 1.234*** 1.000*** 
     (0.350) (0.352) (0.351) (0.350) 
Constant 0.856*** 0.600*** 0.876*** 0.776*** 1.613*** 1.601*** 1.740*** 1.508*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.130) (0.246) (0.250) (0.249) (0.263) 
Observations 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 
R2 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.056 0.113 0.103 0.105 0.121 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.054 0.111 0.101 0.102 0.117 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.968 (df = 
5159) 
2.978 (df = 
5159) 
2.977 (df = 
5159) 
2.933 (df = 
5151) 
2.844 (df = 
5147) 
2.859 (df = 
5147) 
2.857 (df = 
5147) 




= 4; 5159) 
33.121*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
34.618*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
25.326*** (df 
= 12; 5151) 
41.089*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.115*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.665*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
29.427*** (df 
= 24; 5139) 




 Appendix 3.12: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Populism groups 
2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) 
Radical Populists 0.030 0.076 
 (0.111) (0.131) 
Moderate Populists -0.006 0.028 
 (0.109) (0.126) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) 
Moderate Non-Populists -0.132 -0.317*** 
 (0.096) (0.112) 
Radical Non-Populists -0.296*** -0.728*** 
 (0.104) (0.122) 
Education  0.021*** 
  (0.008) 
EU_Vote  -0.670*** 
(1 = Leave)  (0.092) 
gender  -0.029 
(1 = Female)  (0.076) 
ageGroup  -0.118*** 
  (0.030) 
Ethnicity  0.154 
(1 = Non-White)  (0.146) 
Cons_ID  -0.874*** 
  (0.120) 
Lab_ID  -0.786*** 
  (0.119) 
LD_ID  0.075 
  (0.170) 
SNP.PC_ID  1.905*** 
  (0.175) 
UKIP_ID  -0.296 
  (0.182) 
Greens_ID  1.910*** 
  (0.242) 
Other_ID  1.165*** 
  (0.329) 
Constant 1.027*** 2.154*** 
 (0.074) (0.236) 
Observations 8,759 5,906 
R2 0.002 0.106 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.104 
Residual Std. Error 3.054 (df = 8754) 2.858 (df = 5889) 
F Statistic 3.295** (df = 4; 8754) 43.822*** (df = 16; 5889) 





 Appendix 3.13: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Policy and Populism groups. (Part 1 of 2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Rad Left 0.758***    0.613*** 0.653***    0.579*** 
 (0.121)    (0.122) (0.119)    (0.121) 
Cen Left 0.593***    0.500*** 0.572***    0.526*** 
 (0.138)    (0.136) (0.133)    (0.133) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Cen Right -0.247*    -0.119 -0.165    -0.129 
 (0.131)    (0.130) (0.129)    (0.129) 
Rad Right -0.690***    -0.429*** -0.496***    -0.399*** 
 (0.118)    (0.119) (0.127)    (0.127) 
Rad Lib  1.073***   0.834***  0.567***   0.605*** 
  (0.118)   (0.136)  (0.125)   (0.135) 
Mod Lib  0.397***   0.362***  0.245**   0.305** 
  (0.126)   (0.126)  (0.123)   (0.123) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Con  -0.100   -0.124  -0.018   -0.071 
  (0.132)   (0.130)  (0.128)   (0.127) 
Rad Con  -0.155   -0.297**  -0.017   -0.181 
  (0.136)   (0.139)  (0.133)   (0.136) 
Rad Incl   0.881***  0.526***   0.480***  0.377*** 
   (0.129)  (0.137)   (0.130)  (0.134) 
Mod Incl   0.263**  0.149   0.117  0.106 
   (0.133)  (0.133)   (0.130)  (0.129) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
Mod Excl   -0.404***  -0.387***   -0.273**  -0.306** 
   (0.139)  (0.138)   (0.136)  (0.135) 
Rad Excl   -0.466***  -0.517***   -0.308**  -0.370*** 
   (0.117)  (0.123)   (0.123)  (0.125) 
Rad Pop    -0.085 0.028    0.049 0.002 
    (0.142) (0.145)    (0.139) (0.141) 
Mod Pop    -0.002 0.079    0.062 0.062 
    (0.141) (0.137)    (0.134) (0.133) 
Centrist (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) (baseline) 
ModNonPop    -0.197 -0.437***    -0.372*** -0.444*** 
    (0.126) (0.124)    (0.120) (0.120) 
RadNon-Pop    -0.324** -1.040***    -0.739*** -0.991*** 
    (0.130) (0.136)    (0.130) (0.134) 
           
Constant 0.856*** 0.600*** 0.876*** 1.037*** 1.014*** 1.613*** 1.601*** 1.740*** 2.016*** 1.701*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.095) (0.150) (0.246) (0.250) (0.249) (0.254) (0.273) 
Observations 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 
R2 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.002 0.070 0.113 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.133 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.001 0.067 0.111 0.101 0.102 0.105 0.128 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.968 (df = 
5159) 
2.978 (df = 
5159) 




2.912 (df = 
5147) 
2.844 (df = 
5147) 
2.859 (df = 
5147) 
2.857 (df = 
5147) 
2.853 (df = 
5147) 
2.816 (df = 5135) 
F Statistic 
42.321*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
33.121*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
34.618*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
2.243* (df 
= 4; 5159) 
24.232*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
41.089*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.115*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.665*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
38.713*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
28.094*** (df = 
28; 5135) 








Appendix 3.13: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Policy and Populism groups. (Part 2 of 2) 
Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups 
 Dependent variable: 
 Evaluation Change by Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Education      0.016** 0.0003 0.003 0.021** 0.011 
      (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
EU_Vote      -0.495*** -0.333*** -0.236** -0.710*** -0.350*** 
(1 = Leave)      (0.092) (0.098) (0.103) (0.098) (0.105) 
Gender      0.002 -0.027 -0.032 -0.044 -0.019 
(1 = Female)      (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) 
ageGroup      -0.096*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.099*** -0.077** 
      (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Ethnicity      0.128 0.173 0.105 0.150 0.040 
(1=NonWhite)      (0.157) (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.156) 
Cons_ID      -0.467*** -0.757*** -0.795*** -0.802*** -0.314** 
      (0.136) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.137) 
Lab_ID      -0.960*** -0.793*** -0.806*** -0.744*** -0.967*** 
      (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) 
LD_ID      0.001 -0.053 -0.062 0.041 0.010 
      (0.184) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.182) 
SNP.PC_ID      1.753*** 1.962*** 1.941*** 1.935*** 1.660*** 
      (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) 
UKIP_ID      -0.164 -0.114 -0.067 -0.235 -0.069 
      (0.194) (0.196) (0.197) (0.196) (0.195) 
Greens_ID      1.813*** 1.904*** 1.908*** 2.063*** 1.581*** 
      (0.257) (0.259) (0.258) (0.256) (0.257) 
Other_ID      1.078*** 1.226*** 1.234*** 1.242*** 0.920*** 
      (0.350) (0.352) (0.351) (0.351) (0.348) 
Constant 0.856*** 0.600*** 0.876*** 1.037*** 1.014*** 1.613*** 1.601*** 1.740*** 2.016*** 1.701*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.095) (0.150) (0.246) (0.250) (0.249) (0.254) (0.273) 
Observations 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 
R2 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.002 0.070 0.113 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.133 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.001 0.067 0.111 0.101 0.102 0.105 0.128 
Resid. Std. 
Error 
2.968 (df = 
5159) 
2.978 (df = 
5159) 




2.912 (df = 
5147) 
2.844 (df = 
5147) 
2.859 (df = 
5147) 
2.857 (df = 
5147) 






= 4; 5159) 
33.121*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
34.618*** (df 
= 4; 5159) 
2.243* (df 
= 4; 5159) 
24.232*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
41.089*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.115*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
37.665*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
38.713*** (df 
= 16; 5147) 
28.094***(df=
28;5135) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
